This is a brief summary of the European Commission's forecasts and plans, published alongside its annual Enlargement Report.

This report is the main document of the year assessing the progress (or lack thereof) made by candidate countries. For the first time in its history, the European Commission has presented roadmaps for the next stages of the enlargement process, additionally to the report, for the four most advanced candidate countries, including Ukraine.

In Ukraine's case, this document is clearly more optimistic than expected and certainly more ambitious than the pace of reforms demonstrated by Kyiv. Brussels, however, explains that it sees an acceleration in the process and expects this trend to continue.

For now, the European Commission has set an expected date for signing the accession treaty only for Montenegro: June 2027. No predictions have been made regarding the final accession dates for the other candidates.

The decision to leave the timeline open was largely driven by Ukraine.

A draft containing dates had been prepared, but the European Commission received signals from EU member states that room should be left for Ukraine to accelerate its progress. After all, Ukraine is currently falling behind Moldova. The Commission agreed that it would be politically inappropriate to issue an assessment suggesting that Moldova could join the EU earlier.

Nevertheless, Moldova is clearly more advanced in terms of reforms, and the approved documents confirm this.

The Enlargement Report also sends optimistic signals to Ukraine. This is another surprise and another important message for Kyiv. The document presents a paradoxical situation. The European Commission acknowledges that reforms in Ukraine have slowed significantly over the past year, yet its assessment of Ukraine's readiness for EU membership has improved, recording the largest increase in the country's history. This includes the critical Fundamentals chapters.

Brussels, however, offers a logical explanation for this phenomenon.

In particular, regarding anti-corruption efforts, the European Commission explained that the improved assessment was not the result of government action, but rather happened despite it. This is because the EU takes into account not only legislative changes but also the work of Ukrainian civil society, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO).

The document also sets out the tasks Ukraine must accomplish if it hopes to remain among the four leading candidates.

Brussels' ambitious plans for Ukraine

Just a few years ago, when Ukraine was only moving towards opening accession negotiations, the EU was engaged in a debate about whether it could cope with such a significant enlargement. The institutional challenge was considered to involve not only admitting Ukraine, the largest candidate country, but also integrating ten new states (which would mean ten additional leaders in the European Council, new official languages, and so on).

Recently, the EU has begun distinguishing between serious and nominal candidate countries.

This distinction has now been formalised, helping the EU acknowledge that it is already ready for enlargement.

The European Commission has identified four promising candidates with the agreement of all member states: Montenegro, Albania, Moldova and Ukraine. On 4 November, roadmaps and timelines were presented in Brussels, outlining how each country is expected to progress towards EU membership.

Ukraine has not yet completed the opening of all negotiation clusters. The two remaining clusters, the most difficult, are awaiting Hungary's approval. Nevertheless, all of the European Pravda's sources in Kyiv and Brussels are confident that this will happen by the end of 2026. Officials in Brussels say they have received positive signals from the Hungarian side. Although the European Commission cannot issue instructions to member states, its roadmap for Ukraine "insists on/calls for making every effort" to open the remaining clusters by the end of 2026.

But the most ambitious target for Ukraine has been set for 2027.

The European Commission expects Ukraine to receive a positive assessment of its fulfilment of the IBAR benchmarks (the Fundamentals benchmarks) in the first half of that year. This will allow Kyiv to move on to closing accession negotiation chapters.

The roadmap aims for Ukraine to close seven negotiation chapters in 2027 (education and culture; intellectual property; social policy; enterprise and industrial policy; science and research; external relations; foreign, security and defence policy).

The Commission wants the first of these chapters to be closed in the first half of the year. It means Ukraine must complete the necessary IBAR reforms and submit its report to Brussels as early as April, or at the latest in early May.

Kyiv is even more ambitious. Ihor Zhovkva, Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, stated at the Accession Exchange Forum on 4 November that Ukraine plans to receive a positive IBAR assessment as early as March and to close several chapters, rather than just one, by mid-2027, as expected by the European Commission. The Ukrainian roadmap explicitly provides for this possibility if Ukraine progresses faster than anticipated.

But the current pace of reforms in Ukraine suggests that even the European Commission's plans are extremely ambitious.

A study by the Ukrainian Centre for European Policy indicates that since June, when the first cluster was opened, Kyiv has completed only 20% of the tasks required for IBAR.

This means that Ukraine must complete the remaining 80% in the same amount of time. This will be very challenging politically. IBAR includes all tasks related to the rule of law and the fight against corruption contained in the "Kachka-Kos list". [In December 2025, the Ukrainian government made written commitments to the EU regarding urgent key reforms in the areas of the rule of law and anti-corruption. The plan was signed on Ukraine’s behalf by Taras Kachka, Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, and became unofficially known as the "10 Kachka-Kos points".]

The latest published assessment, released in June, of Parliament's implementation of the Kachka-Kos list gave it just 15 points out of 100. European Pravda is aware of more recent assessments that were not made public due to the lack of progress. These indicate that the current score would be slightly above 20 points.

The four leading candidate countries

What gives the European Commission grounds for such optimistic expectations? To answer this question, it is worth first looking at the other leading candidate countries.

First and foremost – at Moldova.

The introductory and descriptive sections of the roadmaps for Ukraine and Moldova are practically identical. However, the specific details allow us to draw one conclusion:

The EU acknowledges that Moldova has overtaken Ukraine.

Overall, the European Commission has not attempted to hide the fact that it has its own ranking within the group of four.

Montenegro is in the lead, as it is already almost ready to sign its accession treaty. Albania is in second place, with Brussels describing its negotiations as "advanced".

Moldova comes next, currently considered "well advanced" in meeting the interim benchmarks. Several sources have told European Pravda that the European Commission has prepared a positive IBAR assessment and is expected to send it to member states for approval soon. Marta Kos, the European Enlargement Commissioner, could announce this at any moment.

The European Commission's plans for the next stages of negotiations are particularly telling. For Ukraine, the roadmap envisages beginning to close negotiation chapters towards the end of the first quarter (although, given Kyiv's limited current progress in meeting IBAR requirements, even this seems ambitious). For Moldova, the plan is to close nine chapters in the first half of 2027 and another 16 by the end of the year – a total of 25 chapters in one year.

For Albania, the plan is to close all 31 remaining negotiation chapters, as well as Cluster 1, by the end of the year. In fact, this means Albania could spend 2028 preparing its accession treaty.

However, no specific target year for completing negotiations has been announced for either Moldova or Albania, although the European Commission had initially planned to do so.

According to European Pravda, this decision was made in Ukraine's interests. It would be politically unwise to further emphasise that Moldova will be ready for EU membership before Ukraine. After all, the EU is prepared to demonstrate in every possible way its desire to include Ukraine in this wave of enlargement, provided that reforms progress.

The Enlargement Report illustrates this further.

Ukraine: Record progress despite a lack of reforms

Ukraine has been included in the European enlargement report for the fourth consecutive year.

And if any of these four reports can be considered successful for Ukraine, it is the current one.

European Pravda prepares an illustration every year showing Ukraine's progress towards EU membership.

This year's illustration requires some additional explanation.

It has never before seen such progress in the European Commission's assessment of Ukraine's readiness for membership. The progress is still insufficient for a country hoping to join the EU within the next few years, but it is greater than ever before. The overall assessment across the 33 negotiation chapters has increased by 4.5 points, with half a point of progress in each of nine chapters.

The fact that the increase was limited to just nine of the 33 chapters does not mean that there is no room for further progress.

Nevertheless, the largest increase Ukraine had previously achieved in a single year was 2.5 points, so the current result is certainly not bad.

Paradoxically, however, this record improvement for Ukraine has occurred against a backdrop of openly weak progress. The European Commission states that the pace of reforms has slowed significantly in eight chapters, even compared with 2025, although concerns about the speed of reforms had already been raised last year.

How is it possible that the pace of reforms has deteriorated while the assessment of achievements has improved? The European Commission insists that its assessment is justified, although it did involve some "creative approaches" on the part of European officials.

To give Ukraine a better assessment in Chapters 23 and 24, the Commission had to take into account reforms implemented in the autumn, even though the report normally assesses results achieved between 1 September of the previous year and 1 September of the current year.

On Thursday, EU Ambassador to Ukraine Katarína Mathernová emphasised that reforms had accelerated specifically during the autumn. Other officials, speaking anonymously, have said the same.

Ukraine's progress over the years. Graphic: European Pravda

"Ukraine has in fact implemented a number of reforms, including in the judiciary. It is true that progress was somewhat mixed before the summer, but since then, significant progress has been made, including on reforms under the Ukraine Plan. This justifies the assessment we have included in the report," a senior EU official involved in preparing the document told European Pravda.

Assessments of the Fundamentals deserve particular attention.

Ukraine's scores have increased across all areas, including the fight against corruption. This is despite the fact that there were no reforms in this area during the autumn, while key documents, such as the anti-corruption strategy, remain unadopted.

So what explains the improvement in Ukraine's assessment?

This is another creative approach by Brussels, and one that is entirely justified. The European Commission constantly emphasises that EU accession is not the responsibility of the president, the government or the Verkhovna Rada [Ukrainian parliament] alone. It is a task for all of Ukraine and every level of society. And this is precisely what has provided the basis for the positive assessments.

The European Commission is almost explicitly saying that progress has sometimes been achieved not thanks to the government's actions, but despite them.

All the cards are on the table for Ukraine

The improvement in the European Commission's assessment of Ukraine's anti-corruption efforts despite the government's actions is particularly evident.

"Some progress was made, mostly because the specialised anti-corruption institutions – the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) – continued to deliver on their mandate and build a track record by stepping up investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in high-level corruption cases, including at the highest levels of government and the judiciary," the document states.

Several sources who were involved in preparing the document confirmed this interpretation of the paragraph to European Pravda.

Moreover, the remainder of the European Commission's report reinforces this conclusion.

Brussels makes no secret of the fact that the Ukrainian authorities need to fundamentally change their approach.

Officials in Brussels presumably understood that the positive assessment could be misinterpreted by the Ukrainian government. They therefore explicitly emphasised that the EU is fully aware of the seriousness of the problems.

European Pravda has reported that a shadow report commissioned by the European Commission points to serious problems, including alleged persecution of anti-corruption detectives by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the authorities more broadly.

All the main elements have also been included in the official report.

"Despite these improvements, the limited advancement in adopting structural legislative and institutional reforms recommended by the Commission remains a major concern, requiring urgent action by the authorities to ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of the anti-corruption framework. Anti-corruption institutions continued to report pressure from state institutions, law enforcement and security agencies, and their situation remains fragile overall. Despite some improvements in regulatory and corporate governance, corruption remains an issue in certain economic sectors, particularly energy, defence and construction," the European Commission states.

In view of this, the European Commission needed another creative approach.

EU Ambassador Mathernová had already announced it the previous day, when she stated that the EU report on Ukraine would take into account progress made in previous years.

Indeed, the European Commission's report states that it took into account "cumulative improvements in institutional capacity and the implementation of preventive measures over recent years", which made it possible to improve Ukraine's assessment.

An important detail is that this approach has not encountered opposition from EU member states. European Pravda has received confirmation of this from European capitals, where officials say the report appears objective. The European Commission also expects this approach to be accepted, as several sources have confirmed. Everyone understands why this is happening.

There are two main reasons why Brussels is looking for creative ways to present Ukraine in a more favourable light.

First, the EU recognises that Ukraine's accession process is taking place during a full-scale war and therefore requires special consideration. The EU cannot waive reform requirements for Ukraine. Such a move would not have the support of member states and would contradict the very logic of EU membership. However, the EU is prepared to demonstrate flexibility.

Second, the EU has no desire to decouple Ukraine and Moldova, even though Chișinău currently appears better prepared than Kyiv to report on its progress. That is why Brussels is willing to look for alternative approaches and procedures and even temporarily delay Moldova. In particular, there are indications that despite Moldova being ready to submit its IBAR report, it is unlikely to be approved quickly. This would give Ukraine time to catch up with its neighbour.

The main question is whether Ukraine, and above all its parliament, will be willing to take the necessary steps towards EU membership, or whether it will return to the path of slowing down reforms, despite the consequences.

Sergiy Sydorenko, Kyiv

Tetiana Vysotska, Brussels

European Pravda

Until recently, the 57-year-old mayor of Cannes was relatively unknown outside French political circles. Now, he is attracting national attention ahead of the 2027 presidential election.

The electoral picture is more restrained. His online expansion has been remarkable, but it has yet to produce comparable levels of electoral support.

A survey conducted on 17–19 October gave Lisnard between 5.5% and 7% of first-round voting intentions,

depending on the candidates included

What makes Lisnard particularly interesting is the programme accompanying his sudden popularity. At a time when France's traditional right is struggling to distinguish itself from Emmanuel Macron's centrism and the nationalist right, Lisnard is defending an ambitious programme of economic liberalisation, drastic public-spending cuts and decentralisation. He couples these proposals with conservative positions on immigration, security and national authority.

For a country where economic liberalism has rarely inspired mass electoral enthusiasm, Lisnard's sudden popularity is striking. Whether voters are embracing his economic ideas or simply the man promoting them is far less certain.

Cannes as a launchpad

Lisnard is hardly a newcomer to politics. He began his career in local government, became mayor of Cannes in 2014 and was elected president of the Association of French Mayors (AMF) in 2021.

He developed Nouvelle Énergie from a local political initiative into a national movement before leaving Les Républicains (LR) in March 2026 to pursue his presidential ambitions independently.

Lisnard has built his political reputation in Cannes, where he was re-elected for a third term in March with more than 81% of votes cast. His list won 45 of the 49 council seats, although fewer than half of registered voters participated.

Lisnard presents Cannes as evidence that public administration can be made more efficient without sacrificing investment. According to the municipality's 2025 accounts, the city's debt has fallen by nearly €82 million since 2014, while €72.5 million was invested during 2025 alone.

An independent audit by the regional chamber of accounts confirmed that Cannes had maintained sound finances and improved its management. It also found that transfers of responsibilities to the intermunicipal authority contributed to reductions in municipal expenditure.

Cannes's substantial tourism-related revenues further distinguish it from most French municipalities.

These qualifications do not negate Lisnard's record, but they complicate his argument that the same methods could be applied to France as a whole. A municipality benefiting from international tourism and major commercial events operates under very different financial and institutional constraints from the French state.

Nevertheless, his experience gives him an established political base.

Unlike a candidate whose notoriety originates entirely online, Lisnard had spent decades building relationships with elected officials before acquiring a much larger national audience.

The speed of that expansion has surprised even experienced political observers. According to Le Monde, he gained more than 300,000 social-media followers from late September to mid-October, with much of the increase concentrated on Instagram. His slogan, "something is happening" spread rapidly across social platforms.

Nouvelle Énergie, meanwhile, claimed 81,547 registered members and a database of 1,830 elected officials on 24 October.

Neither figure has been independently audited, and the latter does not necessarily represent politicians affiliated exclusively with the movement. Whatever the explanation for the rapid increase in visibility, Lisnard has succeeded in drawing attention to a political project that had previously received limited national exposure.

A liberal revolution for France?

At the centre of Lisnard's programme is a severe diagnosis of the French economic model. He argues that decades of expanding public expenditure, taxation and regulation have weakened competitiveness, discouraged enterprise and left France dependent on borrowing to sustain a state it can no longer afford.

His proposed remedy is extensive. Lisnard wants to reduce annual public expenditure by €80 billion during his first year in office and by at least €200 billion by the end of the presidential term. His longer-term ambition reaches €300 billion.

His argument is that France taxes employment and production too heavily,

making companies less competitive while preventing employees from receiving a sufficient share of what their work costs employers. Lower contributions, he believes, would improve purchasing power and encourage employment without relying on further borrowing.

The programme extends well beyond taxation. Lisnard advocates greater labour-market flexibility, the elimination or consolidation of public agencies, a reduction in administrative staffing and a transfer of responsibilities away from central government.

On pensions, he supports raising the legal retirement age to 65 and introducing a compulsory funded component alongside the existing pay-as-you-go system.

The scale of these proposals deserves attention. Cutting €200 billion from annual public expenditure would require changes extending far beyond administrative efficiency.

France's social insurance, pensions, healthcare and public services account for a substantial proportion of government spending. Decisions about their financing inevitably affect the distribution of resources between citizens, businesses and generations.

There is also a difference between reducing public expenditure and reducing the fiscal deficit. Lisnard proposes returning most of the savings to workers and companies through lower contributions and taxation. Under his stated allocation, only €40 billion of the €200 billion would go directly towards debt reduction.

His campaign maintains that the necessary savings have been identified. Their feasibility, timing and effects on public services require independent examination.

French voters have repeatedly demonstrated their attachment to public services and social protection, including when supporting parties that favour greater economic freedom.

Lisnard nevertheless sees the existing welfare-state model as exhausted. In a recent interview, he argued that France needed to develop a new system rather than continue financing an increasingly expensive one through debt.

His liberalism also has clear limits.

On security, Lisnard advocates tougher criminal penalties, greater police authority and stronger measures against drug trafficking.

His immigration programme proposes substantially reducing residence permits, tightening access to certain benefits and asserting greater national control over migration policy, even where that would involve confrontation with European judicial institutions.

In education, he proposes giving schools considerably more autonomy, including greater freedom over admissions and organisation, while reinforcing academic standards.

These positions reflect his understanding of the state's proper role. He wants government to withdraw from areas where he believes individuals, businesses and local authorities can act more effectively, while strengthening its authority over security, justice, education and defence.

His programme therefore combines a substantial reduction in economic intervention with a demanding conception of public order and national sovereignty. Its political coherence depends partly on whether those stronger sovereign functions can be financed alongside the tax and spending reductions he proposes.

Lisnard's battle for a place on the right

Lisnard's sudden visibility comes amid a prolonged struggle over the identity of France's traditional right.

The emergence of Macron's centrist movement weakened Les Républicains by attracting part of its moderate and economically liberal electorate.

At the same time, the Rassemblement National (RN) expanded its support among voters who might previously have identified with the conservative right, particularly on immigration, security and questions of national identity. Lisnard is seeking to establish a position within those divisions.

His relationship with Bruno Retailleau illustrates the difficulties. The two men share conservative positions on immigration, public order and national authority, alongside commitments to controlling public expenditure.

But Lisnard places economic liberalisation at the centre of his programme and has openly challenged the strategy of LR, which Retailleau leads.

Their disagreement is institutional as well as ideological. Lisnard left LR in March after the party rejected his preferred approach to an open presidential primary.

He subsequently called for a broader selection process capable of bringing together competing currents of the right.

The RN presents another challenge.

Lisnard shares some of its positions on immigration and security, but his economic programme differs substantially from the nationalist party's more interventionist approach, particularly concerning social protection, industrial policy and the role of the state in protecting purchasing power. He also rejects withdrawal from the European Union, advocating cooperation between sovereign European states while opposing further political centralisation.

His growing influence has nevertheless begun to affect relations within the traditional right. On 21 October, Lisnard met Retailleau again to discuss the possibility of avoiding competing presidential candidacies, including through a primary. No agreement was reached.

From online popularity to political power

His foreign-policy positions also deserve attention, particularly in Ukraine.

Lisnard has repeatedly supported Ukraine against Russia's invasion and advocated strengthening European defence production. He has personal experience of cooperation with Ukrainian authorities: Cannes established a partnership with Lviv in 2022, followed by a medical cooperation agreement with the UNBROKEN rehabilitation network in March 2024.

He favours stronger European defence capabilities while maintaining that political sovereignty should remain principally with individual states. He has also argued for restoring structured diplomatic dialogue with Russia after the war.

His positions on Ukraine's eventual EU accession and specific post-war security guarantees remain less clearly defined.

For now, the most striking feature of Lisnard's candidacy is the speed with which a long-established local politician has acquired a national audience. His political organisation and economic convictions existed well before the recent surge in attention. What has changed is the number of people his speech reaches.

Whether that enthusiasm represents a growing constituency for economic liberalism remains uncertain. France's traditional right has long struggled to reconcile its commitment to lower public expenditure with an electorate that continues to value extensive social protection.

Lisnard has demonstrated his ability to govern a city and, more recently, to attract a national audience.

Governing France would involve a different test. His proposed reforms would require a parliamentary majority willing to reshape public expenditure on a scale rarely attempted in modern French politics.

Charlotte Guillou-Clerc,

Journalist, France

Following drone strikes by the Ukrainian Defence Forces on data centres in the Russian Federation, Cloudflare (a global cloud platform that acts as an intermediary between website visitors and the server) recorded a decrease in the volume of automated traffic coming from ‘Yandex’.

A lively discussion began online regarding the unverified screenshots showing activity charts for bots supporting the ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD) party. However, these claims around the decrease in bot activity were later debunked.

However, there is verified data regarding another component of the Russian Federation’s disinformation network in Europe – in this case, a German-language network operating in Germany and Austria. Specifically, these are pro-Russian websites which, whilst promoting the Kremlin’s narratives of disinformation and misinformation, actively support the AfD.

Moreover, the resources we have analysed exert a destructive influence that extends beyond mere support for this far-right party. It is clear that their objectives are considerably broader.

Alongside the AfD’s blatant self-promotion, these platforms are spreading Kremlin conspiracy theories.

From myths about the ‘dominance of globalists’ to tales of the ‘decline of Old Europe’.

And this narrative is in line with statements by Putin himself (the AfD’s success is the result of systemic errors by ‘Western globalists’ and a consequence of Europeans realising the risks of being drawn into a war with Russia. Naturally, this is due to the policies of their current leaders).

The analysis of the traffic and content on various online resources clearly demonstrates the scale of this information network.

Such websites include both giant platforms with multi-million audiences and niche satirical sites, whose negative influence lies not in their mass appeal, but in their involvement in targeted GRU/FSB special operations or other hybrid operations, where the media outlet serves merely as a front to legitimise Russian political influence and financial flows.

Unser Mitteleuropa

This resource, which translates to ‘Our Central Europe,’ strives to present itself as an independent volunteer project. ' However, in its regular publications, it categorically depicts the AfD as nothing less than a "breath of fresh air".

The editorial team consistently defends German far right against criticism from the mainstream German media, persuading readers that any pressure on the party only serves to benefit it. Unser-mitteleuropa articles shamelessly brand the democratic parties as a 'dictatorship', while portraying AfD figures as innocent victims of political repression.

It has even reached the point where the author of one article openly stated, "All pressure on the party stems solely from the fact that the AfD, unlike its opponents, seeks to avoid war with the Russian Federation."

However, Unser-mitteleuropa's pro-Russian activity extends beyond merely promoting Kremlin narratives.

Unser-mitteleuropa generously feeds its audience with top-class nonsense: conspiracy theories about the dangers of 5G and anti-vaccine delusions regarding COVID-19 and other disinformation viruses.

One of the website’s most recent articles discussed the alleged influence of US intelligence agencies on Europe within the cultural sphere

The website receives 82,000 visits per month according to data by Similar Sites platform (hereinafter, traffic figures for the resources analysed are also sourced from this platform).

It is worth noting that long before the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the website coordinated the creation of a network of right-wing media outlets, bringing together more than 25 outlets of varying degrees of radicalism under the banner of ‘European Media Cooperation’.

The website’s founder is the Hungarian János Benchik.

At the time the portal was launched, he was a member of the openly pro-Russian Hungarian party ‘Jobbik’.

Bencsik was also the publisher of the provocative website Kárpát Hír, aimed at the Hungarian minority in Ukraine’s Zakarpattia region, through which Kremlin disinformation was systematically disseminated to stir up separatism.

The formal leader of the aforementioned ‘European Media Cooperation’ was the Austrian Peter Gauer (who passed away in November 2021). 

In 2020, he stood trial in Austria on charges of violating the law banning Nazi organisations. He was acquitted at the time, but during the court hearings, Gauer explicitly admitted that he had set up Unser-mitteleuropa together with "Hungarian friends", and had also worked for Stefan Magnet, a figure who will be discussed in a separate segment below.

Report24

This Austrian platform systematically and cynically exploits the war in Ukraine, shifting the blame from the aggressor onto the victim. 

This website persistently feeds its readers the myth that the AfD is the only "pacifist force" capable of achieving peace. Far-right speakers have been given an open platform here to engage in all manner of provocations.

The website’s traffic is quite substantial, reaching over 432,000 visits per month.

On 22 October, Report24 published an article accusing the SPD, the CDU and the Greens of an alleged attack on ‘Alternative for Germany’

Report24’s links to Russia are very clear.

This outlet is registered in Linz, Austria, at the same legal address (Steingasse 6A) as other notorious pro-Russian projects, including AUF1 and Info-Direkt.

In particular, in July 2022, AUF1 promoted the claim that Russia had merely pre-empted a planned invasion of Ukraine by the US and its allies. Meanwhile, representatives of Info-DIREKT travelled to Russia and occupied Crimea, after which articles on those trips appeared in the magazine.

The founder of AUF1 is the aforementioned Stefan Magnet, a long-standing and staunch supporter of the Kremlin who regularly travels to Moscow and publicly praises Putin’s policies.

A column by Stefan Magnet, published in 2019 in the bilingual magazine Art & Business

The magazine Art & Business, in which this ode to Russia appeared, was published in Austria, with Natalia Holtzmüller as the editor-in-chief and organiser of the annual Russian Ball in Vienna (Russischer Ball in Wien). The event was attended by representatives of the Austrian and Russian political, cultural and business communities.

On the eve of the ball in 2015, Stefan Magnet personally presented the fifth issue of the magazine Info-DIREKT. He publicly denied any formal ties to the publication, but the evidence on the matter is clear.

A tweet featuring a photo of Stefan Magnet and the Info-Direkt number

And the icing on the cake: Info-Direkt’s servers have been physically hosted on Russian territory since 2016. So the question of who actually manages these processes answers itself.

Journalistenwatch

This is a classic example of manipulative framing. The website focuses the audience’s entire attention on migration issues, artificially attributing any internal problems in modern Germany exclusively to refugees.

Naturally, the AfD is being presented to Germans as the sole saviour.

Journalistenwatch has an audience of over 574,000 visits per month.

The main theme of its publications is that the current German government is ‘anti-people and undemocratic’, whilst a powerful state repressive apparatus is allegedly working against the AfD.

The editor of this Kremlin propaganda mouthpiece is Max Erdinger, a long-standing contributor to the German branch of the Russian state propaganda network RT (Russia Today). Even after the full-scale invasion, Erdinger shamelessly tried to convince readers that the sanctions against Russia were allegedly imposed by the United States with the sole aim of destroying the German industry.

An illustration accompanying one of the latest articles on the website, in which the author argues that, to end the war, Ukraine must cede the Russian-occupied territories to Russia

The domain is owned by Daniel Matissek, a staff member of the aforementioned Report24. Every article blatantly reveals the Russian influence in Germany.

PI-News

In fact, the site is an aggressive blog (the name stands for Politically Incorrect News), which was officially recognised as a right-wing extremist site by Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in 2021. Its main focus is on inciting hatred, Islamophobia and anti-immigration propaganda.

The site attracts over 850,000 visits a month.

Under the guise of ‘fighting political correctness’, it relentlessly attacks Ukraine, smears the German government and demands the resumption of trade with Moscow. The only role models it holds up are AfD leaders and, previously, the pro-Russian Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán. AfD party officials often publish their articles on the website, praising like-minded individuals.

Articles by Elena Fritz on PI-News. The publication features a photograph of allies of the German far-right

Stefan Gerre founded PI-News after working for a long time in the office of AfD MEP Petr Bistron. This is the very same Bistron whose parliamentary immunity (in the Bundestag and the European Parliament) was annulled in several stages between 2024 and 2025 due to an investigation into the laundering of Kremlin funds in exchange for "necessary" votes.

The funding scheme was linked to Putin’s infamous associate Viktor Medvedchuk and his network of agents of influence, centred around the Voice of Europe project.

COMPACT

Сompact is the flagship of far-right propaganda, created by Jürgen Elssesser. Its set of manipulative tactics is standard: anti-migrant rhetoric, the fight against ‘globalism’, praise for the AfD and the demonisation of NATO as an aggressor in contrast to ‘peace-loving’ Russia.

The website attracts an audience of over 281,000 visits per month.

In March 2022, immediately following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, COMPACT launched a large-scale campaign named ‘Frieden mit Russland’ (‘Peace with Russia’). Elssesser openly calls for Germany to withdraw from NATO, cease support for Ukraine and completely cancel sanctions against the aggressor.

Jürgen Elsesser presents a medal dedicated to Putin at the Russian Embassy in Germany

Jürgen Elsesser is a regular guest at receptions at the Russian Embassy in Berlin. On 7 October 2025, representatives of the outlet presented the ‘Patriot Wladimir Putin’ silver medal, minted to mark the ‘patriot’s’ 73rd birthday.

QPress

Despite its small audience, this site is also worth looking into.

NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre (StratCom) lists QPress as a participant in coordinated Russian disinformation operations. In particular, QPress actively dispelled doubts and covered for Moscow following the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with Novichok.

The Similar Sites service does not index the site at all due to its low traffic volumes. Another service, Ahrefs, reports around 1,300 visits and 1,900 page views per month.

Illustration accompanying the article ‘Aktien: Rhein– & Rausmetall’, which criticises investments by German defence companies and propagates anti-Semitic narratives

This resource masquerades as satire against the "absurdity of everyday life". In reality, however, it pursues a typical Kremlin proxy agenda: supporting the AfD, distorting reality and attacking the German political establishment.

Incidentally, ‘Rausmetall’ is the name of an anti-militarist protest initiative and political slogan in Germany, directed against the expansion of the defence industry, the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany and, in particular, the activities of the German defence conglomerate Rheinmetall. The name is a wordplay: Rheinmetall + raus (‘out’, ‘away’ in German). In a political context, it can be literally translated as ‘Rheinmetall – get out!’

Overton-magazin.de

The paradox of this website lies in the fact that it professes left-wing views. One might wonder: where is the political left, and where is the far-right AfD in this story? But the political horseshoe theory manifests itself flawlessly in this case: the site regularly publishes columns in defence of the AfD, embellished with fear-mongering and claims that any attempt to ban this party will inevitably lead to civil war in Germany.

The site has fairly good traffic – over 211,000 monthly visits.

Overton's authors have close ties to Russian state agencies.

In particular, Ulrich Heiden lives in Moscow and writes for RT, regularly publishing reports from the occupied territories of Ukraine, where he cynically justifies the Russian Federation’s war crimes.

One of Overton's most recent articles is devoted to NATO’s "expansionism" and its alleged role in fuelling conflicts. An illustration depicting Russia surrounded by the Alliance eloquently highlights the content and message of the article "NATO’s Expansion – In Full Swing".

"Even without Ukraine, NATO is continuing on its path of expansion. It creates the impression that all the United States’ efforts to reach an agreement with Russia are aimed solely at masking this reality," writes the author. 

A malicious web: the dominance of pro-Kremlin media 

All the key information channels upon which the AfD’s electoral success is built have a clear, undisguised, and documented link to the Kremlin.

This chain is unbreakable: from shared talking points and servers on Russian territory to visits to the Russian Embassy, the awarding of honours to Putin and the receipt of cash via Medvedchuk’s schemes. These media outlets do not merely spread disinformation under the guise of a so-called alternative viewpoint.

They legitimise agents of influence and create a convenient socio-political lift for pro-Russian forces straight into the German parliament. By obscuring facts, feeding voters conspiracy theories and instilling fear of imaginary threats, Moscow is creating demand for controlled fringe groups whose mission is to undermine Germany’s unity and subjugate it to the aggressor’s interests.

It is high time for Berlin to take these matters seriously. It is not enough simply to monitor content from StratCom purposes or hold public lectures on media literacy.

Financial control mechanisms and ‘sanctions lists’ for the media must be put into effect, including the initiation of criminal proceedings for financing anti-state activities, including such measures as seizure of assets. 

Oleksandr Liemenov, an officer of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Head of the Board of StateWatch think-tank

Volodymyr Cherchyk, Disinformation Researcher and Analyst

These figures point to a challenge Ukraine will increasingly have to address. Crossing the border is only one step in a much longer process that may involve finding a home and a job, accessing healthcare, enrolling children in school and rebuilding everyday life in a community.

The issue is becoming more urgent as millions of Ukrainians have now spent several years abroad, building careers, sending children to local schools and becoming part of their host communities. Some want to come back soon, some are waiting for greater security, and others may consider it years from now. Ukraine therefore needs to understand both what makes coming home possible and what helps people build a sustainable life once they are back.

What happens after people return?

Research conducted within YOUA – "Shaping New Paths, Building Ukraine’s Future" project offers a closer look at what happens after people come back and what may influence future decisions. Implemented by GIZ in cooperation with Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity, the project combines research, policy support, work with communities, digital tools and dialogue with Ukrainians abroad.

A research team led by the ifo Institute is studying Ukrainians abroad, people who have returned and those who remained in Ukraine, including which policies can actually influence intentions to return.

The preliminary findings reveal some of the challenges after arrival. Among surveyed returnees, full-time employment stood at 43%, compared with 56% before the full-scale war, while 34% of those employed were working below their qualification level. Everyday expenses and access to healthcare and medicines were among the most frequently reported needs.

For a country that will need human capital for reconstruction, these findings matter. People coming back need opportunities to use their skills, regain economic stability and build a viable life in Ukraine.

What can actually influence return?

The decision to return depends on many factors, with security remaining the most fundamental. At the same time, economic and social conditions play an important role, influencing not only people’s willingness to return but also their ability to build a stable life in Ukraine. Public policy must therefore address both the factors that encourage return and the needs of people after they come back.

It is equally important that such policies take into account the interests not only of those returning from abroad but also of other groups within Ukrainian society.

Return policy should therefore be viewed in the broader context of strengthening social cohesion. Its purpose is not only to create incentives for Ukrainians to return from abroad but also to ensure a balanced approach to supporting everyone affected by the consequences of the war. The needs of returnees must be addressed alongside those of people who remained in Ukraine and those who have been internally displaced.

Return ultimately happens in a community

National policy can set the framework, but reintegration happens in a city, town or village, through access to housing, employment, schools, healthcare, services and social connections.

Over the past year, YOUA has worked with 10 pilot communities, with another 14 expected to join, helping them better understand the needs of people considering return, communicate local opportunities and develop practical solutions.

For some Ukrainians, coming back will not mean returning to the place they left. Homes have been destroyed, communities remain under occupation or close to the frontline, while employment or family circumstances may lead people elsewhere. Ukrainian communities may therefore increasingly become places where returnees build a new home rather than simply resume the life they had before the war.

From research to practical tools

People considering returning to Ukraine may need information about documents, employment, housing, healthcare, education and available support long before they make a decision.

One practical tool developed within YOUA in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity is Dodomu, a digital platform that brings verified information together and helps users build a personalised return plan.

Note: The screenshot shows an English translation of the Dodomu website (dodomu.unity.gov.ua). The original website is in Ukrainian

More than 68,000 users have already visited the platform, many of them exploring their options rather than preparing to move immediately. After a short questionnaire, Dodomu suggests relevant steps, services and communities based on the user’s circumstances, with more than 150 communities and 30 programmes and services already represented.

Dodomu remains in beta, and users are invited to test the platform and share feedback on missing information or services. People can also share their experiences of returning or considering a return, providing insights into the practical challenges they face.

Staying connected also matters

YOUA also works to strengthen dialogue between Ukrainians abroad and those living in Ukraine. The project does not seek to influence individual decisions about return; its work with institutions and communities focuses on creating better conditions for those who choose to come back.

Dialogue between communities, Ukrainians abroad, civil society organisations and people who have already returned can help maintain meaningful connections with Ukraine even when coming back is not an immediate plan. This will become increasingly important as Ukrainians abroad build professional experience, networks and lives in other countries, while retaining opportunities for future cooperation, knowledge exchange or eventual return.

For Ukraine, success cannot be measured by border crossings alone. Sustainable return will depend on whether people can find housing, use their professional skills, access essential services and see a future for their families here. At the same time, maintaining meaningful ties with Ukrainians who remain abroad will be essential for keeping them connected to the country and its future.

Getting people home is one challenge. Creating a country in which they can build a future – while keeping those abroad part of Ukraine’s future – is the bigger one.

Dodomu was developed within the YOUA "Shaping New Paths, Building Ukraine’s Future", implemented on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine. According to the project, no Ukrainian state budget funds were used to develop or operate the platform.

The project provides technical assistance only and does not influence individual decisions about returning to Ukraine. Participation in its activities and use of its services are entirely voluntary for people considering return, those who have already decided to return, and those currently reintegrating after returning to Ukraine.

In 2027, the Italian general election could take place between March and June or between September and December, during a key electoral cycle beginning with Spain in November 2026, followed by France in April and ending with Poland in the autumn of next year.

The debate over Ukraine in Italy reflects its longstanding pacifist traditions, the strong influence of Russian narratives and an extensive Russian disinformation campaign aimed at supporting populist parties across the political spectrum. The central issue is the continuation of Italian military aid to Ukraine.

From Draghi to Meloni

Since the first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Italy has consistently stood by Ukraine’s side.

A decisive role was played by Prime Minister Mario Draghi,

who adopted a firm pro-Ukrainian position and was the first leader of a major European country to back the decision to grant Ukraine candidate status for EU membership. According to former Minister Dmytro Kuleba’s latest book, whose account was confirmed by former Italian Ambassador Pier Francesco Zazo, it was during Draghi’s train journey with Macron and Scholz in June 2022 that the Italian prime minister persuaded a still-hesitant German chancellor to support this decision.

After the fall of Draghi’s government and the calling of elections, there were concerns that Italy’s next government would adopt a less supportive position towards Ukraine. However, the centre-right coalition led by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, to the surprise of many, continued and strengthened her predecessor’s policy.

Based on the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker, Italy allocated €4.31 billion in bilateral financial (€0.48 billion), humanitarian (€0.83 billion) and military (€3 billion) assistance, representing 0.24% of its 2021 GDP. Italy’s attributed share of EU allocations, including the European Investment Bank (EIB), amounted to €13.80 billion.

Total bilateral and EU allocations therefore amounted to €18.11 billion, representing 1.02% of Italy’s 2021 GDP.

With the approval of the new Italian electoral law, it is now possible to outline different political scenarios based on current polling. The Stabilicum, an electoral law designed to guarantee a stable majority after the elections, is essentially a proportional system, but it includes a seat bonus to ensure a stable governing majority when certain conditions are met.

The governability bonus is triggered when a coalition finishes first and receives at least 42% of valid votes in the elections for both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the two chambers of the Italian Parliament. If no coalition reaches the 42% threshold, seats are allocated on a purely proportional basis.

Another relevant element of the new electoral law is the requirement for each coalition to name the person it intends to propose to the President of the Republic as prime minister.

All party voting-intention figures below are drawn from the YouTrend/AGI Supermedia published on 15 October 2026, a weighted average of national voting-intention polls conducted between 1 and 14 October.

The centre-right will continue military support for Kyiv

The first scenario is the re-election of the centre-right government, led by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, with more than 42% of the vote. According to current opinion polls, the centre-right coalition falls slightly short of the 42% threshold: Brothers of Italy (27.2%), Forza Italia (7.4%), the League (6%) and Noi Moderati (1.2%) together account for 41.8%.

However, a political agreement was reached with Sud Chiama Nord (1.1%) on 12 October, bringing the coalition’s combined support to 42.9%.

Meloni, whose government has become the longest-serving in the history of the Italian Republic, has taken a clear stance in support of Ukraine, despite the initial fears. In her address to the Italian Parliament ahead of the European Council meeting on 15–16 October, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni was clear:

"Support for Ukraine is not an alternative to peace; it is what makes peace possible."

Meloni warned that if Ukraine stopped defending itself, the result would be the occupation of a European nation and a return to Soviet-style imperialism.

She reiterated her commitment to pursuing a just peace, even at the cost of political support: "Only a just peace can last. Only a just peace can safeguard Europe and our interests."

Meloni also criticised US President Trump’s diesel deal with Putin, describing it as "a legitimisation of Moscow while its bombs continue to fall on Ukrainian cities, new revenue to finance the war, and an implicit weakening of the leverage of sanctions" – elements that contradict the efforts made so far by Western countries.

Within the governing alliance, Brothers of Italy, Meloni’s party, and Forza Italia, led by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Tajani, take a pro-European and pro-Ukrainian stance.

The League, the coalition’s third-largest party, led by Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, is

one of Italy’s most pro-Russian parties and has criticised support for Ukraine and its EU integration.

At a meeting of Patriots for Europe leaders in Brussels on 14 October, Salvini stated: "We cannot go on giving billions to Ukraine indefinitely.

Once the war is over, we have a duty to resume buying gas and oil wherever it is cheapest" – meaning Russia. Nevertheless, despite the League’s position, Meloni’s government has continued Draghi’s policy towards Ukraine and approved further military assistance.

The risk of a centre-left victory

The second scenario is a victory for the centre-left coalition, which is currently neck and neck with the centre-right in opinion polls, with both blocs slightly above the 42% threshold.

The Democratic Party (20.1%), the Five Star Movement (12.4%), the Green and Left Alliance (6.4%), Italia Viva (2.4%) and +Europa (1.7%) together account for 43.0%.

While the centre-right coalition is firmly led by Giorgia Meloni and is a consolidated governing alliance, the centre-left coalition has neither a common candidate for prime minister – its leadership is contested between Elly Schlein of the Democratic Party and former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte of the Five Star Movement – nor a common government programme. This may affect the final electoral outcome.]

The position of this political bloc on Ukraine is fragmented, as illustrated by the fact that, following Meloni’s address to Parliament ahead of the European Council, the five parties presented five separate resolutions. Within the Democratic Party, the bloc’s largest member, there is a strongly pro-Ukrainian progressive minority.

However, the majority of the party and its leader, Elly Schlein, often remain vague on military aid to avoid irreconcilable differences with the other coalition partners, namely the Five Star Movement and the Green and Left Alliance. The Five Star Movement, the bloc’s second-largest member, recently approved its points for discussion within the coalition,

including the assertion that "continuing to supply weapons [to Ukraine] only makes peace more distant"

– a position on which Giuseppe Conte remains adamant.

The Green and Left Alliance’s programme states that "the delivery of weapons to Ukraine must stop immediately". Italia Viva and +Europa are pro-Ukrainian and are in favour of military assistance, but their political weight within the alliance is limited.

Given the general preference for pacifism and negotiations with Putin, and the fact that, according to an opinion poll, 46% of centre-left voters believe military aid should stop immediately, compared with 43% in favour of continuing it, a victory for the centre-left coalition could lead to a radical change in Italy’s position towards Ukraine.

Roberto Vannacci: the Trojan horse

Although current polling suggests that the centre-right bloc could win without him, an alliance with Italian MEP Roberto Vannacci and his far-right party, National Future (Futuro Nazionale), may be a tempting way to secure victory. The party currently stands at 7.2% in opinion polls, just below Forza Italia’s 7.4%.

Vannacci is open to such an agreement, provided that his red lines are respected, including an end to military and financial support for Ukraine. 

Vannacci, a former paratrooper general previously unknown outside military circles, has been described as "a Trojan horse for Russian influence inside Italy" by the European Council on Foreign Relations. From February 2021 to May 2022, he served as military attaché at the Italian Embassy in Moscow.

It was during this period that his sympathies for Russia emerged.

As former British defence attaché to Russia John Foreman told the Financial Times, General Vannacci "was of that Italian military type who thinks we shouldn’t be having a confrontation with Russia – that Russia should be a partner". In August 2023, he published his controversial book The World Upside Down, which brought him popularity.

After being elected to the European Parliament with the League in 2024, Vannacci left the party in February 2026 and founded National Future. 

Vannacci has adopted Russian propaganda narratives, claiming that rising oil prices are due to Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries rather than the war in Iran, that the EU should halt its financial support for Ukraine because of corruption scandals, and that Ukraine should not join the EU.

National Future’s programme proposes ending military aid to Ukraine and adopting a more conciliatory approach towards Russia, with the aim of restoring normal diplomatic and commercial relations.

While an alliance with Vannacci could strengthen the centre-right coalition electorally, the price could be high: for Prime Minister Meloni and her government, a breakdown in relations with mainstream European partners and the alienation of more moderate voters; for the EU, a weakened ability to act as a coherent geopolitical actor; for Ukraine, the halting of military support.

If no party wins 42% of the vote

The fourth scenario arises if no coalition reaches the 42% threshold in both chambers of the Italian Parliament. Seats would therefore be allocated on a proportional basis. In this case, it is difficult to predict which governing coalitions could emerge.

Much would depend on the election results, subsequent negotiations between parties and consultations with the President of the Italian Republic, Sergio Mattarella, who has the constitutional power to appoint the prime minister.

In this scenario, a key role in forming a government committed to maintaining support for Ukraine could be played by the centrist grouping comprising Azione, led by Carlo Calenda, the Liberal Democratic Party, and Spazio Pubblico, associated with MEP and European Parliament Vice-President Pina Picierno. Azione and the Liberal Democratic Party together account for 4.6% in the latest polling average, while Spazio Pubblico is not separately measured.

* * * * *

The clearest prospect of continuity in military support for Ukraine is a victory for the centre-right bloc with more than 42% of the vote. This assessment draws on the experience of the last four years of Giorgia Meloni’s government. Despite differences within the governing coalition, Italy has consistently maintained its political, financial, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine.

However, the analysis reflects current polling and does not take into account external factors, such as developments on the battlefield in Ukraine, changes in the European and international political context, or a possible economic downturn, factors which could affect any party’s electoral strategy or political programme. Only the election and the subsequent formation of a government will reveal which path Italy takes.

Edoardo Bosio,

Italian legal professional, former president of Comitato Razom 

Ukraine is not new to him, though. Until recently Ruge was a senior NATO official, serving as Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy – essentially the third-highest position in the Alliance’s civilian hierarchy. And, of course, he was closely involved with Ukraine and supported closer ties for Ukraine with the Alliance.

Now Ruge speaks on behalf of Berlin.

And when he tells European Pravda in this interview that Germany supports NATO membership for Ukraine, that represents a clear German position. But his statements on EU membership for Ukraine are even clearer and more detailed.

This and much more in the ambassador’s first interview in office.

"We are absolutely determined to stay here"

In your view, what does Ukraine mean to Germany?

Ukraine is a very important partner for Germany – in technical terms we could say a strategic partner, as we agreed in the spring of this year. We understand how important Ukraine is for European security, and we also understand its weight as a major economic player.

You’ve worked at NATO, so you’ll know that pretty much every member is described as "a highly valued ally". It’s the same for Ukraine, isn’t it?

No, it’s not the same for Ukraine. Ukraine is a big country, and it is, unfortunately, at the heart of the largest war in Europe since 1945, which has been going on for more than four years now – tragically so. The outcome of this war will determine Europe’s future security order.

As far as we are concerned, Europe’s future security order should include a Ukraine that is sovereign, independent and democratic – and able to move towards and join the European Union, certainly. And NATO as well: we said a few years ago that the future of Ukraine is in NATO.

All of these things matter. At the core is a fundamental point: Ukraine must be able to exercise its own choices and be part of what, in the old days, we would have called the free world. And I think that is very relevant today – if we look at what Russia represents today, it is definitely not the free world.

So, NATO membership, EU membership, and a democratic Ukraine. Those are encouraging messages at the start of our interview, and we’ll come back to each of them later. But first let me say that I’m particularly happy to see you here in Kyiv after last night’s missile attack [the interview took place on 22 October]. Do you know why I say that?

No.

Because we Ukrainians remember 2022, when one embassy after another was leaving Kyiv. Can we be certain that this won’t happen again?

