Five pillars of Canada's new defence strategy and opportunities for Ukraine

Wednesday, 25 March 2026 —

Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney announced a fairly ambitious plan to double the country’s defence budget by 2035.

Such changes could propel a country that currently does not even meet NATO’s 2% of GDP benchmark into the top three of the Alliance’s ranking for defence spending and investment, right after the United States and the United Kingdom.

Carney announced the launch of the first comprehensive Defence Industrial Strategy to achieve this.

Read more about Canada’s new defence strategy and the opportunities it opens for Ukraine in the article by Dmytro Sherengovskyi of the Ukrainian Catholic University: From 'pacifists' to leaders in security spending: what changes Canada is preparing in its defence strategy. 

The document is built around five pillars and effectively proposes a new social contract in defence between the state, the military and business.

First, it provides a long-term "demand signal" for business and promises regular defence orders for industry.

Second, a key element of the strategy is the BUILD–PARTNER–BUY formula.

BUILD means that where the country already has strong industry or critically important technologies, the government will prioritise domestic production and the development of national companies.

PARTNER involves joint projects with trusted allies within the allied technological space of NATO and EU countries.

Only if these two options are impossible or too expensive does the BUY principle apply – purchasing ready-made systems abroad. Even then, Canada intends to set conditions ensuring participation of its companies, technology transfer or reinvestment into its own defence industry.

Third, the strategy emphasises innovation and scaling of new technologies.

Canada places particular focus on the development of drones as one of the key areas of future warfare.

Fourth, it addresses supply chain resilience and access to critical materials.

A notable element is the intention to restore nitrocellulose production in Canada – a key component of gunpowder and rocket propellants. This material forms the basis for most modern ammunition and its shortage has become one of the most critical problems for Western defence industries.

Finally, the fifth element concerns the Arctic, which is increasingly becoming a strategic security frontier for Canada.

The document specifically sets the creation of a network of Northern Operational Support Hubs – a system of support points capable of providing supplies, equipment maintenance, logistics and rapid deployment in difficult northern conditions. The government plans to develop this network gradually over 10-20 years.

Overall, the Canadian government proposes a new logic: whereas previously the defence industry adapted to the economy, now economic policy should adapt to defence needs.

The strategy creates a number of opportunities for partner countries that should be utilised.

For Ukraine, Canada’s launch of domestic nitrocellulose production in 2029 may matter in the medium term as part of a broader allied "ammunition belt", where each country covers part of the production chain. However, the document does not describe direct mechanisms for directing this output to Ukraine.

A second dimension is drones and rapid innovation. For Kyiv, this opens an important opportunity not only to purchase but also to participate in joint development and testing.

For Ukraine, the main value of the Canadian Strategy lies in the fact that it effectively embeds Ukrainian experience into an ally’s policies through institutions, budgets and production decisions.

This creates a foundation for more systematic defence-industrial cooperation.

If you notice an error, select the required text and press Ctrl + Enter to report it to the editors.
Advertisement: