When German Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz wrote to the EU leadership to propose a special path for Ukraine towards EU accession (and a new status for Ukraine which Merz dubbed "associate membership"), the letter triggered a reaction in Kyiv that Berlin probably hadn’t been expecting.

European Pravda has already published both an article criticising the German approach and explaining how it should be changed, and arguments from Brussels in favour of the idea, highlighting the advantages for Ukraine of participating in EU institutions even without voting rights.

However, it was important to hear an explanation from Germany.

So we were happy to accept an invitation to discuss the issue with the German Ambassador to Kyiv, Heiko Thoms.

In this interview – which definitely deserves attention – the ambassador explains Merz’s motives and acknowledges that some elements (such as the name of the format) need to be adjusted, while others have been misunderstood in Kyiv. Berlin continues to believe that the idea is worth considering and has assured us that this is "the best proposal that will be discussed anytime soon for Ukraine".

It’s also worth noting that Berlin sees something positive even in Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s rather critical comments about the German idea.

"I understand the desire to become a member of the EU very soon"

I believe you have heard that Merz’s proposal did not receive an unequivocally positive response in Ukraine, haven't you? 

Yes, there were a number of reactions which do not necessarily reflect the intention of the letter sent by Chancellor Merz. It’s a proposal specially designed and tailored for Ukraine, a country which is at war, which needs our support, which is receiving our support, and which will continue to receive our support. And one of the ways of expressing our support is to pave the way for Ukraine into the European Union.

For the German government, the goal is to get Ukraine into the European Union, and we want Ukraine to be in the EU as fast as possible.

And the proposal by the Chancellor, by the German government, is meant to speed the process up and give Ukraine additional ways of being represented in Brussels on your way to the EU. It’s something that we are not going to offer to other candidate countries because we want to reflect Ukraine's unique position as a country at war, which is still making great progress. You're one of the frontrunners among the candidate countries.

That doesn't mean that you cannot do better, but you're doing quite well.

The president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, responded to Merz’s letter with scepticism. He said that Ukraine deserves 100% membership, and he reads the letter as an offer of "semi-membership". 

It's very important to look at the facts objectively. Merz’s letter very clearly says that our goal is Ukraine's full membership in the European Union.

At the same time, I’d subscribe to every word President Zelenskyy says in his letter. There is nothing that I would not agree with.

The only thing that I believe is very important for everyone to understand is that there cannot be a discount on EU membership. And I believe that this accession process, with all the steps that need to be taken, is first and foremost in the interest of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.

But I don't see the letter by President Zelenskyy as going against the proposal. On the contrary, I find that he, in his own way, expresses support for many elements of Merz’s proposal.

Our goal is shared. 

We want Ukraine to become a full member of the European Union, full stop. 

You want the same.

That sounds quite surprising. In Ukraine it was perceived differently, and I didn’t see that support in the letter either. 

I can see it.

And I understand the desire to become a member of the European Union very soon. I see the negotiating position of Ukraine – that you want to define a date.

That's the only element where I believe we will still need to discuss more with Ukraine. I think it's important to understand that just mentioning a date will never be enough to join the EU. What needs to be done is to take the necessary reform steps. That’s why it's in Ukraine's own hands when the accession will happen. When Ukraine does its homework, Ukraine will be in the EU.

Has anyone else in Ukraine, apart from the president, shared their impressions of Merz’s letter with you? 

Of course – we are in touch with many interlocutors here, including those who are steering the process. They understand the nature of the proposal very well. 

 "If Moldova stopped reforming, this would not harm Ukraine"

I believe that some elements of the Merz proposal should be amended. One example is the name "associated membership". You may have noticed that it met with widespread criticism here in Ukraine. 

Yes, but I believe it's partially due to misunderstandings of the nature of the proposal. Because it is not a second-rate membership. It is not an intermediate status that then will become permanent. 

I believe this name was also a mistake in communication terms. Ukraine has had an Association Agreement for over ten years, and "associated membership" is perceived as something we already have. 

Yes, I can see that too.

But we are not married to that name. If someone comes up with a better name, we are for it.

There are still concerns that we could get stuck in that semi-membership position. 

Look, there are only two possible pathways.

The first path, a standard one: Ukraine does the necessary reforms and joins the European Union and all the EU structures after all the benchmarks are fulfilled.

And a second path: Ukraine does the necessary reforms and at some point also becomes a full member of the European Union, but in the meantime you also get some additional elements of membership right now. That’s an option no other candidate country will get.

With this second path, you will be represented in the College of Commissioners, you will have members in the European Parliament, participation rights in the European Council, even observer judges in the European courts, and you will also benefit from the application of the acquis communautaire.

That means that we’re offering full membership, which is the desired outcome for President Zelenskyy, plus some additional elements.

The Merz proposal also reflects that it is not only your interest but also our interest to have Ukraine inside the EU. For that, we are bringing you as close to us as possible already today.

You mentioned that this is a unique scheme that would only be offered to Ukraine and no other candidates. It would mean that our "accession coupling" with Moldova would be broken. In Ukraine, decoupling is seen as a threat because we had a bad experience with the Hungarian veto, when decoupling was pushed for. Who knows whether it won’t happen again?

Well, indeed there were good reasons why there was this coupling, and everybody knows what the background is.

But in the end, for Moldova and for Ukraine, everything will depend on reforms. Now, if Moldova suddenly stopped reforming, this would not hold Ukraine back. 

It’s the same in the other direction.

President Zelenskyy clearly says in his letter that Ukraine should stay within the same type of accession process as Moldova. Does Germany insist on the contrary?

I think this debate is rather a distraction because in the end, your membership will not depend on what another country is doing or not doing. It will depend on what your country will be doing in terms of implementing reforms.

If Moldova stopped reforming, this would not harm you. And the other direction as well. 

"It's probably the best proposal that will be discussed anytime soon for Ukraine"

Chancellor Merz’s letter mentions that negotiating clusters should be opened immediately. 

That's our clear intention. That's our political direction: we want clusters to be opened as soon as possible, and we want all clusters to be opened. 

But every member state sees that "as soon as possible" differently.

Yes, absolutely.

But the opening of at least one first cluster might be a matter of weeks, if not days – that’s what we’re pushing for. You know there will be a European Council [meeting] in June, and it’s usually a moment when important decisions are being taken.

Only the first cluster?

That would be my realistic expectation now.

And for all the rest of the clusters, I believe we will also be making progress soon. But again, in the end, what is really important is not formal steps. What is important is changes in substance. And there Ukraine has homework to do.

We on our side also have work to do inside the EU. 

As you rightly referred to, there were blockages of Ukraine in the past, which was also frustrating for us. And I believe that we are making good progress here. We are having very substantial talks now with some member states of the EU which will enable us to show progress with Ukraine in the near future.

When do you expect this scheme which Chancellor Merz is proposing to start working? When will Ukraine get that observer status? 

As soon as it has been agreed by all member states.

I don't think there's any connection. I believe once a decision at the European Council or in some other format is taken and supported by 27 states, then it can be implemented immediately.

And there’s something I want to make very clear: the proposal by us, by Germany, to Ukraine is, I believe, the most concrete proposal that has been on the table yet. And it's probably the best proposal that will be discussed anytime soon for Ukraine.

The best one? What about the Lithuanian idea of granting Ukraine the status of an "acceding state"?

I was talking about realistic proposals among those on the table now.

And it's not a given, it's not self-understood that everyone in the European Union will automatically agree to this German proposal. This is something that we jointly need to work for.

Germany feels obliged to work on it. It’s our proposal, and we will do what we can to fight for it inside the European institutions, but of course, 

we also need Ukrainian backing for this.

And of course it would be hard to convince other EU members that this is the direction we should take if Ukraine is not on board.

Let’s talk about reforms. There are definitely some reforms that are the most important. And possibly there are solutions that could unlock membership even before the full list is implemented, but when Ukraine is almost ready. 

I agree. I think it will very much depend on the momentum that will be observed. And that has been the case also for other countries.

But still, there will be no discounts in the sense that we, in the end, will require less from Ukraine. That needs to be understood.

And that’s why it's so important that reform momentum is not lost. Ukraine has been a model candidate for many years, and now it's extremely important that we do not stop here or slow down.

Ukraine needs to reform further, and this is very much in the interest of the country and the Ukrainian people, who are demanding more transparency, demanding additional efforts in the fight against corruption, demanding more steps for fostering the rule of law in your country.

There are still things that Ukraine can do and that Ukraine must do.

"German IRIS-T systems are probably as important as Patriots, but less well known"

Russia is threatening Ukraine with new attacks. I'm happy to see that we are meeting here at the embassy and your staff are around. 

We can also meet next week, and we will be here too.

We have absolutely no reason to change our presence here in Kyiv. 

Ukraine needs additional support to protect its skies. And Germany is definitely number one among our allies in terms of providing air defence capabilities. How many Patriot systems have you already provided? 

We intentionally do not disclose concrete numbers, but you're right that when it comes to air defence – but also, I believe, in almost every other respect – Germany is the number one supporter of Ukraine. That includes other forms of military support, support for the civilian sector, for the energy sector, fostering regional structures, administrative reforms, and also assisting you and standing by your side in the EU accession process. 

Whatever area you name, even support for schools and frontline areas. And I don't want to mention the support we give to Ukrainian refugees in Germany.

Indeed, we can now fairly say that we are overall the number one supporter of Ukraine.

Speaking about air defence, indeed we have provided several Patriot systems.

Also, we help through the PURL mechanism [the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List, through which US military equipment, including Patriot interceptor missiles, is purchased for Ukraine – EP], where we are again the largest supporter. Here we have been providing PAC-3 missiles, which are the most effective defence against Russian ballistic missiles. And we have now signed a deal about providing additional PAC-2 missiles, which goes into the hundreds.

Then I would like to mention the German IRIS-T systems, which are probably as important as Patriot, but less well-known. This is the most effective air defence means that Ukraine has against cruise missiles.

As you remember, last winter there was a minimum of energy infrastructure in Ukraine that could be preserved, and your air defence managed to do it in large part due to the IRIS-T systems that we delivered.

We all know that the situation in the winter was extremely difficult; our embassy also suffered from it, and we all stayed here. And I can say that if Ukraine hadn’t had that IRIS-T supply, the situation would have been worse. They proved to be very efficient, very often showing a hit rate of 100% against cruise missiles from Russia.

But again, we don’t share the numbers of systems we supply, and we do that intentionally. I can only say that we supplied several hundred IRIS-T interceptor missiles, and that’s going up.

Readers sometimes ask: why does Germany need to support Ukraine that much?

Frankly, that's a surprising question to me. I'm always being asked the question the other way around. But of course, I have the answer.

It's obvious that no country which is under attack by a criminal regime like the one in Moscow can withstand those attacks alone.

If you are under threat of attack from an actor which blatantly violates international law, which has such military means at its disposal, you need help from your friends. And we consider Ukraine not only a partner but also a friend, and we will continue to stand by your side.

As the Chancellor said once, Germany is acutely aware that Germany is not at war at this point in time, but we are also not living in peacetime.

Sergiy Sydorenko

Editor, European Pravda

European Pravda has published its own view of how the proposal should be modified in order to address the concerns being voiced in Ukraine.

Now we are giving the floor to a European expert – a retired but still influential official who is defending Merz’s initiative while acknowledging that some of its elements will probably need to be revised.

