Because of this, Kwaśniewski still enjoys a high level of authority in Poland and can afford to speak openly about things that are unpopular that it would be risky for current politicians to talk about. He has also been an unwavering supporter of Ukraine and believes that Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO would benefit Poland itself.

Kwaśniewski’s wife’s family comes from a village in Ukrainian Volyn. His father-in-law survived the Volyn tragedy. [The Volyn (Volhynia) tragedy was a series of events that led to the ethnic cleansing of the Polish and Ukrainian populations in 1943. The tragedy was part of a long-standing rivalry between Ukrainians and Poles in what is now Ukraine's west.] Kwaśniewski now says that when he was negotiating with President Leonid Kuchma on the policy of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, he only became fully convinced that this was the right approach after the actions of the state also convinced his father-in-law and his family.

The sitting president of Poland, Karol Nawrocki, is moving in the opposite direction and using the conflict with Ukraine as one of his electoral tools.

At the same time, Aleksander Kwaśniewski places most of the responsibility for the current escalation of tensions on Kyiv.

He insists that Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a mistake and urges him not to repeat it, warning that it could lead to destructive consequences.

We spoke with the former president ahead of the YES discussion held in Gdańsk on the eve of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC-2026), organised by the Victor Pinchuk Foundation. In this interview you can read about Kwaśniewski’s conversation with Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine’s prospects for joining the EU and NATO, and the possibility that a breakthrough in the war with Russia could (and, in his view, should) happen in the coming months.

"If that happens, it would be bad news for you"

Mr President, you once led Poland into the EU. You have said many times that you are convinced that Ukraine will also become a member of the European Union. Do you still believe that?

I still believe that. Especially because the Americans decided not to propose NATO membership for Ukraine, I think it’s absolutely necessary to negotiate effectively and to prepare both sides – the European Union and Ukraine – for Ukraine’s membership.

I know that it is not easy, but it must happen.

All the EU member states will need to agree to it. Do you believe that the Poles will agree?

Yes! And the problem is not only in Poland – this anti-Ukrainian card is also being played in Germany, everywhere.

Who is doing this?

Well, do you remember who played the Dutch referendum? That is serious. [Editor’s note: Numerous investigations point to Russia’s involvement in organising and promoting the anti-Ukrainian referendum in the Netherlands in 2016, but Kwaśniewski did not mention Russia by name.]

Regarding Poland, I hope that pro-European democratic parties will win the next elections. For that, it’s very important to avoid mistakes.

The decision of President Zelenskyy to name the military units [after the Heroes of the UPA] was a mistake.

These anti-Ukrainian sentiments are present. In Poland, there are two parties speaking openly against support for Ukraine – Konfederacja [Wolność i Niepodległość, Confederation Freedom and Independence] and Konfederacja Korony Polskiej [KKP, a pro-Russian party led by Grzegorz Braun – ed.], and they have something like around 23%.

They aren’t the only ones opposing Ukraine. President Nawrocki is as well. He was elected as the candidate of the Law and Justice party (PiS).

He is a special case. Before the election, he was very tough on all these issues of the history of Volyn, the UPA, etc. He is a very radical person, and he wants to be the leader of this coalition of right-wing parties after the 2027 election, if these parties together form a majority.

If that happens, that would be bad news for you, for Poland and for the European Union.

More than 20 years ago, you and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma agreed on the formula "We forgive and ask for forgiveness." Why has this approach stopped working?

We agreed that almost 30 years ago, in 1997, in the declaration about Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation.

We achieved some progress in implementing it, which was very difficult, as we still had a lot of witnesses or members and the families of victims of the Volyn massacre. But it worked.

Maybe in the years that followed, we didn’t invest enough effort to keep it going. There was not enough dialogue between historians, intellectuals and academics. But we still had a good chance for reconciliation at the beginning of the [full-scale] war, when millions of Ukrainian refugees were welcomed by the Polish people, and it was not organised by the authorities. It was a spontaneous reaction coming from their hearts.

I hoped then that we would have a new pillar for the Polish-Ukrainian relationship.

But I understand the psychological reasons why that changed later. Year by year, people become tired of the war. And we have seen unacceptable behaviour by some Ukrainians, like recently when a Ukrainian influencer drove to Morskie Oko [a lake in a protected area of the Tatra mountains where cars are banned], or the Ukrainian lady who was caught driving a Porsche at 220 km/h in Warsaw, or that fishing guy. Stupid things, but they really created an atmosphere of irritation.

There are 1.5–2 million Ukrainians in Poland. Inevitably, some of them will break the rules.

Absolutely! The majority is absolutely okay. They work. They help the Polish economy very much. But this is about psychology.

The atmosphere is supported by politicians who cynically use it to amplify these cases.

Nicolas Lobet – PRYZM/ Victor Pinchuk Foundation

"Time is the best medicine, but with one condition"

You mentioned that you consider a decision by Volodymyr Zelenskyy a mistake.

Let me tell you: I was very much afraid from the very beginning of this difficult process of reconciliation, that one day we will offer Polish-Ukrainian relationships to radicals.

Today, we are close to it.

If that happens, if radicals from both the Ukrainian and the Polish sides become the mainstream of Polish-Ukrainian relationships, it would be the beginning of a catastrophe.

We are not there yet.

Look at the decision of President Zelenskyy. Was it by chance? Did it happen by accident?

You met with Kyrylo Budanov [Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine] in Warsaw. Did you get the impression that it was a mistake or a deliberate and calculated step?

I think it was wrongly calculated. It happened because of pressure from somewhere.

We didn't discuss in detail with Budanov the procedure of this decision. Budanov came to Warsaw to clean up the situation, to facilitate next steps, but that didn't happen.

I want to repeat again: we should avoid giving the Polish-Ukrainian relationship to radicals,

because it would be extremely dangerous.

You do understand that it is impossible to reverse the decision to name this unit after the Heroes of the UPA?

Politically, of course, and that’s why the situation is so difficult for both sides. Zelenskyy can’t change his decision and Nawrocki can’t change his decision. So we are where we are.

And I understand why Zelenskyy did not come here to Gdansk. It’s good that we have a delegation with the Prime Minister at the top. But I don't understand why the president of Poland announced his decision four days before the conference started. He had already waited for two weeks and he could have done it two days after…

The reason is obvious: to disrupt the conference and make life more difficult for Prime Minister Tusk. This is domestic politics.

Your understanding might be correct, but I myself cannot say so.

Is there a way to cool the tension down?

Time is the best medicine for that, on one condition: if we do not escalate. Both sides.

That’s why now it’s important to have the conference flow normally, with ministers meeting each other and so on.

In Ukraine, there is a widespread feeling that Nawrocki is seeking escalation.

Nawrocki will do everything possible to help the right-wing opposition to win the 2027 election.

Nawrocki’s plan is to reform Poland's division of power to have a much more presidential system – like in Ukraine.

He has no chance of changing the constitution in the foreseeable time, it is impossible – you can’t get a two-thirds majority in polarised Poland.

But even without amending the constitution, he can organise a more presidential system. For that, he wants to be the man who organises the coalition deal between PiS, Konfederacja and Braun’s party Konfederacja Korony Polskiej. With this, Nawrocki will nominate a prime minister who will be very close to him, and this will create a much more presidential system in Poland.

Will he play the Ukraine card again for that purpose?

Ukraine will become a topic of the next elections. That’s for sure. That's a risk, of course.

There will be constant attempts to escalate. Konfederacja will escalate, Braun will escalate. Nawrocki will, of course.

That would be a huge task for Ukraine to avoid giving them ground, to prevent further escalation through its own actions.

At the same time, it would be the task for democratic forces in Poland to calm society down – by facts, by information. An example of the information the Polish government should be communicating much more widely is the positive impact that Ukrainians living and working in Poland are having on the Polish economy.

We need to talk more about things like that, otherwise history will be the only thing discussed about Ukraine.

"I don't think that the majority of Poles are really anti-Ukrainian"

Politicians come and go. But according to polls, Polish society is becoming more and more anti-Ukrainian…

First of all, I don't trust public opinion polls. We have seen a lot of election polls that turned out to be wrong. I travel around Poland a lot and meet many people.

There is indeed some irritation towards Ukrainians, based on examples of wrongdoings by the Ukrainians I mentioned before. That’s what people tell me when they explain their irritation.

I have a personal story, which I always tell people when I hear them saying that one Ukrainian did this and another Ukrainian did that.

In 2005, after Polish accession to the EU, we had more than 1 million Poles living in the United Kingdom. It was my last visit to the UK as president and I had an audience with Queen Elizabeth II. That morning, the Polish ambassador showed me the British tabloid The Sun with a big story on the front page that a Polish guy killed a whole British family – father, mother and a child.

Quite a background for a state visit!

With this, I started my meeting with the Queen by apologising, by saying that I'm so sorry that it happened.

The Queen was a clever woman, a great woman, and she said: "Mr. President, it's happened. But in my memory, the most important thing concerning the Poles living in the UK is the Second World War and how much you helped us." She told me about the Polish soldiers who helped the UK and its people that time. (Ed. note: During World War II, the Polish government-in-exile was based in London.)

In my experience, when I tell this story, people say, indeed, there are now some irritating situations, but it shouldn’t become the core of the attitude to Ukraine.

So, of course, we have some increase of the anti-Ukrainian position, but I don't think that the majority of the Poles are really anti-Ukrainian.

Nicolas Lobet – PRYZM/ Victor Pinchuk Foundation

"NATO membership for Ukraine is unrealistic as long as Donald Trump is the president of the United States"

Let’s talk about Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Does the pace of reforms convince you that Ukraine will soon join the European Union?

First, you’re far from the beginning of this road. The first reforms started with Yushchenko, there were some reforms even under Yanukovych, and then, of course, after 2014. So Ukraine has been doing its homework for quite some time.

But let me remind you of our journey.

Poland signed the Association Agreement in 1991 and we finally joined the EU in 2004 – after 13 years. We were not lazy or ineffective in that preparation.

The road to membership is quite long, and you are on it.

Indeed, you need to speed up some elements. And there are some extremely sensitive elements – agriculture, service, corruption, independence of the judiciary – and I suggest that Ukraine and the EU should organise groups of experts to find a solution for proper reforms and integration there.

During your tenure, Poland played the role of defender of Ukraine’s interests in the EU. When did Poland cease to that role? Because now it definitely is not.

I don’t think so. In my opinion, this government still plays this role.

Indeed, there have been changes in politics. The reason is that in modern reality, politicians are used to working according to public opinion polls, and that is terrible – I'm very much against it. Because if you change the tone every single day and switch from pro-Ukrainian to more anti-Ukrainian, that is not a strategy. That is reactive politics, which is wrong.

I hope this government has a strategy. I know the Prime Minister, I know some ministers, including Radoslaw Sikorski. I know the speaker of the Polish parliament very well, and I can tell you they are absolutely in favour of Ukraine joining the European Union.

Of course, we have Polish farmers who are very much afraid of Ukrainians in the EU. But it means we have to discuss it, to show them that the risk is not real.

We had the same issues on our way to the EU. I remember my meetings in France, in Spain. It was the same. But finally, we joined the EU and nothing tragic happened.

By the way, in my opinion, Ukraine should start with NATO membership, and then the EU. But I know that today it is totally unrealistic because of the position of US President [Donald] Trump. Although I believe he is wrong here.

Given the threat posed by Russia, Putin, and given that Ukraine has the biggest European army, which understands contemporary war, having Ukraine as a NATO member would be the best guarantee of security not only for Ukraine, but also for other NATO members. Referring to the Russian doctrine that they need this zone of non-NATO countries surrounding Russia doesn’t work. They already have Finland in NATO, Sweden in NATO, and the Baltic states.  

But still, that is impossible as long as Donald Trump is the president of the United States. I don't know how much the situation will change in the coming years.

But the European Union is something very real. Ukraine’s membership of the EU would be the best possible and achievable security guarantee for Ukraine and the EU.

I can promise that as long as I'm in good shape – because I'm not the youngest person in the world – I will advocate for Ukraine, Poland and the European Union. But now, we have a good chance to progress here soon.

I believe something will happen in the coming months and the "something" won’t be a real peace.

Because I don’t believe that any reliable peace agreement is possible. In my opinion, neither Putin nor his successor will be interested in war.

Nevertheless, we can expect some kind of ceasefire, and it may come soon. Even if peace is impossible, the ceasefire is achievable.

That would be a chance for a breakthrough.

Sergiy Sydorenko

Editor, European Pravda
From Gdańsk

Kyiv knew from the outset that this list has special significance for the Europeans. It’s not just that all of its elements stem from the EU accession criteria and other bilateral documents. For Brussels and the member states, this plan is an indicator of whether Ukraine’s declarations about its commitment to reform can be trusted. That is why it includes reforms that the EU considers particularly indicative.

"You can change the laws however many times you want, but you can’t bring trust back overnight.... This is what we agreed in the paper – within one year," European Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos explained, referring to the notorious events of July 2025, when Ukraine undermined its own anti-corruption reforms.

The plan may not have formal legal status, but politically, it’s hugely significant.

EU officials are now repeatedly emphasising that Ukraine itself set the implementation deadline at one year. Ukrainian officials, including Taras Kachka, are continuing to insist on this timeframe as well.

Yet six months have gone by, and progress on implementing the plan is well below expectations. Expert monitoring of Ukraine’s progress gives it a score of 15 out of 100 – and most of that reflects preparatory work rather than reforms that have actually started.

Unless the situation changes immediately, Ukraine will create serious obstacles on its own path towards EU membership. Failure to fulfil the commitments it has undertaken, especially those regarded as a "test of trust", also significantly increases the risk of the EU deciding to decouple Ukraine and Moldova’s accession ahead of schedule – something that officials in Brussels have hinted at.

If that happens, the government and parliament will have no one to blame but themselves.

What this report is about and what counts as success

Alignment with the EU legislation that Ukraine must adopt during the accession process is measured annually by the European Commission in the Enlargement Report. To assess progress in the "Fundamentals" Chapters 23 and 24, the EU uses a separate mechanism – the Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR).

Things are more complicated with the Kachka-Kos plan. It is not part of the formal accession process, so there are no public EU tools to evaluate progress. The European Commission prepares only internal documents, which it shares with member states but does not publish.

This raises the question: how can we determine whether Ukraine is actually succeeding in fulfilling these requirements, which are essential if it is to continue on its path towards EU membership?

To address this, Ukrainian think tanks formed a coalition known as Membership Check, led by the New Europe Center. It brings together eight expert organisations working on European integration, anti-corruption and judicial reform. The other members of the group are European Pravda, the Mezha Anti-Corruption Center, ANTS (the National Interests Advocacy Network), the DEJURE (Democracy, Justice, Reforms) Foundation, the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform, the Anti-Corruption Action Center, and Transparency International Ukraine.

In this article, the coalition presents its second report.

The first one, published in early April, revealed disappointing results. After three months of work, the authorities had achieved only 9% of the maximum score. At the time, the government said it expected to speed up later, as the first few months were mainly spent on preparatory work. This explanation made sense. But even less progress has been achieved in the second quarter.

The result as of the end of June, according to the methodology, is 15 out of 100 points – only 15% complete.

It’s important to emphasise that 100% completion is not an absolute requirement.

Of course that remains the desired outcome, but reality is always more complex.

Even when it comes to formal accession requirements, Brussels often accepts less-than-perfect results. For example, in the area of the rule of law, the EU does not require literal compliance with all its recommendations, but rather the creation of a system in which citizens and businesses can trust court decisions and believe that they are fair.

The same applies here: if Ukraine can show that it has made a genuine effort to implement all the points, but details of the final decisions differ from the EU’s vision (or that of the expert coalition), the plan could still be considered fulfilled even if the numerical score were, say, 80 points instead of 100.

The problem is, however, that right now, no meaningful progress is being made on any of the 10 points.

Ukraine has implemented only one minor element of one of the points. It has also completely failed to address the main elements related to judicial reform. Within the coalition there were even discussions about whether a negative score should be given, since this is essentially a rollback in one of the reform areas.

Yet the coalition’s sources in the government remain optimistic.

They say that work is ongoing, a number of draft laws are being coordinated with the European Commission, and that this is one of the main reasons for the delay (in other words, it’s the EU’s fault, not Ukraine’s).

It is true that Kyiv could still demonstrate rapid progress in implementing the plan in the remaining six months before the deadline Ukraine itself set. But that doesn’t explain how it will remedy the dismantling of the reform of judges’ declarations of integrity.

Another reason for cautious optimism is that a group of MPs, including the chair of the anti-corruption committee, Anastasiia Radina (from the Servant of the People faction), have started registering draft laws that aim to implement the plan’s points on their own, without waiting for the government.

But will there be enough votes in parliament to go against the government – even with the realisation that Ukraine’s path towards EU membership is at stake – especially given that the government has been showing that it disagrees with certain pro-European parliamentary initiatives?

Now for some more details on each of the 10 points.

Point 1: closing corruption loopholes in the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC)

This point of the Kachka-Kos plan reads: "Adopt comprehensive amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and other legislation to ensure fast and high-quality justice."

This is the most important point of the entire plan and the largest in scope. In its detailed explanation, five elements are listed that are meant to solve several long-standing and very important problems.

In particular, Ukraine has committed to closing loopholes that currently allow some top-level corruption offenders to avoid responsibility – for example, by dragging out investigations and then closing cases due to statutes of limitation (this is a long-standing problem that Ukraine created for itself during a previous convocation of parliament, when it adopted and the president signed the "Lozovyi amendments").

All attempts by parliament to fix these and similar provisions have failed, so the European Union has identified remedying these problems as one of the accession criteria.

In the coalition’s assessment, the first point carries the highest weight – 20 points. However, Ukraine’s current score is only 2.5 out of 20.

Ukraine is still only preparing to work on this reform.

The government promised long ago to submit a relevant draft law, and has actually drafted it, but issues arose during coordination. The draft has now been sent back for revision jointly with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP).

Recently – evidently not expecting rapid progress from the government – members of parliament registered two alternative draft laws: No. 15333 on improving the effectiveness of criminal proceedings after the expiration of pre-trial investigation deadlines and preventing procedural abuse, and No. 15334 on improving the rules for determining jurisdiction and ensuring international cooperation. So far there has been no movement on them in parliament.

Point 2: independent forensic examinations for NABU

Here, too, everything is still at a very early stage. Essentially, there have only been political statements expressing readiness to implement this point.

The Ministry of Justice has started to draft a bill, but NABU is unhappy with the proposals and critical of the government’s concept of how the institution responsible for conducting forensic examinations would operate. After discussions of the ideas promoted by the Ministry of Justice, anti-corruption activists doubt that the new body would truly be independent. There is currently no draft suitable for expert analysis.

Expert score: 2 out of 10 points.

Point 3: changing the rules for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General and selection of candidates for the position

This point of the plan deserves particular attention.

Normally the European Union is very cautious not to interfere with national traditions and procedures, especially in areas where there are no common EU rules. The rules for appointing a Prosecutor General differ across European states, and the position is often filled according to political quotas, but subject to strict professional criteria.

However, an exception has been made for Ukraine. A review of the procedure for selecting and dismissing the Prosecutor General has been included in the EU accession criteria, and in the Kachka-Kos plan as well.

The reason for this exceptional treatment is the role played by Ukraine’s Prosecutor General, Ruslan Kravchenko, in the attack on anti-corruption institutions in July last year. The EU is well aware that it was Kravchenko who drafted the controversial law that undermined the independence of NABU and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO).

However, the European Union cannot and will not demand his dismissal. The only requirement is that Ukraine introduce safeguards for the future, so that future Prosecutors General are selected based on professionalism rather than loyalty.

Even here, however, the government has done nothing so far. Moreover, there have not even been any political statements indicating an intention to carry out a meaningful reform.

The experts have awarded half a point only because of a parliamentary initiative: draft law No. 15343 on competitive selection for the position of Prosecutor General has been registered in the Verkhovna Rada.

Expert score: 0.5 out of 10.

Point 4: reinstating the competitive selection process for the appointment and transfer of prosecutors

This is another consequence of the notorious July 2025 law. As is well known, under pressure from the Ukrainian public and Western partners, the authorities rolled back restrictions on the independence of NABU and SAPO. However, the law also contained a provision concerning the prosecution service.

Parliament "forgot" to repeal it, and to this day Kyiv has ignored all reminders about this from the EU.

There have been political statements about the intention to implement this point, but no actual action.

The Office of the Prosecutor General has drafted a law (which the coalition has reviewed), but it does not reinstate competitive appointments of prosecutors to positions. The government says it intends to submit the draft law to the Venice Commission after further refinement, which could delay the process even more.

Expert score: 0.5 out of 10.

Point 5: reform of the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI)

Despite the fact that the Kachka-Kos plan is supposed to be implemented by the end of 2026, the government already appears to be planning to miss the deadline when it comes to the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). Current government statements suggest an intention to submit a draft law "by the end of the year", which is quite late for such a complex reform.

The government says this is because the bill will only be drafted upon completion of an audit of the SBI.

However, the main problem is not missing the deadline, but the possible deliberate entrenchment of politically dependent leadership within the SBI.

The tenure of the current SBI director ends on 31 December 2026, and the competition commission to select his successor must be formed no later than 31 October 2026. Therefore there is a risk that the new director will be selected according to the existing procedure, the transparency and independence of which are questionable.

Expert score: 1 out of 10.

Point 6: appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court and members of the High Council of Justice

This point of the Kachka-Kos plan includes the requirement that only internationally vetted candidates should become judges of the Constitutional Court (CCU) and members of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) going forward.

Overall, there are no critical problems here, although the pace of implementation could be faster. A competitive selection process is underway for two vacant CCU judge positions under the parliamentary quota. Around late June/early July, the Advisory Group of Experts is expected to determine the candidates’ rankings and submit them to the parliamentary committee. The CCU judge positions that are under the quotas of the president and the congress of judges remain vacant.

As regards the High Council of Justice, the congress of judges has elected two members to the HCJ, but there are still vacancies under the quota of the congress of advocates (no competition has been announced since 2022, as the bar self-governance system, once controlled by Andrii Portnov, remains a systemic problem).

In August 2026, and again at the beginning of 2027, the terms of 13 more HCJ members will expire. Competitions to fill these vacancies have been announced.

Expert score: 1 out of 5, with hopes that the assessment may improve shortly.

Point 7: involving international experts in the selection commission of the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ)

Draft law No. 13382 has been registered in parliament, but its consideration has not progressed since June 2025.

The government claims it has prepared an alternative legislative initiative, which is currently at the stage of coordination with the European Commission.

Expert score: 1.5 out of 10.

Point 8: judges’ declarations of integrity and digitalisation of enforcement proceedings

This is a complex point consisting of three elements, so the experts agreed to roughly divide the maximum score (10 points) equally between them.

Let’s begin with the good news.

On 7 April, parliament adopted new legislation on the digitalisation of the enforcement of court decisions. The law received a positive assessment from the European Commission, and the experts also have no objections, so the coalition awarded the maximum score here – 3.5 points.

The other two elements concern the reform of judges’ declarations of integrity, which must include "improvement of the verification procedure", as well as the introduction of a separate mechanism for such declarations for Supreme Court judges, including "the temporary involvement of internationally nominated independent experts".

On both of these elements, there has been either zero progress or movement in the wrong direction.

It is important to explain that declarations of integrity are one of the few tools for cleaning out the judiciary. Or rather they were supposed to be – but the Ukrainian parliament has decided to protect dishonest judges. And this assessment is no exaggeration.

On 9 June 2026, parliament adopted draft law No. 13165-2 on judges’ declarations of integrity. Yet the law contradicts the plan’s requirements, does not improve the verification of existing declarations, and actually makes it easier for judges to exploit loopholes to avoid accountability. European Pravda has covered this in this article: A "European" reform in name only.

In addition, contrary to the plan’s requirements, the adopted bill does not provide for the temporary involvement of international experts in the verification of Supreme Court judges’ integrity declarations. Thus, parliament did not even attempt to simulate compliance with this element.

The controversial law is now awaiting the president’s signature.

Total expert score for the three elements of this point: 3.5 out of 10.

Point 9: the Anti-Corruption Strategy and Anti-Corruption Programme

Formally, this point has already been breached. It is the only one for which the Kachka-Kos plan has a separate deadline: both of these documents were supposed to have been adopted by the end of Q2 2026 – i.e. now.

Yet it was not until May, after a long delay by the government (which failed to approve the strategy developed by the NACP), that draft laws for the State Anti-Corruption Strategy (SAS) appeared in the Verkhovna Rada. The process was unlocked despite the Cabinet of Ministers’ position when MP Anastasiia Radina decided to submit the draft on behalf of the NACP herself.

Only then did the government submit its own draft law – but it removed several of Ukraine’s key commitments from the Strategy (as European Pravda has reported on in detail).

Later, a third, alternative parliamentary draft was also introduced. At present, all three remain stalled. It is unclear whether the government will agree to adopt a version that aligns with Ukraine’s obligations to the EU.

Work on the State Anti-Corruption Programme, which is to be based on the Strategy, will only begin after the Strategy is adopted.

Expert score: 1.5 out of 10.

Point 10: internal control systems against corruption

Here, according to the experts, work is still at a very early stage, although a number of measures have been implemented. The State Audit Service of Ukraine has added questions about the state of internal control to the audits it conducts. A whistleblower reporting portal is functioning, but it needs further improvement.

In May, updated Internal Audit Standards came into force which revised the requirements for organising internal audits in the public sector and strengthened requirements for the organisational and functional independence of internal audit units.

Expert score: 1 out of 10.

The full monitoring report is available at the following link.

By Sergiy Sydorenko, European Pravda

Assessment by the Membership Check coalition

It’s the summit’s most candid description of its internal order.

France had spent months preparing the G7 around global economic imbalances, critical minerals, artificial intelligence and the gathering conflict around the Strait of Hormuz.

Ukraine was never certain to dominate an agenda crowded by Iran, China and a fraying global economy. Yet by the end of the summit, the seven leaders had adopted a dedicated declaration on Ukraine. It promised more air defence, more interceptors, long-range capabilities, support for Ukraine’s energy system and stronger sanctions on Russia’s oil and gas sectors.

The fact that the United States signed it was the point.

A year earlier, the G7 summit in Canada had ended without a common position on Ukraine after Trump left early. In Évian, he stayed until the end. He met Volodymyr Zelenskyy twice on the margins of the summit. Emmanuel Macron emerged declaring a "re-synchronisation" of the G7 on Ukraine and a "very deep change" in the American approach to the war.

The United States remains the country that can alter the military balance faster than any other partner, whether through its air-defence stockpiles, intelligence, industrial capacity or political influence over allies.

According to IMF-based figures assembled for the French presidency’s policy ecosystem, the group’s share of global GDP has fallen from roughly 60% in 1980 to about 45% in 2025. At the same time, power inside the G7 has become more lopsided.

The United States accounted for nearly 59% of the G7’s GDP in 2023, up from 46% in 2000. Europe may still speak in the plural; economically and militarily, America increasingly arrives as the heavyweight.  

A better summit than expected

The G7 declaration contains more than ceremonial language. It says the group will increase deliveries of air-defence capacities, additional systems and interceptors, as well as long-range capabilities. It says members are ready to consider granting licences that would allow Ukraine to expand its military production. It promises further support for Ukrainian energy resilience ahead of next winter and stronger pressure on the Russian war economy.

Those commitments gather several strands of the war into one political offer. Air defence protects cities and industry. Long-range capabilities shape Russia’s calculations behind the front line. Energy resilience keeps the country functioning through winter. Industrial licences could reduce Ukraine’s dependence on the increasingly depleted arsenals of its partners.

Macron’s argument was that the G7 had finally accepted a reality that Kyiv has been repeating for months: Russia is not negotiating seriously because it believes time still favours it.

Trump, according to the French president, now shares that judgement.

The change should not be exaggerated. Trump’s position has moved before. It can move again. His administration remains an unpredictable presence in the coalition supporting Ukraine, capable of announcing a new posture one week and undermining it the next.

But diplomacy often begins with narrower gains. France did not obtain an American conversion to European strategic thinking. It obtained something more immediate: a US signature under a text that treat Russia as the problem, Ukraine as a partner worth arming, and pressure on Moscow as unfinished business.

That is a considerable improvement on the atmosphere of the previous G7 summit.

It also reveals how low the bar has fallen. European leaders now count it as a strategic success when the American president stays in the room, endorses a collective line and does not leave them to explain the consequences alone.

A promise is not a shield

The G7 "agrees to increase" deliveries of air-defence capabilities and long-range systems. It is "ready to consider" licences for Ukrainian military production. It "agrees to provide further support" to get Ukraine through winter.

The declaration offers political direction, not operational detail. It gives no figures for additional systems or interceptors. It sets no timetable. It does not say which country will provide which capability, how licences would be structured, or what financing would make production viable in Ukraine.

For a country facing another season of Russian missile and drone attacks, that distinction is severe. An interceptor arrives in one of two forms: it is either in a warehouse, on a launcher or already flying towards its target. It cannot be substituted by a paragraph agreed beside Lake Geneva.

The same caution applies to military production. Friedrich Merz, the German chancellor, was right to say that Europe and the United States are producing too little, and that licences could help compensate for the shortfall. Ukraine has factories, engineers, experience and a brutal understanding of what works in modern warfare. Yet "ready to consider" is not the same as a signed industrial agreement. American firms have commercial interests, export controls and concerns about intellectual property. European governments have their own procurement rules and political constraints.

The United States and Europe have spent years sending weapons from existing stocks. That approach has limits. The next phase must involve production lines, shared designs, repair facilities and long-term orders. Ukraine should not remain a customer waiting for deliveries from abroad. It should become part of the industrial base producing the weapons Europe itself will need.

Évian acknowledged that possibility. It did not settle it.

The guarantee that remains missing

The summit did not establish a security-guarantee mechanism for Ukraine. The EU and its member states said they were prepared to contribute to "robust and credible security guarantees" for Ukraine through the Coalition of the Willing and "in cooperation with the United States".

Europe wants to prepare for a future in which it it carries more responsibility for its own security. Yet the guarantees it is beginning to sketch still depend on cooperation with the same country whose commitment has become hardest to predict.

There is no contradiction in wanting American involvement.

Europe cannot replace the United States overnight.

It still relies on American intelligence, surveillance, strategic lift, nuclear deterrence and several categories of advanced weapons. But dependence becomes dangerous when the partner at its centre changes policy according to personal instinct, domestic politics or the latest crisis.

Trump’s "I’m the boss" line was delivered as a joke. It nevertheless captured the bind facing European capitals. They dislike his methods, distrust his consistency and understand that he can use their dependence as leverage. They also know that the United States remains indispensable in the short term.

France’s policy in Évian was built around that uncomfortable reality.

Macron’s version of strategic autonomy is often described as an effort to free Europe from America. The summit showed a more practical version. France is not trying to push Washington out of European security. It is trying to keep Washington involved while Europe builds enough capacity to survive a future American retreat.

France buys time, Ukraine needs capability

The French achievement at Évian was therefore not autonomy. It was time.

Time for Europe to increase military production. Time to build a more credible air-defence architecture. Time to turn Ukrainian and European defence industries into partners rather than occasional contractors. Time to reduce the risk that a political mood swing in Washington leaves a hole in Ukraine’s defence.

The European Council has called for faster production and delivery of air-defence systems, ammunition, drones and missiles. It has also linked Ukraine’s security to the protection of energy infrastructure, the repair of the grid and the resilience of civilian life. On finance, the EU has far stronger instruments. Brussels expects the first disbursement from its €90bn loan for Ukraine in 2026 and 2027 before the end of June.

Europe can keep the Ukrainian state functioning. It can finance reconstruction, support reform and move accession negotiations forward. It has proved that repeatedly.

Its weaker point remains hard power. A Europe able to fund recovery but unable to secure Ukrainian skies without American help has not yet achieved strategic autonomy. It has achieved a partial form of it.

Ukraine, meanwhile, is not only the recipient of European security policy. It is becoming one of its architects. Ukrainian forces have adapted faster than most European militaries to drones, electronic warfare,, dispersed production, civilian resilience and the industrial demands of a high-intensity war. European armies are studying those lessons because they have little choice.

The war has already made Ukraine central to Europe’s future security order. The question is whether Europe will treat Ukraine as a temporary battlefield on its eastern edge or as a permanent military and industrial partner.

The licensing debate points towards the second option. So does the growing recognition that Ukrainian factories should not merely repair foreign systems but help produce the next generation of European capabilities.

What to watch after Évian

The first test is air defence. Ukraine needs additional systems and interceptors before Russia’s next major campaign against cities and energy infrastructure. Every delay will be measured in damaged substations, destroyed housing and civilians spending nights in shelters.

The second is industrial. Announcements about licences must lead to contracts, technology transfer and production. Otherwise, Europe will continue to describe Ukraine as a defence-industrial partner while leaving its factories dependent on decisions made elsewhere.

The third is sanctions. The G7 promised stronger pressure on Russian oil and gas.

The European Council went further, calling for reduced Russian energy revenues, tighter action against the shadow fleet, greater pressure on the banking system and more serious enforcement against sanctions evasion.

That is where the next phase of economic pressure lies. Russia has become skilled at keeping its war economy afloat through opaque shipping, intermediaries and third-country supply chains. Another package of restrictions will not be enough if enforcement remains optional.

Finally, there is Washington itself.

Trump’s change of tone in Évian is useful. It should be welcomed, not romanticised. A president who accepts that Russia is the offensive party and signs a declaration on strengthening Ukraine’s air defence is preferable to a president who leaves the summit early and tells Europe to manage alone.

France succeeded in keeping the United States tied to the coalition. The harder task is making Ukraine’s security less dependent on that tie.

Charlotte Guillou-Clerc,

Journalist (France) 

Polish President Karol Nawrocki’s decision to "punish" the president of Ukraine by stripping him of the Order of the White Eagle, and the subsequent mass renouncing of Polish state honours by Ukrainian politicians and diplomats, are not the cause of this crisis, merely one of its manifestations.

This is not about awards. We are truly heading towards the abyss.

Some in Warsaw are calling for military supplies to Ukraine to be halted. That is unlikely to happen (at least for now), but at a minimum, Ukraine's accession to the EU is on the line. Yet even that high stake does not mean Kyiv has unlimited room for concessions. There are red lines that the Ukrainian authorities will definitely not cross.

Under these circumstances, Ukraine’s friends in Poland are even more important than usual.

Poland’s political arena is filled with anti-Ukrainian narratives and xenophobia. A Polish minister who attempted to explain to other politicians why Ukraine named a military unit after the Heroes of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) has been harassed and attacked. That said, there are still healthy political forces in Poland. There are politicians who are trying to prevent relations with Ukraine from deteriorating further. Prime Minister Donald Tusk is one of them. So it is vitally important that Kyiv’s actions take account of the interests of those in Poland who continue to stand on the side of common sense.

For now, and precisely for these reasons, the official reaction from Kyiv to Nawrocki’s attack has been broadly correct. The order had to be returned to Warsaw.

But for the very same reasons, President Zelenskyy should travel to Poland this week.

The visit would help Ukraine’s friends – and refusing to go would help anti-Ukrainian politicians.

This article is an Editorial. That means it is published on behalf of the entire editorial team and reflects the collective position of all European Pravda journalists. We reserve this format for truly exceptional cases, particularly when Ukraine finds itself at an important crossroads. Given that the President’s Office is reportedly considering declining to attend the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) in Gdańsk, this is just such a situation.

We will also explain in this article why the European Pravda editorial board believes that the "order-fall" (the return of Polish state decorations by Ukrainian politicians and diplomats) was necessary. It’s particularly important to note that this unprecedented step, taken without any directives or coordination, was undertaken not only by representatives of the current government, but by its opponents as well.

This demonstrates the existence of the red lines mentioned above – red lines that are not obvious to Poland.

Ukraine as a political tool

First, let us address something that Kyiv is acutely aware of and that we at European Pravda have written about many times, but which is important for understanding the current situation.

The "Ukraine question" has long been used as a tool in domestic politics in Poland. The reason is simple: playing against Ukraine brings electoral dividends.

This tendency has evolved into a self-reinforcing spiral.

Opinion polls consistently show that negative attitudes towards Ukrainians predominate in Poland, especially among right-wing voters (who constitute the majority of the electorate), and that this is getting worse. As a result, criticising Ukraine/the UPA/Stepan Bandera has become an obligatory element of almost every right-wing politician’s campaign.

These politicians have no hesitation about playing the Ukraine card, often relying on myths, half-truths or outright lies.

Anti-Ukrainian statements by politicians then normalise this sort of rhetoric and further worsen public attitudes towards Ukrainians. The vicious circle is complete.

It isn’t just the far-right who play this game (you have only to recall the anti-Ukrainian remarks made by the liberal politician Rafał Trzaskowski during the 2025 election campaign).

But when it comes to the Nawrocki-Tusk rivalry, the division of roles is particularly clear.

For Nawrocki, attacks on Ukraine are a tool in his struggle against Donald Tusk.

For example, if Tusk is not sufficiently supportive of criticism of Ukraine by Nawrocki, he can be accused of being "pro-Ukrainian". In Poland today, this accusation is being increasingly used to stigmatise nationally prominent politicians.

The story surrounding the Order of the White Eagle is a perfect example of this dynamic, as European Pravda has previously explained in this article. When Karol Nawrocki signed the decree stripping Volodymyr Zelenskyy of the Order, it wasn’t just punishing his Ukrainian counterpart that was important to him. More significantly, he would need to send the decree to Tusk for countersignature, knowing that the prime minister is opposed to the Ukrainian president being "punished".

Every day that passed without Tusk’s signature gave Nawrocki an opportunity to attack him, accusing him of tolerating the crimes committed in Volhynia in 1943, and so on. This is precisely why Zelenskyy’s decision to return the order to Warsaw was the right one: it removed the political need for Tusk’s signature and minimised the political damage to him.

That said, the decoration did not necessarily have to be sent back via Nova Poshta courier; other channels were available. But politics is rarely devoid of an element of theatre.

Why going to Gdańsk is the necessary next step

However, Zelenskyy’s loss of the decoration is not the end of the story.

The crisis has not gone anywhere. It has only become more acute. And the President’s Office in Kyiv is fully aware of how deep it is. One sign of this is the fact that since early June, Zelenskyy has no longer been using Rzeszów Airport for his foreign trips. During a period of tension between the two countries, it would look odd to be relying on Polish transit and would further underscore Kyiv’s dependence on Poland.

Nevertheless, Zelenskyy had planned to make an exception for the trip to Gdańsk given the importance of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2026) – the annual international forum on Ukraine, which this year has been organised by Poland.

However, after the decoration was withdrawn, Kyiv started to think about cancelling even that exception.

Indeed, over the weekend, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha stated that Zelenskyy might decline to travel to Gdańsk.

In other words, Ukraine could choose to punish Poland in return.

Zelenskyy’s refusal to attend the conference would indeed constitute a form of punishment. It would be highly likely to lead to a lower level of participation by other countries. At present, participation is expected to be at leader level. According to early reports, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen are planning to attend.

Moreover, the worst-case scenario would be if all of Ukraine’s top government officials were to announce that they could not attend, effectively stripping the conference of its purpose.

Poland aspires to international leadership on Ukrainian issues and is frustrated by its inability to fully achieve that goal. Even the milder version of such a response would be a slap in the face of the Polish government from Kyiv.

And "government" is the operative word here.

The Gdańsk conference is a project of the Polish government and Donald Tusk personally. It was Tusk who arranged for top European leaders to attend.

So its disruption or failure would be a failure for Tusk. It would also provide another argument for anti-Ukrainian forces in Warsaw to complain about Kyiv’s "ingratitude", which they would claim is isolating Poland from European discussions on aid to Ukraine.

In addition, Zelenskyy’s refusal to travel to Gdańsk would be perceived in Poland as a sign of Kyiv’s weakness.

Thus, such a response from Kyiv would be the best possible gift for Nawrocki, and it is quite likely that this is exactly what he is hoping for. There is even a view, not without foundation, that derailing the URC may have been one of the motives behind Nawrocki’s decision to sign the White Eagle decree at this particular time.

So should Ukraine really give Nawrocki such a gift?

That is a rhetorical question.

But an important point must be added: decisions regarding Poland should be based on two factors.

The first is Ukraine’s interest: does a given action bring strategic benefit to Ukraine?

The second is the interest of those forces and politicians in Poland that are friendly to Ukraine. If Ukraine acts without considering their position, it will only strengthen anti-Ukrainian forces – and ultimately harm Ukraine itself.

Both of these considerations mean that Zelenskyy should go to Gdańsk and maintain the Polish government’s engagement in Ukrainian affairs. Politics is no place for emotional decisions.

But this also means that despite all of Nawrocki’s outrageous behaviour, Zelenskyy should also seek to meet with him.

Red lines for both sides

As we have mentioned, topics such as the UPA, Bandera and "Ukraine's ingratitude" have long been part of domestic politics in Poland, where Ukraine is treated as an object.

But that does not negate the fact that for Polish voters, the issue of the UPA is indeed highly sensitive.

The reason is that Poland largely lives within a historical myth about the events of the first half of the last century. In the interpretation dear to Nawrocki, the entire right wing and Polish historiography in general, Poland was solely an innocent victim during the interwar period and World War II.

There was no Polish occupation of Ukraine. There were no ethnically motivated crimes by Poles against the Ukrainian population. There was no ethnic cleansing by the Home Army (Armia Krajowa). Instead, the Volhynia tragedy of 1943 is unequivocally identified in Polish historiography as "genocide".

Most Poles deny and do not wish to hear that for Ukrainians, the UPA is a symbol of Ukraine’s struggle for statehood and freedom. It is perceived exclusively through the lens of ethnic crimes.

So while for politicians history is often merely a tool to be used, their voters feel genuinely offended.

The social sensitivity of this issue in Poland has to be understood – and this is precisely what Ukrainian politicians often fail to do.

But at the same time, we must also work to ensure that the Polish public understands the principled nature of Ukraine’s position. In Poland there is a widespread belief that the issue is simply about politicians’ malicious intentions.

The conspiracy theory that Zelenskyy named a unit of the Special Operations Forces after the "Heroes of the UPA" specifically in order to insult Poland, and as part of a larger strategic manoeuvre, is very widespread. This is not a fringe belief. And it appears that Nawrocki did genuinely expect Zelenskyy to reverse that decision. Yet for Ukraine, that would have been an absolute red line and would have meant agreeing to Poland rewriting Ukrainian history.

That is why the mass renouncing of Polish state honours by Ukrainian politicians was not just a gesture: it also carried significant meaning.

This was not done by order of the President’s Office (as indicated by the lack of synchronisation: two days passed between the decision of Sybiha, who was the first, and former ambassador to Poland Vasyl Zvarych, who is currently the latest to return an award). It’s also important to note that all the recipients of the Order of the White Eagle have returned it, including Petro Poroshenko, a political opponent of the current president, and Leonid Kuchma, who is certainly not dependent on Zelenskyy.

There was probably no other way to send the message that Nawrocki’s decision crossed a red line for Ukraine.

That he had offended not Zelenskyy, but the Ukrainian people.

After all, the order awarded to Zelenskyy in 2023 was rightly perceived as an award to the brave Ukrainian people and to the Ukrainian soldiers who are defending Europe, including Poland, from the Russian invasion. So Nawrocki’s "punishment" was not directed at Zelenskyy alone, but at all Ukrainians.

And most importantly, pressure from the Polish president demanding that Ukraine abandon its interpretation of history is unlikely to succeed. Opposition to this approach is broad and includes representatives of all political camps.

However, while defining red lines is important, it is certainly not all that needs to be done. Ukraine’s leadership must also seek a way out of this deadlock.

And the worst possible option right now would be to burn bridges with Nawrocki.

The stakes are too high for Ukraine to leave grievances to heal on their own after this level of escalation.

Therefore, Zelenskyy should not only attend the URC in Gdańsk, but also seek opportunities to meet Nawrocki. For this reason, sending the order back via Nova Poshta rather than trying to deliver it personally may not have been the best idea – although the editorial board of European Pravda has differing views on this point as well.

Six months ago, in a similarly challenging context ahead of the Hungarian elections, Kyiv chose to burn its bridges with Viktor Orbán in anticipation that Péter Magyar would win. That bet paid off, and Ukraine now has a new partner in Hungary – not always an easy one, but one with whom agreements are possible.

But repeating that strategy with Poland is not possible right now.

Nawrocki’s current term has only just begun and is set to last until 2030. There is no certainty that the right wing will not regain both parliament and government in the 2027 elections. So there is no alternative to negotiating, while respecting the red lines of both sides. Zelenskyy must seek a path to such agreements even when no path is visible.

Options must be proposed that allow Nawrocki to claim an electoral victory and to sell the decision to right-wing voters.

And for that to happen, bridges with Poland, including with the Polish right wing, must not be burned. There are still many friends of Ukraine there, but in the current climate they are forced either to remain silent or to join the chorus of critics.

The trip to Gdańsk (and possibly also to Warsaw) should be the first step on this difficult path.

Editorial Board of European Pravda

The speed of the application in such an extraordinary situation signals that EU accession is regarded primarily as a geopolitical project. However, it will also entail the economic integration of Ukraine into the European internal market.

For this integration to succeed, Ukraine’s industry must remain competitive.

And that is where a geopolitical project such as EU accession turns into a practical economic question: how can Ukraine prepare its industry to meet European environmental standards, including the requirement to purchase permits for its carbon emissions?

If Ukraine wants to become a full member of the European Union, its industry will ultimately need to pay the European carbon price. If this is the goal, Ukraine must decide: prepare its industry for it, or not.

Already now, a portion of Ukrainian exporters are being exposed to Europe’s climate regime, with the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism entering its paid phase this year.

But unlike in the EU,

Ukrainian companies have so far had to face these challenges alone,

with no sustainable domestic financial mechanism for public support. Without enabling frameworks for decarbonisation investments, companies have a hard time preparing their businesses for steeply rising carbon prices.

Clearly, such support cannot come from Ukraine’s wartime state budget. But it also does not have to. Across the EU, decarbonisation support instruments are largely financed through revenues generated by carbon pricing itself.

This principle, known as carbon-price recycling, was also introduced in Ukraine through the creation of a small decarbonisation fund that earmarks carbon-pricing revenues for decarbonisation investments.

The central problem, however, stayed unchanged: a low carbon price generates only limited revenues and therefore only limited support.

Without such, Ukraine’s industry does not have enough investment finance to modernise and prepare for integration into Europe’s climate regime. Also, the potentially-to-be-created Modernisation Fund, as recently proposed under the draft law on national ETS, will not solve the problem.

The chicken-and-egg problem of carbon pricing

This creates a chicken-and-egg problem. Without financial support for decarbonisation, industry is reluctant to politically accept higher carbon prices. Yet without higher carbon prices, Ukraine will struggle to mobilise the investment needed for a successful green transition.

At the same time, if Ukraine ultimately wants to join the European Union, it will have to integrate into the EU’s Emissions Trading System, which currently produces a carbon price of around €70–90 per tonne of CO2.

In a country whose carbon price is still below €1 per tonne, a sudden, unmitigated increase of more than 60-fold would overwhelm businesses.

As EU integration is seen as the only credible way to Ukraine’s prosperity and security, and EU integration is directly linked to joining EU carbon pricing, the best way forward is a predictable, gradual increase in carbon pricing.

This would help avoid a sudden shock to the industry, steer reconstruction investments toward cleaner and more modern production, and support Ukraine’s long-term competitiveness inside the European internal market.

Ukraine, therefore, should begin preparing for its transformation as early as possible. Yet, wartime conditions shape policymaking towards short-termism, even when the strategic goal remains European integration.

How to double compensations

That is why Kyiv and Brussels need a new political agreement.This agreement should be centred around a simple principle: every euro raised domestically through Ukrainian carbon pricing and/or national ETS should trigger additional European co-financing.

This mechanism has the potential to fundamentally change the political economy of carbon pricing in Ukraine.

With it, higher carbon pricing would immediately generate additional investment capital for Ukrainian businesses needed to modernise. With such a mechanism, Ukrainian industry would not need to fear paying EU-level carbon prices, which could in turn incentivise Ukraine to gradually increase the level and expand the scope of its domestic carbon pricing.

Both revenue streams could flow into a jointly governed European-Ukrainian instrument focused on industrial modernisation, clean energy infrastructure and long-term reconstruction investment.

Over time, such a mechanism could mobilise billions of euros annually

and allow Ukraine to build a strong institution similar to the climate and industrial funds that already support the EU’s own green transition.

If Ukraine is serious about EU integration, it needs to increase its carbon price. But if Europe is serious about Ukraine’s accession, it cannot treat Ukrainian industrial modernisation as Kyiv’s problem alone.

A jointly financed and jointly governed financial institution could bridge this gap and help Ukraine (re)build a competitive and sustainable industry that can compete within the European green economy and contribute to its advancement.

Georg Zachmann, Alexander Sicheneder, Green Deal Ukraine;

Oleh Savytskyi, Razom We Stand 

This cluster, Fundamentals, is often described in Brussels as the backbone of the accession process. It is opened first and closed last, and the pace of the entire accession track depends on progress within it. In addition to judicial reform, the cluster covers reforms in anti-corruption, public procurement, and financial control.

The rule of law is particularly important in the context of Ukraine’s European integration. Yet, when it comes to justice and judicial integrity, Ukraine unfortunately remains far from being among Europe’s top performers.

Despite this, much has been achieved in recent years. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC), electronic asset declarations, and the reformed High Council of Justice (HCJ) and High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), renewed with the participation of international experts – all of these achievements emerged thanks to Ukrainians’ strong demand for reform and the significant role played by Ukraine’s international partners.

At the same time, initiatives that in reality move Ukraine further away from European standards

can be presented under the banner of "European integration".

Under the Ukraine Facility Plan, the Verkhovna Rada was supposed to adopt, by mid-2025, legislation improving judges’ integrity declarations and the procedures for verifying them. The reform was expected to introduce clearer declaration requirements, extend the verification period, establish more detailed procedures, and provide for clear legal consequences.

After missing the deadline by an entire year, Parliament finally adopted Law No. 13165-2 on this issue on 9 June 2026. The reason lawmakers ultimately acted is well known: nearly €400 million in funding is linked to improving the system for verifying judges. Moreover, European Commissioner Marta Kos, who visited Kyiv shortly beforehand, specifically urged Parliament not to jeopardise these funds and to finally take this step.

The paradox is that, under the guise of a European integration law, Parliament adopted a piece of legislation that moves Ukraine further away from the European Union, democracy, and the rule of law.

What are judges’ integrity declarations and why do they matter?

Every year since 2016, judges have been required to submit an integrity declaration. This is a special questionnaire in which a judge confirms, among other things, that they live within their lawful means, have not issued decisions in situations involving a conflict of interest, and have not attempted to obtain Russian citizenship.

If any of these statements are found to be false during the verification process, the judge is supposed to be held accountable – although, as discussed later in this article, the sanctions currently provided by law are far from severe.

The need to improve judges’ integrity declarations and the verification process did not emerge out of nowhere. In practice, the first phase of judicial reform following the Revolution of Dignity proved largely unsuccessful. After nearly 3,000 judges were assessed for integrity and professional competence, only 15 were dismissed, roughly 0.5%.

Dozens of judges lacking integrity made it onto the Supreme Court, which was built from scratch between 2017 and 2019 without the involvement of international experts. The scandal surrounding former Supreme Court Chief Justice Vsevolod Kniaziev and the record-breaking bribe allegedly paid to him, along with other judges ,some of whom have already received formal notices of suspicion, was merely a symptom of a flawed selection process.

It is also worth recalling how the Supreme Court spent years returning judges lacking integrity to the system. For example, it derailed the assessment process for nearly 180 such judges and allowed several dozen others, including the controversial Judge Inna Otrosh, to avoid completing the assessment altogether.

Moreover, the Court opened the door for all judges who failed the assessment to take what is known as an "honourable retirement" route. Instead of facing accountability, they were allowed to leave office while retaining substantial lifetime benefits and other privileges associated with judicial status.

Against this backdrop, the European Union has been calling on Ukraine throughout the past three years, in its annual reports, to "address corruption within the Supreme Court".

The only realistic way to do so today is through the verification of Supreme Court judges’ integrity declarations. Other mechanisms are no longer available: either the applicable limitation periods have expired, or those mechanisms have already been applied in a purely formal manner, while neither the Constitution nor the law permits their repeated use.

In fact, over the past ten years, no judge has been punished for providing false information in an integrity declaration.

The loophole that allows judges lacking integrity to avoid accountability is embedded in the law itself. Liability exists only for the intentional submission of false information. In legal practice, however, proving intent, as opposed to a mistake, oversight, or forgetfulness, is nearly impossible.

Even in the rare cases where intent was established, the penalties imposed amounted to little more than a warning or the loss of bonus payments for a month – hardly a meaningful incentive to change behaviour.

This is precisely why the demand emerged to "fix" the integrity declaration mechanism.

To make it effective, the law should establish liability for gross negligence when completing declarations, extend the maximum verification period to allow all relevant circumstances to be examined, and strengthen sanctions so that dismissal of a judge becomes a realistic outcome.

And one more element is critically important under current circumstances: international experts should be temporarily involved in the review of judges serving on the highest court, namely the Supreme Court.

All of these requirements are reflected in the Ukraine Facility Plan, the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Kachka–Kos list of priority reforms for 2026, and the accession negotiation benchmarks under Chapter 23.

Beyond the Supreme Court, this mechanism could also serve as an important accountability tool for judges in lower courts. For example, it could be used to review approximately 300 appellate court judges who have never undergone the qualification assessment that all other judges have faced.

This refers to a procedure introduced ten years ago that proved largely formalistic: even when a judge demonstrated incompetence or a lack of integrity, the most severe consequence was often little more than mandatory professional training courses.

How a "European Reform" was replaced with an imitation

The draft law on improving the verification of judges’ integrity declarations was postponed until the very last moment. As the deadline approached, it was suddenly introduced in Parliament allegedly given that international financial assistance depended on its adoption and that failure to act immediately could result in the loss of funding.

Yet instead of improving the mechanism, Members of Parliament voted to remove roughly half of the declaration requirements and render verification of the remaining provisions largely meaningless.

For example, judges are no longer required to confirm that their assets correspond to their income or that they did not issue rulings against protesters during the Revolution of Dignity. The verification period for most declaration elements was reduced to just one year, despite explicit EU requirements to extend it.

Liability remains limited exclusively to cases involving "intentionally false" statements, even though practice has demonstrated how difficult it is to prove intent. In addition, lawmakers introduced a number of harmful provisions, including the possibility of challenging verification results in court and an automatic "amnesty" whereby a judge escapes accountability if the review is not completed within six months.

In effect, rather than improving the mechanism, Parliament has further weakened a tool that was already ineffective.

This is not the first time Ukrainian authorities have committed to a reform only to exploit vague requirements or changing circumstances in order to replace genuine reform with imitation.

But this represents a new level of distortion of what is presented as a "European" law.

Lawmakers ignored the relatively detailed requirements set out in EU documents and adopted legislation that directly contradicts its stated purpose and produces the opposite effect.

If such a reform is accepted as fulfilling Ukraine’s commitments and all related funding is disbursed, it will send a clear message to the authorities: violations of obligations carry no consequences and will ultimately be forgiven.

That would open a Pandora’s box, creating a powerful incentive to repeat similar tactics in other areas of reform.

It is telling that the judiciary immediately understood the message of this "amnesty". Just hours after Parliament adopted Draft Law No. 13165-2, the Supreme Court reinstated Aliona Mazur, a previously dismissed judge of the Kyiv District Administrative Court (OASK) linked to the "Vovk tapes" scandal.

The continuation of this approach could encourage other influential actors within the government to replicate the "success" of summer 2025 to dismantle NABU and SAPO independence.

It is worth recalling that this desperate and highly damaging step for Ukraine was also preceded by a series of violations of EU integration commitments by the Ukrainian authorities, coupled with a persistent unwillingness on the part of the EU to acknowledge them.

The EU has leverage over reforms and that leverage must work

Over the past twelve years, key rule-of-law reforms in Ukraine have not occurred because the political leadership suddenly developed an internal desire to dismantle the old system. More often, they became possible when two factors converged: pressure from civil society within the country and clear conditions set by international partners.

This is how reforms in the fields of justice, anti-corruption, and law enforcement were achieved. International financial assistance, macro-financial programmes, visa liberalisation, candidate status, and now the EU accession process have all followed the same logic: reforms in exchange for political support, funding and progress towards membership in the European Union.

This is particularly important today, when martial law has significantly restricted the usual democratic tools for holding the government accountable. Elections are not being held, peaceful assembly is limited, and society has fewer ways to directly compel politicians to deliver on their promises.

As a result, the role of international commitments becomes even more important.

They remain one of the few effective levers preventing reforms from either stalling altogether or being reduced to mere imitation.

There is no shortage of examples of successful reforms carried out under strong international conditionality.

For instance, the reform of the Constitutional Court judge selection process, as well as the reform of the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges, formed part of the seven steps Ukraine was required to complete when it was granted EU candidate status in June 2022. In other words, even the most significant changes to the judicial system were not initiated in isolation, but through a combination of domestic pressure and external conditions.

This is not because Ukraine is incapable of reforming itself. Rather, it reflects the enormous resistance of the old system. Without clear conditions, deadlines, and consequences for non-compliance, those in power almost invariably attempt to delay change, hollow it out or present formal measures as genuine reform.

The law on judges’ integrity declarations was also intended to be a reform implemented in exchange for funding and progress towards EU membership.

Instead, the authorities effectively sold their partners the title of the bill rather than its substance.

One often hears the counterargument that taking a principled stance on reforms could somehow harm the Ukrainian state. In reality, the opposite is true.

When international partners take a clear and consistent position, Ukraine is capable of securing parliamentary support even for difficult decisions. This was the case with restoring the independence of NABU and SAPO, as well as with other important legislation. For that reason, international partners should maintain the same level of clarity now and refuse to accept imitation reforms where genuine results are expected from Ukraine.

Especially because the EU currently possesses perhaps the strongest tools for supporting reform in Ukraine that it has ever had.

A €30 billion support package for the next two years, the launch of accession negotiations, and unprecedented public support for the EU among Ukrainians have created a unique window of opportunity. Ukrainians support not only EU membership itself but also the rules and standards without which membership is impossible.

In particular, 73% support international partners exerting pressure on the Ukrainian authorities to clean up the justice system and combat corruption. Meanwhile, 64% view Brussels’ requirements as a genuine effort to help Ukraine modernise.

The situation surrounding the law on judges’ integrity declarations can still be corrected.

The legislation can be revised and brought into line with the objectives for which it was originally created. Likewise, approaches to assessing Ukraine’s compliance with its rule-of-law commitments should be reconsidered when the authorities offer an imitation of reform instead of the real thing.

This is not a choice between supporting Ukraine and criticising it.

It is a choice between supporting genuine reform and accepting its imitation.

Mykhailo Zhernakov, Executive Director of the DEJURE Foundation

Tetiana Shevchuk, Lawyer at the Anti-Corruption Action Centre (AntAC)

One of the most significant milestones at this stage of the accession process is meeting the interim benchmarks.

This entails carrying out a series of reforms in key areas of the rule of law, justice, and public order. These benchmarks were established by the European Union under Chapters 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) of the Fundamentals Cluster.

The candidate country must not only align its legislation with EU law, but also apply these norms within existing public institutions, or even establish new ones.

The aim of such reforms is to demonstrate that progress in the fields of the rule of law, anti-corruption, human rights, security, and border management goes beyond legislative changes and results in tangible, lasting improvements to the functioning of the state.

Albania and Montenegro – spot the difference

This is why these benchmarks carry particular importance. The provisional closure of any other negotiating chapter is contingent upon Ukraine fulfilling the interim benchmarks in Chapters 23 and 24. In other words, this is a stage of the negotiations without which the process cannot advance to its final phase, even across other chapters.

The implementation of the interim benchmarks must be confirmed in a separate European Commission report – the Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR). Based on this assessment, the EU Member States will make a key political decision regarding the country's further advancement in the accession negotiations.

The experience of other countries shows how important it is not to waste time at this stage.

After Montenegro received interim benchmarks from the EU in 2013, it took more than ten years, until June 2024, for the country to receive a positive assessment from the European Commission on the IBAR. A range of factors contributed to this: limited political will, frequent changes in governments and negotiating teams, weak institutions, and the broadly and imprecisely formulated nature of the EU-defined benchmarks themselves.

Albania has shown a different trajectory.

The Fundamentals Cluster was opened in October 2024, and in May 2026 the EU Council confirmed that Albania had generally fulfilled the interim benchmarks under this cluster. The country completed this stage in less than two years.

This is an important lesson for Ukraine. We cannot afford the Montenegro scenario: a decade of slow movement, inconsistency and loss of political momentum. Ukraine's interest is to replicate the Albanian experience, and possibly even exceed its pace.

What needs to be done

That is why the Ukrainian Centre for European Policy, together with its partners, has prepared a study on how Ukraine should meet the interim benchmarks under Chapters 23 and 24. Its aim is to convert the benchmarks set by the European Commission into a detailed and practical implementation plan. (The study is currently available in English, and the Ukrainian version is being prepared.)

In judicial reform, the key issue is the stable and integrity-based functioning of judicial governance bodies, primarily the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ). The capacity of these bodies underpins the selection of judges, the filling of vacancies, disciplinary proceedings, judicial accountability and the overall performance of the judicial system.

This calls for a combination of legislative amendments, including ensuring continued involvement of international experts in the HQCJ selection process, addressing deficiencies in the appointment procedures for the HCJ and HQCJ, and strengthening their legal frameworks, as well as institutional steps aimed at improving and digitalising workflows and enhancing institutional capacity.

In the anti-corruption sphere, the focus is on ensuring the inevitability of criminal liability for corruption, strengthening the independence of anti-corruption bodies (primarily the NABU and SAP), removing legal obstacles to the investigation of corruption offences, reviewing statutes of limitation and ensuring that anti-corruption bodies can effectively carry out their mandate.

In the area of fundamental human rights, the challenges involve long-standing structural problems: the non-enforcement of court decisions, torture and ill-treatment, inadequate conditions in places of detention, the lack of a comprehensive personal data protection system, weak anti-discrimination frameworks and insufficient investigation of violent crimes.

In the field of migration, asylum, and border management, the main task is not only to update legislation but also to establish a modern system of coordination between authorities. Implementing EU standards requires measures in the areas of international protection, legal migration (particularly labor migration), combating illegal migration and migration-related offences and immigration policy for foreign nationals. In the area of border management, efforts will focus on implementing the new Integrated Border Management Strategy and establishing a National Schengen Management System.

Law enforcement reform involves the transformation of key institutions: the SBI, the National Police, the BES, the SSU, the ARMA, the penitentiary system, the probation service and other bodies. Key priorities include building a robust legislative framework, conducting transparent selection processes for senior positions, implementing external audits and reinforcing accountability and public oversight.

It is already clear that the implementation of interim benchmarks may encounter a number of risks capable of slowing or even blocking progress.

What could stall the reforms

In the judicial sphere, the key risk relates to whether the significant renewal of the HCJ and HQCJ membership, expected as early as next year, can be effectively managed. It is important to maintain the quality and rigor of the selection process established in 2022-2023 and to address any shortcomings in the selection procedures in advance.

If the governing structures of these bodies are not formed in a timely manner, this may halt nearly all personnel processes in the judicial system, including judicial selection, qualification assessments, disciplinary procedures, and dismissals,

thereby effectively blocking the implementation of the relevant benchmarks.

The anti-corruption sphere remains politically sensitive, as reforms in this area directly affect the balance of powers and accountability in the state. Any strengthening of the NABU and SAP's powers is often perceived by political actors as a potential threat, which generates a cautious or even critical attitude towards the relevant reforms. This creates a risk of delays or partial implementation of key decisions.

In the area of fundamental rights, the main challenge is that reforms require significant resources, time, and changes in related sectors. They may require revising Soviet-era codes, rethinking the social security system and its financing, reforming investigative practices and creating new institutions, such as an independent personal data protection authority.

Certain measures may trigger public or political controversy, including anti-discrimination legislation, the legalization of same-sex partnerships, provisions for alternative service during mobilisation, migration policy changes, and penitentiary reform.

In the area of migration and border management, effective inter-agency coordination will be the key challenge. This area involves various ministries, agencies, and international partners, while in practice their interaction is often difficult to ensure, particularly due to limited coordination mechanisms, overlapping mandates and imperfect procedural rules.

Law enforcement reform faces risks associated with martial law: certain reform components, particularly the reform of the SSU, can only be fully implemented after the war is over.

Civil society matters

Accordingly, the task of the non-governmental sector is to work in a structured way with both government and society to prevent these risks from slowing down reforms and the negotiation process.

A distinct role in the implementation of the interim benchmarks falls to the Verkhovna Rada. All areas will require considerable legislative effort, with parliamentary involvement needed, depending on the sector, for between 25% and 70% of measures. In many cases, it is legislation that launches the reform, which is then implemented at the institutional level.

Without swift, consistent, and high-quality parliamentary work, progress in implementing the benchmarks will be impossible. The effectiveness of parliamentary work will also depend significantly on how promptly and effectively the government prepares the required draft legislation.

In discussions about "accelerated membership" or "intermediate integration formats", it is important not to lose sight of one fundamental point: for many EU member states, even those strongly supportive of Ukraine, progress in the rule of law remains a non-negotiable condition.

This reflects both the experience of previous enlargement rounds, when some new EU members were still unable to fully complete rule-of-law reforms years after accession, and the need for Ukraine to convincingly demonstrate real change in the areas of law and justice.

European politicians need persuasive arguments for their voters and colleagues.

The state that joins the EU must not only proclaim its commitment to the rule of law and anti-corruption; it must demonstrate real and sustained change. That is why the implementation of interim benchmarks is not a bureaucratic formality, but a political test of Ukraine's capacity to advance towards membership.

The path to the effective closure of negotiating chapters and progress towards a future full EU membership agreement will only begin once Ukraine meets these benchmarks.

Viktoriia Melnyk, Coordinator of the European Integration Department, Center of Policy and Legal Reforms

Liubov Akulenko, Executive Director of the Ukrainian Centre for European Policy

The article is based on a joint study by:
Center for Civil Liberties Europe Without Barriers Center of Policy,
Legal Reforms Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre
under NaUKMA Ukrainian Centre for European Policy

It returned in Vesna, a film about forbidden funerals in occupied Ukraine.

It returned in Minotaure, the Grand Prix winner by Russian director Andrei Zviaguintsev, where the war appears through the moral collapse of a society sending men to the front.

It also appeared more indirectly in other films haunted by Europe’s old wars. Coward, set in the trenches of the First World War, follows two soldiers caught in the mud and fear of a conflict that was supposed to belong to the past.

Seen in 2026, its images of men trapped in trenches inevitably recall the conditions still faced by some Ukrainian units on the front line.

Even La Bola Negra, awarded for best direction alongside Pawel Pawlikowski’s Fatherland, added to a selection marked by history, violence and the return of political cinema.

Ukraine returned most clearly on the stage of the Grand Théâtre Lumière, when Zviaguintsev, now living in exile, called on Vladimir Putin to end the "carnage".

The moment mattered because it did not come alone. The 2026 edition of Cannes was widely described in the French press as political, humanist and marked by resistance.

On the Croisette, Ukraine was not forgotten. The war still had a name, a face and a moral place. The audience heard a Russian dissident address the man responsible for the invasion. French media covered the speech. A film about occupied Ukraine found its place in the official selection.

But Cannes also tells only part of the story.

French paradox

The festival shows that Ukraine remains present in France’s cultural conscience.

It does not show how far French society is still willing to go politically. Four years after Russia’s full scale invasion, French opinion on Ukraine is harder to read than it was in 2022.

It has not turned pro Russian. It has not become indifferent. But it is no longer carried by the same sense of emergency.

The latest Ifop survey, conducted in February 2026, shows the new balance. A majority of French respondents support a major increase in the defence budget. Yet only 47% now approve the supply of weapons to Ukraine by European countries,

down from 65% in March 2022.

That is the French paradox. The country increasingly accepts that Europe has entered a more dangerous age. But its public is more divided on how far France and Europe should go for Ukraine.

Before 2022, Ukraine was still distant for many French people. After the beginning of the Crimea crisis in 2014, French support for financial aid to Ukraine was limited.

Support for Ukraine’s entry into the EU was even weaker, with fewer than one in three French respondents in favour. For many voters, Ukraine looked like a difficult crisiis on Europe’s eastern edge, not yet like a question of French security.

The full scale invasion changed the picture.

In 2022, Ukraine entered French public consciousness in a different way. The war was no longer an obscure geopolitical dispute. It was a brutal invasion, watched in real time, on European soil. The reaction was not only diplomatic. It was human. In May 2022, 84% of French respondents supported welcoming some of the Ukrainians fleeing the war.

For comparison, only 46% had supported receiving migrants crossing the Mediterranean in 2015.

Arms deliveries divide the French public

That first movement has not disappeared. But it has changed.

Humanitarian support remains the easiest. Financial help is still easier to defend than weapons. EU accession opens a more difficult debate. Direct military involvement remains the hardest line of all.

The change is clearest on arms deliveries. In the first weeks of the invasion, sending weapons to Ukraine looked like an emergency response to an obvious aggression.

Four years later, it has become a dividing issue. Approval has fallen below the majority threshold. Disapproval has almost doubled.

The French have not become sympathetic to Moscow.

They have become more reluctant about the means used to support Kyiv.

That reluctance does not mean France ignores the Russian threat. It means that threat perception no longer settles the political debate. Many French voters accept that Europe must become stronger. Fewer accept that France should be directly exposed in Ukraine.

The same 2026 survey makes the hesitation visible. If a ceasefire were reached, 40% of French respondents would approve sending French soldiers to Ukrainian soil to provide security guarantees to Ukrainians. 43% would oppose it.

French wants guarantees for Ukraine, but not an uncontrolled escalation. It wants a stronger Europe, but not a Europe left alone facing Russia.

This is also why the question of the United States remains so important.

When asked who should help ensure Ukraine’s security after a ceasefire, most French respondents wanted other countries, including the United States, to participate alongside Europeans.

Very few wanted Europe to carry the burden alone.

To make Ukraine visible

That is what Cannes can still do: return a distant war to the realm of human experience.

The festival is a place of images, emotion and moral recognition. It can make Ukraine visible again.

It can remind a French audience that occupation is not an abstraction.

Vesna does this with particular force. In the film, the Russian occupier forbids the burial of civilians who resisted.

A priest and his parishioners try to offer the dead a grave despite the orders of the occupier. The image was striking, simple and brutal; even mourning becomes resistance.

Minotaure approaches the war differently. It does not place Ukrainian suffering at the centre. It looks at Russia from within.

The film follows the disintegration of a Russian bourgeois world while the "special military operation" sends men into the machine of war.

Zviaguintsev’s speech gave a direct political voice to a film built on moral decay.

The film and the speech do something useful for the French debate. They break the lazy confusion between Russia and Russians.

They show that a Russian artist can stand against the war without pretending that the war is leaderless or abstract. Zviaguintsev did not ask "both sides" to stop. He addressed Putin .

That distinction is crucial in France, where the tradition of dialogue with Moscow has long survived changes in government.

In the French political imagination, speaking to an adversary is not always seen as weakness.

The Fifth Republic has often treated dialogue as a way to preserve influence, even when trust is absent.

From Kyiv, dialogue with Putin can look like ambiguity. From Paris, it often looks like a way of keeping control over risk.

What Ukraine in the EU means for the French

The same caution appears on EU accession. For Ukraine, accession is about justice, survival and security. For many French voters, it is also about money, agriculture, institutions and the future shape of the Union.

Ukraine’s possible accession would not be a routine enlargement. It would give the EU’s expansion a new geopolitical weight, while forcing the Union to rethink its budget, institutions and major policies.

None of this weakens Ukraine’s case. It changes the way the case has to be made.

The French public can support Ukraine and still worry about what a larger Union would become. Saying that Ukraine belongs in Europe is important. Explaining how Europe would adapt iis now just as necessary.

On screen, Ukraine still appears as a moral fact. In polling, it appears more and more as as a political choice.

In 2022, the images were enough to move people: tanks crossing the border, families fleeing, cities under bombardment, a country refusing to disappear. In 2026, those images still matter, but they no longer settle the debate.

The French public now asks what support means in practice, how long it will last, what risks it carries, and what place Ukraine will occupy in Europe’s security architecture.

For Ukraine, the situation is therefore more complicated than in 2022.

France has not stopped caring. But sympathy alone no longer carries the debate. The war is now also seen through questions of risk, costs and European security.

That does not make Ukraine a burden. It simply shows how much the war has changed Europe.

Cannes can still make people listen, as Zviaguintsev’s speech showed.

But outside the festival hall, the harder question remains: whether France is ready to see Ukraine not as a distant tragedy, but as a war that also concerns its own future in Europe.

Charlotte Guillou-Clerc,

Journalist (France)

European Pravda has published detailed coverage of both the criticism of these proposals and the arguments in their defence, as well as explanations provided by the official German side.

The editorial team has also received an article by leading European experts Steven Blockmans and Michael Emerson, who join the debate and explain why Germany’s ideas may, in fact, have considerable merit.

Rejecting a ‘membership light’ offer because of its negatively perceived symbolism means failing to take advantage of valuable deliberative and participatory rights in the EU.

In a system built on consensus rather than majority voting, having a seat at the table can matter as much as having a vote. Candidate countries with speaking rights can shape EU decisions and legislation.

The extension of representative rights prior to accession does not relegate candidate countries to a waiting room. It marks an important signpost on the formal trajectory towards full membership.

EU should open the clusters all together

In May, the EU quietly broke a months-long stalemate over Ukraine, pushing through an expansion of the mandate for its advisory mission to the country (EUAM) after Hungary lifted its opposition, sustained since late 2025.

The decision drew far less media attention than the €90 bn loan that Budapest had likewise stalled since January, but the significance of this seemingly technocratic amendment should not be underestimated: it could help prepare the war-torn country for eventual EU membership by accelerating reforms to its rule of law and civilian security institutions.

The opening of accession negotiations on these Fundamentals (cluster 1) is expected to happen by the June European Council, following technical consultations between Budapest and Kyiv, after the new Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar said that Ukraine must ensure the Hungarian minority enjoys the same rights as minorities in other EU countries.

As we have argued elsewhere, accession talks should commence with all 35 negotiation chapters to be opened at an early stage of the process, so that preparedness for membership can be measured across the board and be rewarded with gradually higher levels of access to the EU’s policies, institutions and funding each time average rating thresholds are met.

Combining pre-accession access in technical areas like transport, financial services and food safety with progress in the justice and interior sectors (chapters 23 and 24) in the average ratings ensures that candidate countries do not just pick the low-hanging fruits but also crack the hardest nuts.

It also protects them from ending up with access to just certain areas of the single market, i.e., partial rather than full membership.

Support for a form of staged accession for all candidate countries that have opened membership negotiations is found in separate proposals from three member states [Lithuania, Germany and France], which have been in circulation since April.

Each of the so-called non-papers introduces an eye-catching label of advanced pre-membership status

and is intended to accelerate membership talks and prevent the recurrence of old dysfunctionalities in the enlargement methodology.

Rather than dismissing it out of hand, Ukraine should embrace this move.

Yet the EU’s offer to Ukraine should also include steps to recognise its unique and technologically impressive war effort on behalf of all of Europe beyond itself.

Paris advocates an "integrated status" for Ukraine

To signal a firm determination about expanding the EU, a French non-paper talks about extending "integrated state status" encompassing gradually upscaled representative rights in the institutions and pre-accession access to EU policies and "all funding programmes which are open to third countries", subject to candidates having made sufficient progress with regard to the fundamentals and the principle of reversibility.

This comes close to the ‘nominated member state’ proposal we made in February, whereby a (geo)politically significant commitment by the EU is backed up with important representative, but not voting, rights for Ukraine and other candidate countries in the Council of Ministers and other EU bodies.

The French paper employs lots of grand language ("accelerating", "streamlined", "upscaled", "enhanced") but is mostly vague in its proposals, except for its exclusions, most notably that of no access to the common agricultural policy and cohesion funds until after accession.

Berlin: focus on Ukraine

A German non-paper sent by Chancellor Merz to Presidents Costa, von der Leyen, and Christodoulides for discussion at the June European Council proposes "associate membership" for Ukraine, which is weaker than the French label since the candidate country already has an association agreement with the EU.

However, the German proposal goes much further in spelling out institutional access prior to formal accession, with, among others, full participation (without voting rights) in European Council and Council meetings, and the appointment of an associate Commissioner (without portfolio), associate MEPs (without voting rights), and an associate judge of the Court of Justice. Here, too, an incremental approach in stages would make sense.

Helpfully, the German proposal also spells out how the principle of reversibility might be operationalised. It introduces a ‘snap-back mechanism’ in case of backsliding on respect for the fundamental values of the EU: structural steps back in the accession negotiations.

The German chancellery does not propose associate membership for Moldova and the Western Balkans.

Instead, it calls on members of the European Council to look into innovative solutions to accelerate the accession process for those countries, most notably by granting "observer status in all relevant EU institutions" upon substantive progress on priority pathways into the internal market.

For Berlin, the distinguishing feature between Ukraine and the other candidate countries lies in the "particular situation the country has been forced into" by Russia, and the time pressure the EU is under to enhance Ukraine’s position in view of the impending peace process.

Incidentally, it is worth noting that neither the French nor the German non-paper mentions extending qualified majority voting (QMV) to intermediate steps in the accession process, an idea that several think tanks have been pushing for years.

Lithuania’s idea of an "acceding state"

A Lithuanian non-paper does make this plea, but other member states have not endorsed it so far. One concern about the paper is that it proposes that the EU set a target date for "membership within this decade".

Worryingly, another reason may be opposition to mainstreaming QMV in the pre-accession process.

Vilnius suggested that the concept of "acceding state", which currently only exists once an accession treaty has been signed, be applied to a candidate country already much earlier, i.e., "once it successfully passes the 1st cluster Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR), demonstrates comprehensive alignment with the acquis, and achieves advanced (at least 90%) alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)".

These are attractive proposals that merit serious consideration

and should not be left by the wayside by the European Council and in the follow-up to its discussion.

Bestowing "acceding state" status would send a much stronger signal than "associate member".

Ukraine’s unique security role

It is striking that the German non-paper also highlights that Article 42.7 – the EU's mutual defence clause – could be made de facto applicable through a mere political declaration.

This is likely to be more than one bridge too far for several other member states prior to a sustainable peace deal with Russia, but could be implemented through a coalition of the able and willing to extend such security guarantees.

Indeed, Ukraine’s unique role in countering Russian aggression deserves more explicit recognition than is evident in the three non-papers.

Ukraine should be fully integrated in whatever emerges in the direction of an emerging European Defence Union.

This implies not just defence industrial integration, but also inclusion of Ukraine in a future European Security Council, its supporting command structures, and multinational force packages.

A beacon, not a waiting room

Dismissing an advanced status offer for its negatively perceived ‘symbolism’ while continuing to push an unrealistic goal of obtaining full membership in the next year or two is not just tantamount to shooting oneself in the foot by forgoing early and valuable deliberative and participatory rights in an EU that puts a premium on consensus-building rather than majority rule.

Having a seat at the table often matters as much as having a vote.

Candidate countries which are bestowed with speaking rights gain influence in the decision-shaping process of EU positions and legislation where, more often than not, no vote is taken. Rejecting such an offer is to underestimate the value and promise it holds.

It is also a denial of how enlargement politics work between and within EU member states; a refusal which no amount of repetition of the (valid) argument that Ukraine is fighting in defence of all of Europe is going to overcome.

The merits-based approach to pre-accession means that the process is a marathon, not a sprint. The German non-paper puts a fine point on this: given the "countless hurdles" in the accession process and the "political complexities of ratification processes in various member states", it takes years to obtain full membership.

A candidate country needs to earn the trust of its future peers who will share their money and power with the new entrant.

Trust takes time to be earned and can be lost instantly. Experiences with member states backsliding on respect for democracy and the rule of law, as indeed news of recent corruption scandals rocking Kyiv, have only hardened the EU’s resolve in strictly applying this fundamental condition for membership.

This is why cluster 1 of the accession negotiations is opened first and closed last: to have the time to assess the track record.

Finally, the current alignment of stars is vulnerable to the prospects of electoral gains by populist radical right parties like the Rassemblement National and the Alternative für Deutschland, which oppose enlargement outright; these should be distinguished from parties like Fidesz which oppose EU membership for Ukraine and Moldova but advocate for accession of the Western Balkans.

Even if Fidesz has been knocked off its pedestal, populist radical right parties continue to rise across Europe. Their framing of the enlargement policy and candidate countries is likely to influence public opinion across the EU, forcing governments and other actors to adopt a more cautious approach to enlargement, especially in countries where referenda must be won to ratify accession treaties.

Form over substance?

Tinkering with the enlargement methodology is no substitute for geopolitics. It is high time for the European Council to open accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova.

The recent flurry of seemingly technocratic decisions and proposals indicates that something is, indeed, afoot. The politics around the enlargement methodology are slowly shifting in the governments of key swing member states, such as France and Germany.

It is evident that Paris and Berlin recognise that something needs to be done now to prevent old ghosts of the pre-accession process from rearing their ugly heads as and when anti-enlargement parties may gain strength. In the meantime, Ukraine should seize every opportunity to accelerate its accession process.

For their part, the friends of EU enlargement should harness the process so that the gradual integration of candidate countries does not fall prey to nativist and revisionist tendencies inside the European Union.

The offer needs to transcend mere symbolism and be concretely benchmarked (cf., ‘staged accession model’). To be meaningful, it needs to go beyond the initial priority pathways into the single market and integrate Ukraine into the emerging European Defence Union as a prospective full founding member.

Concretely, participation in EU Councils without voting rights should be seen as a major advance in institutional integration,

since this leaves open all possibilities for decision-shaping, with most decision-making actually taking place without a vote.

The idea behind the flurry of member state proposals is not to invent new vocabulary for postponing or substituting membership,

but to genuinely accelerate accession in a credible and manageable way.

The extension of representative rights prior to accession does not relegate candidate countries to a waiting room. It marks an important signpost on the formal trajectory towards full membership.

Steven Blockmans, Deputy Director of the International Centre for Defence and Security (Tallinn),

Michael Emerson, Associate Senior Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels),

For European Pravda

When German Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz wrote to the EU leadership to propose a special path for Ukraine towards EU accession (and a new status for Ukraine which Merz dubbed "associate membership"), the letter triggered a reaction in Kyiv that Berlin probably hadn’t been expecting.

European Pravda has already published both an article criticising the German approach and explaining how it should be changed, and arguments from Brussels in favour of the idea, highlighting the advantages for Ukraine of participating in EU institutions even without voting rights.

However, it was important to hear an explanation from Germany.

So we were happy to accept an invitation to discuss the issue with the German Ambassador to Kyiv, Heiko Thoms.

In this interview – which definitely deserves attention – the ambassador explains Merz’s motives and acknowledges that some elements (such as the name of the format) need to be adjusted, while others have been misunderstood in Kyiv. Berlin continues to believe that the idea is worth considering and has assured us that this is "the best proposal that will be discussed anytime soon for Ukraine".

It’s also worth noting that Berlin sees something positive even in Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s rather critical comments about the German idea.

"I understand the desire to become a member of the EU very soon"

I believe you have heard that Merz’s proposal did not receive an unequivocally positive response in Ukraine, haven't you? 

Yes, there were a number of reactions which do not necessarily reflect the intention of the letter sent by Chancellor Merz. It’s a proposal specially designed and tailored for Ukraine, a country which is at war, which needs our support, which is receiving our support, and which will continue to receive our support. And one of the ways of expressing our support is to pave the way for Ukraine into the European Union.

For the German government, the goal is to get Ukraine into the European Union, and we want Ukraine to be in the EU as fast as possible.

And the proposal by the Chancellor, by the German government, is meant to speed the process up and give Ukraine additional ways of being represented in Brussels on your way to the EU. It’s something that we are not going to offer to other candidate countries because we want to reflect Ukraine's unique position as a country at war, which is still making great progress. You're one of the frontrunners among the candidate countries.

That doesn't mean that you cannot do better, but you're doing quite well.

The president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, responded to Merz’s letter with scepticism. He said that Ukraine deserves 100% membership, and he reads the letter as an offer of "semi-membership". 

It's very important to look at the facts objectively. Merz’s letter very clearly says that our goal is Ukraine's full membership in the European Union.

At the same time, I’d subscribe to every word President Zelenskyy says in his letter. There is nothing that I would not agree with.

The only thing that I believe is very important for everyone to understand is that there cannot be a discount on EU membership. And I believe that this accession process, with all the steps that need to be taken, is first and foremost in the interest of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.

But I don't see the letter by President Zelenskyy as going against the proposal. On the contrary, I find that he, in his own way, expresses support for many elements of Merz’s proposal.

Our goal is shared. 

We want Ukraine to become a full member of the European Union, full stop. 

You want the same.

That sounds quite surprising. In Ukraine it was perceived differently, and I didn’t see that support in the letter either. 

I can see it.

And I understand the desire to become a member of the European Union very soon. I see the negotiating position of Ukraine – that you want to define a date.

That's the only element where I believe we will still need to discuss more with Ukraine. I think it's important to understand that just mentioning a date will never be enough to join the EU. What needs to be done is to take the necessary reform steps. That’s why it's in Ukraine's own hands when the accession will happen. When Ukraine does its homework, Ukraine will be in the EU.

Has anyone else in Ukraine, apart from the president, shared their impressions of Merz’s letter with you? 

Of course – we are in touch with many interlocutors here, including those who are steering the process. They understand the nature of the proposal very well. 

 "If Moldova stopped reforming, this would not harm Ukraine"

I believe that some elements of the Merz proposal should be amended. One example is the name "associated membership". You may have noticed that it met with widespread criticism here in Ukraine. 

Yes, but I believe it's partially due to misunderstandings of the nature of the proposal. Because it is not a second-rate membership. It is not an intermediate status that then will become permanent. 

I believe this name was also a mistake in communication terms. Ukraine has had an Association Agreement for over ten years, and "associated membership" is perceived as something we already have. 

Yes, I can see that too.

But we are not married to that name. If someone comes up with a better name, we are for it.

There are still concerns that we could get stuck in that semi-membership position. 

Look, there are only two possible pathways.

The first path, a standard one: Ukraine does the necessary reforms and joins the European Union and all the EU structures after all the benchmarks are fulfilled.

And a second path: Ukraine does the necessary reforms and at some point also becomes a full member of the European Union, but in the meantime you also get some additional elements of membership right now. That’s an option no other candidate country will get.

With this second path, you will be represented in the College of Commissioners, you will have members in the European Parliament, participation rights in the European Council, even observer judges in the European courts, and you will also benefit from the application of the acquis communautaire.

That means that we’re offering full membership, which is the desired outcome for President Zelenskyy, plus some additional elements.

The Merz proposal also reflects that it is not only your interest but also our interest to have Ukraine inside the EU. For that, we are bringing you as close to us as possible already today.

You mentioned that this is a unique scheme that would only be offered to Ukraine and no other candidates. It would mean that our "accession coupling" with Moldova would be broken. In Ukraine, decoupling is seen as a threat because we had a bad experience with the Hungarian veto, when decoupling was pushed for. Who knows whether it won’t happen again?

Well, indeed there were good reasons why there was this coupling, and everybody knows what the background is.

But in the end, for Moldova and for Ukraine, everything will depend on reforms. Now, if Moldova suddenly stopped reforming, this would not hold Ukraine back. 

It’s the same in the other direction.

President Zelenskyy clearly says in his letter that Ukraine should stay within the same type of accession process as Moldova. Does Germany insist on the contrary?

I think this debate is rather a distraction because in the end, your membership will not depend on what another country is doing or not doing. It will depend on what your country will be doing in terms of implementing reforms.

If Moldova stopped reforming, this would not harm you. And the other direction as well. 

"It's probably the best proposal that will be discussed anytime soon for Ukraine"

Chancellor Merz’s letter mentions that negotiating clusters should be opened immediately. 

That's our clear intention. That's our political direction: we want clusters to be opened as soon as possible, and we want all clusters to be opened. 

But every member state sees that "as soon as possible" differently.

Yes, absolutely.

But the opening of at least one first cluster might be a matter of weeks, if not days – that’s what we’re pushing for. You know there will be a European Council [meeting] in June, and it’s usually a moment when important decisions are being taken.

Only the first cluster?

That would be my realistic expectation now.

And for all the rest of the clusters, I believe we will also be making progress soon. But again, in the end, what is really important is not formal steps. What is important is changes in substance. And there Ukraine has homework to do.

We on our side also have work to do inside the EU. 

As you rightly referred to, there were blockages of Ukraine in the past, which was also frustrating for us. And I believe that we are making good progress here. We are having very substantial talks now with some member states of the EU which will enable us to show progress with Ukraine in the near future.

When do you expect this scheme which Chancellor Merz is proposing to start working? When will Ukraine get that observer status? 

As soon as it has been agreed by all member states.

I don't think there's any connection. I believe once a decision at the European Council or in some other format is taken and supported by 27 states, then it can be implemented immediately.

And there’s something I want to make very clear: the proposal by us, by Germany, to Ukraine is, I believe, the most concrete proposal that has been on the table yet. And it's probably the best proposal that will be discussed anytime soon for Ukraine.

The best one? What about the Lithuanian idea of granting Ukraine the status of an "acceding state"?

I was talking about realistic proposals among those on the table now.

And it's not a given, it's not self-understood that everyone in the European Union will automatically agree to this German proposal. This is something that we jointly need to work for.

Germany feels obliged to work on it. It’s our proposal, and we will do what we can to fight for it inside the European institutions, but of course, 

we also need Ukrainian backing for this.

And of course it would be hard to convince other EU members that this is the direction we should take if Ukraine is not on board.

Let’s talk about reforms. There are definitely some reforms that are the most important. And possibly there are solutions that could unlock membership even before the full list is implemented, but when Ukraine is almost ready. 

I agree. I think it will very much depend on the momentum that will be observed. And that has been the case also for other countries.

But still, there will be no discounts in the sense that we, in the end, will require less from Ukraine. That needs to be understood.

And that’s why it's so important that reform momentum is not lost. Ukraine has been a model candidate for many years, and now it's extremely important that we do not stop here or slow down.

Ukraine needs to reform further, and this is very much in the interest of the country and the Ukrainian people, who are demanding more transparency, demanding additional efforts in the fight against corruption, demanding more steps for fostering the rule of law in your country.

There are still things that Ukraine can do and that Ukraine must do.

"German IRIS-T systems are probably as important as Patriots, but less well known"

Russia is threatening Ukraine with new attacks. I'm happy to see that we are meeting here at the embassy and your staff are around. 

We can also meet next week, and we will be here too.

We have absolutely no reason to change our presence here in Kyiv. 

Ukraine needs additional support to protect its skies. And Germany is definitely number one among our allies in terms of providing air defence capabilities. How many Patriot systems have you already provided? 

We intentionally do not disclose concrete numbers, but you're right that when it comes to air defence – but also, I believe, in almost every other respect – Germany is the number one supporter of Ukraine. That includes other forms of military support, support for the civilian sector, for the energy sector, fostering regional structures, administrative reforms, and also assisting you and standing by your side in the EU accession process. 

Whatever area you name, even support for schools and frontline areas. And I don't want to mention the support we give to Ukrainian refugees in Germany.

Indeed, we can now fairly say that we are overall the number one supporter of Ukraine.

Speaking about air defence, indeed we have provided several Patriot systems.

Also, we help through the PURL mechanism [the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List, through which US military equipment, including Patriot interceptor missiles, is purchased for Ukraine – EP], where we are again the largest supporter. Here we have been providing PAC-3 missiles, which are the most effective defence against Russian ballistic missiles. And we have now signed a deal about providing additional PAC-2 missiles, which goes into the hundreds.

Then I would like to mention the German IRIS-T systems, which are probably as important as Patriot, but less well-known. This is the most effective air defence means that Ukraine has against cruise missiles.

As you remember, last winter there was a minimum of energy infrastructure in Ukraine that could be preserved, and your air defence managed to do it in large part due to the IRIS-T systems that we delivered.

We all know that the situation in the winter was extremely difficult; our embassy also suffered from it, and we all stayed here. And I can say that if Ukraine hadn’t had that IRIS-T supply, the situation would have been worse. They proved to be very efficient, very often showing a hit rate of 100% against cruise missiles from Russia.

But again, we don’t share the numbers of systems we supply, and we do that intentionally. I can only say that we supplied several hundred IRIS-T interceptor missiles, and that’s going up.

Readers sometimes ask: why does Germany need to support Ukraine that much?

Frankly, that's a surprising question to me. I'm always being asked the question the other way around. But of course, I have the answer.

It's obvious that no country which is under attack by a criminal regime like the one in Moscow can withstand those attacks alone.

If you are under threat of attack from an actor which blatantly violates international law, which has such military means at its disposal, you need help from your friends. And we consider Ukraine not only a partner but also a friend, and we will continue to stand by your side.

As the Chancellor said once, Germany is acutely aware that Germany is not at war at this point in time, but we are also not living in peacetime.

Sergiy Sydorenko

Editor, European Pravda