A view from Poland on Russia's hybrid attacks and big war in Europe
Jacek Severa, who headed Poland’s Bureau of National Security from October 2022 until the beginning of 2025, was directly involved in preparing Polish assistance to Ukraine.
Answering questions from European Pravda, he expressed the view that Ukraine had a chance to defeat Russia back in 2022.
He also spoke about the West’s reaction to the war and support for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the first months of the conflict, assessments of the likelihood of a Russian attack on EU countries and Poland’s readiness for such a scenario.
Read all of Jacek Severa’s explanations in the article From a swift victory for Ukraine to an attack on the EU: how Poland sees the Kremlin’s change of plans.
Our experts, based on data shared by the United States, quite accurately predicted both the fact of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 and the method of its execution.
We knew that in the West there were forecasts that Kyiv would fall within three days. Unfortunately, memories of 2014 were still alive there, when a significant part of the invasion took place without shots being fired.
The West did not realise how much progress and transformation the Ukrainian army had undergone and the important role that identity, national idea and the Ukrainian people’s desire for freedom since 2014 played in that process.
Here one must note the role of General Zaluzhnyi, his strategy was extraordinary and inspired admiration in Ukraine. I would also note the extremely bold actions of General Budanov, which often shocked the West by the scale of Ukrainian capabilities.
Russia would have suffered a decisive defeat in 2022. Unfortunately, that window of opportunity was lost due to the slowness of European NATO allies.
From the start of the war we felt very significant efforts by the Russian Federation aimed at destabilising Polish society, including through information-war tools and the information space.
Russian efforts were aimed at fomenting tension and provocations, especially during election periods and at stoking anti-Ukrainian sentiment.
In particular, during the blocking of the Polish-Ukrainian border, Russia was undoubtedly present in the public sphere and tried to inflame the atmosphere, driving a wedge between Poles and Ukrainians.
Fortunately, Polish services found ways to make it impossible to amplify those narratives.
On 4 December 2023, I was one of the first administration officials in Europe to risk saying that the countries of the eastern flank should think about a conflict with the Russian Federation over the next three years.
Of course, today Russia does not have the capability to open a new front by conventional means. Such actions would mean military defeat for it.
The possibility of a ground invasion of the Russian Federation through the Brest gap is now unlikely, that would require armored forces in numbers that Russia does not presently possess.
A different matter is hybrid provocations on the Suwałki Gap, attacks using drones, or even artillery (mortar) fire from Belarusian territory. Those are scenarios that cannot be ruled out.
There is also a risk of Russian airstrikes on NATO territory, including strikes on strategic targets, or acts of aggression carried out by aircraft. All of this is not only possible but seems a very real direction for escalation.
The only way to avoid it is to create adequate defensive capabilities on the part of the eastern flank countries of NATO and of the whole European Union. After all, war in a modern technological world will not concern only a front line.
The value that Ukraine will contribute through its intellectual property to NATO’s combat capabilities is one of the most important tools it can use on the path to the Alliance.