Klaus Welle is the former Secretary General of the European Parliament. He occupied this post for nearly 14 years – longer than any of his predecessors for nearly 14 years – before stepping down at the end of 2022. He currently chairs the academic council of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies and advises several current top officials. It is also important that Welle is German and comes from the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) – Merz’s and Germany’s ruling party. He is actively engaged in Ukrainian issues and has travelled to Kyiv many times during the full-scale war. We met at the European Pravda office during his latest visit.

Klaus Welle avoids using the term "associate membership", which has provoked resistance in Ukraine. However, he considers many elements of Merz's proposal beneficial for Ukraine.

Below are quotes from Welle's interview with European Pravda's Editor in Chief, Sergey Sydorenko:

On the main elements of Merz’s proposal

Friedrich Merz, as the Federal Chancellor of Germany, has a strong interest in ensuring that Ukraine comes as close to the European Union as possible at any given moment.

I've been active in the Brussels bubble for more than 30 years. I've seen very, very closely the enlargement round with Poland and all other countries that joined the EU in this period.

I can say that when we look in detail at what he proposed – not the headlines, but the real points – these are improvements compared to past enlargements. What was proposed to Ukraine is a much better offer at the early stage.

Firstly, Merz proposes to immediately open all negotiation chapters–and that's exactly what Ukraine wants.

Secondly, Ukrainians would be present in the meeting rooms of the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and in the European Parliament. I believe that would help your [Ukraine's] case. 

Thirdly, Merz proposes to apply step-by-step the acquis communautaire [EU legislation] according to the progress in accession negotiations, meaning you grow into the European Union.

Fourthly, some budget programmes under the direct management of the Commission would already be accessible to Ukraine. Ukraine could criticise it and say that it doesn’t touch agriculture or cohesion funds, but programmes under direct management are about 20% of the EU budget and that’s a lot.

The fifth point is the full alignment of Ukraine’s foreign and security policy with the European Union, and while this is something for Ukraine to do, in exchange Ukraine would get access to Article 42.7 – a solidarity article, a kind of European analogue to NATO’s Article 5. Under Article 42.7, you can activate many European Union programmes, for example military mobility, which provides a way to supply military equipment quickly. We are now discussing in the European Union how to make Article 42.7 operational, so it will evolve.

The sixth point is a snap-back mechanism against backsliding, which would allow the EU to reverse certain steps in the event of a rollback of reforms in Ukraine. 

On no voting rights

It has already happened that we were giving observer status to those countries which were about to join the EU – at the phase between the signature of the accession treaty and ratification. At this stage, they also did not have voting rights.

For Ukraine, it is proposed to reach this stage much earlier. And I would argue that most applicant countries in the past would have loved to have the proposal made to Ukraine.

No voting rights and no influence do not go together.

But being present at EU meetings means that every day you put the interests of your country on the agenda. You are in the debates, you go to the committees, and you say, "Look, you are discussing something, but here is an important point from my country’s point of view". 

In the European Parliament, those who have influence are those who have strong arguments and who can make their points. Voting has an importance, but instances where one vote makes a big difference are relatively rare. 

But one strong voice can make a huge difference in debate, if you send your leading politicians to the European Parliament.

I would stress that in the European Parliament this observer status would mean that representatives from both the government and the opposition would be heard, so that the plurality of voices from the country can be heard. Hopefully this would be in Ukraine's interest as well.  

A Ukrainian representative to the European Commission would not be a full Commissioner, but we expect an observer country to send somebody strong, with governing experience, because you want that person to be taken seriously in the College. Even if they are not yet a full Commissioner. And these representatives would have staff, a cabinet, taking part in various meetings.

Having Ukraine in the institutions with voting rights is not possible legally, unless you become a full EU member.

While the institutions – the European Parliament, the Commission, the Council can organise the way they run, but the composition of the institutions and the voting rights are set out in the Treaties and cannot be changed that easily.

Failure to implement reforms would mean no full membership

The "snap-back" mechanism against reform rollback is an important element. If Kyiv fails to implement the necessary prerequisites – for example, in the area of anti-corruption – then preferences provided to Ukraine could be reduced.

And here comes a question: do you want EU membership absolutely, or do you want EU membership relatively?

Let me explain what I mean.

If you want it absolutely, you have to tackle very painful issues with very painful action, even if these actions could cause you problems as the government. Reforms may go against party interests as well. There would be really tough and painful things to be done, but absolutely needed for your membership.

I worked for EP President Jerzy Buzek, who used to be Prime Minister of Poland in 1997-2001. The most important reforms in Poland on the accession path were conducted under Prime Minister Buzek and his deputy Leszek Balcerowicz [former Deputy Prime Minister of Poland], and there were very painful reforms (for example, on social security).

The party union that delegated him to the government [Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, AWS] got an absolute majority in the 1997 election. But by the next elections in 2001 it became so unpopular in Poland that it did not make it back into parliament. The reforms they did were so tough that people didn’t want to see them in politics anymore, and [in 2001, after that defeat, AWS was dissolved].

Nowadays, everybody understands this was the decisive time that is why Poland is now doing great. And Prime Minister Buzek is very respected for what he did. But this understanding came later.

And that is what I call "if you want to be in the EU absolutely".

The road to membership is neither easy nor smooth. You have to go against a lot of vested interests. And if you have the absolute willingness, you get the prize.

That is what we see now in Montenegro: they have the absolute willingness, they're always ahead of schedule with reforms, and that’s why they are where they are now. [Montenegro is the only candidate country that has begun preparing the text of its accession treaty].

With Ukraine, I definitely see that the Ukrainian people absolutely want to be in the EU. But if your government is not willing to make that sacrifice – to take actions which are needed but may result in the loss of popular support – then it will be difficult to reach what their people want so much.

The Merz proposal is not final – Ukraine has a say

This letter is not a decision or a legislative proposal; it is a call for discussion. It is a contribution from the largest member state in the EU, a state that feels very close to Ukraine. Berlin is looking for a constructive answer to Ukraine’s concern about the overly long accession process.

Now the European Council in June will discuss this [at the summit].

And I am sure they will very carefully listen to what Ukraine has to say, and of course that will be respected. It would be absolutely fair to say that Ukraine and Moldova should not be decoupled. And I do not think this would present a major hurdle.

On the contrary, the current proposal is more of a challenge for Chișinău, because they would need the same benefits offered to Ukraine to also be made available to Moldova.

Whether everybody in the European Council supports this, I do not know. But it is important that Merz is the proponent of this, and I think he deserves some credit, not just criticism, because he is making the case for some special rights for Ukraine.

Friedrich Merz is motivated to push this because he sees himself as a close friend of Ukraine.

Of course, if Ukraine says "we do not want this", the others will not impose this on Ukraine. It is an offer.

And if this initiative is taken to the European Council in June, there will surely be some in the room who are more sceptical, who will question it, like: "Why should we do that? Let’s go for the normal process."

Even those ideas [like the opening of all clusters for Ukraine] that were already supported by 26 in the past, meaning everyone except Hungary, are not guaranteed now. It could happen that for some countries it was easy to vote for Ukraine knowing that Hungary would block it anyway.

Now you could face the reality that other countries may be willing to delay pro-Ukrainian initiatives a bit.

And that is why I say that the German Chancellor deserves some credit for the initiative he took, knowing that it may not be popular with all EU member states. And I believe Merz should not be shot down both by member states and by Ukraine. 

Still, Ukraine has a say in the shape of that initiative. There are elements that Ukraine may have reason to dispute, and that debate is exactly what Mertz's proposal sets out to initiate. 

And let me share with you a story from my early years of work in European politics.

It was 30 years ago when the EU prepared to change its fundamentals and held negotiations on what is now called the Amsterdam Treaty. At that time I worked for Chancellor Helmut Kohl. There were tough debates among member state representatives [the EU consisted of 15 states back then], but we worked hard and managed to find a consensus by the summit, presenting our leaders with a draft treaty that every member was ready to sign.

But Helmut Kohl was very angry that we did it.

Because he wanted to have a debate at leaders’ level; he wanted to hear what every other leader had to say, to feel where the differences between the capitals lay. That is politics. And that is why leaders sometimes go forward with proposals that are not final–to feel the temperature and to find the idea that will fly.

Sergiy Sydorenko,

Editor, European Pravda

It may have seemed that President Zelenskyy had put an end to the discussion when, at the end of the week, he rejected Merz’s proposal in its current form in a detailed letter to EU leaders. His main message in the four-page letter can be summed up as: "There can be no complete European project without Ukraine, and Ukraine’s place in the European Union must be full and equal."

However, this does not mean that Merz’s initiative is dead.

The German chancellor has reignited discussions within the EU about what to do with Ukraine, and there are already several alternative proposals, including one from the Lithuanian government, which certainly cannot be accused of acting against Ukraine’s interests.

Moreover, despite the criticism from Kyiv, it is also in Ukraine’s interest that Merz’s idea should not disappear, but evolve instead.

The important thing is that it should develop into forms that are beneficial to both European and Ukrainian political actors, as well as to Ukrainian society.

And this is a completely realistic objective.

Indeed, Merz’s proposal contains both certain dangerous elements and some positive elements that could be useful for Ukraine.

The German chancellor did make several critical mistakes in his letter to the EU leadership, and these need to be analysed separately in order to draw red lines that would create risks for Ukraine if crossed. But if these errors are corrected, there are some entirely possible steps the EU could take that would not yet mean full membership, but would still be beneficial for Ukraine.

Not only that – Kyiv should fight for such formats and for Merz’s idea to be refined into acceptable forms. And this work must be done without delay, because the window of opportunity for creating a new framework will only be open for a few more weeks.

Membership, not a substitute

First, it must be emphasised as a fundamental point that Ukraine’s goal is full accession to the European Union.

And not just because this aspiration is enshrined in the Constitution. It is not just an aspiration supported by the country’s current leadership.

Joining the EU has unequivocal support from Ukrainian society, providing a significant level of confidence that this goal will be maintained under future governments as well due to voter demand. Even more important is the fact that Ukraine’s accession to the EU is a geopolitical necessity. Geography and the proximity of Russia, which is unlikely to stop wanting to destroy Ukraine, leave no alternative to European integration. And from a security perspective, it is also essential for the EU itself.

The main problem with Merz’s letter is that the integration scheme he has proposed, if implemented in its current form, would call Ukraine’s ultimate goal into question.

Under Merz’s proposal, Ukraine and Moldova would be decoupled. For Chișinău (and for the Balkan countries that are further advanced in integration), Merz suggests finding ways to accelerate accession, while for Ukraine he proposes introducing a new special status. As a result, the letter was perceived in Kyiv as an attempt to create a pretext that could lead to EU membership for Ukraine being replaced with an alternative (and an empty alternative devoid of substantive content at that).

European and German sources have assured European Pravda that this was not Merz’s intention.

He still sincerely aims to bring Ukraine into the EU, just as he stated in his letter.

But regardless of his intentions, for Kyiv, the decoupling of Ukraine’s and Moldova’s integration paths is seen as a red flag. If decoupling is carried out now, it could be used precisely to pull Ukraine away from the leading group of enlargement countries and relegate it to the laggards whose accession won’t be up for discussion until much later – even if the proponents of this idea do not actually intend that to happen.

Without this element, Merz’s idea would be received much more positively.

A path to accession, not a special status

The second idea that will definitely not find support from Kyiv or a unanimous positive reception from the Ukrainian expert community is the special status that Merz has proposed calling "associate membership".

