How Trump changed US foreign policy and how Europe can restore the partnership
The foreign policy of the US administration led by Donald Trump has become a serious test for both the European Union and Ukraine.
A shift in focus from shared values to pragmatic cooperation, public criticism of allied governments, disregard for international law, as well as rhetoric about a possible occupation of Greenland and attempts to draw European partners into a war with Iran – all of this has significantly undermined relations across the "great beautiful ocean".
Under these circumstances, Ukraine and the EU need a new strategy for engaging with the United States – one that takes into account both disagreements and opportunities for deeper pragmatic cooperation where possible.
Read more in the article by Marianna Fakhurdinova and Yehor Tkachuk, EU-Ukraine partnership programme participants: A marriage of convenience is needed: how the EU and Ukraine can build new relations with Trump’s America.
Allies on both sides of the Atlantic have significant differences in goals, methods and even their overall vision of foreign policy.
The US is shifting its focus to the Indo-Pacific region. This trend began during the presidency of Barack Obama, but under Donald Trump Washington’s distancing from Europe became particularly sharp and demonstrative.
Statements from the Pentagon suggest that the US aims by 2027 to shift responsibility for conventional deterrence onto European allies and to create a kind of "NATO 3.0".
A particularly painful change for Europe and Ukraine has been the shift in the American approach to Russia.
While the administration of Joe Biden viewed Moscow and Beijing as part of a broader global confrontation between democracies and authoritarian states, Trump’s team seeks engagement with Russia in order to at least partially pull it away from China.
At the same time, US allies are increasingly becoming targets of Trump’s criticism.
The less confidence Europe has in Washington’s willingness to continue guaranteeing the continent’s security unconditionally, the more actively Brussels and EU member states move towards greater strategic autonomy, accelerating rearmament and taking on a larger share of responsibility for supporting Ukraine.
However, this autonomy remains limited. European support for Ukraine still cannot fully replace American assistance. Despite significant increases, it lacks key elements.
According to some forecasts, the European Union may need 5-10 years to achieve self-sufficiency in defence production.
There is also no readiness yet to move towards a "European NATO". This would require major structural changes within NATO and the EU does not even have its own command structures outside the Alliance.
The most obvious area for cooperation between the US, the EU and Ukraine remains ending the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Another potential area is the confiscation of frozen Russian assets. The EU failed to agree on a reparations loan for Ukraine late last year and instead replaced it with a €90 billion loan backed by the EU budget. However, this issue could return to the EU agenda.
A new generation of transatlantic cooperation could also emerge in weapons production.
The US has expressed interest in expanding cooperation with Ukraine in drone technology, including possible post-war arrangements involving exchanges of Ukrainian drones for American systems and in 2026, Ukraine remains open to this. Ukrainian drones have also been selected this year for procurement by the US Army.
Among "peaceful" areas, cooperation could focus on critical minerals and raw materials.
Although transatlantic relations are currently experiencing a deep crisis of trust, the EU, Ukraine and the United States still share enough common interests to rebuild cooperation.