How Pashinyan is turning Armenia towards Europe after elections and what Russia's retaliation might look like
For the first time, there are grounds to say that Armenia’s authorities may be ready for a genuine "escape from Russia".
And this is not only because of a series of anti-Russian statements. The arrest on 25 August of Robert Kocharyan, a former president of Armenia and personal friend of Vladimir Putin, provided further evidence of the Armenian government’s determination.
Read more about the signs of Armenia’s turn in the article by Yurii Panchenko, European Pravda's co-founder: Pashinyan has chosen Europe after all: how Armenia is paying less attention to the Kremlin and planning to join EU.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has made a number of statements that clearly indicate the beginning of a turn away from Russia.
On 24 August, while presenting the government’s programme, the prime minister said that Armenia would not step up its involvement in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Recall that during the 2020 war with Azerbaijan, Armenia attempted to invoke the CSTO’s security guarantees, but unsuccessfully.
"There are discussions within the organization, and the country may be expelled. I will be very happy if that happens. It will spare us the dilemma of whether or not to leave," Pashinyan said.
In addition, during the presentation of the government program, he called on Russia to transfer the concession for managing Armenia’s railway infrastructure to a "third party". Although the railways are owned by the Armenian state, in 2008 they were handed over to Russian Railways (RZD) under a 30-year concession.
"Because the Armenian railways are under Russian control, we now risk losing the historic opportunity to integrate Armenia into the international railway network," Pashinyan said.
This refers to the implementation of a transportation project involving the United States, known as TRIPP ("Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity").
Among other things, the project is intended to create trade routes to European countries that bypass both Georgia and Russia. This would substantially reduce Yerevan’s dependence on Russia.
The almost inevitable loss of the Russian market is making Armenia more determined in its rapprochement with the European Union.
Pashinyan has publicly stated for the first time that he intends to begin preparations for submitting an application to join the EU.
However, the absence of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan is a major obstacle on Armenia’s path towards EU membership. Formally, Armenia is still in a state of war, and the EU is unlikely to be as accommodating toward Armenia as it has been towards Ukraine. It will probably demand a peace treaty before accession negotiations can even begin.
One key demand from Baku remains unfulfilled: removing from Armenia’s constitution provisions that could be interpreted as claims to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
The issue of the lost Nagorno-Karabakh region remains extremely painful for Armenian society. As a result, convincing citizens to support the constitutional amendments demanded by Baku in a referendum will be extremely difficult.
That is why Pashinyan’s opponents do not rule out the possibility that two questions could be put to the referendum simultaneously.
The popular one would be about joining the EU, according to various estimates, it is supported by 54% to 75% of Armenian citizens.
The unpopular one would concern constitutional amendments.
Then, on 25 August, the day after the government program outlining a course towards revising relations with Russia was published, Armenia was shaken by sensational news: following searches, Robert Kocharyan, leader of the opposition Armenia faction and Armenia’s second president, was detained, along with his son Sedrak.
Robert Kocharyan is not merely an opposition politician and Armenia’s second president. He is considered a personal friend of Vladimir Putin.
The Armenian government’s current statements sound sensational, and Moscow has, of course, responded with barely concealed threats.
Russia appears determined to make the process of "divorce" as painful as possible for Yerevan. Moscow has several tools at its disposal – not only trade restrictions, but also the issue of Russian gas supplies.