European Pravda has already explained in a previous article why such a proposal sounds politically meaningless and like bad PR for Ukraine: for a country that has had an Association Agreement with the EU signed and ratified for nearly nine years, it sounds like an attempt to "sell" Ukraine something it already has. For that reason, any future "creative" ideas offering Ukraine "another association" are destined to be met with a negative reception.

In Berlin, however, they are insisting that for Merz, this term is not essential. Several sources have assured European Pravda that the chancellor’s team is already aware of Kyiv’s negative perception of the name, and that it would not be a problem to drop references to "associate membership" in all future reflections on Ukraine’s path to accession.

That’s a good thing. But the problem isn’t just the name.

Any ideas about how Ukraine could gain greater access to EU institutions and be more actively present in European discussions are worth considering. But attempts to formalise them as an official status raise a legitimate question in Kyiv: could this turn into a substitute for membership?

The framing of Merz’s proposal leans towards precisely that interpretation.

This is also how Zelenskyy appears to have read it, and that’s reflected in his emotional response to European leaders (European Pravda has seen the letter). The president describes the German chancellor’s ideas as "half-measures" and the proposed status for Ukraine as "semi-membership", insisting that Ukraine "deserves a fair approach and equal rights with Europe".

So what should the EU actually propose that Ukraine would agree to?

First, it is worth considering whether this should be a formal status at all. Interim initiatives that help Ukraine’s integration do not always need to be formalised as a special legal status. If they are, it creates grounds for debate about whether such a step could one day become an alternative to full integration.

The logic would be: you’ve got "intermediate membership" (or whatever it may be called), so there’s no need to rush towards formal accession.

Kyiv will inevitably take that risk into account, knowing that there are some actors within the EU (Merz is not one of them, by the way) who would welcome such an outcome.

But there is an alternative: a new formal EU status for Ukraine that would not give rise to such concerns from the outset. This is possible if the status is clearly defined as a staging post on the way to accession and has no alternative interpretation. Put simply, this would be the status of a country negotiating an accession treaty (as is currently the case with Montenegro), or a country that has signed an accession treaty but is awaiting ratification (normal and even desirable for Kyiv).

In search of a hybrid solution that takes these considerations into account, Lithuania, through dialogue with other EU countries, is proposing that Ukraine should formally be granted the status of an "acceding state", meaning a country in the process of joining the EU. As you can see, this is a fundamentally different concept from the "associate member" status suggested in Merz’s letter.

But it isn’t just the name that matters. It is also the substance.

Why the issue has become urgent

It is also worth briefly addressing something that was mentioned at the beginning of this article: the next few weeks are going to be decisive in shaping the future architecture of EU accession.

On 18-19 June, at the end of the Cypriot presidency, an EU summit is set to be held in Brussels. Formally, its agenda has not yet been set, but in practice the meeting is expected to focus largely on the emerging new balance of power within the European Union.

This is the first official EU summit since Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat and the first time leaders will be meeting with the new Hungarian leadership under Péter Magyar. Orbán was a source of problems far beyond Ukraine. He openly worked to undermine European unity and publicly questioned shared values, and the weakening of EU unity on Ukraine was only one element of this broader pattern.

Although Magyar presents himself as "anti-Orbán", not all member states are fully convinced of that. He still has to prove it, and that hasn’t happened yet.

For now, the EU has significant leverage over Magyar’s government: blocked funds left over from the Orbán era, which are about to expire. Brussels must decide before the end of the summer whether to release billions of euros that are badly needed by the Hungarian government. It is during this period that Péter Magyar will have the strongest incentive to align with common EU policies.

The only EU summit in this period will take place in about three and a half weeks’ time, in June.

So Ukraine is interested in ensuring that ambitious and acceptable ideas regarding its European integration are put on the agenda of this summit.

However, it would be naïve to expect Ukraine to be offered EU membership at that summit. That is impossible even in theory. After all, the obstacles to faster progress are not limited to Hungary, and Hungary is not even the main one. There is also Ukraine’s own lack of readiness, as assessed by Brussels and key capitals; insufficient reform momentum, particularly in the Fundamentals cluster; and unresolved questions about the EU’s own functioning, including its Common Agricultural Policy and other institutional issues.

Nevertheless, we must make the most of this moment to shape a new European vision of Ukraine.

Even without "voting rights", you can still have a voice

Despite the criticism of several important elements of Friedrich Merz’s initiative, Ukraine should in fact be grateful for his letter, because it has triggered a discussion within the EU regarding what to do about Ukrainian accession.

The standard path to EU membership is clearly not suitable for Ukraine, and the German chancellor emphasises this as well. It’s too long, because this path was designed for completely different realities in Europe. And it’s too dangerous, because even European leaders now understand that for Russia, Ukraine’s success and its accession to the EU are unacceptable outcomes.

That is why Europe is trying to find ways that do not threaten the destruction of the European Union, but would allow Ukraine to become a member more quickly.

As a result, creative ideas are emerging about how to help Kyiv, including in the area of reforms (which ultimately have to be carried out).

Not all of these ideas have received support from Ukraine. In particular, in his letter to the EU, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was very critical of Merz’s proposal that as an "associate member", Ukraine would receive the right to send representatives to all EU institutions (from the Council of the EU to the Court of Justice of the EU), but without voting rights.

His arguments are understandable, but not all of them are convincing.

In fact, participation in the Council of the EU would be very useful for Ukraine.

And this is not about politics.

Meetings of the Council of the EU take place almost daily in different sectoral configurations, with ministers from various countries travelling to Brussels every day. In this context, it is arguably not essential for Ukrainian ministers to be constantly travelling to the EU capital, especially given that it takes them two whole days to get there – significantly longer under wartime conditions from Kyiv than from most other European capitals.

Moreover, these ministerial meetings are often more of a formality – countries arrive with their positions already agreed.

So it would be much more interesting to participate in the Council’s working bodies where those positions are actually shaped, so that Ukrainian representatives would be present at all internal EU discussions without exception, receive information, and be able to report back to the capital if anything went wrong.

And ultimately be able to express Kyiv’s position.

Because even without voting rights, Ukraine does not have to remain silent. Even in an observer role, Ukrainian representatives would have the right to present and explain the Ukrainian government’s position, warn against decisions that could undermine EU-Ukraine relations, and point out consequences that may not be obvious in Brussels, among other things.

There is a lot less sense, however, in Ukraine being represented in the European Parliament without voting rights. That is a political body, where influence matters greatly. And if it came to holding elections for "not-quite-MEPs", what Ukrainian politician would want to compete for such a position with only symbolic weight?

The same applies to the EU Court of Justice (appointing a judge from Ukraine who would have no vote but simply sit in Luxembourg – an idea that may be interesting, but not groundbreaking), and so on.

And finally, the timing of this development is crucial.

Let us recall a basic principle: Ukraine’s goal is full membership. And it would be entirely normal, even desirable, for there to be an intermediate status that serves as a transitional stage on the way to accession. For example, the "status of a state in the accession process", as proposed by the Lithuanians.

Therefore, if the European Union offers a substantive, concrete status that truly functions as such a transitional stage, this could help Ukrainian reforms. It would also demonstrate to EU member states, their politicians, Ukrainians, and ultimately also the Kremlin, that Ukraine’s accession to the EU is a truly inevitable and irreversible European decision, and that full membership is only a matter of time.

Ideally, the EU could decide to grant this status in exchange for Ukraine meeting the requirements of the first Fundamentals cluster, which covers the rule of law, anti-corruption measures, human rights and more.

Within the EU, the benchmarks (criteria used to assess Ukraine’s compliance) have been agreed, and there is also a mechanism for assessing candidate countries known as the Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR).

From there, the question becomes one of creativity.

When to sign the accession treaty and when to ratify it; how to define possible timelines for Ukraine to enjoy the benefits of membership; how to make the process legally irreversible – these are all issues that can and must be considered.

And if Merz’s letter, despite its initial shortcomings, leads to such an agreement, it will become a historic milestone on Ukraine’s path to EU accession.

After all, diplomacy is always the art of the impossible. And Ukraine has more than once displayed its mastery of that art.

Sergiy Sydorenko,

Editor, European Pravda

The Strategy relates to several EU-mandated criteria according to which Brussels will assess Ukraine’s readiness for membership. It will also determine whether Kyiv is truly making progress on its journey towards European integration.

The Strategy must be approved by the Verkhovna Rada [Ukrainian parliament] via a separate law.

But it isn’t just the fact of its adoption that matters: its content is equally important.

This is where the problems are arising – problems that even some in the ruling party acknowledge.

On 18 May, Anastasiia Radina, an MP aligned with the Servant of the People party who chairs the parliamentary anti-corruption committee, wrote on Facebook: "The government headed by Yuliia Svyrydenko has ignored key European integration pledges from the Kachka-Kos communiqué [the 10 key reform priorities outlined in the Joint Statement by EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos and Ukraine’s deputy prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Taras Kachka]. The government is acting contrary to the interim benchmarks for Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations, which are official requirements. Unless these benchmarks are met, there will be no accession to the EU."

Even before Radina’s emotional post, the situation had gradually become unclear, even threatening.

Briefly, this is how the story unfolded.

The EU started emphasising last year that the adoption of this Strategy, which Kyiv had been slow to develop, was one of the key criteria. This set the process in motion. The National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and experts in the field drafted a document that aligned with what had been agreed with the EU, and it was submitted to the government on 2 April to be introduced to parliament.

And then the process ground to a halt. The government was in no hurry to move towards approval.

On 13 May, Radina decided to seize the initiative and registered in parliament the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy that the NACP had previously submitted to the government. And just two days later, on 15 May, the government submitted its own draft "in pursuit" – as an alternative to the first one. There are several critical differences between the two documents.

There are even grounds to speak of a new attack on Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions.

In particular, the government proposes to remove key provisions from the Strategy concerning the independence of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and competitive selection procedures for top-level positions.

These proposals contradict the government’s own commitments as set out in the Kachka-Kos plan. They also contradict the EU’s benchmarks – a list of the criteria Ukraine must meet on its path towards accession.

What the Svyrydenko government has changed

After a significant delay, the government submitted a draft law approving the Anti-Corruption Strategy to parliament. It is a detailed document that runs to well over a hundred pages.

After the six weeks the NACP’s draft proposal spent under government review, most of its content remained unchanged. But the few provisions that have been amended are among the most sensitive.

Notably, in some sections the government draft is more ambitious. But this is mainly in the sections that contain broad, declaratory statements.

For example, instead of Ukraine committing to "continuous monitoring of the status and dynamics of Ukraine’s fulfilment of international obligations in the field of preventing and combating corruption, and the compliance of Ukrainian anti-corruption legislation with EU law", the government now proposes that parliament guarantee the "gradual alignment of Ukraine’s anti-corruption legislation with EU law" and the "implementation of recommendations provided to Ukraine by international institutions".

In other words, instead of merely "monitoring", Kyiv now wants to commit itself to implementing changes, and that sounds positive.

But the subsequent list of proposed changes casts doubt on that impression.

The government has acknowledged in the Anti-Corruption Strategy, just as in the original NACP draft, that an "insufficient guarantee of the independence and institutional resilience of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) reduces its effectiveness". Yet it then goes on to remove two instruments intended to ensure that independence from the list of objectives – Ukraine’s pledge to grant SAPO the authority to "enter information into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations regarding the possible commission of a criminal offence by a Member of Parliament of Ukraine and approve applications considered by an investigating judge", and to "carry out other necessary investigative and procedural actions in all criminal proceedings that fall under the jurisdiction of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, without the involvement of the Prosecutor General".

The state’s acknowledgement of the politicisation of the procedure for appointing and dismissing the prosecutor general, as well as proposed ways to resolve this problem, have also been completely expunged from the Strategy.

Also deleted is any reference to competitive selection procedures for appointing the heads of the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and the National Police. The original draft had proposed changing the current SBI selection procedures and introducing a competitive process for the National Police, the objective being to create a merit-based selection system.

Several changes outside the anti-corruption infrastructure were also proposed.

The original proposal had envisioned drafting and adopting a comprehensive code to regulate urban development, but that ambition has now been reduced to making piecemeal amendments.

The proposal had suggested that constitutional amendments be made to regulate the work of the National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities, but the government, while still acknowledging the problem, has dropped any mention of seeking constitutional changes even by 2030.

Finally, the section dealing with corruption problems in the tax system has undergone dramatic revision. The government has removed all references to the problem of "manual control" (overriding the usual procedures) in ordering arbitrary tax inspections, as well as a section that acknowledges the problem of "the tax authorities’ practice of asking certain taxpayers to artificially inflate their profits so that planned tax revenue targets can be met". It is as if this problem – one familiar to the entire business community – simply does not exist.

Protection for MPs and control over investigations

It’s worth examining Anastasiia Radina’s claims that the government’s amendments are contrary to Ukraine’s path towards EU membership. Is this really the case? What exactly is the contradiction?

In July 2025, the authorities launched an open attack on the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), triggering protests in Ukraine and causing enormous problems in Kyiv’s relations with its international partners. The resulting lack of trust in the sincerity of the Ukrainian authorities’ anti-corruption rhetoric has still not faded, and it may flare up again now with renewed force.

To address the problem of the lack of trust in Ukraine, Brussels proposed a creative solution – the approval of the Kachka-Kos plan.

The plan comprises 10 points that Kyiv has promised to implement by the end of 2026, including commitments to enhance NABU and SAPO’s independence and expand their jurisdiction to cover "all high-risk positions based on an existing independent assessment".

Another key document is the EU benchmarks – the indicators that EU member states use to evaluate whether Ukraine is fulfilling the requirements for EU accession. These benchmarks also cover the institutional strengthening of the anti-corruption bodies.

They specifically state that NABU and SAPO must be granted the necessary powers to initiate criminal proceedings against Members of Parliament without prior approval from the Prosecutor General (Benchmark IBM 23.6.3).

Thus, the government has refused to implement a mandatory criterion for EU accession.

The provision on the independence of NABU/SAPO’s investigative and procedural actions from the will of the Prosecutor General does not have an exact equivalent in the Benchmarks, but it does correspond to the requirements of the Kachka-Kos plan regarding the independence of the anti-corruption institutions in carrying out their activities.

The other deleted provisions also contradict commitments made to the EU.

Preserving the Prosecutor General

The role of the Prosecutor General was central during last year’s attack on NABU and SAPO. After that, the EU’s demand that the appointment procedure had to change became even more insistent.

In December 2025, the Kachka-Kos plan injected new optimism regarding this issue.

The plan includes a commitment to "conduct a comprehensive review of the selection and dismissal procedure of the Prosecutor General, with a view to aligning it with European best practice with the involvement of the Venice Commission".

Another EU benchmark criterion is "rendering the selection and dismissal procedure for the Prosecutor General and high-level prosecutors more transparent and merit-based" (Benchmark section IBM 23.2).

This goal, as mentioned earlier, was reflected in the initial NACP draft registered by Anastasiia Radina.

Yet there is nothing in the government’s draft law about a competitive selection procedure for the position of Prosecutor General.

This entire section has been removed, including the acknowledgement that a problem exists at all.

There are, however, references to other competitive procedures within the Prosecutor General’s Office, specifically regarding appointments "to positions of prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General and regional prosecutor’s offices in accordance with European Commission recommendations".

The government’s draft contains no explanations for these amendments. Supporters of the government’s approach usually argue that Ukraine cannot amend the Constitution during martial law. However, the strategy covers the period until 2030, and the NACP’s initial draft included other constitutional changes – for example, regarding the National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities. But the government has removed all such references.

This raises the question of whether this "clean-up" reflects the government’s need to avoid addressing the politically sensitive issue of the Prosecutor General’s position, particularly given its importance for the authorities and the president.

A phobia of transparent competition

The government’s amendments to the Anti-Corruption Strategy suggest that it has developed a phobia of competitive selection procedures for key leadership positions.

It’s not just the Prosecutor General – provisions introducing or reforming competitive selection processes to appoint the heads of the National Police and the SBI have also been removed from the draft Strategy.

The NACP’s draft had envisaged the introduction of a "transparent, merit-based and predictable selection procedure for the position of Chief of the National Police of Ukraine, involving independent experts nominated by international partners…"

In the government version, this has been removed and replaced with a gradual transition to "occupying the positions of heads in central and territorial bodies" of the National Police, which would be carried out "solely on a competitive basis".

It’s worth mentioning that neither the Kachka-Kos plan nor the EU benchmarks contain provisions that specifically require a competitive process to appoint the Chief of the National Police.

But there are explicit references regarding the SBI.

The Kachka-Kos statement mentions, albeit in a somewhat general form, "conducting an independent comprehensive review of the SBI's institutional framework, integrity mechanisms, and oversight functions to assess the necessity and feasibility of further reforms in line with best European practices…"

The EU benchmarks, however, are much more specific. The EU requires Ukraine to "develop, adopt and start implementing a comprehensive reform law of the State Bureau of Investigation with the meaningful involvement of independent experts nominated by international partners" (IBM 24.3.1), and Brussels has made it clear that it expects the introduction of just such a competitive selection process, involving international experts and drawing on examples from best practice.

The government’s draft law effectively ignores this obligation.

So Radina appears to be entirely justified in her criticism that the government’s amendments are contrary to Ukraine’s path towards EU membership.

The question of why the government made these changes remains open.

As does the question of whether parliament will have enough political courage to keep Ukraine on its path towards European integration and adopt a draft that actually meets the EU’s requirements.

Because in the end, these reforms will still have to be implemented if Ukraine wants to stay on its European trajectory.

Anatolii Martsynovsky, Sergiy Sydorenko

Editors, European Pravda

The document, which was intended to remain confidential, outlines over five pages how Berlin envisions Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Merz referred to this format as "associate membership".

However, the German idea is unacceptable for Kyiv.

The problem is not only that the format offers Ukraine very few advantages.

There are also serious risks that Berlin attempted to conceal.

Merz writes that the new format is not a substitute for full membership and would help advance the accession process. But the document itself does not support this claim.

On the contrary: his proposal envisions Kyiv receiving an intermediate status, being stuck in the "EU waiting room", while for the other candidate countries, including Moldova, Berlin proposes accelerated accession bypassing Ukraine.

Moreover, the status proposed by Merz is legally fragile. If there is a change of power in Berlin or Brussels, Ukraine could be left without even these symbolic advantages.

Even the term "associate membership" is odd. Ukraine already has an Association Agreement with the EU. Merz is proposing "another association" without any legal guarantees and without any real benefits.

Despite all this criticism, the fact that Europe is searching for creative formats for Ukraine’s accession is, in itself, positive. The understanding that Ukraine’s accession is necessary for Europe itself is steadily growing in EU capitals. However, in negotiations over the terms, Ukraine should not agree to the first proposal put on the table.

What the debate is about

Discussions about an alternative format of EU membership for Ukraine intensified in April. Media outlets reported on a Franco-German non-paper stating that Europe should integrate Ukraine without waiting for Kyiv to fulfil the accession criteria under the standard procedure.

The document was received negatively in Kyiv. Above all, this was due to its misleading presentation in the Financial Times, where the proposal was described as "symbolic membership", implying that it would serve as a symbol of Ukraine’s future full-fledged accession to the EU.

In Ukrainian, however, the word "symbolic" was interpreted differently – as meaning "small" or "inferior". "Ukraine does not need symbolic membership in the EU. Ukraine is defending itself and is definitely defending Europe. And it is not defending Europe symbolically – people are really dying," Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated back then.

Terminology was not the only problem. The possible parameters of this intermediate membership format were also uninspiring for Ukraine. Berlin, however, did not abandon the idea. This time, Friedrich Merz decided to act without Paris’s backing and sent EU partners a more detailed outline of his proposal.

The document begins with Berlin’s assurances that Ukraine belongs in the European Union.

"The enlargement process takes much too long… As we are now in the fifth year of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, we need to quickly advance with Ukraine's EU membership," Merz wrote, adding that he had already proposed to President Zelenskyy "the idea of what I call an 'associate membership' for Ukraine".

Merz does not specify how the Ukrainian leader reacted to the proposal.

The format he describes in the letter offers little to Kyiv.

He believes Ukraine should gain access to all EU summits, as well as meetings of the Council of Ministers – the EU’s main legislative and political body. However, Kyiv would not receive voting rights, only observer status.

Ukraine would also receive the position of a European Commissioner with reduced powers – again, merely to observe the work of the European Commission rather than participate fully in it. The Ukrainian commissioner would have no voting rights. More importantly, the commissioner would not be assigned a portfolio (a designated EU policy sector), which is what gives the role real substance.

Ukraine would be offered seats in the European Parliament. But these MEPs would also lack voting rights, effectively reducing their influence in parliament to zero. The same principle would apply across all other EU institutions – for example, in the Court of Justice of the European Union, where there would be an associated Ukrainian judge without actual authority.

Ukraine would not gain access to the EU budget or structural funds like full member states do. Assistance projects for Ukraine would remain separate, as they are now.

There is only one sector in which Merz proposes immediate integration for Ukraine: security. Here, Berlin is prepared to involve Kyiv in all processes, including mutual security guarantees under Article 42.7 – the European equivalent of NATO’s Article 5.

Take everything and give nothing in return

Even this brief outline shows that the idea is not particularly attractive. In essence, Kyiv receives nothing. It is "symbolic membership" in the worst sense of the term – precisely the kind of proposal that had already triggered a negative reaction from Kyiv when Merz first floated it.

At the same time, while offering Ukraine participation in none of the EU’s actual policies, Germany wants to strip Kyiv of its main negotiating leverage – security. After all, Article 42.7 implies not only EU assistance in defending Ukraine, but also Ukraine’s involvement in defending other European states from possible Russian aggression.

Most importantly, however, the German proposal contains a hidden trap for Ukraine.

In his letter to EU leaders, Friedrich Merz insists that the new format is not a replacement for or alternative to Ukraine’s full EU membership.

"We want Ukraine to become a full member of the European Union. Therefore, we should, immediately and without delay, formally open all negotiation clusters," he writes. The chancellor argues that the goal of the proposal is to "further accelerate the accession process". Supposedly, Kyiv’s participation in European institutions, even in an observer capacity, would allow Ukrainians to move towards membership more quickly.

But the effect would be the exact opposite in geopolitical reality.

The German proposal explicitly envisions the decoupling of Ukraine and Moldova on their path towards accession. This would be an irreversible process that leaves Ukraine behind the other candidates.

Only Ukraine would receive this "associate membership" and observer role. At the same time, for Moldova and the more advanced Western Balkan candidates, Merz proposes an accelerated route towards full membership. "We suggest that we look into innovative solutions also for those candidate countries… and that we accelerate their accession process," Merz writes.

There are several EU member states, Romania above all, that would welcome such a development.

They would be happy for a "difficult" Ukraine to remain an observer in the EU’s waiting room: without voting rights, without access to European funds and so on. Moldova, meanwhile, would be fast-tracked into the Union.

