Yet this system did not emerge on its own and has never been guaranteed.

Justice has never been, and still is not, flawless.

International criminal justice is even less so.

The International Criminal Court has been criticised for its slow pace, selectivity, uneven attention to different conflicts, dependence on state cooperation, and inability to enforce its own decisions independently.

Some of these criticisms are entirely justified. The Court needs to become more efficient, transparent, and consistent.

It must better explain its decisions, respond more quickly to the needs of victims, and demonstrate that it is capable of delivering not only symbolic but also tangible results.

Today, however, the problem runs much deeper.

Increasingly, the issue under dispute is no longer the quality of the work of a particular institution, but the very right of an independent international court to investigate the gravest international crimes.

Political pressure exerted by individual states on an independent international court creates a dangerous precedent.

If one state can punish judges for decisions that do not align with its political interests, why should another state not do the same tomorrow?

If international jurisdiction is recognised only so long as it is directed against one's adversaries, then this is no longer justice but a system of selective approval.

An institution's true strength is revealed in times of crisis

International criminal justice emerged precisely because national justice systems were unable to respond to crimes whose scale extended beyond the borders of a single state.

From the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals to the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the international community repeatedly created new mechanisms in the aftermath of tragedies that required an international response.

The International Criminal Court became the first permanent institution established to ensure that accountability for the gravest international crimes would no longer depend on the need to create a new tribunal each time.

At the heart of the Rome Statute lies a simple yet profoundly important principle: individuals must be held accountable for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.

High office, military rank, or a state's nuclear status should not automatically guarantee impunity.

At the same time, the ICC was never intended to replace national institutions or assume their functions.

The primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting international crimes rests with states themselves.

The International Criminal Court intervenes only where a state is unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out an investigation or prosecution.

This is why the ICC is not an alternative to national justice but rather its complement and a safeguard that the gravest international crimes will not go unpunished even when a national system proves incapable of fulfilling its responsibilities.

These principles are now facing one of their greatest tests.

At the same time, external political pressure is not the only challenge the Court has faced in recent times.

An equally serious challenge has been the internal crisis involving the now former Prosecutor Karim Khan. Recently, the Assembly of States Parties decided to terminate his mandate on the grounds of serious misconduct.

Undoubtedly, this episode will be used by those who have long sought to discredit the Court. It will be presented as evidence of the institution's moral crisis and its inability to judge the conduct of others.

Yet this situation also demonstrates something else.

The strength of institutions is not reflected in the absence of crises. No system can guarantee that all of its representatives will always act impeccably.

The real test begins when wrongdoing involves a person vested with authority, influence, and a high international office.

The situation was not covered up. It was examined and concluded with a decision. This is not an argument for dismantling the ICC.

On the contrary, it demonstrates that the system is capable of applying the principle of accountability to its own officials.

Supporting international criminal justice does not mean defending a particular official under all circumstances. A court established to hold others accountable cannot expect public trust if it is incapable of ensuring accountability within its own system.

At the same time, an individual's misconduct should not become a verdict on the very idea of international justice. Institutional shortcomings are grounds for improvement, not for destruction.

How Ukraine should respond

Ukraine is now one of the states whose experience will largely shape the future development of international criminal justice. Our voice in the discussion on the future of the ICC carries particular weight. And it must be heard loudly.

For Ukraine, protecting the ICC and international criminal justice is not merely a matter of principle but also one of practical importance. After all, it is Ukrainian victims who will be the first to feel the consequences of their weakening.

Following the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, Ukraine twice made use of the mechanism provided under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, recognising the Court's jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory.

As a result, the investigation of international crimes began long before the full-scale invasion and became the product of many years of work by Ukrainian law enforcement authorities, human rights organisations, journalists, victims, and international partners.

With the Rome Statute entering into force for Ukraine on 1 January 2025, our country became a full State Party to the ICC system.

This means not only greater opportunities but also greater responsibility. Ukraine can no longer support international criminal justice only when it concerns Russian officials. It must consistently defend the very principle of the independence of international courts.

We have every right to criticise ICC decisions, disagree with their legal reasoning, the pace of investigations, procedural approaches, or the Prosecutor's priorities.

But such criticism must remain constructive. It is impossible to defend the authority of the Court in some cases while undermining it in others.

From our own experience, we know that the greatest challenge facing the ICC lies not only in the quality of its decisions but also in its ability to ensure their enforcement.

Enforcement remains the weakest point of international criminal justice. The Court has no police force of its own. It cannot independently arrest suspects or bring them to The Hague. It depends on the cooperation of states.

The arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin was an important decision by the Court.

However, subsequent developments demonstrated the gap between the legal force of that decision and the political willingness of certain states to enforce it. Putin's visit to Mongolia in September 2024, followed by his visit to Tajikistan in October 2025, showed just how vulnerable the system remains when states refuse to comply with their international obligations.

An arrest warrant that can be ignored without immediate practical consequences gradually loses its deterrent effect. Even more dangerous is the message this sends to future suspects: that political influence, a system of alliances, or military power may prove to be more reliable protection than international law.

For this reason, it is not enough for Ukraine merely to call on the Court to issue new arrest warrants.

It is equally important to raise the issue of the consequences of non-compliance with those warrants, the role of the Assembly of States Parties, and mechanisms for the collective support of the Court. Without this, international criminal justice risks becoming a system of decisions with only limited practical effect.

We can no longer remain a state that turns to international justice solely for protection. As a full State Party to the Rome Statute, we must be among those who shape the future of this system, defend its independence, and insist on the implementation of its decisions.

The alternative to international justice is impunity. By defending the independence of international criminal justice, Ukraine is defending its own right to justice, the right of victims to be heard, and the right to call a crime a crime, regardless of who committed it.

In essence, Ukraine has become the state through which the viability of the entire system is being tested. If it proves incapable of ensuring an independent investigation into the gravest international crimes committed in the largest armed conflict in Europe since the Second World War, this will inevitably cast doubt on its ability to fulfil that mission in the future as well.

This is precisely why safeguarding the independence of international criminal justice is a matter of preserving the international legal order built on the principle of accountability.

If that principle is undermined today, it will be far more difficult to restore tomorrow. That is why the Ukrainian voice in the discussion on the future of the ICC matters far beyond the borders of Ukraine.

Publications in the Expert Opinion section are not editorial articles and solely reflect the author's point of view

There is, however, one member state that enjoys a special role and unique opportunities.

That is the country holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union. It chairs meetings of many EU bodies, helps set their agendas, and can either actively push an issue forward or quietly let it stall.

Since 1 July, the EU Council Presidency has been held by Ireland, which is firmly committed to opening all the negotiating clusters for Ukraine and has a plan for achieving that. Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Micheál Martin, who visited Kyiv this week, spoke about that plan, as well as Ukraine's approach to the accession process and the key tasks that lie ahead for Kyiv.

"It's not that we’re deciding to postpone anything. We believe this is realistic"

Taoiseach, I am glad to see you here in Kyiv. Is this your second time here?

Third time.

I came after the outbreak of the war in my capacity as Taoiseach.

And then after about two and a half years being Taoiseach, I came back as foreign minister with the Foreign Affairs Council, when we all came together.

And now I'm back a third time as Taoiseach of the country again.

Cool! Let me start with a general question about the European Union. Why does the EU need Ukraine?

I think the European Union needs Ukraine, and Ukraine needs the EU, because we share a lot of common values in terms of democracy, fundamental rights, freedom of association – things that are important.

I believe that if we don't have enlargement in the neighbourhood, other things will happen – other bad things will happen. Russia, for example, will exploit a vacuum. They have exploited a vacuum and they've invaded Ukraine and they've violated the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which has implications for Europe and other parts of the continent.

The Presidency plays a special role in the enlargement process. Of course it doesn't make decisions on its own, but it helps shape the agenda. What are your expectations for the next six months?

What we want to achieve is that all clusters pertaining to Ukraine will be opened by the end of the year. That is our agenda.

Last week we were successful in opening Cluster 6. Cyprus had opened Cluster 1.

Our next target is Clusters 2 and 3, as soon as possible, and then the remainder by the end of the year.

Obviously we've a lot of work to do with other member states – we have to persuade people. But we have set this as our target.

