Why EU sanctions against Russia are vulnerable to blackmail and how to fix them
The European Union has extended its individual sanctions against people and companies supporting the war against Ukraine. The result of prolonged negotiations and a difficult compromise was a controversial decision: Russian oligarchs Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman were removed from the list, while the entire updated sanctions package was extended for the first time for 36 months, rather than the usual six or 12 months.
Removing two key Russian oligarchs from the sanctions list raises questions about the future prospects for the unity and resilience of the EU sanctions system.
A possible solution to this systemic problem would be to change the EU’s voting rules for imposing or extending sanctions. At present, unanimity is required, and this is precisely what creates risks and uncertainty.
Read more about the problem and possible solutions in the article by Tetiana Khutor of the analytical center "Institute of Legislative Ideas: All in favour! to the Kremlin’s benefit: why extending EU sanctions has become so difficult and what to do about it.
Lifting sanctions against the two Russian oligarchs creates a number of systemic threats.
These include legitimising political blackmail, unfreezing Russian assets, strengthening Russian influence against the backdrop of elections and creating a threat to future sanctions.
Imposing new sanctions and extending existing ones requires full consensus and the unanimous support of all EU member states. However, when the leaders of individual countries effectively sabotage this process and put their own interests above the EU’s goals and values, risks arise for the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Discussions about the requirement for unanimity when imposing EU sanctions have been going on for a long time. One proposal is to change the voting rules for sanctions so that they can be adopted by a qualified majority, rather than requiring the support of every EU member state. In other words, at least 15 of the 27 countries would have to vote in favor, with those countries collectively representing more than 65% of the EU’s population.
This would help eliminate de facto blackmail, whereby a single country can block common decisions in order to obtain political or economic benefits for itself.
An alternative solution that could maintain pressure on Russia amid an actual split over foreign and security policy would be for individual EU countries to impose national sanctions.
However, national sanctions also have significant drawbacks. In particular, they apply only within the country that imposed them. Moreover, each state applies national sanctions at its own discretion, which makes enforcement more difficult and creates loopholes for sanctions evasion.
A number of EU member states already have and use national sanctions systems that operate independently of EU regulations. The purpose of these restrictions is to combat terrorism, prevent international crimes or human rights violations and protect national interests.
Usmanov and Fridman are not simple figures but among the wealthiest businessmen in the Russian economy. Their success offers hope to others as well – for example, Roman Abramovich, who has repeatedly attempted to have the restrictions against him lifted. The precedent does not function merely as the story of two individuals; rather, it creates a mechanism that opens the door for a queue of others seeking the same outcome.
Moreover, this story is not about the past but about the coming year. That is when the EU will have to decide the fate of its sectoral sanctions, and that is where the real battle will take place. Preparations need to begin now – not so much by defending every individual sector, but by supporting partners in reforming the mechanism itself: moving from unanimity among all 27 member states to voting by qualified majority.
As long as a single country can block a common decision in order to bargain for a benefit of its own, blackmail will remain a viable strategy.