If implemented, this scenario would push Kyiv backwards in the accession process.

And even if and when Ukraine eventually moved again from observer status back into a full accession track, it would find itself in a new "enlargement package", grouped not with Moldova but with enlargement laggards such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia or North Macedonia.

Meanwhile, the EU would obtain everything it is interested in. Europe already has access to the Ukrainian market. And Kyiv would be expected to hand over access to its defence sector voluntarily.

"Incomplete membership" without guarantees

There is also an entire legal dimension to the problem. No such term as "associate member" exists within the EU framework. In his letter, Friedrich Merz acknowledges this issue, but expresses confidence that a legal mechanism could be found.

And that is indeed true. There are at least two possible ways to implement the kind of associate membership proposed by Berlin.

One option would be legally impeccable but politically unrealistic. It would require amendments to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which in turn would require ratification by all 27 member states and referenda in several of them. There is broad consensus that this is unachievable.

The second option is politically easier.

As is well known, Volodymyr Zelenskyy already frequently attends EU summits, and Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha is invited to meetings of EU foreign ministers, among others. Europeans could agree that, from now on, invitations for all Ukrainian ministers, as well as lower-ranking officials for working meetings, would become permanent.

But this would be a political arrangement, not a legal obligation.

In three years, the President of the European Council will change, and the successor to António Costa could easily decide that there is no place for the Ukrainian president at EU meetings. The EU treaties would be on their side.

The rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union changes every six months. Who can guarantee that one day a new presidency will not decide to end or restrict the arrangement, especially if Kyiv attempts to defend Ukrainian interests too assertively during meetings?

So even the limited advantages of associate membership would not be guaranteed.

Given all of this, Ukraine’s chances of accepting Merz’s proposal are virtually zero.

According to European Pravda, Kyiv reacted extremely critically to the German idea.

Moreover, Zelenskyy reportedly expressed these concerns directly to Merz personally, and it remains unclear why the German leader failed to understand this after their meeting in Cyprus.

Even the very term "associate membership" is unlikely to be acceptable. Since 2014, Ukraine has had an Association Agreement with the EU, which Ukrainian society has often, not entirely accurately, referred to as "associated membership". Now Ukraine is being offered a "new association" that grants few benefits, lacks legal stability, yet would allow European leaders to reject any future Ukrainian requests for accelerated full membership by saying: "We have already given you a special format".

And it is not only Ukraine that struggles to see the point of this proposal.

France, which supported the original version of the initiative, ultimately declined to co-sign Merz’s letter.

Even Slovak leader Robert Fico, whom Ukrainians often criticise for excessive sympathy towards Russia, publicly stated that Merz’s idea would fail. "Either we admit someone into the EU, or we don’t," he explained.

Berlin has crossed its own "red line"

Despite the fact that the German chancellor’s proposal appears politically dead on arrival, the discussion itself also has positive aspects.

Just a year ago, the EU in principle refused to discuss any hybrid formats for Ukraine’s accession. Now we are witnessing an active debate not even about whether such formats are possible, but about which path should be chosen.

Only a few months ago, flatly rejected any idea of rapid accession. Now Merz is openly urging other EU leaders in writing to seek accelerated formats for candidate states. Yes, his letter speaks of "acceleration" for Moldova and the Balkans, not for Ukraine, but the very fact that this red line has been crossed is extremely important.

The German government can no longer insist that accelerated accession is impossible in principle. Merz himself has destroyed the credibility of that argument.

So the EU is now actively searching for ways to continue enlargement.

Member states have seized the initiative from the European Commission, which until recently had been the driving force of the enlargement process. And if Ukraine remains constructive, proposes its own initiatives and demonstrates that it is carrying out reforms – and is prepared to continue them if granted a special status – then it may achieve the outcome it seeks.

Finally, it has become increasingly clear that Ukraine’s accession to the EU is also necessary for the European Union itself.

Merz’s letter places particular emphasis on Ukraine’s security integration into Europe, underscoring the strategic leverage Kyiv possesses. That leverage may help Ukraine persuade other European capitals once the Ukrainian question returns to the agenda, especially if accompanied by a serious and credible initiative.

Sergiy Sydorenko,

Editor, European Pravda

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha shared this with the media after the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Brussels on 11 May. This point was even included in the official statement by Ukraine's Foreign Ministry.

Given such optimism, EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos appeared uncharacteristically restrained in her expectations. According to Kos, the first cluster should be opened before the end of Cyprus's presidency of the Council of the EU (by 30 June) and all the remaining clusters should open in July 2026.

But the diplomats in Brussels who spoke to European Pravda off the record are even more cautious. They say the opening of the final clusters could be delayed until the autumn, or even later.

So whose forecast is correct, and when will the EU begin opening clusters for Ukraine?

And is there any truth in rumours that two new countries have allegedly emerged as blockers of Ukraine’s progress, effectively taking over the role previously played by Viktor Orbán?

The post-Orbán era

European Pravda has explained in previous reports that Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations are divided into six negotiating clusters. But to recap: the most important is Cluster No. 1, Fundamentals, within which Ukraine must demonstrate compliance with EU requirements in areas such as the rule of law, anti-corruption policy and related reforms. Under the negotiation rules, the Fundamentals cluster is opened first and closed last.

Ukraine is fighting specifically for this cluster to be opened.

The EU was technically ready to take this step as long ago as March 2025. But the process stalled because Hungary blocked Ukraine’s path to EU membership by refusing to approve the EU’s common negotiating position for opening the cluster – the document that lists the criteria Ukraine must meet during the negotiations. This step, like many others in the EU enlargement process, requires unanimous support from all 27 member states.

By the end of 2025, Ukraine had completed the screening procedures, and discussions could have moved towards opening negotiations on all the clusters. But former Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán, citing the results of a survey of Hungarians whose fairness was widely questioned, continued to oppose any advancement of Ukraine on its path to EU membership.

After spending several months attempting first to persuade Orbán and then to find a way around his veto, the European Commission proposed a mechanism called "frontloading". This is an entirely new format for the EU, designed specifically for Ukraine, that would allow accession negotiations to proceed at a technical level without negotiating clusters being formally opened.

At the same time, the European Commission and the member states drafted negotiating positions for each cluster. Moreover, these documents were even handed over to Ukraine (three clusters in December and three more in March).

Officials in both Kyiv and Brussels reiterated that they wanted to open all the clusters at once as soon as Orbán's veto had disappeared.

The necessary preparations have been completed.

"Everything is ready for opening the clusters," one European Commission official recently assured European Pravda. Both the draft negotiating positions and the benchmarks have been submitted to the Council of the EU for consideration. They received preliminary approval from 26 member states (all except Hungary) back in winter, which made it possible to launch technical negotiations through "frontloading".

But politically, there has been no progress whatsoever.

And Orbán’s defeat has not changed the situation so far.

Moreover, there is no discussion underway at the level of member states' ambassadors about officially giving Ukraine the green light even with regard to the first cluster – and it cannot be put to the vote without technical and procedural preparation at the diplomats' level.

So what is the obstacle now?

Who is against Ukraine, and does a "Franco-Polish veto" exist?

On 12 May, Brussels was outraged when Rikard Jozwiak of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty claimed that the countries most opposed to all the negotiating clusters for Ukraine being opened at once are France and Poland. According to Jozwiak, they are lobbying for the opening of the remaining clusters to be postponed until around autumn.

But by the following morning, Jozwiak had cast doubt on his own publication. He stated that Poland and France had denied his assessment. At the same time, he was in no hurry to admit he had been wrong.

"We'll see what happens in June," he added.

Jozwiak’s persistence is understandable, because if you look not at the formal signs (indeed, no vote on Ukraine has taken place), but at the substance of events, he and his sources do not appear to be mistaken about the positions of France and Poland.

Indeed, Paris and Warsaw have every reason not to rush this process and to compel Kyiv to meet certain conditions first instead.

Poland and France are both countries with powerful farming lobbies that fear competition from Ukrainian farmers – and not without reason. In both countries, there are also concerns that Ukraine's accession to the EU would undermine the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy fund, which currently provides generous annual financing from the EU budget to their agricultural sectors.

And there is something else that unites these two countries.

Another factor is that both will hold major elections in 2027: presidential elections in France and parliamentary elections in Poland. Strong farmers' movements represent large blocs of voters who could become a serious political problem during the upcoming campaigns.

But it’s important to emphasise that France and Poland are not alone in having such reservations. There is similar distrust and concern regarding Ukraine’s agricultural integration into the EU in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and elsewhere. However, since no formal vote on the issue has taken place, there is no definitive list of "Ukraine-sceptics". We can only speak about expectations.

Even more importantly, there is absolutely no indication that anyone intends to take over Hungary's role.

It’s this implication that appears to have triggered the outrage from the French and the Poles.

The issue is not that any one country is prepared to veto Ukraine’s progress towards EU membership. Likewise, even though Poland and France's actions are influenced by the approaching elections, neither country is considering freezing Ukraine's progress until after their own elections. That scenario is not even part of the discussions.

But ideas about changing the approach to future negotiations with Kyiv are indeed being discussed.

Under Hungary's cover

There is no shortage of issues, and Ukraine has difficult points in its relations with almost every EU member state. It appears that if the countries were forced right now to vote either for or against the immediate opening of all negotiating clusters for Ukraine, objections could arise from nearly a dozen EU states.

"Previously, all potential opponents used to hide behind Hungary's back while it blocked Ukraine's progress towards EU accession. With the change of government in Hungary and the shift in its position on this matter, you could be in for many surprises soon regarding the positions of some of Ukraine's friends on eastern enlargement," one of European Pravda's sources said.

However, this remains theoretical, because no open vote is being discussed.

Besides, the opponents’ position is not a flat "no". The situation is much more nuanced.

European Pravda has information that about a month ago, when it became increasingly clear that a change of power in Hungary was indeed likely, some countries began suggesting that the recently approved conditions for negotiations with Ukraine might need to be revised. These are the negotiating positions that the Danish and Cypriot EU presidencies handed over to Ukraine (first in December and then in March).

And it's reportedly the French and the Poles who have put forward the most ideas for changing the EU's common negotiating position with Ukraine – for example, in farming.

The most interesting developments began after Orbán's defeat became a reality.

It was then that the voices grew louder arguing that the draft negotiating position (the criteria for Ukraine) had been developed and agreed upon without Hungary's participation, and therefore it could – and should – now be changed.

And this is despite the fact that Hungary itself is not demanding such changes now. It looks as if Hungary is being used as a convenient cover. But the struggle is not over yet. There are also many friends of Ukraine among the EU member states who remind their colleagues (not only the French and Poles) that they themselves voted for the previous criteria, and that there should be consistency in the process.

As a result, several European Pravda sources involved in the process agree that it is indeed likely that the criteria will change. This could include adjustments meant to satisfy the member states that are worried about their farmers. But there is no question of fundamentally rewriting the conditions for Ukraine, and the chances of that are extremely small. Nor is there any question of a Hungarian-style blockade – the chances of that are effectively zero.

One more detail: the discussions inside the EU about possible changes to Ukraine’s criteria primarily concern two clusters: Cluster 5 (Agriculture) and Cluster 4 (particularly the chapters related to transport, where Poland effectively has a monopoly on freight transportation).

More broadly, the various areas of the negotiations with Ukraine give rise to significantly different levels of controversy. That is why officials in Brussels are increasingly advising against expecting all the clusters to open simultaneously.

