Trump’s deal with Belarus’s dictator: what lies behind the release of political prisoners?

On Saturday 13 December, it became known that the self-proclaimed president of Belarus had released 123 political prisoners. This is the third release of hostages by the Lukashenko regime to have been brokered by the Trump administration. It’s also the largest and the most high-profile release.

But the concessions made by Washington appear to be far more serious.

The United States has announced that it will lift sanctions on Belarusian potash. Potash exports are one of the main sources of revenue for the Belarusian state budget.

It was in response to this that Lukashenko agreed to release his "top" prisoners: Nobel Prize winner Ales Bialiatski, former banker Viktar Babaryka, who was considered Lukashenko’s main opponent in the 2020 presidential election, and Babaryka’s associate Maria Kalesnikava.

This is unquestionably a triumph for American diplomacy. But there are still many questions to be answered. Will Trump go ahead with further swaps, as previously announced, or will he lose interest in the Belarusian issue?

And how do these scenarios depend on the progress of peace talks between Ukraine and Russia?

Two deportation routes

This deal was entirely expected as soon as it was announced that Donald Trump’s special envoy John Coale would be visiting Minsk.

A month earlier, on 4 November, the US Treasury Department had announced that it was lifting sanctions against Belarus’s national airline and permitting operations related to Lukashenko’s own aircraft.

Even back then, these steps looked like preparation for another, likely much larger, exchange.

That’s exactly what happened. In Minsk, John Coale confirmed the lifting of sanctions on Belarusian potash, a move that is hugely significant for Belarus.

But the process by which the political prisoners were released was not entirely without surprises.

In the past, all released prisoners have been deported to Lithuania, but this time things were done differently. The majority of the political prisoners, including Viktar Babaryka and Maria Kalesnikava, were deported to Ukraine. It was later reported that this decision was made personally by Lukashenko in the last few hours before the deportation.

It was a strange move, to say the least. After all, Ukraine is at war, and deportations are not usually carried out to countries engaged in active hostilities.

Presumably Lukashenko took the decision on impulse.

Relations between Belarus and Lithuania are currently in a phase of escalation. Minsk has detained Lithuanian lorry drivers and has also been attacking Lithuania with weather balloons, disrupting airport operations. In response, Vilnius has threatened to confiscate all Belarusian assets.

Given the situation, Lukashenko may have been reluctant to make even a symbolic gift to Lithuania. And since Minsk also has difficult relations with other neighbouring EU countries, the idea of Ukraine came about.

A small number of prisoners were, however, deported to Lithuania, including human rights activist and 2022 Nobel Peace Prize winner Ales Bialiatski.

This is rather telling, since of all Lukashenko’s prisoners, Bialiatski was the only one of personal interest to Trump.

The release of a Nobel laureate is meant to increase the chances of the US president himself receiving the Nobel Peace Prize.

So it is not impossible that this is why the US, while prepared to accept Lukashenko’s stunt of changing the deportation route for most of the prisoners, was uncompromising when it came to Bialiatski.

What does Lukashenko have left to offer?

Despite three waves of releases, there are still around a thousand political prisoners in Belarus.

Trump’s special envoy John Coale has suggested they could be released within a month, quite possibly all at once. "I think it's more than possible that we can do that, I think it's probable... We are on the right track, the momentum is there," he said.

The US representative also predicted that Lukashenko may abandon the practice of launching weather balloons toward Lithuania, as he is "sincerely trying to calm it down" when it comes to relations with his neighbours.

In return for the release of all the political prisoners, Coale said, most of the sanctions against Belarus could be removed. Coale called this "a fair trade".

Is this a realistic scenario?

On the one hand, the previous swaps have shown that nothing is impossible. Lukashenko agreed to release people whom he considers his personal enemies.

On the other hand, Lukashenko has run out of political prisoners who might be of interest to Trump. Many journalists and trade union activists are still held in Belarusian prisons, but their release would bring little benefit to the US president.

Essentially, the only high-profile figure left is Andrzej Poczobut, a journalist of Polish origin and activist on behalf of the Polish minority in Belarus. However, his release is a priority for Warsaw. It is with Poland that Lukashenko is bargaining over the terms of Poczobut’s release.

In addition, it is believed that Lukashenko could also be useful to the United States in exerting pressure on Putin. John Coale has said that he discussed the Russo-Ukrainian war with Lukashenko, and Lukashenko’s advice and close contact with the Russian ruler could prove useful.

Another possible option is influence over Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro, with whom the Belarusian dictator has good relations.

However, in both cases, it would clearly be unwise to seriously count on Lukashenko’s assistance being effective.

What does the US have to offer?

A clear pattern can be seen in the history of Lukashenko’s rule: in the 2000s, the regime escalated tensions and was sanctioned by the West. But in the middle of the decade, there was a "thaw": Minsk released some hostages, and the West eased sanctions.

Following this logic, the current developments appear entirely predictable. However, there is one significant difference. Europe is not participating in the current "thaw".

The United States does not have a lot to offer Lukashenko.

The EU sanctions are far more significant for the Belarusian economy than the American ones.

It’s thought that unless the European Union lifts sanctions on Belarusian potash, the positive effect for Belarus from the United States’ removal of similar sanctions will be very limited.

The main obstacle preventing Lukashenko from fully benefiting from the lifting of the potash sanctions is the lack of maritime logistics. The removal of the sanctions could have a tangible impact were Lithuania to agree to unblock the transit of Belarusian fertilisers to Klaipėda. This would enable Lukashenko to significantly increase exports. But Vilnius has been clear that it will make no concessions to the Belarusian regime.

And Lukashenko has no other star hostages left who could be of interest to Trump and be used to put pressure on Lithuania.

It appears that further exchanges between the United States and Belarus will depend on the progress of peace talks between Ukraine and Russia. If these talks move forward, the United States will have an interest in improving relations with Belarus as one element of soft pressure on Putin.

Lukashenko, for his part, is interested in reaching an agreement with the United States before the Russo-Ukrainian war is frozen. After that, offers to release political prisoners will no longer be as generous as they are now.

But if Trump’s next peace initiative fails, this will have a direct impact on the dialogue with Lukashenko as well.

Yurii Panchenko

Editor, European Pravda