What Security Commitments Can Ukraine Receive from US and Its Allies?

Wednesday, 9 August 2023

Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) countries made a joint declaration at the NATO summit in Vilnius regarding future security commitments for Ukraine.

The declaration is open to Ukrainian partners outside the G7. 12 additional countries have agreed to join the initiative.

However, the negotiation of the commitments themselves is still ahead. Talks with the US began on August 3.

There are risks that security commitments might remain only as political agreements. That's a concern. Additionally, the Ukrainian framework declaration differs from similar security relations the US has with Israel and Taiwan. This is highlighted in an article by international lawyer Mikhailo Soldatenko: Israeli Model with Ukrainian Twist: What US Security 'Guarantees' Could Look Like.

Ukraine has been requesting its partners for long-term and legally binding security guarantees since last year. In September, Ukrainian proposals were outlined in a document "Kyiv Security Compact."

The G7 declaration represents the first step towards meeting Ukrainian expectations.

The security commitments mentioned in the G7 declaration differ from the provisions of mutual defence agreements, which might involve assistance up to using allied armed forces (the most well-known Article 5 of the NATO Washington Treaty).

Instead, the G7 declaration envisions that Ukraine and its security partners will agree on "specific bilateral long-term commitments and arrangements" aimed at helping Kyiv strengthen its self-defence capabilities for years to come. Potential commitments could include providing advanced weaponry, developing the Ukrainian defence industry, cyber support, intelligence sharing, and economic assistance to bolster "Ukrainian economic stability and resilience, including through reconstruction and recovery efforts."

However, this doesn't fully match what Ukraine requested in the "Kyiv Security Compact."

The G7 declaration is full of general phrases to "promptly" initiate negotiations. The results of these negotiations with each country are unclear. Furthermore, the declaration wasn't signed and remained at the level of a political statement by the G7 leaders. This leaves open the possibility that some leaders might wish to limit the number and strength of promises at this stage.

Moreover, the document doesn't even use the word "guarantees," which Ukraine continues using.

Previously, the idea has been raised that the security cooperation between the US and Israel could serve as an example for agreements with Ukraine.

In Israel's case, the US declares an unwavering commitment to maintaining Israel's so-called qualitative military superiority over its neighbouring armies, implying "technological and tactical superiority to deter and, if necessary, defeat numerically superior adversaries." To achieve this, Israel relies on "better equipment and training to compensate for its smaller territory and population compared to most potential adversaries."

However, it's crucial to understand that Israel's security environment differs from Ukraine's. Israel's potential adversaries do not possess nuclear weapons, unlike Russia.

As for Taiwan, the goal is to meet Taipei's self-defence needs without requiring a commitment to achieve qualitative military superiority over China, which possesses nuclear weapons. However, for Taiwan, a significant restraining factor against China has been the policy of "strategic ambiguity" regarding the involvement of US forces in Taiwan's defence. The US President has recently directly spoken about the possibility of defending the island. There have been no similar statements about Ukraine.

Consistently, Ukraine insists on formalising the necessary security commitments in the form of a treaty, legally binding under international law.

The first option is the ratification of Ukraine's future security agreements in partner countries parliaments, which would make them part of the internal legislation of those partner states.

The second, less preferable option involving parliamentary participation could be an agreement similar to the US-Israel memorandum, codifying in separate legislation the approach to supporting Ukraine, as the US Congress did for Israel and Taiwan.

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