So when will Ukraine open the clusters – and how many?

Traditionally, the Intergovernmental Conference at which negotiating clusters are opened takes place alongside the EU General Affairs Council (a meeting of the EU ministers for European affairs). The next such meeting is scheduled for 26 May, which is why Ukraine's Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha referred to that date.

But according to numerous Brussels sources cited by European Pravda, it is now impossible for even the first cluster to be opened by that date, and no one in the EU institutions is even working towards it.

Even setting politics aside, the technical and bureaucratic preparations alone would take time, and the date in question is only 12 days away. Moreover, clusters must be opened not only for Ukraine, but also for Moldova, with which Ukraine is "coupled". That effectively doubles the preparatory effort required.

But beyond all of this, the key obstacle remains the Hungarian factor.

That is the central political problem that prevents the EU from even thinking about preparing for a 26 May launch.

Orbán’s resignation has indeed ushered in a new era in relations between Kyiv and Budapest. The unprecedented summoning of the Russian ambassador following a strike on Zakarpattia (Transcarpathia) is a clear illustration of that shift. However, this doesn’t mean that all the issues have been resolved.

The new Hungarian prime minister, Péter Magyar, has not yet publicly stated whether he agrees to the opening of clusters for Ukraine, and if so, how many of the six clusters he would support and on what conditions.

But Brussels is aware that Budapest is not yet ready for that step. In late April, before his inauguration, Magyar visited the EU capital, where he told European Council President António Costa that the opening of clusters should be preceded by steps from Ukraine. And that will only be possible after a meeting between Magyar and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, which may take place in early June, when Hungary will formally present its position to Ukraine.

Until then, there is simply no point putting the issue to a vote.

Diplomatic sources also believe that Hungary's position will become clearer after official meetings between Magyar and the EU leadership, which are scheduled for the last week of May.

So the first cluster can open no earlier than mid-June.

And it is already possible to roughly anticipate when this might happen.

The earliest possible date is 16 June, at the next EU General Affairs Council meeting. On that day, the first cluster for Ukraine (and Moldova) is likely to be opened, in the presence of representatives of both countries.

Another possibility is that Kyiv may want to turn this into a more high-profile political event – for example, involving the president – which could push it to 18-19 June, on the sidelines of the EU leaders' summit in Brussels (although European Pravda’s EU sources are somewhat sceptical about this idea).

In any case, the EU does retain some flexibility regarding the exact day.

Either way, the first cluster is likely to remain the only open one for some time.

According to European Pravda sources, Péter Magyar has signalled an intention to initially allow only one negotiating cluster to be opened, after which he would institute a pause to wait for Ukraine to implement reforms in the area of minority rights.

Ukraine has to adopt amendments to several laws, and this process will take some time. The first cluster could be opened "on the basis of trust" in President Zelenskyy's assurances. Subsequent clusters would depend on the implementation of commitments made in agreements between Zelenskyy and Magyar.

Regarding next steps, no final decision has yet been taken within the EU. Moreover, the timing of further cluster openings will depend on when Ukraine implements the agreements that will have been reached with Magyar.

But multiple conversations with European sources indicate that one, two or even three clusters – Clusters 6 (External Relations), 2 (Internal Market), and possibly 3 (Competitiveness) – could be opened in July 2026, when the Irish EU Council presidency begins.

Clusters 4 and 5, which are already subject to discussions about possible changes in the EU's position, may take longer. The process could potentially stretch into autumn 2026. Some sceptics even suggest that the agricultural cluster might be delayed until 2027, when Lithuania holds the EU Council presidency. However, nothing has been decided yet.

Ukraine and its allies are working to ensure that 2026 will be the year that accession negotiations are fully and officially launched – and on the conditions that have already been communicated to Ukraine.

And the chances of that happening are pretty good.

Tetiana Vysotska, Brussels correspondent

Sergiy Sydorenko, Editor

European Pravda

For years, the European Union treated enlargement as a slow, technocratic and largely predictable process. Candidate countries adapted to EU rules step by step, while the Union itself remained geopolitically stable.

Ukraine has changed that reality.

Today, enlargement is unfolding under conditions of war, reconstruction, geopolitical rivalry and economic realignment. And the EU still lacks the institutional tools to manage these processes together.

Recent tensions between Kyiv and Brussels are often portrayed as a dispute about pace. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government is accused of pushing too aggressively for accession, while some EU governments insist that enlargement must remain slow and strictly merit-based.

But this framing misses the real issue.

The problem is not Ukrainian impatience.

It is that the traditional enlargement model was never designed for a situation in which security, reconstruction and economic integration all have to proceed simultaneously.

Ukraine understands this very clearly.

For Kyiv, accession is not simply a long-term political aspiration. It is part of a broader strategy of survival and anchoring.

With the war continuing and future American support uncertain, Ukraine needs deeper integration with Europe now – economically, institutionally and strategically.

And Ukraine is right to think in these terms.

Both swift accession and delays are dangerous

The EU often behaves as if delay were neutral. But in Ukraine’s case, delay carries major costs.

The reconstruction of the Ukrainian economy is already underway. Decisions about infrastructure, energy systems, industrial supply chains and defense production are being made now. Whether these structures become integrated into European markets and regulatory systems – or instead evolve around alternative geopolitical and economic centers – will shape not only Ukraine’s future, but Europe’s as well.

Prolonged uncertainty also creates political risks inside Ukraine itself. Earlier enlargement rounds in the Western Balkans demonstrated that when accession remains permanently open-ended, geopolitical orientation can again become politically contested.

At the same time, Brussels is not wrong to worry about internal political backlash.

Ukraine’s future accession will affect agricultural markets, cohesion funding, industrial competition and budget politics inside the EU. In several member states, governments fear that rapid integration could generate domestic disruption and strengthen anti-EU forces.

This is the core deadlock.

Delay weakens the strategic value of enlargement. But rapid integration without safeguards risks undermining political support for enlargement inside the Union.

The issue, therefore, is not whether enlargement should move faster or slower. It is whether Europe can build institutions capable of managing integration under conditions of uncertainty.

Right now, the EU’s policy architecture remains fragmented. Accession negotiations, reconstruction financing, industrial policy and sectoral integration largely operate separately despite overlapping in practice.

As a result, Europe lacks a coherent strategy for shaping Ukraine’s gradual integration before full membership.

The EU should therefore create a coordinated framework linking enlargement policy, reconstruction instruments, sectoral integration and EU-level industrial policy into a single strategic process.

That is the missing tool.

Mechanisms for gradual integration needed

Importantly, ideas in this direction are already emerging from Ukrainian policy debates themselves. Economists Tymofiy Mylovanov and Gérard Roland have proposed establishing a Ukraine Reconstruction and European Integration Agency (UREIA) – inspired partly by the Marshall Plan’s Economic Cooperation Administration – that would coordinate reconstruction with preparation for EU accession.

The broader point is not institutional design for its own sake. It is that reconstruction, enlargement and economic integration can no longer be treated as separate processes.

This would not even be unprecedented for the EU.

European institutions have repeatedly created coordinating mechanisms when different policy goals had to be reconciled under crisis conditions. The creation of DG Reform after the euro crisis, for example, reflected the recognition that short-term stabilisation and long-term development goals could not be managed separately.

Ukraine now requires a similar approach: one capable of combining the merit-based logic of accession with Europe’s geopolitical, industrial and security interests.

Such integration should remain gradual, conditional and reversible where necessary. But it should also become operational.

Ukraine should progressively enter selected areas of the European economic and regulatory space before formal accession – especially in defense production, energy systems, transport infrastructure and industrial supply chains.

At the same time, the EU must address the adjustment costs facing existing member states. Sectors and regions likely to experience competitive pressures should receive targeted transitional support. Without such safeguards, domestic resistance to enlargement will continue growing regardless of the geopolitical arguments.

This is not about bypassing accession rules or granting Ukraine shortcuts.

It is about recognising that the old enlargement model no longer corresponds to Europe’s strategic environment.

The irony is that the EU already possesses most of the necessary instruments: association agreements, reconstruction facilities, accession negotiations, sectoral integration mechanisms and increasingly ambitious industrial policy tools. What it lacks is a framework capable of coordinating them.

Without such a shift, enlargement risks falling into a familiar pattern: strong rhetorical commitments combined with practical delay.

And that vacuum will not remain empty.

If Europe cannot create a credible pathway for gradual integration, uncertainty will continue to grow – economically, politically and geopolitically.

The stakes therefore extend well beyond Ukraine alone.

The question is whether the EU can adapt its own institutions to a world in which enlargement has once again become a strategic instrument rather than simply a technocratic process.

Ukraine is not misunderstanding enlargement.

It is revealing why Europe now needs a different kind of enlargement policy.

Laszlo Bruszt,

CEU Democracy Institute for European Pravda

With the victory of Hungary’s Tisza Party, the European Union (EU) has at last unblocked its €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan, ending months of political paralysis.

Yet in doing so, Brussels may have settled for the expedient over the transformative.

What could have been a defining moment in Europe’s response to Russia’s war has instead become a case study in caution.

The €90 billion plus uncertainty for Ukraine

The EU has secured short-term relief for Kyiv, but at the cost of abandoning a far more ambitious – and potentially game-changing – plan: the so-called EU Reparation Loan, first floated by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during the 2025 State of the Union.

In December 2025, EU heads of state agreed on a €90 billion package to address Ukraine’s urgent financial needs, estimated at around €135 billion for 2026–2027.

Yet this commitment remained stalled for over four months due to Hungary’s veto in the Council.

Only on April 23, 2026, following the electoral victory of the centre-right Tisza Party and the end of Viktor Orbán’s sixteen-year anti-EU, pro-Russian political trajectory, was the deadlock resolved.

The Council’s implementing Regulation allocates €23 billion to strengthen Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity and €16.7 billion for general economic support throughout 2026, with a similar package expected for 2027.

However, long-term certainty remains fragile.

Bulgaria’s new prime minister, Rumen Radev, has signalled a more "pragmatic" approach toward the Kremlin, while populist governments in Slovakia and Czechia continue to cast doubt on sustained European support for Ukraine.

The Ukraine Support Loan is undeniably a significant step. It represents the EU’s largest financial package for Ukraine to date, partly compensating for reduced United States (US) assistance under the Trump administration.

It also breaks a long-standing taboo by normalizing the use of common EU debt to support a third country – an instrument that may well be used again.

Yet, in doing so, the EU has overlooked its most powerful leverage: Russia’s immobilised sovereign assets.

Why taking Russian money would have been better

The EU holds nearly 80% of the G7’s Russian sovereign assets (approximately €210 billion) primarily through the Belgian Euroclear and Luxembourg-based Clearstream depositories.

So far, Brussels has focused only on redirecting the roughly €3 billion in annual windfall profits generated by these assets, while leaving the assets themselves untouched.

With the adoption of the Ukraine Support Loan, the political momentum to mobilise these funds has effectively dissipated.

The proposed EU Reparation Loan would have been transformative on several fronts.

Financially, it could have delivered a support package more than twice the size of the current loan, closing the roughly €20 billion gap in Ukraine’s military funding needs.

Its design was both innovative and financially sound: Russian sovereign assets would serve as collateral for loans to Ukraine, to be repaid through future war reparations once Russia ends its aggression.

Only at that stage would the EU reimburse lenders, allowing for the eventual return of the assets to Russia’s central bank.

Crucially, this mechanism would have preserved the legal ownership of the assets, avoiding outright confiscation and thus maintaining compliance with international law.