We have made Ukraine a priority of the Irish presidency.

And the enlargement of others – Montenegro is close, we want to close all the remaining chapters for Montenegro.

And Moldova is important. Moldova is coupled with Ukraine right now.

We have closed some chapters for Albania last week, which is positive.

We want to get a cluster opened in relation to Serbia as well.

You've suggested opening Clusters 2 and 3 first, and then Clusters 4 and 5. We've been told several times that Ukraine is ready for all the clusters. Why not open them all at once? What is the reason for postponing them?

I think there are two aspects to that. First of all, it's not we deciding to postpone anything. We believe this is realistic.

And obviously there are ongoing reforms – this is a merit-based process.

Ukraine has made enormous strides, and the Commission president has said this. But there is need for more reforms, of course, on rule of law, anti-corruption, and so on.

Ukraine has made great progress. But we have to persuade others as well.

And if you consider the period before the Russian invasion, enlargement was in cold storage to a large extent. Quite a number of countries in the Western Balkans, for example, came close but didn't quite get over the line. We're very conscious of that.

But since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I think the atmosphere has changed. But there are still challenges and people still want to reflect on it and so on.

We think our programme is realistic.

"The 10-point Kachka-Kos list and plan are there to be engaged with"

So does that mean Ukraine still has to fulfil certain conditions before the Council is ready to open all the clusters?

There are ongoing issues that every country applying to join the European Union has to benchmark themselves against and make sure that they achieve.

The Kachka-Kos 10-point list and plan – those are there to be engaged with.

I had good meetings today with President Zelenskyy, with the prime minister, the Speaker of Parliament – all of them are focused on reforms, and they know that it's important that the reforms get done as part of the accession process.

But also, across the Union more broadly, I think it's important to bring people with you, and different member states have different approaches to enlargement.

We'll come back to the Kachka-Kos plan later. First, I'd like to ask about how you see Ukraine's overall approach. Some people say President Zelenskyy is being overly optimistic about Ukraine's EU accession timeline and has set goals that may be difficult to achieve.

I take a different view to that. I think President Zelenskyy has been very forthright, ambitious, determined, and he perseveres, and that's important. If people don’t see someone with ambition coming forward, they're not going to respond in an ambitious way.

He doesn't leave much room for people to hide on the question.

So that's a plus, that's a positive, in my view, because he has been relentless in pursuing this on behalf of the Ukrainian people.

And in our view, enlargement is a key part of the struggle of the Ukrainian people, because it's what people aspire to.

It's interesting to hear you say that ambition is a good thing. In Ukraine, we tend to share that view. Do you think most EU leaders share this view?

The majority do, but not all.

Others are worried, others have different views. There has to be political realism at times, there's no question about that.

But from Ukraine's perspective, I think there's an obligation on your leadership to be ambitious and to push strongly. Otherwise you do not get the response. That is why I think President Zelenskyy has been correct in his approach in pushing very strongly for this.

There are several ideas being discussed in the EU. One was proposed by Chancellor Merz, then there was the French-German non-paper and the Lithuanian proposal. Which of these do you think is most likely to become the basis for future changes to the enlargement process?

From the Irish perspective, we will facilitate discussion on those ideas, but we will not be distracted from the merit-based approach and from the present system of joining the European Union.

We will continue to pursue the opening of clusters, the closing of clusters, closing of chapters.

But we will also facilitate a discussion.

One interesting positive from those ideas is that people are now beginning to think about enlargement – what does it mean? Because for a long time, enlargement was dormant, as I said earlier, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Now people are beginning to sort of say: "Okay, enlargement is coming. How do we manage it?" In one way, if you stand back, that's a positive. And so people are thinking: are there other mechanisms to facilitate a country's progress to enlargement?

There was an informal discussion of this in the Western Balkan summit with the European Union, and some of the impetus came from some of the Western Balkan countries. I found it quite interesting.

But from our perspective in Ireland and the presidency, we cannot be distracted.

You know, Montenegro is in the business now of closing its chapters. We feel we can close all its chapters by the end of the year. We believe we can open all the clusters for Ukraine and Moldova and do more work for Albania, Serbia and others.

So we will not be distracted from that, but of course, parallel with that, it makes sense that there will be these discussions.

"The prime minister was very clear, and he went through the Kachka-Kos list"

Which do you think will come first – the end of the war, or Ukraine's accession to the European Union?

Well, we hope for the end of the war.

I cannot tell you the timeline for that right now, but I would hope that it would be soon. I think even a ceasefire would be very, very welcome.

I visited some of the sites that have been subject to missile attacks. I've met residents who've been made homeless because of attacks on their apartments. We are shocked that this level of attack on civilian infrastructure can happen.

So we would hope and pray that the war would end very, very quickly. And I would pray that it would end before accession.

But will it still be possible for Ukraine to join the EU if the war is protracted? Or perhaps achieve some form of political accession before the war is over?

That suggests the war will go on for a long, long time and I don't want to comprehend that, but it is possible in the sense that if you stand back and look at the level of engagement between Europe and Ukraine already, it's been quite accelerated, quite extraordinary.

Use of the SAFE [Security Action for Europe] programme, Ukraine's progression on the defence industry, for example. Look at the €90 billion borrowing by the European Union for Ukraine. There's been tremendous support from EU member states of Ukraine.

To a certain degree, there's been already a degree of engagement between Ukraine and the European Union that's unprecedented.

Do you see any realistic chance of changing the enlargement procedure, which currently requires unanimity among EU member states at every stage? There has been discussion about reforming this. Is it politically feasible?

It's very difficult. It's very difficult.

We have a window now, particularly with the change of government in Hungary. And we all need to work constructively with the Hungarian government as well. And the European institutions are, and we are.

But there are different government changes in other member states as well. And we will engage with those.

Giving up the unanimity is difficult, particularly when it comes to closing chapters.

And what about opening, or other steps?

Yes, but we would argue to people, in an endeavour to persuade them, that opening a chapter is not the same as closing a chapter, in one way, if you know what I'm saying.

It's a very challenging prospect. On the other hand, Europe cannot stand still.

The European Union cannot stand still. The last country to join the EU was in 2013. It was Croatia.

I'd like to ask you about reforms. You mentioned that you've heard that there is a strong appetite for reform from Ukraine's political leadership. But do you think the Verkhovna Rada is genuinely ready to move forward? From our perspective, we haven't seen enough progress.

Certainly at the parliament there was a very strong focus and emphasis on the need for reforms.

The prime minister was very clear, and he went through that list of Kachka-Kos.

He said he has discussed it with the president of the Сommission, and he wants to be in a position where he can come back and respond in detail to each point as to what's possible and what's not possible.

That is kind of a positive engagement.

And the president is very clear that there needs to be continuing reforms. Because your number one goal – and you have many goals in the war – is to protect your people, but also join the European Union. I think the big prize is joining the European Union, ultimately, for the future of the Ukrainian people.

I think we need to keep the eye on that. And part of that then means reforms as per the European criteria that are set.

You always have to have priorities in reforms. What are the priorities for Ukraine?

Ukraine has to prioritise that itself. Obviously the rule of law is important for the EU member states. And anti-corruption is important. An independent judiciary is important. A strong, resilient independent judiciary is very important.

These are areas that are important to member states in Europe.

And those are the kind of areas that people focus on.

"We would prefer it if material wasn't going to Russia"

Normally it's Central and Eastern European countries that have been Ukraine's strongest supporters. They understand Russia and the threat it poses because of their own history. Ireland is much further away, and Russia poses a far less immediate security threat. Why, then, has Ireland been such a strong supporter of Ukraine?

A very basic one.

We were a small country that was a colony for a long time in earlier centuries.

For us, our security is embedded in multilateralism and in the United Nations framework. Our security is the UN multilateral framework.

And we see the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a fundamental violation of that framework. A fundamental undermining of multilateralism and of territorial integrity.

And that's basically it.

And also, we've been through our own struggles historically. We now are in a very good position. We’ve a tremendous relationship with the United Kingdom. Ireland and the UK are in a good position and have been for the last 40 years. And that's a positive.

And then we have had a very good experience as members of the European Union, and we feel then that if other countries want to join, provided they meet the criteria, they should be allowed to join. I don't feel morally I can stop anyone from joining the European Union once they adhere to the criteria.

There is still concern about how sanctions are being implemented in Ireland. I'm referring to the alumina case, where Ukraine has raised questions about how both the Irish government and Irish businesses are complying with sanctions. How do you think this issue can be resolved?

Alumina has never been sanctioned by the European Union. It’s never been put on the list, so alumina as a product has never been sanctioned. The Aughinish plant is not breaking any sanction, Ireland isn't breaking any sanction, because there's no sanction there to break in terms of the product.

But Ukraine has an issue – which I understand, by the way – with the fact that material from Aughinish Alumina is now finding its way to Russia.

But alumina from Aughinish is also going to France, to the smelter in Dunkirk, to Sweden.

It's clear that it's a very important part of the European supply chain in terms of alumina. Now we've concluded an investigation. It has not found evidence that it is going into the Russian weapons industry, but neither can we say definitively that it is not.

We would prefer if material wasn't going to Russia.

So we're going to work with the European Commission now, we're going to share our investigation with them, because this is a European supply chain issue.

The sanctions were never meant to damage Europe. And Europe seems to have a problem with alumina, because I think the primary manufacturing of alumina, about 7% is in Europe. So it's very dependent on others outside of Europe in terms of manufacturing and processing and so on.

Aughinish is important as a European facility.

In Ireland we don't depend on the material from Aughinish – there are no industries in Ireland that need the material from Aughinish. 50% goes to the EU, but now close to 50% is going to Russia. That’s a concern, of course it is.

Is there a way to completely stop exports to Russia?

That's what we're going to look at. It will be difficult.

There's about 900 to 1,000 people's jobs depend on it as well, so we have to factor that in. People are worried about their livelihoods and so on.

We have supported every sanctions package. In fact, under the presidency, we succeeded in getting the 21st package over the line today, this morning.

Our team, the Irish team in Brussels, did a first-class job in negotiating the compromises – because other member states had issues about industries in their countries. You know, that happens with sanctions.

We managed to get a deal, which I think was very important because it was the largest list, I think, of individuals sanctioned in the financial sector in that list that's passed now by Europe. And also cryptocurrency enterprises and so on.

That sends a very strong signal that Europe is united in continuing with sanctions. And then we will work on the preparation of the 22nd sanctions package.

Finally, do you have a message for Ukrainian refugees living in Ireland and elsewhere across Europe? Many of them are living with uncertainty. What can they expect? Will they be able to stay for as long as they need, or do you think European countries will increasingly encourage them to return to Ukraine?

It's very difficult – first of all for Ukrainians here, but also across the world. I mean, it's appalling.

The war has visited terrible trauma on the Ukrainian people. I saw it again today. That's why we took in initially about 125,000 Ukrainians into Ireland, which given our population of close to 5 million is a big number per capita. But we did that because we felt we had an obligation. We have a housing crisis in Ireland on top of all of that. We've got to try and manage.

Our system initially cost about €2 billion a year because we hired and leased out hotels and rooms. We're changing that over time. But Ukrainians have settled well in Ireland. They've integrated well.

Many Ukrainians are working. Many of their children are going to schools. Obviously there will come a time when many will want to come back to Ukraine and help to rebuild Ukraine. And we will be helpful in that regard.

But it's a special case. We're very conscious of the fact that this is a unique situation: the first major war on the European continent since World War II. The European Union had to step up, and many member states did. And we would like to think we've played our part. Others have done more, but we're doing everything we possibly can within our capacities. And we will continue to do that to support Ukraine and to support Ukrainian people in Ireland.

Sergiy Sydorenko

Editor, European Pravda

The European Union has declared its commitment to gradually phasing out cooperation with the aggressor state and reducing its dependence on Russian energy resources under the REPowerEU plan.

Framatome's Russian alliance

However, decisions taken at the national and regional levels in Germany contradict this strategic course. On 22 July 2026, the Lower Saxony Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Climate Protection, acting on behalf of the German federal government, approved an application submitted by Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF), a subsidiary of the French company Framatome, for a licence to manufacture nuclear fuel assemblies for Soviet-designed VVER reactors at its facility in Lingen.

The fuel will be produced using Russian technology and know-how under a licensing agreement with TVEL, a subsidiary of Rosatom. VVER reactors are currently in operation at nuclear power plants in Czechia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, Finland and Ukraine.

Most European countries are working to diversify their nuclear fuel supply in order to reduce cooperation with the Russian state corporation. Ukraine and several other countries, for example, have switched to fuel supplied by Westinghouse.

Framatome aims to become a European alternative supplier of VVER fuel assemblies. However, instead of relying on Western partners, the company has chosen to cooperate with Russia's state-owned nuclear corporation.

As a result, a paradoxical situation has emerged. On the one hand, non-nuclear Germany officially supports Ukraine and the European strategy of reducing dependence on Russian energy resources.

On the other hand, it has authorised a project that will facilitate the expansion of Russia's nuclear business within the European Union.

In practice, this opens a "back door" for Rosatom into the European nuclear fuel market. Fuel assemblies manufactured in Lingen for European VVER reactors will carry a "Made in the EU" label,

yet they will be produced using Russian technology and manufacturing know-how, which remain under Russian control.

This hardly represents genuine diversification away from Russia; rather, it amounts to a transformation of the existing dependency into a different form.

Rosatom deserves sanctions, not cooperation

How did this become possible? The primary reason is the lack of sufficient legal grounds to reject the project.

Although Lower Saxony's Environment Minister Christian Meyer, a member of the Green Party, openly stated that he opposed the project, he acknowledged that German law provided no formal legal basis to block it.

Who could have influenced this decision? The German federal government had the authority to veto the project, for example on the grounds of security concerns and foreign policy risks identified in the report prepared by Prof. Dr. Gerhard Roller. This report was officially commissioned by the Lower Saxony Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Climate Protection to provide an independent assessment of the project's security risks.

Ultimately, however, the authorities concluded that these risks could be managed, and the project was approved subject to ANF complying with a number of conditions.

These include restricting access for Rosatom representatives, strengthening physical and cybersecurity measures, ensuring strict control over the use of Russian technologies and components and implementing safeguards against espionage and sabotage.

The decision inevitably invites comparisons with the infamous Nord Stream 2 project.

In both cases, a major energy project involving a Kremlin-controlled company was treated primarily as a commercial and regulatory matter, despite repeated warnings from Ukraine and other European partners about strategic dependence, political leverage, and security risks. Nord Stream 2 clearly demonstrated the consequences of ignoring broader geopolitical and security considerations in relations with Russia. A project justified on economic grounds ultimately increased Europe's strategic vulnerability and became politically unacceptable only after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The expansion of the ANF facility in Lingen risks repeating the same strategic mistake. It envisages integrating Rosatom's equipment, technologies, and know-how into European nuclear fuel production precisely at a time when the European Union seeks to reduce its dependence on Russia.

The conclusion is clear: this case demonstrates that the current European legal framework is no longer fit for today's security challenges. Formal compliance with existing legislation is insufficient to prevent decisions that deepen the EU's dependence on Russia.

The appropriate response should therefore not be silent acceptance, but rather a review of the existing regulatory framework, stronger political and legal efforts to challenge this decision, and accelerated sanctions against Rosatom and its subsidiaries. Otherwise, Europe risks repeating the mistake of Nord Stream 2 – this time in the nuclear sector.

This material was prepared by DIXI GROUP NGO with support of the International Renaissance Foundation within the framework of the project "Strengthening Ukraine's Resilience in Energy". The material reflects the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.

However, just a week earlier, some uncertainty had emerged over the implementation of such long-term and ambitious plans.

On the evening of 7 July, Marine Le Pen appeared on French television with a simple interpretation of a complicated judgment. "I am a candidate for the presidential election," she announced.

Hours earlier, the Paris Court of Appeal had upheld her guilt in the European Parliament assistants case. It sentenced her to three years in prison, two of them suspended, and one year of home detention under electronic monitoring. Yet it also shortened her effective period of ineligibility to one that had already elapsed. Le Pen could run for president on 18 April 2027.

