How Berlin and Paris are helping Rosatom enter EU and why it is dangerous
The fifth year of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine is underway.
At a time, the European Union has declared its commitment to gradually phasing out cooperation with the aggressor state and reducing its dependence on Russian energy resources under the REPowerEU plan. However, decisions taken at the national and regional levels in Germany contradict this strategic course.
Read more about how the EU is opening a "back door" for Rosatom in the article by Diana Sushkova of DiXi Group: A green light for Russian nuclear power? How Germany is repeating its Nord Stream 2 mistake.
A paradoxical situation has emerged. On the one hand, non-nuclear Germany officially supports Ukraine and the European strategy of reducing dependence on Russian energy resources. On the other hand, it has authorised a project that will facilitate the expansion of Russia's nuclear business within the European Union.
On 22 July 2026, the Lower Saxony Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Climate Protection, acting on behalf of the German federal government, approved an application submitted by Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF), a subsidiary of the French company Framatome, for a licence to manufacture nuclear fuel assemblies for Soviet-designed VVER reactors at its facility in Lingen.
The fuel will be produced using Russian technology and know-how under a licensing agreement with TVEL, a subsidiary of Rosatom.
Framatome aims to become a European alternative supplier of VVER fuel assemblies. However, instead of relying on Western partners, the company has chosen to cooperate with Russia's state-owned nuclear corporation.
Fuel assemblies manufactured in Lingen for European VVER reactors will carry a "Made in the EU" label, yet they will be produced using Russian technology and manufacturing know-how, which remain under Russian control.
This hardly represents genuine diversification away from Russia; rather, it amounts to a transformation of the existing dependency into a different form.
How did this become possible? The primary reason is the lack of sufficient legal grounds to reject the project.
Although Lower Saxony's Environment Minister Christian Meyer, a member of the Green Party, openly stated that he opposed the project, he acknowledged that German law provided no formal legal basis to block it.
The decision inevitably invites comparisons with the infamous Nord Stream 2 project.
Nord Stream 2 clearly demonstrated the consequences of ignoring broader geopolitical and security considerations in relations with Russia. A project justified on economic grounds ultimately increased Europe's strategic vulnerability and became politically unacceptable only after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The expansion of the ANF facility in Lingen risks repeating the same strategic mistake.
It envisages integrating Rosatom's equipment, technologies, and know-how into European nuclear fuel production precisely at a time when the European Union seeks to reduce its dependence on Russia.
This case demonstrates that the current European legal framework is no longer fit for today's security challenges. Formal compliance with existing legislation is insufficient to prevent decisions that deepen the EU's dependence on Russia.