At the same time, it would have established a clear principle:

Russia pays for the damage it has caused.

By embedding reparations into the financial architecture, the EU would also have strengthened its leverage in any future peace negotiations.

Legally, the Reparation Loan offered a more agile alternative.

It could have been adopted by qualified majority voting under Article 212 TFEU and, crucially, would not have required amendments to the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework – except as a last-resort safeguard. By avoiding the need to revise the MFF, it would have removed the unanimity requirement that ultimately gave Hungary its veto over the Ukraine Support Loan.

As a result, funding could have been deployed as early as January 2026, sparing Ukraine months of financial uncertainty.

Moreover, it would have avoided the problematic precedent of selectively exempting Member States – such as Hungary, Slovakia, and Czechia – from collective financial responsibilities. While largely symbolic, such opt-outs risk normalising a model of "collective action without collective responsibility", incentivizing political obstruction.

Geopolitically, the EU Reparation Loan could have been a game changer.

It would have positioned the EU as a global leader in innovative war financing, potentially setting a precedent for other actors, especially the US, to follow.

More importantly, it [just as happened under the scheme allocating €90 billion to Ukraine – EP] would have exerted tangible pressure on Moscow by linking financial consequences directly to the continuation of its war.

Europe will still have to return to Russian assets

Overall, the Ukraine Support Loan is an important milestone, but it falls short of the EU’s broader strategic ambition for Ukraine.

By contrast, the EU Reparation Loan could have fundamentally reshaped both Ukraine’s resilience and Russia’s cost calculus. Its absence therefore marks a missed opportunity.

Looking ahead, this debate will not fade. Ukraine’s reconstruction is expected to cost over €500 billion, with the EU likely to shoulder a substantial share – both directly and indirectly – at a time when fiscal space is constrained and new own resources remain limited.

In this context, the question of how to use Russia’s immobilised sovereign assets is unavoidable. The Reparation Loan framework remains not only a pragmatic option, but also a fair one.

Ukraine is poised to become a cornerstone of Europe’s future security architecture. Ensuring its long-term stability requires not only financial support, but strategic imagination – something the EU has, for now, left on the table.

Davide Genini,

a PhD candidate in EU Law at Dublin City University (DCU),

Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence in European Studies of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

But Magyar has made other statements that have alarmed many people, raising questions about whether there really are grounds for such optimism.

The new Hungarian leader has also made a number of critical remarks about Ukraine’s policy regarding the Hungarian minority in Zakarpattia (Transcarpathia). Moreover, in a breach of diplomatic protocol, he has "initiated" a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Berehove, leading some to speculate whether this could imply that he considers the city to be Hungarian territory.

Following these statements, many in Ukraine began to wonder: are we dealing with a new Viktor Orbán in Budapest, albeit one in a more democratic guise?

Will we face a new ultimatum that could block our progress to EU membership?

And should Ukraine make concessions accordingly?

European Pravda has reconstructed the sequence of events that took place before and after this much-talked-about statement, and we can say with confidence: 

there is no cause for alarm.

Despite Magyar’s aggressive rhetoric, this particular statement of his is positive for Ukraine. However, as is often the case in Hungarian politics, a lot was being said "between the lines".

The fact that Magyar made this statement after meeting the mayor of Berehove is an extremely good sign. Magyar’s list of demands gives further reason for optimism. The expectations of Ukraine on the list do not pose any real problems, and the most problematic part of Viktor Orbán's demands has been removed.

Ukraine has a proposal for Budapest that primarily benefits the Hungarian community in Zakarpattia. The community itself has also let Magyar know that it is finally time to reconcile with Ukraine. Ultimately, the new Hungarian leader will have to take Brussels' position into account. So the statements about resetting the relationship have solid grounds.

In this article, we explain what’s currently happening in Hungarian politics regarding Ukraine and how to act in order not to miss this opportunity.

No, Magyar is not laying claim to Berehove

Péter Magyar’s statement came out on Tuesday evening. The new Hungarian leader published his first extensive post on Ukraine after meeting with the mayor of Berehove, Zoltán Babják, who travelled to Budapest specifically for the meeting.

There are positive elements for Kyiv here, as well as some negative ones which have caused confusion or even outrage among many people in Ukraine. Let’s focus on those first.

First of all, many were surprised by the wording, in that Magyar himself appeared to be inviting Volodymyr Zelenskyy to a meeting. "I am initiating a meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in early June, symbolically in Berehove, a Hungarian-majority town," he wrote.

This is clearly not how meetings between state leaders are supposed to be arranged, as even European Pravda's Hungarian sources acknowledge. In personal relationships, especially between friends, there is no issue with "inviting oneself over", but in relations between countries, the invitation should come from the host country.

So why did Magyar post this statement?

The explanation is obvious to anyone who follows the Hungarian leader's media activity. This may sound unusual to Ukrainians, but it’s true: Magyar still writes his own posts and comments, and at times his improvisations drive his international and media teams up the wall.

More importantly, there are no grounds whatsoever to claim that Hungary's new leader is questioning Ukraine's sovereignty over Berehove or anything like that.

Magyar avoided using the word "invite" (since he can only invite someone to Hungary, not to Ukraine). And in the final sentence of his post – probably not everyone read that far – he makes it clear that he is waiting for an invitation from the Ukrainian authorities: "I hope to soon be able to accept his [the mayor’s] kind invitation to Berehove. I am ready."

Overall, the tone of Magyar’s post is rather positive.

The main message is: the Ukrainian-Hungarian conflict of the Orbán era must end.

"It is in the interest of Hungarians living in Transcarpathia to place Hungarian-Ukrainian relations on new foundations," he says, adding that this was the outcome of his conversation with Zoltán Babják.

"The aim of the meeting [with the mayor of Berehove] is to improve the situation of Hungarians in Transcarpathia and to support their ability to remain in their homeland." According to Magyar, if Ukraine resolves the issues that Hungarians face, then "we can certainly open a new chapter in Ukrainian-Hungarian bilateral relations".

Now it’s time to move on to the "price to pay" – what exactly Magyar expects the Ukrainian authorities to do.

No, these are not Szijjártó’s "11 points": the most toxic elements are gone

"The concessions announced by the Ukrainian government in 2025 in the field of education are a step in the right direction, but they are not sufficient." Magyar’s wording here came as a surprise to many (did the government really announce something specifically for 2025?).

Magyar also provided specific details in his post – a list of the problems that supposedly need to be addressed. But this list is even more puzzling.

Neither the author of this article nor European Pravda's sources have been able to determine its origin. One of the most interesting (and possibly realistic) explanations that’s been suggested is that the list may have been generated by AI in response to a prompt such as "Please list the language-related problems experienced by Hungarians in Zakarpattia". This could explain the inaccuracies in it (which might just be AI hallucinations).

"Higher education in Ukraine remains monolingual," Magyar claims in the first point on the list of issues he wants resolved.

But this is simply not true. There is a fully Hungarian-language institution in Berehove – Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian College of Higher Education – and in Uzhhorod, there is a Hungarian institute within the state-run national university where instruction in Hungarian is available.

"Final examinations [when leaving school] are conducted in Ukrainian," the second point on Magyar’s list says – and again, this is not true. Hungarian children in Zakarpattia can take the National Multi-Subject Test (NMT) in Hungarian if they wish. It is true that the issue of the old external independent assessment (ZNO, for admission to universities in Ukraine) remains unresolved (although it is not being conducted under martial law anyway), but according to European Pravda sources, this is not a red line for the Ukrainian government.

This is only a partial list of the inaccurate claims in the post.

Even more importantly, all the points where Magyar was referring to actual demands of the Hungarian minority in Zakarpattia are ones that Ukraine is willing to address. European Pravda has reported several times that the government even has a package of proposals ready. Some of these ideas were approved at a working level between Kyiv and Budapest back in 2024, but Viktor Orbán set a political goal of blocking Ukraine’s path to EU membership, and last year all discussions were halted.

Now these ideas may get a new lease of life. They include clearer regulations for schools with Hungarian-language classes, as well as formalised rights for Hungarians in Ukraine to address local authorities in their native language in areas where there are Hungarian communities, and more. These are precisely the points that Magyar listed.

Even more important, however, is what Hungary’s new leader did not mention.

Back in January 2024, Hungary’s then foreign minister Péter Szijjártó (who is now known to have followed instructions from his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov) handed Ukraine a list of 11 demands.

Some of them can realistically be resolved and would benefit Ukrainian citizens of Hungarian origin.

But other points were totally unacceptable from the outset. They had nothing to do with language or education rights, and it’s widely believed they were included simply to provoke a refusal from Ukraine and shift the blame onto Kyiv.

For example, Orbán’s government demanded that Ukraine change its electoral system and guarantee representation for Hungarians in parliament. This would require amendments to the Constitution and a nationwide referendum – effectively impossible even after the war is over.

Magyar did not even allude to these absurd political demands, which is another indication that he is inclined towards a constructive approach. And there are further, more tangible signs of this as well.

A message for Zakarpattia’s "Orbán-era elite"

We’ve mentioned how significant it is that the mayor of Berehove, Zoltán Babják, was the one who travelled to Budapest to meet Péter Magyar.

Babják is considered one of the most pragmatic leaders of the Hungarian community in Ukraine – and there are good reasons for that.

In 2023, when Viktor Orbán was blocking the political decision to open EU accession negotiations with Ukraine, it was Babják who wrote an open letter to him, explaining that this decision was important for the Hungarian community. Orbán initially refused to consider Babják’s request, but eventually he was forced to "step out for coffee" during the EU summit, allowing the decision on opening the negotiations to go through.

Babják has also visited the front line and is said to be the only Hungarian community leader who has been to positions near the line of contact.

Incidentally, the way Magyar phrased his post led many to believe that Babják had personally conveyed the list of problems faced by Hungarians. But this seems unlikely: the head of Berehove's community could hardly be unaware of the existence of a Hungarian-language college in his own city.

This issue is not just about personalities.

For Péter Magyar, caring about Hungarians abroad is not political opportunism, but part of his convictions and ideology. Because Hungary’s complex history has left large parts of the Hungarian people outside its borders, this is a widespread view, especially among politicians.

In the weeks following his election, Magyar met with representatives of Hungarian minorities in Romania, Serbia and Slovakia, each time inviting the political leaders of those communities to the meeting – even those who had worked with Orbán for years.

For example, in Romania he invited Hunor Kelemen, even though Kelemen is considered by some to have been involved in vote manipulation in Orbán’s favour. As European Pravda reported, during their meeting Magyar proposed leaving the past behind and starting again with a clean slate for the benefit of Hungarians in Romania.

This was the approach that Orbán's allies in Zakarpattia had expected.

There is essentially one major organisation representing ethnic Hungarians in the region – the Hungarian Cultural Association of Transcarpathia (KMKSZ), which for years has been led by László Brenzovics (rumour has it that he and Orbán are godfathers to each other's children). Brenzovics leads from abroad, having left Ukraine in 2024 due to the risk of prosecution by the Security Service of Ukraine after a search was conducted at his office during a period of heightened Ukrainian-Hungarian tensions.

European Pravda sources say that after Magyar’s election victory, the KMKSZ initially considered changing its leader and had even identified a possible replacement. However, when the new Hungarian leader signalled his readiness to reconcile with various minority leaders abroad, Brenzovics was re-elected as head of the KMKSZ on 18 April.

There is little doubt that the KMKSZ leadership offered Péter Magyar a meeting.

