How Sandu defeated Putin and what this victory could mean

Much has been said about how Moldova’s elections would determine the future not only of that country but beyond and not without reason. For Kyiv, the 28 September vote carried special weight, as Moldova’s elections also shaped Ukraine’s European future.

Keeping a pro-European government in Moldova was one of the conditions for Ukraine’s success in EU integration. That condition has been fulfilled.

Read more about the role of Russia’s "Șor network" and what allowed Moldova’s president to achieve this historic victory  in the analysis by Sergiy Sydorenko, European Pravda's editor: Sandu’s triumph, Kremlin’s failure. How Moldova stayed on the EU path and the challenges this creates.

In Moldova’s parliamentary elections, the winner was the one who frightened their voters more, compelling them to show up at polling stations.

This was the essence of the campaign by President Maia Sandu’s party, Action and Solidarity (PAS). Their slogan was: "There will be no second round." In other words, if you don’t vote now, the historic chance will be lost.

But rallying their own supporters was not the only factor behind PAS’s sensational victory. The second factor was a tough stance toward "the others."

Overall, it must be admitted: these elections were far from the ideal democratic picture.

The pro-European authorities crossed many red lines in their struggle against Kremlin-aligned forces.

For instance, not everyone was even allowed to compete.

Now, all the disqualified parties can complain to the European Court of Human Rights, and some may even win symbolic compensation (this already happened after the 2014 elections, since banning parties is not new in Moldova). But the voting itself cannot be reversed.

Another telling story was how voting for residents of Transnistria was restricted.

Two days before the elections, the CEC moved key polling stations tens of kilometers away from their usual locations, making them inaccessible for most voters. At the remaining stations, it suddenly became difficult to enter on election day, because police allegedly received reports of mined bridges across the Dniester.

Overall, all pro-Russian regions saw a slight drop in turnout. Most likely, it was not genuine voters staying home, but participants in the exposed "Șor network," who only voted for money.

None of these restrictions drew criticism from the West.

The EU’s tolerance for such violations has its explanation.

First, last year’s presidential elections left no doubt that Moldova is under a hybrid attack from Russia. And trying to play chess when your opponent is playing Chapayev – that is, following every rule when the stronger side ignores all restrictions – is not always a winning strategy.

Second, wartime means the stakes are far too high. If the Kremlin had won in Moldova, the consequences for Ukraine (its future and even for the front line) could have been so severe that ordinary rules seemed less important.

Yet now the EU faces a new challenge.

In Moldova’s next elections, and later when Ukraine resumes its electoral process, the EU may need to re-establish the red lines erased in 2025. Because there will always be those eager to ignore the rules, even when it is no longer about fighting Russia.

Another sensation of Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections was the strong showing of Democrația Acasă (DA). It presents itself as a unionist party: that is, advocating the abolition of Moldova’s independence and unification with Romania.

Pro-Romanian citizens are the group of Moldovans who generally treat Ukraine most favourably, understand Russia’s role, and assess the war soberly. However, their leader Vasile Costiuc is an anti-Ukrainian politician most likely linked to the FSB.