How the G7 decided to increase support for Ukraine and why Trump didn’t object
France had spent months preparing the G7 around global economic imbalances, critical minerals, artificial intelligence and the gathering conflict around the Strait of Hormuz.
Ukraine was never certain to dominate an agenda crowded by Iran, China and a fraying global economy. Yet by the end of the summit, the seven leaders had adopted a dedicated declaration on Ukraine. It promised more air defence, more interceptors, long-range capabilities, support for Ukraine’s energy system and stronger sanctions on Russia’s oil and gas sectors.
The fact that the United States signed it was the point. Emmanuel Macron emerged declaring a "re-synchronisation" of the G7 on Ukraine and a "very deep change" in the American approach to the war.
Read more in the article by French journalist Charlotte Guillou-Clerc: "I'm the boss": What Ukraine gained at the G7 summit and how Trump changed his stance.
The G7 declaration contains more than ceremonial language. It says the group will increase deliveries of air-defence capacities, additional systems and interceptors, as well as long-range capabilities. It says members are ready to consider granting licences that would allow Ukraine to expand its military production.
It promises further support for Ukrainian energy resilience ahead of next winter and stronger pressure on the Russian war economy.
Those commitments gather several strands of the war into one political offer.
Macron’s argument was that the G7 had finally accepted a reality that Kyiv has been repeating for months: Russia is not negotiating seriously because it believes time still favours it.
Trump, according to the French president, now shares that judgement.
The change should not be exaggerated.
Trump’s position has moved before. It can move again.
But diplomacy often begins with narrower gains.
France did not obtain an American conversion to European strategic thinking. It obtained something more immediate: a US signature under a text that treat Russia as the problem, Ukraine as a partner worth arming, and pressure on Moscow as unfinished business.
That is a considerable improvement on the atmosphere of the previous G7 summit.
It also reveals how low the bar has fallen. European leaders now count it as a strategic success when the American president stays in the room, endorses a collective line and does not leave them to explain the consequences alone.
The French achievement at Évian was therefore not autonomy. It was time.
Time for Europe to increase military production. Time to build a more credible air-defence architecture. Time to turn Ukrainian and European defence industries into partners rather than occasional contractors. Time to reduce the risk that a political mood swing in Washington leaves a hole in Ukraine’s defence.
Ukraine, meanwhile, is not only the recipient of European security policy. It is becoming one of its architects.
Ukrainian forces have adapted faster than most European militaries to drones, electronic warfare,, dispersed production, civilian resilience and the industrial demands of a high-intensity war. European armies are studying those lessons because they have little choice.
The war has already made Ukraine central to Europe’s future security order.
France succeeded in keeping the United States tied to the coalition. The harder task is making Ukraine’s security less dependent on that tie.