What really strained Ukraine-Poland relations and why it's about more than the UPA and Volyn
Eastern Europe is entering a new phase in which the old roles of states no longer work, while new ones have yet to take shape. That is why the current tensions between Poland and Ukraine appear unusually emotional, uneasy and disproportionate.
Before 2022, Poland served as Ukraine's gateway to the West and its principal advocate within the European Union and NATO.
Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, however, Ukraine has gained direct access to Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, Brussels, the Nordic capitals and later to new partners in the Middle East. As a result, Poland is no longer perceived as an indispensable intermediary.
Moreover, Ukraine is no longer a country that only asks for assistance.
Read more about the deeper causes of the current crisis in Polish-Ukrainian relations in the article by Taras Myshliaiev of the International Diplomatic Alliance: Offensively independent" Ukraine: The hidden cause of the dispute between Warsaw and Kyiv.
Against the backdrop of the full-scale war, Ukraine has become a major military power. It possesses Europe's most extensive recent combat experience, has developed its own drone industry, and has successfully carried out strikes against Russian industrial targets. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has even been able to issue ultimatums to Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko over military communications infrastructure and achieve his objectives.
All of this has produced a new Ukrainian mindset: Ukraine now believes in itself.
The Ukrainian state has developed a stronger sense of its own agency. Ukrainians increasingly tell Poles: "We are fighting, we are dying, we are holding back Russia, and you do not get to tell us how to build our own national pantheon."
What Ukraine sees as a natural expression of sovereignty, however, is often perceived in Poland as an affront. According to the author, this is where the real source of the current crisis lies.
Poland also bears responsibility for the latest deterioration in bilateral relations.
The Polish president, for domestic political reasons, escalated tensions with Ukraine by revoking the Order of the White Eagle.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Donald Tusk's government has, over nearly three years, failed to develop a strategic framework capable of moving Polish-Ukrainian relations beyond a cycle of reactive disputes.
Poland's own deep political divisions also play a role. The country seeks to be a regional leader, yet its ambitions are constrained by intense domestic conflict between the government and the opposition.
At the same time, Ukraine risks falling into a trap if it chooses a path that sidelines Poland, because geography continues to work in Poland's favour.
Poland remains Ukraine's principal land corridor to the West. It is the key country on NATO's eastern flank and will continue to handle a substantial share of Ukraine's logistics, trade, migration, humanitarian ties and political communication with Europe.
Geography also provides Poland with significant leverage. Trade, transport, economic policy, issues affecting the Ukrainian diaspora, the legal status of Ukrainians living in Poland and access to the labour market can all become bargaining chips or instruments of pressure.
Ukraine may no longer need Poland as an older brother.
But it still needs Poland to remain a reliable partner.
The reverse is equally true.
Poland may resent Ukraine's growing independence, demand historical gestures, or continue to emphasise disputes over Volhynia [the Volhynia tragedy of 1943], the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) and historical memory.
Yet it cannot escape the reality that its own security today depends to a considerable extent on the Ukrainian armed forces.
Ukraine remains economically weaker, more corrupt, poorer and dependent on external financial assistance. But militarily and psychologically, it has matured.
That has created a conflict over status. The greatest irony, the author concludes, is that Poland and Ukraine are quarreling precisely at the moment when their mutual dependence has reached its highest level.
The history of Eastern Europe has repeatedly punished those who confuse emotion with strategy. Today, Poland and Ukraine are coming dangerously close to making exactly that mistake.