Two days later, the first voting intention surveys conducted after the ruling placed her at around 35 per cent in the first round. No opponent reached 20 per cent. The same polls showed her defeating most – if not all– of the rivals tested against her in a second round.

Le Pen has not been cleared. Nor has she become broadly trusted. Seven in ten voters reject her assertion that she is innocent, while earlier surveys show that a majority would be unhappy to see her become president. France is confronting a more awkward possibility. Voters can disbelieve her, disapprove of her and still choose her.

Four years ago, Emmanuel Macron tried to make one part of her record impossible to overlook. During their presidential debate on 20 April 2022, he told Le Pen that when she spoke about Russia, she was speaking to her banker.

The reference was to a €9.4 million loan taken out by her party in 2014. The exchange was watched across France. It did not stop Le Pen from winning 41.5 per cent in the second round.

Will the сourt ruling make a difference?

The appeal judgment was not a technical reprieve masquerading as an acquittal. All 12 defendants who appealed were found guilty.

The court confirmed that European Parliament money had paid assistants who were in reality working for the French party rather than for the parliamentary mandates to which they were attached.

The scheme lasted for more than 11 years. The judgment identified Jean-Marie Le Pen and then Marine Le Pen as its driving forces, with party officials and European parliamentarians participating in the arrangement.

The court assessed the loss to the European Parliament at €2.8 million. It also made an important distinction. The elected members had not enriched themselves personally. The national party had obtained the benefit.

Le Pen received a €100,000 fine and 45 months of ineligibility, with 30 months suspended. The remaining 15 months were counted from the first instance judgment of 31 March 2025 and had therefore been served by the time of the appeal ruling.

Her legal position is precise, if unusual. She is eligible today. The appeal court has found her guilty, but the conviction is not final because she has appealed to the Court of Cassation.

That appeal suspends the execution of her prison sentence, so she can begin campaigning without an electronic tag.

France’s highest court has said it could rule by early April 2027, subject to procedural developments. It will examine whether the law was applied correctly, not retry the facts.

The ruling gave Le Pen a choice that is legally possible but politically costly. Le Pen answered by borrowing from a familiar populist repertoire.

She asserted her innocence, confirmed her candidacy and cast the case as an attempt to deny voters their preferred choice. Her performance looked much like the MAGA style turn in French politics.

The comparison does not require the RN to share Donald Trump’s programme or international alliances. It concerns the treatment of institutions.

A court is respected when it vindicates the movement and denounced as political when it constrains it.

A conviction becomes evidence that the system fears the candidate.

That argument may work with Le Pen’s loyal electorate. It is less clear whether it can help her assemble the second round majority she has failed to win three times.

A Russian trace

The Russian loan raises a different evidentiary problem. It was a commercial loan, not a donation. In September 2014, the Front National borrowed €9.4 million from the First Czech-Russian Bank after saying that French banks had refused it credit.

When the bank failed, the debt passed between Russian creditors. The RN announced in September 2023 that it had repaid the outstanding sum.

No judicial or parliamentary finding has established that the party delivered a specific political service in exchange for the money. That point should not be blured. Nor should the loan be separated from the political relationship surrounding it.

Le Pen cultivated ties with senior Russian figures, met Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin during the 2017 presidential campaign and defended Russia’s purported referendum in occupied Crimea. Before a National Assembly inquiry in 2023, she again described Crimea’s incorporation into Russia as legitimate.

The inquiry’s majority report called the RN an effective relay for official Russian discourse. That was a political conclusion reached by the report’s majority, not proof of a secret contract. Le Pen argued that her positions reflected longstanding convictions and had not been purchased.

Mediapart revealed the loan in 2014. It was investigated repeatedly by major French outlets, raised in the only televised debate of the 2022 presidential runoff and examined during four hours of Le Pen’s testimony before the National Assembly. The affair was not confined to specialist publications or a small circle in Paris.

The party’s former name requires equal precision. Le Pen did not leave the Front National to create a separate movement.

The same party changed its name to Rassemblement National in 2018. The court itself refers to the Front National "which became" the RN. The rebranding softened an inherited label and Bardella supplied a younger public face. It did not break the party’s legal or organisational continuity.

What do the French think of Le Pen?

The most useful polling does not depict a country converted to Le Pen. It reveals a candidate whose negative image coexists with a growing presumption that she could govern.

An Ifop survey in September 2025 found that 69 per cent of respondents considered her opportunistic. Fifty nine per cent called her aggressive and 57 per cent intolerant.

Only 41 per cent described her as honest, while 40 per cent found her reassuring. Fifty four per cent believed she could ensure the security of the French. Around half considered her capable of protecting purchasing power, reforming the country or defending France’s position abroad.

Even the fear she generates is no longer overwhelming.

Fifty two per cent said that she worried them, and the same proportion considered her ideas dangerous for France. The country remains divided, but the old presumption that alarm at the Le Pen name would organise an automatic majority against her has weakened.

A voter can regard her presidency as undesirable and still prefer it to the alternative eventually offered.

The appeal judgment has produced no immediate electoral punishment. It may even have consolidated Le Pen’s claim to be the leading candidate.

Her core support appears resistant to the scandal. That resistance has several possible explanations, and the surveys cannot tell us their exact weight. Some RN supporters accept the claim of judicial persecution.

Others regard financial misconduct as endemic to politics rather than distinctive to Le Pen. Many are voting on subjects where the RN has built a strong identity and do not treat probity as the overriding test.

The social divisions in the Ifop data reinforce the point. Graduates were much more likely to find Le Pen worrying or dangerous.

Workers and respondents with fewer qualifications were more inclined to credit her with courage, authority and an understanding of people like themselves. Her reputation is filtered through a broader conflict over class and recognition.

An accusation that confirms one electorate’s rejection can reinforce another’s suspicion of the people making it.

The conviction is therefore unlikely to break her first round base. Its effect may emerge later.

Seven voters in ten do not accept Le Pen’s claim of innocence, and 32 per cent of RN supporters disapprove of her decision to run. Those doubts may not send loyal voters elsewhere, but they could limit her ability to attract the conservatives, centrists and previous abstainers required for a majority. 

Le Pen’s progress between her two previous runoffs rose from 33.9 per cent against Macron in 2017 to 41.5 per cent in 2022.

Her opponents have helped. Macron cannot seek a third consecutive term. The centre, conventional right and left remain divided, with no rival approaching Le Pen’s first round score.

Le Pen’s principal advantage is not a majority that actively wants her. It is the possibility that her opponents will fail to organise the majority that does not.

The appeal court has returned the decision to politics. By preserving Le Pen’s eligibility, it denied her the easiest claim that judges had cancelled the election.

By upholding guilt and imposing a custodial sentence, it left her opponents with a clear argument about fitness for office. Whether they can make it decisive is no longer a legal question.

What should Ukraine consider?

For Ukraine, Le Pen’s eligibility arrives as France is making commitments that will extend into the next presidency. On 14 July, Paris and Kyiv confirmed an initial order for 16 Rafale aircraft, part of a longer plan that envisages as many as 100. Ukraine also announced its intention to order four next generation SAMP/T air defence systems.

France authorised licensed production of SCALP cruise missiles and AASM guided bombs in Ukraine before the end of 2026.

France and Italy made the same commitment for Aster 30 interceptors. Interim SAMP/T deployments and accelerated Aster deliveries are intended to cover part of the period before the new systems become available.

Financing for the Rafale and SAMP/T NG orders is to be sought through the European Union’s Ukraine Support Loan. Training, industrial capacity and delivery schedules remain to be completed.

The first SAMP/T NG modules are planned from 2027.

A change at the Élysée would not automatically dissolve every contract.

France’s government, parliament, armed forces and defence industry would retain influence, while European financing creates further constraints. Yet foreign and defence policy are unusually concentrated in the French presidency. Export permissions, diplomatic initiatives and France’s position in the European Council are all susceptible to presidential direction.

The RN’s present line on Ukraine is more careful than Le Pen’s earlier closeness to Putin’s Russia.

The party now describes Russia’s war as illegal and unjustified. It says Ukraine deserves military support and that Russian aggression threatens French interests. Bardella has gone further than Le Pen in describing Russia as an offensive threat to Europe.