That would have been the worst possible scenario for Ukraine.

Unfortunately, there are some people within the leadership of this organisation who have grown accustomed to divvying up Hungarian funding, living off kickbacks, and increasing their influence by fuelling hostility towards Kyiv.

The fact that Péter Magyar chose not to engage with them and instead met with the constructive Zoltán Babják is perhaps the clearest indication that Hungary’s new leader is serious about resolving issues with Ukraine.

Waiting in Kyiv, waiting in Brussels

Another highly positive signal, this time from Kyiv, is that Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his team decided not to respond to Magyar’s inaccurate or awkward statements. (The Orbán years showed that Zelenskyy is quite capable of responding sharply to Hungary when necessary.)

Now, on the contrary, there is a clear desire to finally end this conflict that benefits no one.

Ukraine is genuinely interested in opening a new chapter of good-neighbourly relations with Hungary and putting an end to the period of constant vetoes on its path to EU membership and beyond.

Of course, a single meeting between Magyar and Zelenskyy will not be enough.

Ukraine must be ready to act quickly, including at the parliamentary level.

Since the elections, European Pravda has reported, citing sources in Magyar’s team, that the opening of EU negotiating clusters will only be possible after Kyiv has taken steps towards Budapest on minority issues. And that isn’t just because Magyar cares about this personally. For the new Hungarian leader, it’s also important to show Hungarian voters that he is not "Zelenskyy’s puppet", as Orbán’s election campaign propaganda claimed.

Fortunately, Ukraine has the support of the genuine leaders of the Hungarian community.

Zoltán Babják's statement in response to Magyar’s post, in which he emphasised that there is no repression of Hungarian rights in Ukraine, is further proof of this.

The venue of the future meeting between the leaders remains to be agreed upon. Zelenskyy will undoubtedly invite Magyar to Kyiv (he has been there before, when he brought humanitarian aid after the strike on the Okhmatdyt children's hospital). But a visit to Kyiv could be combined with a trip to Berehove (or Uzhhorod and Berehove).

Finally, there is another key player in this story that is on Ukraine’s side: the European Commission and its president, Ursula von der Leyen.

The day after his "Ukraine" statement, Péter Magyar flew to Brussels, where he met with Ursula von der Leyen and the president of the European Council, António Costa.

No details of the talks were disclosed, except that they discussed the Ukraine issue.

But Magyar’s main focus is elsewhere. His number one priority is restoring EU funding for Hungary that the European Commission froze during the Orbán era.

Brussels has now set 27 conditions that Budapest must meet to unlock the first tranches of funding. And, as is always the case in relations with the Commission, it is crucial that Brussels feels that the new Hungarian leadership is genuinely committed to cooperation.

For that to happen, Hungary must return to the European mainstream not only in words. One key element of that is realigning with common EU policies.

Given that Ukraine is currently the number one issue for the EU, Brussels expects Magyar to adjust Hungary’s Ukraine policy and is sending fairly clear signals to that effect.

Ultimately, there is every reason to expect that this shift in policy will become visible in practice.

Sergiy Sydorenko

Editor, European Pravda

Even with the United States still inside the alliance, its current posture could profoundly alter Europe’s security situation. Fewer American troops in Europe, weaker political commitments or a reduced US role in intelligence, logistics and other key support functions would already force Europeans to rethink how the continent is defended. 

Paris believes that a US withdrawal from Europe is no longer seen as a remote possibility. 

It is increasingly treated as a scenario for which Europe must prepare.

France is the European country best placed to lead adaptation to a smaller American role. It has the strategic culture, the nuclear deterrent, the expeditionary reflex and the political instinct to think at continental scale. 

But it still lacks the mass, the logistical ecosystem and the industrial depth to replace the United States as Europe’s military backbone. 

Russia’s war has made practical action more important than strategic talk.

What will matter in the coming years is not whether France looks strategically prepared on paper, but whether it can help build a European system fast enough to keep Ukraine armed, deter Russia and prevent the widening gap between a shrinking American role and Europe’s still limited readiness.

France at the centre of Europe’s defence debate

France is closer than any other EU country to being Europe’s strategic pivot.

It is the EU’s only nuclear power, one of the few states on the continent with a defence industrial base that still aspires to a real degree of sovereignty, and one of the rare European militaries that can think at once in terms of continental deterrence, expeditionary action and high intensity war. 

That does not make France sufficient. But at no doubt makes it necessary. 

If Europe has to adapt to a smaller American role, no credible answer can be built around Germany alone, Britain alone or the eastern flank alone. Any European answer to a thinner American role would have to be built with France. 

In Paris, dependence on Washington is not a new concern.

That conviction was formed in 1956, when NATO was recently created. 

At that time, the growing Suez crisis showed Paris that close alignment with Washington could still end in humiliation when American interests diverged.

The United States forced France and Britain to back down from their intervention in Egypt, leaving behind a lesson that shaped French strategic thinking for decades: alliance is useful, but dependence is dangerous. 

From there emerged the doctrine of autonomy, not as a fantasy of isolation, but as the refusal to build national security on the assumption that the United States would always see Europe’s interests as its own.

For years, many allies treated that reflex as a specifically French fixation. Now it increasingly looks like an early understanding of a problem the rest of Europe is only now being forced to confront.

Ukraine as a test for strategic autonomy

Europe would need far more than rhetoric to compensate for a weaker American role. According to a Bruegel and Kiel Institute estimate, it would need around 300,000 additional troops to deter Russian aggression without effective US backing, along with roughly €250 billion more in annual defence spending in the short term. In practical terms, that means around 50 new brigades.

Although that figure is deceptive. Three hundred thousand Europeans are not the same thing as 300,000 Americans. American power comes as a system: coherent command, strategic lift, intelligence, air and missile defence, refuelling, satellite linked and other strategic enablers, and the ability to move, coordinate and sustain forces at speed. Europe’s weakness lies there. 

The gap is not simply one of manpower or money. It is the gap between having soldiers on paper and being able to turn them into credible, integrated combat power in time. Rearmament is part of the answer, but not the whole of it.

The first real test of Europe’s adaptation to "less America reality" will not come at a summit table or in another speech about "strategic autonomy". 

It is playing out in Ukraine. 

If Europe wants to know whether it can carry more of its own security burden, the first question is simple: can it sustain Ukraine if Washington scales back? Over the past three years, Europe already allocated more aid to Ukraine per year than the United States, about €43.5 billion against €38 billion.

In purely fiscal terms, replacing the United States is possible, but replacing US military aid is much harder.

The United States has been a crucial supplier of heavy weapons and ammunition vital to Ukraine’s defence. To compensate for that, European countries would need to increase production quickly and on a broad scale. Europe’s defence industry already produces many of the systems Ukraine relies on, including howitzers, air defence systems, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. But that is not enough to claim autonomy. 

The hardest capabilities to replace remain rocket artillery such as HIMARS, long range air defence such as Patriot, and some of the ammunition those systems require.

Europe still lacks a credible substitute at sufficient scale. That leaves European governments with a difficult choice: continue buying some systems from the United States where possible, look to external alternatives where they exist or accelerate investment in European ones.

Nuclear anchor

One illustration of that difficulty is the collapse of the Future Combat Air System, or FCAS. Launched in 2017 as the flagship Franco German project for European strategic autonomy, it was supposed to produce the next generation of combat air power while reducing long term dependence on US systems. Instead, it exposed the opposite problem. 

French and German requirements diverged, procurement cycles moved out of sync, and industrial rivalry proved stronger than political rhetoric. France wanted an aircraft compatible with its nuclear deterrent and carrier operations. Germany did not share those requirements and, having already bought US F-35s, they no longer faced the same urgency. Control over design, technology and workshare were also disputed. 

It has shown that strategic autonomy remains easier to declare than to produce, and also pointed to something more fundamental than industrial rivalry:

French air power requirements are shaped by nuclear doctrine. 

On 2 March, at Île Longue, Macron gave a speech that gave French deterrence a more openly European dimension. He said France now had to think about its deterrence strategy "in the depth of the European continent" and called for a progressively more "advanced deterrence".

While Russia is using nuclear intimidation more openly, and confidence in the American guarantee is weaker than before, and Paris wants one of the few strategic assets Europe controls itself to count for more in the balance. 

But Macron did not offer Europe a French version of the American umbrella.

His move is more serious than his critics admit and less revolutionary than some of his admirers suggest. 

What is under consideration is a limited but real package: more warheads, less transparency over the stockpile, the possible temporary deployment of nuclear capable Rafales on allied territory, more consultations and exercises with European partners, and tighter coordination on conventional enablers such as early warning, air and missile defence, and precision strike. 

What remains unchanged is just as important. 

Macron did not propose NATO style nuclear sharing. 

He did not offer allies a role in authorising use. The arsenal remains French, the doctrine remains French.

The final decision remains in Paris.

France is extending the political reach of its deterrent, not sharing control over it.

None of this removes the central weakness. Nuclear signalling can reinforce deterrence. It cannot compensate for conventional weakness. If Europe cannot deny Moscow a rapid gain on the ground, no refinement of French doctrine will solve the problem. The hard requirements remain the same: brigades, ammunition, mobility, command and the ability to fight early enough to make nuclear blackmail less useful.

NATO after Trump, France after Macron

Trump’s war exposed, in real time, how brittle the transatlantic relationship has become. European governments did not want this war. They were not officially properly consulted, they questioned both its legality and its strategic logic, and they had no desire to be dragged into another American-led escalation in the region. But they could not escape its consequences. 

It also showed, again, that the United States becomes not just a less predictable strategic actor – it can even end up in blackmailing its European Allies.

That is one more reason why the debate about Europe’s ability to act with less America became more acute this spring. 

All of that would be hardly possible to ignore at the forthcoming NATO leader’s meeting scheduled in July in Ankara.

The debate now stretches well beyond defence spending. It includes post-war stabilisation in the Middle East, maritime security after the Iran war, and the terms on which Europeans can assume a larger role without becoming the support structure for conflicts they neither chose nor control. 

If Ankara avoids those issues, it will say a great deal about NATO’s condition. 

But even if Macron has read the strategic direction correctly, there remains a second uncertainty, and it is French. 

Europe is being asked not only whether France has the right answer to a weaker American commitment, but whether France itself will remain on that line after 2027. 

Jordan Bardella, president of the National Rally since 2022, is now widely seen as a plausible winner of the next presidential election which gives his defence positions immediate European significance.

He has reiterated his opposition to sending French troops to Ukraine, and the broader National Rally line is far less open to the wider European role Macron is trying to build for France, whether on Ukraine, deterrence or force posture. 

Marine Le Pen, former National Rally frontwoman, has already made clear that she would reverse Macron’s opening on the European dimension of French nuclear doctrine and has threatened to leave NATO’s integrated command. She is not the one who decides any more, but her successor’s position on this topic remains vague.

That gives France’s current line a built-in fragility.

Europe may need France to take on more in an era of weaker American commitment, but it cannot assume that the French position of 2026 will survive the election of 2027.

France is unlikely to replace the United States in Europe in any full sense. It does not have America’s scale, its enabling architecture, or its capacity to reassure the whole alliance at once. But that is not the only role that matters in the period now opening. 

France remains one of the few European powers able to combine military credibility with strategic initiative.

In an era of weaker American certainty, that combination gives Paris a role no other European capital can quite replicate: not that of a substitute for Washington, but of a state capable of pushing Europe towards a more coherent military and political posture.

Charlotte Guillou-Clerc,

Journalist (France)