Neither fast nor endless: how EU should rethink Ukraine's accession process

Enlargement, reconstruction and industrial integration can no longer run on separate tracks. Europe needs a coordinated mechanism capable of linking Ukraine’s reconstruction with gradual integration into the EU.

For years, the European Union treated enlargement as a slow, technocratic and largely predictable process. Candidate countries adapted to EU rules step by step, while the Union itself remained geopolitically stable.

Ukraine has changed that reality.

Today, enlargement is unfolding under conditions of war, reconstruction, geopolitical rivalry and economic realignment. And the EU still lacks the institutional tools to manage these processes together.

Recent tensions between Kyiv and Brussels are often portrayed as a dispute about pace. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government is accused of pushing too aggressively for accession, while some EU governments insist that enlargement must remain slow and strictly merit-based.

But this framing misses the real issue.

The problem is not Ukrainian impatience.

It is that the traditional enlargement model was never designed for a situation in which security, reconstruction and economic integration all have to proceed simultaneously.

Ukraine understands this very clearly.

For Kyiv, accession is not simply a long-term political aspiration. It is part of a broader strategy of survival and anchoring.

With the war continuing and future American support uncertain, Ukraine needs deeper integration with Europe now – economically, institutionally and strategically.

And Ukraine is right to think in these terms.

Both swift accession and delays are dangerous

The EU often behaves as if delay were neutral. But in Ukraine’s case, delay carries major costs.

The reconstruction of the Ukrainian economy is already underway. Decisions about infrastructure, energy systems, industrial supply chains and defense production are being made now. Whether these structures become integrated into European markets and regulatory systems – or instead evolve around alternative geopolitical and economic centers – will shape not only Ukraine’s future, but Europe’s as well.

Prolonged uncertainty also creates political risks inside Ukraine itself. Earlier enlargement rounds in the Western Balkans demonstrated that when accession remains permanently open-ended, geopolitical orientation can again become politically contested.

At the same time, Brussels is not wrong to worry about internal political backlash.

Ukraine’s future accession will affect agricultural markets, cohesion funding, industrial competition and budget politics inside the EU. In several member states, governments fear that rapid integration could generate domestic disruption and strengthen anti-EU forces.

This is the core deadlock.

Delay weakens the strategic value of enlargement. But rapid integration without safeguards risks undermining political support for enlargement inside the Union.

The issue, therefore, is not whether enlargement should move faster or slower. It is whether Europe can build institutions capable of managing integration under conditions of uncertainty.

Right now, the EU’s policy architecture remains fragmented. Accession negotiations, reconstruction financing, industrial policy and sectoral integration largely operate separately despite overlapping in practice.

As a result, Europe lacks a coherent strategy for shaping Ukraine’s gradual integration before full membership.

The EU should therefore create a coordinated framework linking enlargement policy, reconstruction instruments, sectoral integration and EU-level industrial policy into a single strategic process.

That is the missing tool.

Mechanisms for gradual integration needed

Importantly, ideas in this direction are already emerging from Ukrainian policy debates themselves. Economists Tymofiy Mylovanov and Gérard Roland have proposed establishing a Ukraine Reconstruction and European Integration Agency (UREIA) – inspired partly by the Marshall Plan’s Economic Cooperation Administration – that would coordinate reconstruction with preparation for EU accession.

The broader point is not institutional design for its own sake. It is that reconstruction, enlargement and economic integration can no longer be treated as separate processes.

This would not even be unprecedented for the EU.

European institutions have repeatedly created coordinating mechanisms when different policy goals had to be reconciled under crisis conditions. The creation of DG Reform after the euro crisis, for example, reflected the recognition that short-term stabilisation and long-term development goals could not be managed separately.

Ukraine now requires a similar approach: one capable of combining the merit-based logic of accession with Europe’s geopolitical, industrial and security interests.

Such integration should remain gradual, conditional and reversible where necessary. But it should also become operational.

Ukraine should progressively enter selected areas of the European economic and regulatory space before formal accession – especially in defense production, energy systems, transport infrastructure and industrial supply chains.

At the same time, the EU must address the adjustment costs facing existing member states. Sectors and regions likely to experience competitive pressures should receive targeted transitional support. Without such safeguards, domestic resistance to enlargement will continue growing regardless of the geopolitical arguments.

This is not about bypassing accession rules or granting Ukraine shortcuts.

It is about recognising that the old enlargement model no longer corresponds to Europe’s strategic environment.

The irony is that the EU already possesses most of the necessary instruments: association agreements, reconstruction facilities, accession negotiations, sectoral integration mechanisms and increasingly ambitious industrial policy tools. What it lacks is a framework capable of coordinating them.

Without such a shift, enlargement risks falling into a familiar pattern: strong rhetorical commitments combined with practical delay.

And that vacuum will not remain empty.

If Europe cannot create a credible pathway for gradual integration, uncertainty will continue to grow – economically, politically and geopolitically.

The stakes therefore extend well beyond Ukraine alone.

The question is whether the EU can adapt its own institutions to a world in which enlargement has once again become a strategic instrument rather than simply a technocratic process.

Ukraine is not misunderstanding enlargement.

It is revealing why Europe now needs a different kind of enlargement policy.

Laszlo Bruszt,

CEU Democracy Institute for European Pravda