The shift is genuine, but incomplete. The RN has opposed weapons that could strike Russian territory, the deployment of French troops and rapid Ukrainian accession to the EU.

It also has resisted the scale and conditions of several European support packages. Le Pen’s record includes opposition to energy sanctions and Ukrainian membership of NATO, as well as a proposed strategic rapprochement with Moscow after the war.

Those positions have changed in emphasis and may change again before 2027. The RN’s foreign policy is opaque, with a persistent divide between Le Pen’s confrontational sovereigntism and Bardella’s more pragmatic effort to work through European institutions.

Le Pen’s return as the presidential candidate gives greater weight to the older, more disruptive tradition.

The Russian loan does not prove that a Le Pen presidency would take orders from the Kremlin. Her record establishes something more relevant than that unproven allegation.

She has repeatedly interpreted French strategic autonomy in ways favourable to Russia, treated Ukraine’s territorial and alliance choices as negotiable, and opposed several of the instruments used to raise the cost of Russian aggression.

A Le Pen presidency could weaken support for Ukraine without formally abandoning it. French arms transfers require government licences, financing and industrial follow-through. With an aligned RN government, the Élysée could slow deliveries or restrict future permissions. Cohabitation with a hostile parliamentary majority would constrain that power.

France’s European leverage is clearer. The EU’s main economic sanctions against Russia are renewed every six months and require unanimity. Enlargement decisions also generally require agreement among all member states. Paris could therefore delay sanctions or Ukraine’s accession without announcing a diplomatic rupture.

The agreement of 14 July reduces this exposure but does not remove it. Ukrainian production of SCALP, AASM and Aster munitions would make disengagement costlier, particularly because Italy and EU financing are involved. Yet the Rafale and SAMP/T programmes still require funding, contracts and deliveries extending beyond the French election.

The decisive test will come when the field narrows to two candidates. Le Pen has shown that she can survive widespread distrust. She has not yet proved that she can overcome it when France chooses its president.

Charlotte Guillou-Clerc,

Journalist (France)

Two things are clearly capable of slowing Ukraine's path to EU membership.

One is the state's insufficient institutional capacity to fulfil negotiating obligations quickly, a problem that endless government changes only deepen.

The other is limited political readiness to carry out difficult political and legal reforms.

Both have been widely discussed recently, particularly in connection with the failure to implement the Kachka-Kos plan.

Not just the Kachka-Kos plan

It's important to understand that this is not the personal initiative of a former deputy prime minister, nor a standalone political project. Most of its provisions stem directly from Ukraine's official commitments within the EU negotiating process.

It concerns above all the interim benchmarks in Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) within the Fundamentals cluster. Once the cluster is formally opened, Ukraine will be formally required to meet these benchmarks.

By our count, Chapters 23 and 24 together contain 85 interim benchmarks. The Kachka-Kos plan covers only 16 of these,

roughly 19% of all obligations under the Fundamentals cluster.

In other words, the plan doesn't even reach a quarter of the total work Ukraine must complete under just these two key negotiating chapters. And beyond the interim benchmarks, closing benchmarks are still to come.

The Kachka-Kos plan is really just a short list of tasks that the EU, for various reasons, identified as the most urgent at this stage.

At the same time, Ukraine publicly insists on wanting to join the EU as quickly as possible, and that's a reasonable position. The longer the negotiating process drags on, the less predictable it becomes. On the EU side, the risk grows that political shifts in key capitals, including the rise of right-wing populists, could derail the process.

On the Ukrainian side, it becomes harder to sustain public and political motivation for difficult reforms when the date of accession remains undefined.

But fast accession is impossible without fast delivery on commitments. Independent assessments by civil society organisations put implementation of the Kachka-Kos plan at around 15%.

Measured against the full set of interim obligations in Chapters 23 and 24, that's no more than 3% of the total workload.

This pace doesn't match the declared ambition of rapid accession. For comparison, Albania needed roughly two years to complete its interim tasks under the Fundamentals cluster, while Montenegro took around 11.

Ukraine needs to answer honestly: at our current reform speed, what pace can we actually expect?

Playing games with institutions

This brings up a separate set of problems tied to institutions and appointments.

Frequent government changes weaken Ukraine's negotiating capacity.

By our estimate, last year's cabinet reshuffle replaced 31% of the heads of negotiating working groups.

After the current round of changes, the full scale of turnover can't yet be assessed since ministerial appointments aren't finalised, but it's reasonable to expect that roughly half of the working group heads will keep their posts.

And it's precisely the ministries that play a key role in the negotiations that are being hit hardest. The Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture is planned to be split into a Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food and a Ministry of Economy and Environment.

The Ministry of Communities and Territories Development is to be divided into a Ministry of Communities, Territories and Internally Displaced Persons and a Ministry of Reconstruction, Infrastructure and Transport.

Such a redistribution of powers means far more than new names and new leaders. Ministries need restructuring, positions get revised, functions get reshuffled, and qualified staff risk being lost along the way.

Something similar already happened after the reorganisation of the former Ministry of Environmental Protection, when the system lost a substantial share of experienced specialists.

For the negotiating process, this translates into a loss of institutional memory and slower work, with new officials having to be brought up to speed on a complex set of obligations almost from scratch.

Frequent government reshuffles and restructuring are themselves weakening the state's institutional capacity, and that's the second problem.

Safeguards are needed

One positive aspect of the latest government change is that the newly appointed deputy prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, Vsevolod Chentsov, was involved in the negotiating process throughout the previous period. This means a degree of continuity and institutional memory will be preserved at the political leadership level.

At the same time, the new position calls for a broader focus, shifting from foreign policy and negotiating work towards coordinating the domestic implementation of EU integration commitments.

The new deputy prime minister will need to work not only with EU member states but also ensure delivery on the Kachka-Kos plan itself and on all other obligations under Chapters 23 and 24.

It's also important to explain clearly within the country that, again, this is not "Kachka's personal plan" but obligations agreed with the EU as part of the negotiating process.

If Ukraine wants to join the EU, it has to show real reform progress and give member states grounds to support further advancement of the talks.

The experience of other candidate countries shows that government changes and frequent reshuffles slow the pace of negotiations. In Ukraine's conditions, avoiding this entirely isn't realistic. Institutional safeguards are needed instead.

One such safeguard would be appointing a chief negotiator who is a senior civil servant rather than a politician dependent on the cabinet's composition. This model could reduce the negotiating process's exposure to political rotations.

A second safeguard is strengthening the role of the secretaries of the negotiating working groups, who are staff of the Government Office for Coordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration.

They are the ones who can keep the work going, hold onto the documentation, track how decisions are implemented and hand institutional memory over to new leadership.

Today, however, the Government Office lacks sufficient staffing capacity and suffers from high turnover. As a result, one person can end up serving as secretary for ten working groups at once, which makes it physically impossible to carry out these functions properly.

One of the new deputy prime minister's priorities should be strengthening the Government Office, since it is the central coordinating structure of the negotiating process.

The office should have around 100 specialists, or even more.

If Ukraine genuinely wants rapid EU accession, it needs to think not only about political statements but about the state apparatus's actual capacity to deliver on negotiating commitments.

Postponing difficult reforms will slow down accession. Frequent reorganisations without mechanisms to retain staff and institutional memory will work against us as well. Every delay gives EU member states additional grounds not to rush further progress for Ukraine.

The speed of accession depends not only on Brussels' political will but also on our own capacity to fulfil the commitments we've taken on, consistently and on time.

Liubov Akulenko,

Executive Director, Ukrainian Centre for European Policy

In addition, relations with the US president, who plays a particularly important role in NATO, have been improving recently.

But there were pleasant surprises even for those who’d anticipated that the 2026 summit would be a success. It’s safe to say that it exceeded expectations.

In terms of NATO, everything went well – just as predicted.

And in terms of the US, Ukraine received more than it could have hoped for. The meeting with Donald Trump demonstrated that the American president is increasingly leaning towards supporting Kyiv, for one simple reason: Ukraine is winning on the battlefield, and Trump likes to bet on winners.

This was evident in both the US president’s actions and his decisions, perhaps the most important of which was the political agreement to grant Ukraine a licence to manufacture interceptor missiles for Patriot systems.