Yes. I think you can be absolutely sure. You remember that Chancellor [Friedrich Merz] came to Kyiv on 4 October. And on 3 October, we were told [by Moscow] that all foreigners should leave Kyiv because it was dangerous and we risked losing our lives by staying here.

But the Chancellor was not deterred from coming here.

We are here. We know that the coming months will be difficult – over the past two months, we have already seen the security situation become more difficult. We need to handle that, and we need to look after the security of our people, but we are absolutely determined to stay here. It’s the same for all our European and NATO partners.

"EU membership won’t happen in 2027 or 2028. That's impossible. It's not doable"

You’ve already said that you see Ukraine as a member of the EU. But is that goal achievable within a reasonable timeframe? And what exactly is a "reasonable timeframe"?

That’s a good question. As we all know, to become a member of the European Union, a country has to adapt its legislation, regulations, institutions and so on. That’s not arbitrary, and it’s not something we’ve made up to make things complicated. It’s simply that the European Union is so highly integrated and demands so much of its members. Ukraine needs to go through those steps – and doing so will also make Ukraine a more European country in a broader sense.

I don’t think you will find a government in the European Union that is more forward-leaning on EU membership than Germany. I remember that you interviewed my predecessor, Heiko Thoms, about the letter that Chancellor Merz wrote back in May [on a special format for Ukraine’s integration into the EU].

Among other things, the letter called for full membership for Ukraine – I think it says so three times in a single letter – and, basically, for opening all negotiation clusters now.

And it says that, as Ukraine moves towards the European Union, Ukrainians – representatives of Ukraine – should be brought into the institutions: the Commission, the Parliament, the Council, the European Court of Justice. It’s a very forward-leaning, very positive vision of how we see Ukraine and of our wish for Ukraine to advance rapidly.

How long it will take is a very difficult question.

I think it's a good thing that

people here in Kyiv have moved away from the notion that it will happen in 2027 or 2028.

It will not happen then. It’s impossible. It’s not doable.

We’re now hearing hopes that Ukraine could join by 2030, and this is being discussed in Brussels as well, not just in Kyiv. Is that an achievable goal, even if it is an ambitious one?

2030 is ambitious. First of all, it depends on how Ukraine performs. And then, of course, the reality is that it’s also a very political process, because there are 27 members of the European Union and they all have a say. So it’s difficult to predict, but I think the geopolitical case for Ukraine joining the European Union is very strong.

What matters is that, together, we keep Ukraine on track, moving forward as fast as possible towards full membership – so that people in this country can feel that this is something they can work towards, and that they have a real opportunity to become a member of the European Union within a reasonable time.

Is it theoretically possible for Ukraine to join the EU while the war is still ongoing?

I don't know whether the European Union has taken a position on whether a continuation of the war would stand in the way of Ukraine becoming a full member. I don’t know that. I don’t believe that’s the case.

We should work with Ukraine, even under these very difficult circumstances, to move forward on the path to the European Union. And then we’ll take it from there.

"There's an understanding, but I remind people that this is the case"

The path to EU membership is first and foremost about reforms.

Last week, several laws were passed that are relevant to the European Union and to Ukraine’s membership – including the law on minorities, but many others as well. There’s a whole list of things – I think they’re very well known to the Office of the President, to the government, to the Rada [Ukrainian parliament] – that need to be done. And in some cases, draft laws or executive decisions are relevant to unlocking funding from the European Union for Ukraine, which is hugely important.

And we keep reminding people that, given the overall situation, we can only encourage Ukraine’s institutions to adopt this legislation as soon as possible, so that the funding the European Union has available for Ukraine can be released.

Do you think the Ukrainian government and our MPs understand that all the reforms must be implemented? That cherry-picking reforms is not an option?

I think there’s an understanding, but I can tell you that I do remind people that this is the case. To raise the very significant resources – the massive resources – needed to support Ukraine and help it defend itself, we also need to be able to tell people in the German parliament, the Bundestag, in the European Parliament and in the European Council that Ukraine is doing its part and delivering on the reform agenda.

Is Ukraine making tangible progress on the rule of law and the fight against corruption?

I mean, there are issues with corruption. There were very prominent cases. But at the same time, we can see that Ukraine has institutions, created after the Revolution of Dignity, that are able to investigate and prosecute people even in very high positions. That’s pretty significant. Maybe it’s not perfect, but nothing ever is.

There is real action on anti-corruption, and that’s extremely important because – again, in Germany – to make the case for supporting Ukraine, there has to be a credible anti-corruption architecture in place and credible action against people who misuse funds for their own purposes.

I remember interviewing German and other European ambassadors five or ten years ago, and even earlier. Time and again they would describe how corruption was hurting their investors. Is that still the case today?

I don’t think that is the main problem for German companies today. And that’s good.

"Russia has at no time in the past four and a half years negotiated in a serious way"

I’d like to ask you about the war, but first, let’s talk about what’s happening around these so-called peace negotiations. I think the best word to describe it is a mess. Would you describe it differently?

No, I don’t have another word for it. I think everyone, first and foremost the people in Ukraine, would like to see the war come to an end – after four and a half years of full-scale war and, before that, eight years of a bloody war at a lower level.

I can see that there is an American-led effort to bring the war to an end. But I would also say, as a German diplomat, that it is clear that Europe has to be part of the picture. The first point is that Ukraine and the people of Ukraine have to decide on what basis they are willing to end the war.

We are grateful to America for trying to bring the war to an end. But Europe – and Germany too – certainly has a big stake in how this war ends, and so we will be there and find a way of articulating our European interests and working with Ukraine to make sure that we end up with a result that is acceptable.

Is Europe playing a sufficiently meaningful role in the process right now?

What we can see is that, as you remember, the national security advisors of France, Britain and Germany have been to Kyiv twice most recently in September. We also had some national security advisors in Oslo just now. So there is a presence, recently in Miami as well.

At the same time, we’re hearing criticism from Poland, our closest EU neighbour. Polish officials don’t hide their frustration that they’re never invited to these discussions. What’s the reason for that?

I don’t know whether it’s true that they’re never invited. But Poland is clearly very important. It’s an important member state of the European Union and an important ally in NATO. It is a neighbour, and it is very much impacted by this war. So I think Poland’s desire to be closely involved is important, clearly. I think there are questions about what the formula will ultimately be.

In a sense, we could say that we have not yet entered into a proper negotiation process. And if we’re serious, we can also say that the Russian Federation has at no time in the past four and a half years negotiated in a serious way. They have always stuck to their basic demands, which essentially amount to Ukraine capitulating – so that is not a negotiation. So I would say we’re not yet in a real negotiation process, and we will see what format it takes.

So for now, as far as I understand, you don't see Russia being ready for serious steps.

Exactly. I mean, last night [21 October] is a demonstration that Russia talks in very vague terms about its willingness to engage, to meet and so on – and in the meantime it attacks Ukraine with its jet drones and ballistic missiles, killing civilians, attacking civilian targets and committing war crimes. So that’s not exactly the mindset of peace. I think we have to be very clear about that.

There was a change in the Ukrainian position beginning in 2025, when the president signalled that he would be willing to accept a ceasefire – a full ceasefire. Since then, we have been talking about the Black Sea deals, grain deals and energy ceasefires – all sorts of things. Russia has rejected every single one of them, and I think the record is perfectly clear.

"I wouldn't say NATO is stepping back. Part of the response is not visible"

Is there a risk that Russian attacks could extend beyond Ukraine?

Russia’s strategy consists of fighting on land. But the front line is relatively stable. Ukraine has done quite a good job of slowing Russia down and, obviously, of retaking territory recently as well.

There’s a war happening in the air, with cruise missiles and drones, where Russia is unfortunately having an impact on the energy infrastructure and attacking the economy – the steel industry, for example. And then there’s a third element: Russia’s hybrid campaign against NATO and EU states, which has been going on for years. Russia is not engaging in a military conflict with NATO, but it is pushing the limits of its hybrid campaign.

In my view, when an explosive-laden drone attacks Leipzig Airport, that’s no longer a hybrid attack. It’s more like a conventional attack, isn’t it?

In the case of Leipzig, Germany made an attribution. We did our homework: we didn’t go out the next morning and say it was Russia – our intelligence services did their homework, and then we attributed it to Russia. And then we took a number of measures: we closed the consulate in Bonn, we closed the Russian House in Berlin, and we did a number of other things to push back.

But you still consider it a hybrid attack?

You know, people argue about hybrid, and I accept that hybrid is perhaps a problematic term. You could say it’s grey-zone – a kind of grey-zone campaign that they’re waging.

But Russia is not engaged in a large-scale military campaign against NATO. And why is that? Because NATO’s deterrence against Russia has worked. So they have been trying to operate below the threshold of an actual military attack.

They've been testing us. And we have to find ways of pushing back.

I was in Berlin at the beginning of September for our ambassadors’ conference. Mark Rutte was there to speak, and he said – and I agree entirely – that if Russia engages in these hybrid operations, the response should be more support for Ukraine, not less, because Russia’s objective is to undermine our support for Ukraine.

And you could see it when Chancellor Merz came here on 4 October with a package of one billion [euros] in military support for Ukraine. So maybe people in Moscow should register that, despite Leipzig and everything else that has been going on against EU states, NATO states and Germany, our support for Ukraine has not gone down. It has gone up.

And yet I’m seeing attacks that ten years ago would have been considered conventional acts of military aggression – Russia is striking NATO member states with drones, targeting Turkish ships, and sinking ships in the territorial waters of Bulgaria or Romania. And nothing happens! There’s no response from the Alliance. So Russia keeps raising the stakes, and NATO is stepping back.

I wouldn’t say NATO is stepping back, but I can tell you that I’ve talked to many Ukrainian colleagues and I know that this is the perception here: that Russia is pushing and NATO has not come up with a strong response. I think part of the response is not visible. But I’ve been telling colleagues from NATO, my former colleagues, that this is the perception here and that they should think about it: The impression that NATO is not responding strongly enough to Russia’s campaign. I think that’s a point people should reflect on in Brussels.

"Germany wants Ukraine to be as close to NATO as possible"

I’m glad to hear that you see Ukraine as a future NATO member. But there’s one opponent to us joining, and that’s the United States. Do you think Ukraine will join the Alliance despite that opposition?

For Ukraine to join NATO, you need all 32 NATO allies to agree. And if you look at the procedure, there are actually several steps where 32 ambassadors need to raise their hand and say "Yes, we agree."

What we said in Washington – and that is the NATO position, as Mark Rutte has reminded people – was that the future of Ukraine is in NATO and that Ukraine is on a… I can’t come up with the adjective right now. Незворотній is the Ukrainian term.

Yeah, absolutely! Незворотній.

Irreversible! Sorry.

So you know the Ukrainian word better!:)

Exactly – so I do remember only the Ukrainian word.

It’s on an irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration. When exactly that will happen is, again, a political issue. The difference today, at least from a German point of view, is that it’s very clear that Ukraine is not just the recipient of our assistance, but also a major element of Europe’s defence today.

We need Ukraine, with its armed forces and its expertise in modern warfare, to be part of our defence against a very aggressive and imperialist Russia whose ambitions go beyond Ukraine. That is our analysis.

What is your vision for Europe’s future security architecture, and what role would Ukraine play in it?

In my view, it revolves around NATO. I’m a former NATO person, so maybe that’s logical. But NATO is the organisation in charge of collective defence. I think the role that the United States plays in NATO is changing – we can see that – because of the change in US force posture globally. As you know, that has been going on for 20 years: Barack Obama talked about the pivot to Asia, and that was in the years after 2008. And now China has become even stronger, and the US is required to play its balancing role in the Indo-Pacific.

So Europeans will have to step up and play more of a role. But to my mind, Ukraine is already very, very close to NATO. We have the NATO-Ukraine Council, and we do a lot of things together. We have the Joint Analysis Training and Education Centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland, and we are learning from Ukraine today when it comes to unmanned systems.

We don’t know when Ukraine will be able to join NATO as a full member, but, from a German point of view, we want Ukraine to be as close to NATO as possible, because in reality you are already part of our collective defence.

What are the key elements of a peace settlement that is acceptable to Europe? And please don’t just say that it’s for Ukraine to decide. You have your own position too, don’t you?

Sure. Our position is that Ukraine should survive as a sovereign, independent, democratic nation that can make its own choices.

What about other conditions, particularly concerning Russia? Some people say that to secure a lasting peace, Europe would need to restore ties with Russia and resume supplies of Russian oil and gas through Ukraine. What’s your view on that?

I don’t believe that’s the case. If you look at the German-Russian relationship after 1991, you could say two things.

One is that Germany got it terribly wrong. We were wrong to assume that we could develop a partnership with Russia. Russia walked away from the partnership we tried to establish and turned into an aggressive, imperialist actor that is trying to overturn the entire political order of Europe. That’s one way of looking at it, and I think in many ways it’s accurate.

Another way of looking at it is that Germany and the rest of Europe tried very hard to build a constructive and positive relationship with Russia. You can see it in the NATO-Russia Council, and you can see it in the way we developed the energy partnership with Russia, and so on. So we tried, and it failed.

We made an honest effort to have a positive, forward-looking relationship with Russia, and Russia threw that out of the window and turned to the use of military force, aggression and this hybrid campaign, this manipulation of information and politics.  

This attempt of ours was a failure. But what is important is that we sincerely made efforts to build forward-looking relations with Russia. So the people in Europe today, including in my country, Germany, who say we should go back to that and build a positive relationship with Russia have obviously forgotten that we spent 20 years doing exactly that, and it turned out to be a massive failure.

And it turned out to be the biggest failure on energy in particular. The idea at the time was that if Russia had a major market in Western Europe, it would have a stake in maintaining peace and building a positive relationship. But that is not what Mr Putin ultimately decided.

We are not going back to that. I don’t believe you will find a majority in Germany for that. Maybe people in Washington DC think we should re-establish that energy partnership between Western Europe and Russia, but I think in Western Europe you will find precious few people willing to make themselves dependent on Russia in any way today.

Interview by Sergiy Sydorenko

Video by Mykhailo Alekseev

European Pravda

They wear Russian military uniforms, carry weapons, and display Serbian, Russian, and, somewhat surprisingly, Montenegrin flags on their uniforms.

In one photograph, a group of masked and armed men pose beside a sign reading "Donetsk".

Two of them have Montenegrin flags on their uniforms.

Their videos offer glimpses into everyday life. They talk about their military assignments, families, jobs, and connections to Montenegro.

Some discuss inquiries from people interested in joining the fighting. They seem remarkably open about their activities, showing their faces, weapons, and surroundings.

Their posts combined Serbian nationalist symbolism with support for Russia's war, presenting military service on Russia's side as part of a broader ideological commitment.

This was not unfamiliar rhetoric. Serbian ultranationalist movements have promoted precisely this understanding of the war for years.

Without government's response 

On 23 September, I raised the issue in my regular column for the Montenegrin news portal Cafe del Montenegro (CdM). Rather than identifying individuals, I asked whether our security institutions knew who these people were, whether they were Montenegrin citizens, and whether anyone was investigating their activities.

One of the most relevant earlier reports appeared in the Montenegrin newspaper Vijesti in July 2025. According to Montenegro's National Security Agency (ANB), five Montenegrin citizens had fought alongside pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and 2015.

One had been convicted, while the others reportedly had not returned to Montenegro. At the time of the newspaper's inquiry, ANB maintained that it had no confirmed information about Montenegrin citizens fighting in Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.

Yet the material circulating on social media raised questions about whether that assessment still reflected the situation.

My column generated little public discussion, and I saw no significant institutional reaction. Last week, I therefore decided to formally notify Montenegro's judicial and security authorities.

I collected screenshots, video recordings, links to Instagram accounts, and specific posts showing armed men serving in Russian military formations. I submitted the information to the Supreme State Prosecutor's Office, the Special State Prosecutor's Office, the Police Directorate, and the National Security Agency.

I also approached Parliament's Committee on Security and Defense, requesting that it examine the broader institutional response.

My requests were to establish the identities and citizenship of the individuals concerned, investigate their possible participation in Russian military formations, examine indications of recruitment, and preserve relevant digital evidence.

Four days after my submissions, I had received no acknowledgment of receipt, no registration number, and no indication that the information had been formally recorded.

Threats on social media

Meanwhile, the accounts I had been monitoring began deleting their posts.

The photographs and videos that had prompted my investigation disappeared from public view. I cannot establish whether this was connected to my reports or resulted from unrelated decisions by the account holders.

Fortunately, I had preserved copies.

Then something considerably more disturbing occurred.

One of the accounts published images of pro-Ukrainian billboards I had personally designed following Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. Those billboards had been displayed at prominent locations across Montenegro for several months, including around Independence Day on 21 May.

The account also published what appeared to be threats against the author of the billboards, accompanied by the display of a machine gun at what appeared to be a military position.

I interpreted this as an indirect threat directed at me.

I cannot establish the author's intentions, but the timing and specific reference to my previous public activities were deeply unsettling.

The irony was difficult to miss. I had reported material suggesting possible participation in Russia's war against Ukraine.

That material subsequently disappeared, while I encountered content I perceived as intimidation. Meanwhile, the institutions I had contacted remained silent.

How mercenaries are being recruited

Montenegro has a complicated relationship with Russia. Historically close cultural and religious ties coexist with its strategic decision to join NATO in 2017, support Ukraine's territorial integrity, and align with European sanctions against Moscow.

The country's political environment nevertheless remains deeply divided over its relationship with Serbia, Russia, NATO and the European Union. Serbian nationalist political organisddations, pro-Russian media and religious and ideological networks sympathetic to Moscow continue to exercise considerable influence.

Within radical Serbian nationalist circles, Russia is portrayed not merely as a foreign ally but as the protector of Orthodox Christianity, Slavic civilisation and Serbian national interests.

Russia's war against Ukraine is frequently presented as a continuation of Serbia's historical confrontation with NATO and the West. In this narrative, fighting for Russia becomes an act of loyalty to a wider national and civilisational cause.

Serbian nationalist ideology has been used to mobilise volunteers for Russia's military campaigns since the beginning of the war in Donbas in 2014.

Appeals to Serbian-Russian brotherhood, the defense of Orthodoxy, resentment over NATO's 1999 intervention, and the unresolved Kosovo question have helped justify participation in a war taking place hundreds of kilometers from the Balkans.

The connection between Serbian nationalist ideology and recruitment is well documented. In October 2025, an investigation by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) exposed recruitment networks operating through Telegram, where experienced Serbian fighters were attracting new volunteers from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The investigation documented offers of military contracts, financial compensation, Russian citizenship and other benefits, alongside appeals to solidarity among Serbs fighting for Russia.

This combination of nationalist ideology, geopolitical resentment, religious identification, and financial incentives has created a recognizable framework for recruitment. It helps explain why people from the Western Balkans might view participation in Russia's war as something more than military employment.

Montenegro is especially exposed to this ideological influence

because Serbian nationalism operates across the border between Serbia and Montenegro through the Serbian Orthodox Church, a dominant religious organisation in the country, as well as through political movements, media and shared nationalist networks.

The accounts I documented displayed precisely this combination of Serbian nationalist identification, pro-Russian military symbolism and connections to Montenegro.

One Instagram biography contained the Russian-language descriptions "Russian Armed Forces" and "contract service," alongside the geographical reference "Budva–Donetsk". Another account published videos discussing inquiries from people interested in joining the fighting and criticising those motivated exclusively by financial compensation.

Montenegro has legislation addressing unlawful participation in foreign armed formations. Article 449b of its Criminal Code, introduced in 2015, also covers recruitment, organization, financing and related activities under the conditions established by law.

Its original adoption came during a period when public concern about foreign fighters was largely focused on Islamist radicalisation and departures to Syria and Iraq.

There is no reason why the authorities should be less attentive when the ideological motivation is Serbian ultranationalism and the destination is Russia's war in Ukraine. The law must be applied consistently, regardless of the political, ethnic or religious narratives invoked by those involved.

What makes the institutional silence particularly frustrating is

that Montenegro's security services have recently demonstrated their ability to act against Russian-linked activities.

On 9 October, Montenegrin authorities detained Mikhail Zvinchuk, a former Russian Defence Ministry press officer and founder of the influential pro-war information network Rybar, along with four other Russian nationals. The authorities subsequently ordered their expulsion on national security grounds.

I intend to continue documenting the available material and seeking answers.

I have preserved the relevant screenshots and recordings and remain prepared to provide them to competent authorities and investigative journalists.

Publications in the Expert Opinion section are not editorial articles and solely reflect the author's point of view

The two clusters opened for both countries form the core of economic integration with the EU, covering, among other things, the rules of competition.

Meanwhile, another priority popped up in Luxembourg.

It’s also about competition – but not in an economic sense.

When the accession negotiations were opened, the EU was willing to keep Ukraine and Moldova in sync and avoid decoupling the two countries in the accession process. But when it comes to closing the negotiations, Ukraine is seriously lagging behind.

European Pravda sources indicate that Moldova is to begin an official progress assessment, also known as an IBAR (Interim Benchmark Assessment Report), this year. Chișinău intends to demonstrate that it has met the initial accession benchmarks set by the EU over the summer. Kyiv is still a long way off this stage, but Vsevolod Chentsov, Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, has emphasised that this is becoming a priority for Ukraine as well.

EU officials in Brussels have also noted that Ukraine has begun to mention the term IBAR, but they say Kyiv is still limiting itself to talk rather than action.

As a result, the EU is making more ambitious statements about Moldova, suggesting, for example, that accession negotiations with Moldova could be concluded in 2028.

It is already clear that further concessions from Ukraine will be required in order to open the two remaining negotiating clusters, and Hungary will no longer be the source of the problems. Countries with elections just around the corner, including Poland and France, could become centres of resistance. That’s why it’s important that the clusters are opened before these countries enter the final stages of their election campaigns. There were some encouraging, though cautious, signs of progress in Luxembourg.

The foundations of EU accession, but in the economy

On 13 October, on the sidelines of a ministerial meeting in Luxembourg, the European Union greenlit the next steps towards accession for Albania, Moldova and Ukraine. The EU opened two negotiating clusters for Ukraine: Clusters 2 (Internal Market) and 3 (Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth).

"Tomorrow, I will be happy to replace the 17 red tokens on the 'enlargement wall' in my office with yellow ones for Ukraine," said European Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, who is responsible for accession negotiations with candidate countries, commenting on the decision.

As a result, Ukraine now has 24 of the 33 main negotiating chapters open – that is, the majority.

In any discussion of negotiating clusters in the EU accession process, the one most often mentioned is Cluster 1: Fundamentals. It includes issues such as the rule of law, combating corruption, democracy and more. Under the EU’s established rules, a candidate country’s progress on the Fundamentals determines the course of negotiations across all the other chapters.

The recently opened clusters do not have the same status, but they are crucial too.

"Clusters 2 and 3 form the economic core of Ukraine’s accession process and, in many respects, the economic core of our country’s transformation," Deputy Prime Minister Chentsov explained in Luxembourg. "The chapters we have opened now concern virtually every aspect of how the economy functions. This is about bringing our economies closer together, strengthening Europe’s competitiveness and building a more resilient European future. Today, we took another important step towards that goal."

The European Union has now officially committed to the gradual integration of candidate countries. A key element of this approach is granting them access to the tools and mechanisms of the single market even before they formally join the EU.

This will only be possible after economic reforms have been implemented – the reforms covered by Clusters 2 and 3.

A new priority for Ukraine

Ukrainian officials discussing EU accession used to emphasise that the main challenge was to open all the negotiating chapters.

This task was on the Ukrainian government’s agenda last year, but it proved impossible to accomplish back then because Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán had blocked Ukraine’s path to EU membership, rallying his electorate around the idea. With the recent change in the Hungarian government, the process has begun to move forward, but not immediately, and only gradually.

Throughout this period, Ukrainian diplomats were also working to ensure that the European Union did not decouple Ukraine and Moldova. The EU was receptive to this argument, so the two countries proceeded jointly through all the legal stages on the path to accession.

