Was Kosovo's capital mayor right to remove the Ukrainian flag over Zelenskyy’s remarks?
The huge "Free Ukraine" banner on the wall of the Grand Hotel in central Pristina was the most visible sign of the sincere, open and unconditional support and sympathy that Kosovo's Albanian majority has expressed for Ukraine.
After all, for Kosovars, the war launched by Russia is reminiscent of what they experienced at the hands of Serbia in the late 1990s – a country that has still not repented and continues to seek revenge.
The demonstrative removal of the banner by Pristina’s ambitious opposition mayor, Përparim Rama, looks like a populist, impulsive and parochial condemnation of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s remarks in Belgrade – after all, the Ukrainian president repeated Ukraine’s longstanding position of not recognising Kosovo’s independence.
Read more about why Kosovars were offended by the Ukrainian president, why Zelenskyy travelled to meet his Serbian counterpart and what consequences this could have for the region in the article by Alex Anderson, former director of the International Crisis Group’s Kosovo programme: Kosovo looks like Ukraine: why Zelenskyy’s statement in Serbia outraged people and what Russia has to do with it.
The Kosovars’ disgust at President Volodymyr Zelenskyy embracing Serbian leader Aleksandar Vučić – an accomplice of Milošević’s genocidal campaign of 1998-1999 – and at his apparent rejection of Kosovo’s independence prevents them from understanding the pragmatic, even if sometimes ugly, calculations (and occasionally miscalculations) of a nation fighting for its survival.
In fact, Kosovo has compelling arguments for Ukraine to finally recognise its independence, as well as striking elements of shared experience. Yet Kosovo has still failed to overcome its own provincialism sufficiently for those arguments to be heard.
Especially against the backdrop of Putin’s persistent comparisons between Kosovo and Crimea and Donbas.
At the same time, over the past four years, Kosovo has sought to turn its natural sympathy for Ukrainians into assistance within the limits of its modest capabilities: joining all sanctions, launching a government program to provide shelter to Ukrainian journalists, participating in the British "Operation Interflex" programme to train thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and sending several small batches of military aid through the United Kingdom. It has also hosted hundreds of Ukrainian service members at an international mine-clearance training center near the city of Peja in western Kosovo.
Against this backdrop, the fact that President Zelenskyy, who is regarded as a hero, publicly sided with Serbia came as a genuine shock.
It hurt.
Scrolling through Facebook, one can see how deeply this has broken Kosovars’ hearts.
A Facebook post showing Pristina’s ambitious opposition mayor, Përparim Rama, demonstratively removing the banner has been met mostly with approving comments.
Some even argue that Ukrainians are no better than Serbs.
But support for removing the Ukrainian banner is not unanimous.
"Ultimately, if we follow this logic, why did we put up the Ukrainian flag there several years ago? Ukraine did not recognise us then either," noted Arianit Koci, a lawyer with a large following.
It must be acknowledged that, for Ukraine, Serbia carries more weight than Kosovo – both in terms of potential support and potential threat.
As part of its multi-vector foreign policy, Serbia supplies Ukraine with significant quantities of ammunition through intermediaries, while at the same time maintaining close cooperation with Russia and refusing to impose sanctions on it.
Throughout 2023, President Vučić made several statements suggesting that Serbia was refraining from recognising the "independence" and subsequent "annexation by Russia" of Crimea, the DPR and LPR in exchange for Ukraine not recognising Kosovo’s independence.
Paradoxically, Ukraine is playing the role imposed on it by Russia in the Balkans. Ukraine allows itself to be pressured into denying Kosovo’s statehood, despite the numerous parallels between Kosovo’s experience and its own. In doing so, it contributes to Russia’s project of sowing division and preventing the consolidation of the region.