Another pleasant surprise was the results of diplomacy efforts with Poland and Hungary. Zelenskyy resumed dialogue with the president of Poland and managed to get out of an artificial deadlock with Hungary. Hungarian leader Péter Magyar appears to have reconsidered his stance and abandoned the unrealistic demands that had been preventing the normalisation of relations.

However, the agreements reached in Ankara are only laying the groundwork.

The real changes are still ahead. Ukraine must make use of the opportunities that have emerged. Every point matters, from Patriots to Magyar.

Trump’s negativity towards NATO allies

Negotiations with the US president are always unpredictable to some extent. Unlike other leaders, Trump does not rely on talking points written by his advisers and diplomats, but on his personal attitude towards his counterpart and his own perception of political processes.

This perception frequently differs from the way Europeans see the world. There was no shortage of examples of this in Ankara.

The way Trump lashed out at Spain will have repercussions. His criticism did not come out of nowhere: relations between Trump’s America and Madrid have long been less than great. And Spain’s refusal to let US bombers use its air bases before heading off on combat missions to Iran put an end to any prospect of friendship between them.

But Trump’s announcement of a trade war with Spain during the NATO summit itself went beyond even the most pessimistic expectations.

It is not yet clear what this will mean in practice, but Washington is reportedly preparing to impose an embargo on Spanish goods.

An even bigger surprise was the revival of the conflict with Denmark.

On this the US president’s policy went beyond the boundaries of international law, good-neighbourly relations, allied commitments etc. long ago. But over the past six months, it had seemed that Trump’s territorial claims with respect to Denmark had been put to rest – that, in the face of resistance both internationally and within the US, Trump would no longer revert to his publicly declared intention to annex Greenland.

But the optimists turned out to be wrong.

Immediately before the NATO summit, first "sources in the White House", then Trump himself once again began declaring an intention to take Greenland away from an allied state.

Exactly what Trump hoped to achieve through this escalation is unclear. There has been no shortage of conspiracy theories about an alleged intention to derail the Alliance summit and so on, but that did not happen. The allies appear to have become accustomed to the US president’s eccentricities and the fact that at times they have to ignore completely unacceptable statements.

Another layer of absurdity was added to the situation by the fact that Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez said he had a "very friendly" conversation with Trump at the summit just before the US president’s outburst. He has since said he is prepared to handle Trump’s threats "patiently".

This made Trump's actions towards Ukraine stand out all the more.

Trump’s positivity towards Ukraine

If the official White House statements are to be believed, Trump held three full bilateral meetings during his two days in Ankara. The first was with the summit’s host, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Then Trump held (admittedly brief) talks with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. More time was spent on the public part of that meeting – a press conference improvised by Trump in the presence of the secretary general during which he lashed out at allies, including Spain.

His third major meeting was with Ukraine.

The Trump-Zelenskyy talks took place on Wednesday, at a time when other NATO members were still in summit meetings.

The meeting between the presidents was scheduled to last an hour – a long time for a Trump meeting. The leaders ended up talking to the media for more than 40 minutes, and after the journalists were asked to leave, they continued their discussions in private for about another hour.

The length and exclusivity of the meeting say a great deal. But there were also other signs of President Trump’s positive attitude towards Ukraine.

It’s worth mentioning one particular feature of the spontaneous press conferences that Trump holds before his international meetings. The foreign leader sits next to the US president, and if Trump wants to speak with the press, he starts to act as a moderator and personally decides which journalists get to ask questions. Representatives of the White House press pool will be there – American media figures whom Trump sees every day and often knows by name – as well as journalists from the guest’s side.

During the meeting with Zelenskyy, it was striking that Trump was keen to engage with Ukrainian journalists, because he repeatedly took questions from unfamiliar media representatives who were clearly expected to ask about Ukraine (whereas journalists from the American pool mostly asked about Iran).

Trump allowed some Ukrainian journalists to ask several questions. He even turned to the journalists and asked them what question he should ask Putin.

"Ask him when he will end this war," BBC Ukraine journalist Myroslava Petsa replied to the US president.

"That's a good question. I'll be asking that question," Trump responded.

But the main achievement of the Zelenskyy-Trump meeting was not the visible attention paid to Ukrainians and Ukrainian issues, nor Zelenskyy’s joke (brilliantly timed as it was) about why it is dangerous to visit Moscow. It was, of course, the substantive agreements reached.

What was agreed with Trump

The main agreement concerns US Patriot systems – Patriot interceptor missiles to be precise.

The shortage of PAC-3 anti-missile interceptors for Patriot systems, which are capable of shooting down ballistic missiles, is one of the systemic problems facing air defence, and not only Ukraine’s. The global shortage of interceptors has intensified dramatically during the Russia-Ukraine war. The capacity of Lockheed Martin’s PAC-3 production lines in the US is estimated at 600-700 units per year.

Given this persistent shortage, Kyiv long ago raised the issue of producing these missiles in Ukraine – to simplify logistics, ensure more reliable supplies, and reduce the global shortage.

For a long time Washington was categorically opposed to this. The resistance did not come from the manufacturer itself (which would also profit from Ukrainian production), but primarily from the US government’s refusal to grant a licence to export the technologies required. (Even European partners do not have localised PAC-3 production.)

It appears that in Ankara, this obstacle was finally overcome.

"One of the things I think we're going to be talking about today," Trump said, pointing at Zelenskyy, "a little birdie told me this – about the fact that we'll give them the right to make Patriots. We'll show them how to do it – it's very complex actually. But you'll figure out the complexity quickly."

"We're going to give a licence to you to make Patriots," Trump later repeated.

He also said he was confident that there would be no problem getting the manufacturer’s approval.

In his usual manner, Trump did not go into detail about exactly what he meant by "Patriots", but it would be reasonable to assume that he was referring to the interceptors rather than the systems themselves. According to European Pravda sources, Ukraine had requested PAC-3 interceptors and had received preliminary positive signals on this issue ahead of the Ankara meeting. Some Western media outlets such as the Financial Times have also reported that the discussion was specifically about these anti-ballistic missiles.

But obviously we still need to wait for an official US decision on this matter.

Launching production takes time, of course. Those missiles won’t reach Ukraine’s Armed Forces tomorrow, or even within a year.

Nevertheless, the official approval and the announcement of production lines in Ukraine will have an immediate impact. Countries supporting Ukraine that are reluctant to draw from their own missile stockpiles will gain a stronger argument for doing so. Once Ukrainian production begins, they will have greater certainty that they can replenish their inventories from the US manufacturer, which is currently focused on supplying Ukraine.

The second success of the Ankara summit concerns the Russia-Ukraine war and its conclusion.

This is less about a specific agreement and more about a change in the US’s attitude.

The clearest example was Trump’s public backing for Ukraine as regards the venue for the "peace talks" with Putin.

But an even more important indicator was Trump’s statement in support of long-range Ukrainian strikes against Russian economic targets such as oil refineries. In all previous years, Washington refused to take Ukraine’s side on this issue. At most, the US maintained neutrality by not commenting on these strikes, but more often it objected to them, including under Trump.

But in Ankara Trump acknowledged that even if Ukraine’s long-range attacks bring about an escalation of the hostilities and raise the conflict to a new level, Ukraine does have the right to carry them out.

"It's an escalation, but it's also an escalation that can help lead to an end [of the war – ed.]," Trump explained.

Relations with neighbours

A much more surprising outcome of the Ankara summit was the progress made towards reducing tensions between Ukraine and two of its neighbours – Poland and Hungary.

Let's add a bit of Polish context.

President Karol Nawrocki travelled from Warsaw to the NATO summit, but this was far from an obvious decision. Under Poland’s system of government, foreign policy powers largely rest with the prime minister, and Donald Tusk has no interest in sharing that authority with the president, his staunch political rival.

The fact that, despite this, Tusk handed over the right to represent Poland at the NATO summit to Nawrocki is explained mainly by US-related considerations.

Poland is one of the few European countries where both public opinion and all the major political parties still look favourably on the Trump administration. This has had positive consequences for the country and its security. In particular, when the Pentagon announced a reduction of its presence in Europe – including a planned reduction of troops in Poland – that decision was successfully reversed.