A future EU member must incorporate the provisions of the EU’s acquis communautaire into its national legislation. Within the framework of the negotiations, a candidate country can only demonstrate to the Europeans that certain provisions have been implemented and negotiate transitional periods or specific exemptions.

Each candidate country faces its own challenges along the way and has its own list of benchmarks that are set by the EU when each negotiating cluster is opened. Each country also conducts its negotiations with the EU separately, and progress depends on achievements – on the reforms implemented.

Therefore, once negotiations have begun across all clusters, keeping Ukraine and Moldova in sync will become less important. But until all the clusters are opened, the two countries will continue to be coupled.

Now a new factor has emerged that could put Moldova ahead of Ukraine.

This is the IBAR (Interim Benchmark Assessment Report), a decisive intermediate stage on the path to EU accession.

A special procedure applies to two chapters within the Fundamentals cluster – the rule of law, anti-corruption, human rights and related issues.

Ukraine has been given interim benchmarks for these clusters. Only after these have been met will the EU provide the final criteria for the chapters.

Most importantly, meeting the interim benchmarks gives a candidate country the right to begin closing negotiating chapters – that is, to receive official confirmation that Ukraine or Moldova meets the requirements for EU accession.

The IBAR report serves as that confirmation.

Two European Pravda sources say that Moldova is preparing to initiate its IBAR process, which could begin as early as November. This would automatically put Moldova ahead of Ukraine in their couple, since Ukraine has not yet reached this stage.

"Undoubtedly, the main priority for the government and parliament is to meet the interim benchmarks and secure a positive IBAR outcome. We are also eagerly awaiting the opening of the remaining two negotiating clusters," Chentsov said in Luxembourg.

However, when European Pravda asked a follow-up question about when Ukraine might achieve this, the deputy prime minister declined to make any prediction, saying "As soon as possible."

That makes sense, since the main tasks are largely beyond the government’s control.

The list of criteria Ukraine must meet to secure IBAR approval includes anti-corruption legislation, rule-of-law reforms, reform of the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and other measures. All of these require decisions by the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada. Bills addressing many of these issues have already been submitted, but have not yet been brought to a vote.

Vsevolod Chentsov has hinted that he sees room to negotiate compromises with Brussels.

It is not yet clear whether the EU is willing to make concessions on these reforms. However, any concessions are unlikely to be radical, as such an approach would not be acceptable to many EU member states.

Nevertheless, the fact that the deputy prime minister has frequently brought up the IBAR has not gone unnoticed in the European Union.

"This is the first time we have heard the Ukrainian government emphasise the IBAR, and that is a good thing. But we also need to see decisions, not just statements," one senior EU official told European Pravda.

During the most recent plenary weeks in parliament, anti-corruption bills have remained off the agenda despite repeated appeals from the EU, including a personal appeal by Ursula von der Leyen during a conversation with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. According to European Pravda sources, she received assurances from the Ukrainian leader that Kyiv does intend to implement these reforms.

It’s not just about Hungary

In discussing the IBAR, we shouldn’t lose sight of Ukraine’s earlier objective: opening the remaining negotiating clusters.

The new government of Péter Magyar blocked Ukraine’s progress for several months. Initially it imposed a veto without making any demands, echoing the bad old days of Viktor Orbán. Later, certain developments persuaded Budapest to change its approach. A constructive dialogue began, leading to a proposed solution: Ukraine would adopt amendments to its Law on Education, while the Hungarian government would present this as its own achievement to the Hungarian public and give the green light to further progress in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations.

Recent developments suggest that Hungary has indeed changed its approach to relations with Ukraine, at least for now.

The Hungarians were entirely constructive in the negotiations over the education law. And Prime Minister Péter Magyar, who has long avoided meeting the Ukrainian president, suddenly took the initiative himself, proposing talks with Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Brussels. They are expected to meet on Friday.

But the next obstacle to Ukraine’s progress towards EU membership could be Romania.

For the last six months or so, Romania has been in political crisis. This made the prolonged absence of an official response particularly concerning, given that the draft education law had been sent to the Romanians as well as the Hungarians. Eventually, President Nicușor Dan publicly expressed his full support for the law, which has now been passed.

Meanwhile, the task of opening the remaining two clusters has not gone anywhere.

These negotiating blocks are considered the most politically sensitive. 

Cluster 4 (Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity) also covers transport and the single market for services – issues that are sensitive for Poland. 

Cluster 5, which deals with agriculture, is even more sensitive – and not just for Poland. The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy is widely considered to be long in need of reform. In particular, the current rules governing the distribution of agricultural subsidies would not be able to accommodate Ukraine’s integration. Brussels is therefore already exploring compromise options that would clear the way for Kyiv’s accession.

There are no concrete solutions yet, but everyone is committed to finding them.

"Ukraine will become part of the European agricultural policy, but under a special model. The EU member states and, of course, Ukraine will have to decide exactly what that model will look like," European Commissioner Marta Kos told European Pravda.

"I see no reason why we should not be able to reach an agreement and open the clusters by the end of this year," Deputy Prime Minister Chentsov added, reiterating Kyiv’s position: exemptions for Ukraine are possible, but they must be temporary rather than permanent.

The political debate on this issue is expected to take place this week at the EU summit, to which President Zelenskyy has also been invited.

Not all of the EU sources who spoke to European Pravda share the optimism that a solution will be found by the end of the year. Marta Kos has also been cautious in her forecasts, speaking of hope, not certainty.

Still, Ukraine’s main problem remains not the opening of the clusters, but the implementation of reforms.

Unless Ukraine meets the benchmarks – above all those covered by the IBAR – there will be no meaningful progress.

And a difference in rhetoric regarding Ukraine and Moldova is already evident.

At the European Commission and in EU capitals, Chișinău is being praised for fulfilling its commitments.

"Everything is going really well at the moment. We support Moldova’s ambition to become an EU member by 2030. And if we look at past experience, we can see that it is technically possible to conclude accession negotiations as early as the first or second quarter of 2028," Kos added.

No similar forecasts were made about Ukraine this time.

Also telling was the way the Irish presidency referred to progress on reforms in its official statement on the opening of the negotiations. "We encourage Ukraine to continue to implement necessary reforms, particularly in the area of Fundamentals," Thomas Byrne, Irish Minister of State for European Affairs, said as he announced the opening of the negotiating clusters for Ukraine.

Unless Ukraine speeds up the pace of reform, the gap could widen further. The IBAR issue clearly illustrates this trend.

Sergiy Sydorenko,

Editor, European Pravda, Luxembourg-Brussels

This article was produced within the framework of MOST – Media Organisations for Stronger Transnational Journalism, a Journalism Partnership funded by the Creative Europe programme that supports independent media specializing in international reporting

Herem is not a politician, but a career officer in the military.

And the new minister isn’t just any officer.

He is a full general, holding the highest military rank. Herem served as Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces from 2018 to 2022, and in that capacity he witnessed the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In this interview, he also acknowledges that he has been on the front line in Ukraine.

While in Kyiv, General Herem met with the editor of European Pravda to discuss this, as well as his expectations regarding Russia’s next attack, including whether Russia might attack NATO.

European Pravda is the first non-Estonian media outlet to interview Martin Herem since his appointment as defence minister.

"Prevent a Russian attack? I'm not sure if we can deter the mad person"

Ukrainians are used to saying that Ukraine will definitely not be the last country that is attacked by Russia. Do you believe that as well?

If I take into account the attitude of the Russian state [towards its neighbours], and if I look at what they are producing right now for military purposes, then I think when they stop here [in Ukraine] – it doesn't matter how, whether you kick them out beyond the border, or the war is frozen – then every day they will start collecting military fat. And given their attitude, they will definitely test somebody.

Whether their first attack will be against Estonia, I'm not sure. It could be Latvia or somewhere else.

What they want to achieve is influence. They need power.

For that they don't need to occupy us, for example, Estonia.

They need to harm us and make us distrust each other, both in Estonia and among the Allies.

And if we have any nasty, ugly aggression, and Russians are gathering along the border, then we don’t want to see it again. And then we may choose the Russia-proposed solution.

That's exactly what they want: influence and instability.

You referred to Estonia and Latvia as examples, I believe, because both are in NATO. Does that mean that you expect an attack on NATO?

They may do it against NATO just to break NATO.

Acting below [the threshold of] Article Five, you mean?

Below Article Five, or under Article Five.

Because when Article Five is invoked, and we win this conflict but the victory is too ugly, then many will start blaming NATO and each other. And that’s the moment when the Russians will offer their solution: "Let's talk, let's do business as usual," and so on. And once we are under Russian influence, we go down.

I grew up in the Soviet Union, I have some understanding about this.

And Estonia has a history which teaches that Russia always attacks.

For the last thousand years, yes.

Can you see any way of preventing those attacks from happening?

I'm not sure if we can deter the mad person. But what we have to do is to prepare. And that's the only thing.

We have to prepare very seriously [for an attack] and if we do that, we may prevent it.

We have to be ready.

What are some practical ways in which small countries can prepare to contain the aggression?

First, our own self-defence capability must be very, very strong.

We must be ready to fight like Ukraine – on the front line and in the rear. And also to be able to eliminate all the threats coming from the enemy's depth, which means we need to develop our own deep strike [long-range] capability as well.

And we cannot do it on our own. We need our allies. Usually Estonia is seen as a country without strategic depth. I say we have a strategic depth. All of Europe is our rear.

That’s why we have to pay special attention to the sea. And again, it's not aggressive, it's not blocking the Baltic Sea or anything. It's ensuring the sea lines of communication at any given time. And that's what we’re doing right now together with our allies.

During the interview with the minister

Photo: European Pravda

"In July 2022, I was in Estonian uniform on the front line in Ukraine"

Estonia is one of the countries active in the JEF (Joint Expeditionary Force).

JEF is a tool within NATO – it's not additional to NATO. JEF could make us faster to provide some support, but it still must follow the NATO plan. So it's nothing additional. It’s not an alternative – it's a small NATO inside NATO.

Does Ukraine have a place in the JEF?

I'm too young a minister to have any experience of discussions about Ukraine joining JEF, but I would say, if Ukraine has aspirations or a plan to join JEF, Estonia will definitely support it.

Let’s talk about Ukraine’s role in helping Estonia and NATO to deter threats and defend itself. You've just signed a drone deal. What are some practical ways to implement it?

The drone deal brings us not just technology, but experience.

And it's not just about how to operate an interceptor drone. It's about how to build our system of air defence or our system of fortifications, our counter-drone system. You have a lot of knowledge, a lot of data which we must adapt and bring to Estonia.

So it's not just the technology, and not even just the experience – it's about the knowledge.

How does it work in practical terms?

It could work in many ways. One of them is that we must come here to Ukraine and learn on the ground. Also, we must bring Ukrainian experts to Estonia to get advice on how we are building our defence line. That includes not just the fortifications or positions, but also sensors, energy, communications, all the necessary counter-drone assets and so on.

To be honest, it’s also about how we prepare our rear area – hospitals, local municipalities, police stations, energy, everything – against whatever air threat, be it an Iskander ballistic missile, a cruise missile, or hundreds of Shahed-type drones.

You mentioned that you could come here. Do you expect Estonian, i.e. NATO, military personnel in Ukraine during the war?

To be honest, we have been visiting since 2022.

I was here for the first time in July 2022 – I came here to learn. At that time, I was Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces.

How does that fit with statements that NATO military personnel are not in Ukraine?

In July 2022, I was in Estonian uniform on the front line, and the front line then was a few kilometres from Kharkiv. I was there in uniform.

The difference is that we do not operate here. We learn. So we don't take up weapons, we don't operate the radar or whatever. But we visit.

And this is not a threat to Russia at all.

But it is, because you bring what you’ve learned back to Estonia.

Estonia will never use this knowledge unless Russia crosses our border.

We have no plan to cross the border and attack Russia. We have no such plan and never have had. But if they come, then we will use everything we have learned from Ukraine.

"Russian hybrid attacks aim to keep conflicts warm"

Russia is not that active in conventional attacks against Estonia, but in the hybrid domain they are. Would you agree?

In the conventional domain, I don't think we should expect anything active from Russia as long as they are tied down here in Ukraine. But actually, with conventional power, sometimes you don't have to use it.

It's enough to show it.

It’s like my fist. (The general shows his fist.) Threatening with a fist is also something. Because if you show it, then one day you may use it. And since Russia is showing it, like they do today against us, that’s also part of conventional power.

How are they showing it?

They're building the Leningrad Military Region, for example. They're building new units. They are producing tanks, artillery, ammunition, aircraft, everything, behind our border.

Why are they doing this? They know NATO has no plan to cross the border. We have no plan to attack.

Then why are they building fortifications and new military bases behind the border of Finland? Why did they create this Leningrad Military Region and so on?

They’re doing it to threaten us, and maybe to prepare.

And what about hybrid threats?

Referring to hybrid operations, we used to talk about sabotage, cyber operations, information operations, whatever.

But in general, hybrid actions serve to prepare the conditions and the environment, keeping the conflict warm.

Because if you want to use conventional power, you need to explain to your own nation and to third countries that you had a problem with Estonia, or with the West. You need a kind of justification for your actions.

And no one will know later that it was you who caused the sabotage. The people in Russia only see that "we had a problem with them and we had to solve it". Now, [Russian] Foreign Minister [Sergei] Lavrov has said very clearly: everybody supporting Ukraine will be punished by us. He said it one or two months ago, and now we see their actions.

But all these hybrid actions just cause harm – it hurts – but it's not a threat to our being, our existence.

Photo: European pravda

Isn’t it? People in Estonia expect NATO to protect them against hybrid threats, and it doesn’t. This could also diminish public trust in the Alliance.

There are no good solutions, no good response, to this problem.

However, if you look at what the Russians have done during the last few months, for example – that armed drone in Germany [that attacked the airport], or when they set fire [to a military production base] in Estonia – what was our response? The Germans increased their support to Ukraine. Estonia decided to support Ukraine through PURL with another €10 million.

Next week we will have a meeting in Tallinn to discuss what kind of support we will send to Ukraine next year – and that will be more than €100 million just from Estonia.

These are actually the responses to all these acts, sabotage and so on. We say to Russia: you can try, but we will not stop.

And one more element of our response is the public disclosure of Russian actions.

If there is something burning, blowing up or falling down, and the Russian special services are behind it, then we must say that openly and attribute it to them as fast as possible. If Russia is not the cause and it's just criminal activity, then okay. But if the Russians are behind it, we must attribute it to them immediately.

"I would like to see Ukraine win this war"

How do you see Ukraine’s role in the future security architecture of Europe?

First, Ukraine has experience. And not just experience in fighting. You’ve learned how to stop this aggressor which is a threat to us as well. And your experience can contribute to European security.

Secondly, I think Ukraine must be an equal member of this security system. It doesn't matter whether we talk about the EU or NATO or whatever. Whether it would be full membership or some kind of association – that's up to Ukrainians and NATO. But if you asked me, I would say: why not full membership?

Is NATO ready to accept Ukraine as a full member?

I don’t know how we [Estonia] joined NATO – whether it was our success, or a miracle, or just a lucky moment.

I can tell you why. It’s because Russia was weak.

Russia was weak. And maybe not everyone realised what they were doing when they agreed to take us into NATO. I don't know.

But if we are in NATO, my question is:

Why wouldn't Ukraine join NATO then? What is the difference?

The only difference is that you have an active war going on right now. But when the war is over, frozen, whatever – why not?

For example, Estonia doesn't even have an official border with Russia. We are not at war, but still, we don't have an agreed border, and that’s also a little bit shaky.

So, it's up to the politicians, but first of all it’s up to the Ukrainian nation and then the other 32 Allied nations to decide.

As you mentioned, because Russia is stuck in Ukraine, they cannot attack you. They don’t dare to cross the border of Estonia, Latvia, Finland – anywhere. Doesn't that mean that to some degree, some Western allies may have an interest in keeping Russia stuck in Ukraine as long as possible?

I've been asked this many, many times. We may say yes, that's possible. But I say honestly: even if stopping the war here is risky for us because then the threat against us will grow, thinking like that goes against our values.

If we forget our values – freedom, democracy, whatever we want to achieve – then we will very soon lose everything.

That's why we should not abandon Ukraine. That's why we have to support Ukraine as much as possible – not to keep the war here, but to support Ukraine to win the war.

If somebody says "Maybe we should just keep the war boiling here, so it doesn’t come to us," that’s definitely not my aim or objective. I would like to see Ukraine win this war. That's my understanding.

Do you believe this is how other allies see it as well?

Maybe I'm too naive, but it's hard to believe that Latvians, Finns, Lithuanians or Poles have this kind of plan to keep Russia fighting here and to let Ukraine suffer. Maybe I'm too naive, but I say: I don't believe that. Because all of us – Finns, Latvians, Lithuanians – see Ukraine as our alter ego. And we don't want Ukraine to suffer. Definitely not.

Otherwise we would not spend so much money and resources or pay that much attention to this.

Sergiy Sydorenko

Editor, European Pravda

This article was produced within the framework of MOST – Media Organisations for Stronger Transnational Journalism, a Journalism Partnership funded by the Creative Europe programme that supports independent media specializing in international reporting

The programme was presented as a response to the anger spreading through France’s upper-secondary schools. By the weekend, France’s lycée protests had acquired a new political life. The students are planning another national day of action on Tuesday.

On Friday, 141 lycées were closed, a sharp fall from the first days of the protests. But the fact that the protests have become less widespread does not mean that the political problem has gone away.

France has spent years accumulating the conditions for this outburst.

It has neglected the ordinary machinery of public education, allowed regional inequalities to harden, and then responded to a student movement as if the principal issue were public order.

The result is a crisis that cannot be reduced either to youthful disorder or to police repression. Both are present. Neither explains the whole story.

A protest born in the classroom

The movement began around 21 September in schools in the Créteil education district, which includes much of France’s poorer eastern suburbs. The first complaints were about the daily experience of attending a school that often seemed unable to provide the basics.

A student in Aubervilliers had no French teacher while preparing for an important examination. In Sevran, pupils showed photographs of damaged chairs, holes in ceilings, mould, leaking roofs and broken toilets.

Some classrooms were difficult to heat in winter and difficult to cool in summer. Timetables stretched from early morning into the evening, with long gaps that left pupils stranded in school buildings without adequate supervision or food.

France’s public secondary schools have fewer teachers than they did in 2008, despite having roughly 250,000 more pupils. More than 70 per cent of classes in public general and technical schools have more than 30 pupils, while one in five has more than 35. Long absences without replacement have increased sharply, particularly in the Créteil and Versailles regions.

Buildings tell the same story. The average French lycée is more than six decades old. Vocational schools are older still. Only a small proportion of secondary-school buildings were built or substantially renovated in the past academic year.

The problems are not evenly distributed. In Seine-Saint-Denis, where the movement first took hold, the poverty rate is close to 30 per cent, almost twice the national metropolitan average.

France’s republican school system promises that a child’s future should not be determined by family wealth, religion or geography.

Yet pupils in the poorest areas are often asked to accept the largest classes, the oldest buildings and the most unstable supply of teachers.

The students understand the contradiction. They are not necessarily demanding a new ideology, but that the Republic honour its existing one.

The struggle over order

The protests have also produced real violence, and some schools have been damaged or ransacked. Teachers and headteachers have been threatened or injured. Incidents have been reported in Bayonne, Toulouse, Saint-Chamond, Poitiers and Saint-Étienne. In one case, a fire spread to a teacher’s car. In another, a school cafeteria was damaged.

The Education Ministry has estimated the cost of repairs at about €30 million and warned that thousands of pupils could lose teaching time.

The state’s authority cannot survive if school staff are attacked and schools become targets.

Nor is the idea that French schools are becoming unsafe entirely invented. Official surveys show substantial levels of intimidation, defiance and verbal abuse.

Many teachers report that pupils challenge their authority or mock their work. A smaller but serious minority report threats, harassment or physical assault. At the same time, the latest official data does not support the claim that French schools are simply descending into generalised violence. Most staff say they feel respected by pupils and safe inside their schools. The number of recorded serious incidents per 1,000 pupils fell slightly in the latest year.

The memory of Samuel Paty hangs over this debate. Paty was murdered in 2020 after being targeted by an Islamist extremist for showing caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad during a lesson on freedom of expression.

Dominique Bernard, another teacher, was murdered in 2023 by a former pupil in a terrorist attack. France’s schools have since become the place where arguments about secularism, religion, free speech and state authority collide with particular force.

The figures recorded during the first national commemoration of Paty showed the scale of the challenge. Hundreds of pupils were reported for provocations, refusal to participate, threats or expressions of support for terrorism. That episode should not be used to label the current movement as Islamist, most of the present protests concern staffing, buildings, timetables and inequality.

But the Paty legacy does expose a larger question: how can teachers exercise authority in an open society when the state has not reliably protected them?

The deployment of riot police has opened another dispute over how the state exercises its authority.

Images of tear gas and riot police confronting teenagers have travelled quickly through France and abroad. In Saint-Denis, the mayor, Bally Bagayoko, was filmed facing police lines while trying to shield young people. In Lens, a 15-year-old lost a hand during an incident involving a police grenade. In the Paris region, a police officer has been placed under investigation after a teenager was seriously injured. By 9 October, more than 200 pupils and over 800 police officers or gendarmes had reportedly been injured,

while more than 6,800 people had been placed in police custody, 86 per cent of them minors.

The police have a duty to prevent arson, protect school staff and stop attacks on public buildings.

They also have a duty to use force lawfully and proportionately. Student violence does not excuse unlawful policing. Alleged police misconduct does not erase the violence committed by protesters.

The state has run out of easy answers

The government has now conceded that the grievances are legitimate. Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu has promised rapid action on teacher replacement, school buildings, timetables and Parcoursup. The Education Ministry has said it is contacting approximately 3,000 qualified teachers who could be sent to schools facing shortages.

That is a useful emergency measure, but it os not the same as solving the recruitment crisis. The government’s plan may demonstrate political responsiveness while leaving the structural weakness untouched. Ministers have recognised the problem, but recognition is cheaper than delivery.

The same tension is visible in the education budget. The government presents a 2027 allocation of roughly €64 billion, excluding pensions, compared with €48.8 billion in 2017.

Yet wider education spending barely increased in real terms last year. Inflation, salaries, energy costs, demographic change and the maintenance of old buildings consume money before it reaches the classroom.

France can still finance its debt, but the government has far less room to finance new promises.The European Central Bank has not judged that emergency intervention is necessary. But the country is in a politically dangerous financial position.

Public debt reached about 119 per cent of GDP at the end of the second quarter.

The government is working with a deficit of roughly 5.4 per cent of GDP this year, while annual interest costs are projected to rise from about €79 billion to more than €91 billion.

The ten-year borrowing rate has approached 5 per cent, its highest level in decades. Each rise makes the government’s promised concessions harder to fund. It means that markets are becoming less willing to treat French promises as costless.

The government therefore faces a narrow corridor. It must invest more in the services that citizens believe are collapsing while convincing creditors that public spending will eventually be brought under control. It must punish destruction without allowing the police response to define the entire crisis. It must restore authority in schools without turning schools into extensions of the security state.

There is no painless solution.

The government’s online consultation gives pupils a formal channel and produces a more precise map of their concerns. But consultation can become a substitute for decision. Students have already spent years being consulted about problems that remained visible afterwards.

France’s crisis is not simply a crisis of youth. It is a crisis of state capacity.

The young people on the streets are not all representative of the country’s lycéens. The movement is uneven, sometimes confused and occasionally violent.

It has not produced a coherent national programme. But it has revealed a common experience across very different schools: the sense that institutions ask for obedience while failing to provide the conditions in which obedience can appear reasonable.

France’s ability to sustain long-term European security commitments, including support for Ukraine, depends partly on whether it can rebuild domestic authority and fiscal credibility.

Charlotte Guillou-Clerc,

Journalist, France

This article was produced within the framework of MOST – Media Organisations for Stronger Transnational Journalism, a Journalism Partnership funded by the Creative Europe programme that supports independent media specializing in international reporting