Maintaining good relations with the White House is a priority for all of Poland’s top officials. Nawrocki’s relationship with Trump is clearly better than Tusk’s. So it makes sense for them to share the responsibilities for Poland’s sake.

But the Polish political switcheroo also opened up an opportunity for Ukrainian-Polish diplomatic efforts.

Even before the NATO summit’s official dinner, to which President Zelenskyy was also invited, many people noticed that the organisers had placed the Ukrainian and Polish leaders next to each other in the official photo. Some joked that Zelenskyy had "used his wife to shield himself from Nawrocki" just to avoid talking to him.

But things turned out differently. At the summit dinner, away from the TV cameras, the presidents of Ukraine and Poland had a brief conversation and agreed to hold a more substantive meeting the following day. On Wednesday evening, after the summit session, they did just that.

The conversation lasted about an hour. We don’t yet know much about what they discussed, but the very fact that such a lengthy meeting took place between the two leaders after the White Eagle controversy indicates their willingness to seek out common ground.

Many also interpreted the remarks Nawrocki made after the evening meeting as a sign of readiness for more constructive dialogue with Ukraine.

There is no reason to hope that this meeting will resolve the historical dispute between Poland and Ukraine. But it is absolutely crucial to reduce the tension in relations between the two states.

And finally, Hungary.

In the aforementioned official summit photo, another neighbour appeared on the other side of Zelenskyy – Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar.

This, incidentally, is another indication that the arrangement was no accident. Credit should go to Turkish diplomacy here, because it’s the host country that determines the positions for the official photograph – there is no improvisation involved.

Next morning it was reported that Magyar had also spoken with Zelenskyy. They too agreed to hold a separate meeting.

But we need to add more context here too.

After Péter Magyar’s election victory, Ukraine had hoped for a somewhat speedier improvement in relations with Hungary. One of the obstacles to this has been the difficulty in arranging a meeting between the two leaders. Budapest put forward a demand that was unacceptable to Ukraine: that Zelenskyy and Magyar should meet in the Transcarpathian city of Berehove. Moreover, Péter Magyar announced this demand publicly, making it even less acceptable to Ukraine.

The reason is that Magyar can only invite a foreign leader to his own country – Hungary. And scheduling the meeting in Berehove made it sound as if he regards the city as Hungarian.

Ukraine has suggested various alternatives.

The first compromise was for the leaders to meet in Kyiv and then travel together to Berehove. Later, Budapest, Brussels and even other Ukrainian cities such as Lviv were suggested. But Magyar wouldn’t budge: it had to be Berehove or nowhere.

During the conversation in Ankara, the Hungarian position finally changed.

"We agreed that we will meet in the near future – in either Budapest or Kyiv – and then travel together to Berehove in Zakarpattia," Magyar said.

The arrangements have yet to be finalised at this point, but Kyiv has confirmed that the dialogue has begun to move forward. Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha has already met with his Hungarian counterpart, Anita Orbán, and there are hopes that a meeting between the leaders will take place soon. Such a meeting is needed, among other things, to unblock Hungary’s obstruction of Ukraine’s further progress toward EU membership and to open the remaining clusters for the accession negotiations.

The results of the Ankara summit are genuinely positive for Ukraine. They lay the foundation for further processes that Kyiv needs.

But the implementation of all these plans – from the meeting with Magyar to the production of Patriot missiles – still lies ahead.

Sergiy Sydorenko

Editor, European Pravda, from Ankara

Because of this, Kwaśniewski still enjoys a high level of authority in Poland and can afford to speak openly about things that are unpopular that it would be risky for current politicians to talk about. He has also been an unwavering supporter of Ukraine and believes that Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO would benefit Poland itself.

Kwaśniewski’s wife’s family comes from a village in Ukrainian Volyn. His father-in-law survived the Volyn tragedy. [The Volyn (Volhynia) tragedy was a series of events that led to the ethnic cleansing of the Polish and Ukrainian populations in 1943. The tragedy was part of a long-standing rivalry between Ukrainians and Poles in what is now Ukraine's west.] Kwaśniewski now says that when he was negotiating with President Leonid Kuchma on the policy of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, he only became fully convinced that this was the right approach after the actions of the state also convinced his father-in-law and his family.

The sitting president of Poland, Karol Nawrocki, is moving in the opposite direction and using the conflict with Ukraine as one of his electoral tools.

At the same time, Aleksander Kwaśniewski places most of the responsibility for the current escalation of tensions on Kyiv.

He insists that Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a mistake and urges him not to repeat it, warning that it could lead to destructive consequences.

We spoke with the former president ahead of the YES discussion held in Gdańsk on the eve of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC-2026), organised by the Victor Pinchuk Foundation. In this interview you can read about Kwaśniewski’s conversation with Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine’s prospects for joining the EU and NATO, and the possibility that a breakthrough in the war with Russia could (and, in his view, should) happen in the coming months.

"If that happens, it would be bad news for you"

Mr President, you once led Poland into the EU. You have said many times that you are convinced that Ukraine will also become a member of the European Union. Do you still believe that?

I still believe that. Especially because the Americans decided not to propose NATO membership for Ukraine, I think it’s absolutely necessary to negotiate effectively and to prepare both sides – the European Union and Ukraine – for Ukraine’s membership.

I know that it is not easy, but it must happen.

All the EU member states will need to agree to it. Do you believe that the Poles will agree?

Yes! And the problem is not only in Poland – this anti-Ukrainian card is also being played in Germany, everywhere.

Who is doing this?

Well, do you remember who played the Dutch referendum? That is serious. [Editor’s note: Numerous investigations point to Russia’s involvement in organising and promoting the anti-Ukrainian referendum in the Netherlands in 2016, but Kwaśniewski did not mention Russia by name.]

Regarding Poland, I hope that pro-European democratic parties will win the next elections. For that, it’s very important to avoid mistakes.

The decision of President Zelenskyy to name the military units [after the Heroes of the UPA] was a mistake.

These anti-Ukrainian sentiments are present. In Poland, there are two parties speaking openly against support for Ukraine – Konfederacja [Wolność i Niepodległość, Confederation Freedom and Independence] and Konfederacja Korony Polskiej [KKP, a pro-Russian party led by Grzegorz Braun – ed.], and they have something like around 23%.

They aren’t the only ones opposing Ukraine. President Nawrocki is as well. He was elected as the candidate of the Law and Justice party (PiS).

He is a special case. Before the election, he was very tough on all these issues of the history of Volyn, the UPA, etc. He is a very radical person, and he wants to be the leader of this coalition of right-wing parties after the 2027 election, if these parties together form a majority.

If that happens, that would be bad news for you, for Poland and for the European Union.

More than 20 years ago, you and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma agreed on the formula "We forgive and ask for forgiveness." Why has this approach stopped working?

We agreed that almost 30 years ago, in 1997, in the declaration about Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation.

We achieved some progress in implementing it, which was very difficult, as we still had a lot of witnesses or members and the families of victims of the Volyn massacre. But it worked.

Maybe in the years that followed, we didn’t invest enough effort to keep it going. There was not enough dialogue between historians, intellectuals and academics. But we still had a good chance for reconciliation at the beginning of the [full-scale] war, when millions of Ukrainian refugees were welcomed by the Polish people, and it was not organised by the authorities. It was a spontaneous reaction coming from their hearts.

I hoped then that we would have a new pillar for the Polish-Ukrainian relationship.

But I understand the psychological reasons why that changed later. Year by year, people become tired of the war. And we have seen unacceptable behaviour by some Ukrainians, like recently when a Ukrainian influencer drove to Morskie Oko [a lake in a protected area of the Tatra mountains where cars are banned], or the Ukrainian lady who was caught driving a Porsche at 220 km/h in Warsaw, or that fishing guy. Stupid things, but they really created an atmosphere of irritation.

There are 1.5–2 million Ukrainians in Poland. Inevitably, some of them will break the rules.

Absolutely! The majority is absolutely okay. They work. They help the Polish economy very much. But this is about psychology.

The atmosphere is supported by politicians who cynically use it to amplify these cases.

Nicolas Lobet – PRYZM/ Victor Pinchuk Foundation

"Time is the best medicine, but with one condition"

You mentioned that you consider a decision by Volodymyr Zelenskyy a mistake.

Let me tell you: I was very much afraid from the very beginning of this difficult process of reconciliation, that one day we will offer Polish-Ukrainian relationships to radicals.

Today, we are close to it.

If that happens, if radicals from both the Ukrainian and the Polish sides become the mainstream of Polish-Ukrainian relationships, it would be the beginning of a catastrophe.

We are not there yet.

Look at the decision of President Zelenskyy. Was it by chance? Did it happen by accident?

You met with Kyrylo Budanov [Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine] in Warsaw. Did you get the impression that it was a mistake or a deliberate and calculated step?

I think it was wrongly calculated. It happened because of pressure from somewhere.

We didn't discuss in detail with Budanov the procedure of this decision. Budanov came to Warsaw to clean up the situation, to facilitate next steps, but that didn't happen.

I want to repeat again: we should avoid giving the Polish-Ukrainian relationship to radicals,

because it would be extremely dangerous.

You do understand that it is impossible to reverse the decision to name this unit after the Heroes of the UPA?

Politically, of course, and that’s why the situation is so difficult for both sides. Zelenskyy can’t change his decision and Nawrocki can’t change his decision. So we are where we are.

And I understand why Zelenskyy did not come here to Gdansk. It’s good that we have a delegation with the Prime Minister at the top. But I don't understand why the president of Poland announced his decision four days before the conference started. He had already waited for two weeks and he could have done it two days after…

The reason is obvious: to disrupt the conference and make life more difficult for Prime Minister Tusk. This is domestic politics.

Your understanding might be correct, but I myself cannot say so.

Is there a way to cool the tension down?

Time is the best medicine for that, on one condition: if we do not escalate. Both sides.

That’s why now it’s important to have the conference flow normally, with ministers meeting each other and so on.

In Ukraine, there is a widespread feeling that Nawrocki is seeking escalation.

Nawrocki will do everything possible to help the right-wing opposition to win the 2027 election.

Nawrocki’s plan is to reform Poland's division of power to have a much more presidential system – like in Ukraine.

He has no chance of changing the constitution in the foreseeable time, it is impossible – you can’t get a two-thirds majority in polarised Poland.

But even without amending the constitution, he can organise a more presidential system. For that, he wants to be the man who organises the coalition deal between PiS, Konfederacja and Braun’s party Konfederacja Korony Polskiej. With this, Nawrocki will nominate a prime minister who will be very close to him, and this will create a much more presidential system in Poland.

Will he play the Ukraine card again for that purpose?

Ukraine will become a topic of the next elections. That’s for sure. That's a risk, of course.

There will be constant attempts to escalate. Konfederacja will escalate, Braun will escalate. Nawrocki will, of course.

That would be a huge task for Ukraine to avoid giving them ground, to prevent further escalation through its own actions.

At the same time, it would be the task for democratic forces in Poland to calm society down – by facts, by information. An example of the information the Polish government should be communicating much more widely is the positive impact that Ukrainians living and working in Poland are having on the Polish economy.

We need to talk more about things like that, otherwise history will be the only thing discussed about Ukraine.

"I don't think that the majority of Poles are really anti-Ukrainian"

Politicians come and go. But according to polls, Polish society is becoming more and more anti-Ukrainian…

First of all, I don't trust public opinion polls. We have seen a lot of election polls that turned out to be wrong. I travel around Poland a lot and meet many people.

There is indeed some irritation towards Ukrainians, based on examples of wrongdoings by the Ukrainians I mentioned before. That’s what people tell me when they explain their irritation.

I have a personal story, which I always tell people when I hear them saying that one Ukrainian did this and another Ukrainian did that.

In 2005, after Polish accession to the EU, we had more than 1 million Poles living in the United Kingdom. It was my last visit to the UK as president and I had an audience with Queen Elizabeth II. That morning, the Polish ambassador showed me the British tabloid The Sun with a big story on the front page that a Polish guy killed a whole British family – father, mother and a child.

Quite a background for a state visit!

With this, I started my meeting with the Queen by apologising, by saying that I'm so sorry that it happened.

The Queen was a clever woman, a great woman, and she said: "Mr. President, it's happened. But in my memory, the most important thing concerning the Poles living in the UK is the Second World War and how much you helped us." She told me about the Polish soldiers who helped the UK and its people that time. (Ed. note: During World War II, the Polish government-in-exile was based in London.)

In my experience, when I tell this story, people say, indeed, there are now some irritating situations, but it shouldn’t become the core of the attitude to Ukraine.

So, of course, we have some increase of the anti-Ukrainian position, but I don't think that the majority of the Poles are really anti-Ukrainian.

Nicolas Lobet – PRYZM/ Victor Pinchuk Foundation

"NATO membership for Ukraine is unrealistic as long as Donald Trump is the president of the United States"

Let’s talk about Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Does the pace of reforms convince you that Ukraine will soon join the European Union?

First, you’re far from the beginning of this road. The first reforms started with Yushchenko, there were some reforms even under Yanukovych, and then, of course, after 2014. So Ukraine has been doing its homework for quite some time.

But let me remind you of our journey.

Poland signed the Association Agreement in 1991 and we finally joined the EU in 2004 – after 13 years. We were not lazy or ineffective in that preparation.

The road to membership is quite long, and you are on it.

Indeed, you need to speed up some elements. And there are some extremely sensitive elements – agriculture, service, corruption, independence of the judiciary – and I suggest that Ukraine and the EU should organise groups of experts to find a solution for proper reforms and integration there.

During your tenure, Poland played the role of defender of Ukraine’s interests in the EU. When did Poland cease to that role? Because now it definitely is not.

I don’t think so. In my opinion, this government still plays this role.

Indeed, there have been changes in politics. The reason is that in modern reality, politicians are used to working according to public opinion polls, and that is terrible – I'm very much against it. Because if you change the tone every single day and switch from pro-Ukrainian to more anti-Ukrainian, that is not a strategy. That is reactive politics, which is wrong.

I hope this government has a strategy. I know the Prime Minister, I know some ministers, including Radoslaw Sikorski. I know the speaker of the Polish parliament very well, and I can tell you they are absolutely in favour of Ukraine joining the European Union.

Of course, we have Polish farmers who are very much afraid of Ukrainians in the EU. But it means we have to discuss it, to show them that the risk is not real.

We had the same issues on our way to the EU. I remember my meetings in France, in Spain. It was the same. But finally, we joined the EU and nothing tragic happened.

By the way, in my opinion, Ukraine should start with NATO membership, and then the EU. But I know that today it is totally unrealistic because of the position of US President [Donald] Trump. Although I believe he is wrong here.

Given the threat posed by Russia, Putin, and given that Ukraine has the biggest European army, which understands contemporary war, having Ukraine as a NATO member would be the best guarantee of security not only for Ukraine, but also for other NATO members. Referring to the Russian doctrine that they need this zone of non-NATO countries surrounding Russia doesn’t work. They already have Finland in NATO, Sweden in NATO, and the Baltic states.  

But still, that is impossible as long as Donald Trump is the president of the United States. I don't know how much the situation will change in the coming years.

But the European Union is something very real. Ukraine’s membership of the EU would be the best possible and achievable security guarantee for Ukraine and the EU.

I can promise that as long as I'm in good shape – because I'm not the youngest person in the world – I will advocate for Ukraine, Poland and the European Union. But now, we have a good chance to progress here soon.

I believe something will happen in the coming months and the "something" won’t be a real peace.

Because I don’t believe that any reliable peace agreement is possible. In my opinion, neither Putin nor his successor will be interested in war.

Nevertheless, we can expect some kind of ceasefire, and it may come soon. Even if peace is impossible, the ceasefire is achievable.

That would be a chance for a breakthrough.

Sergiy Sydorenko

Editor, European Pravda
From Gdańsk

Kyiv knew from the outset that this list has special significance for the Europeans. It’s not just that all of its elements stem from the EU accession criteria and other bilateral documents. For Brussels and the member states, this plan is an indicator of whether Ukraine’s declarations about its commitment to reform can be trusted. That is why it includes reforms that the EU considers particularly indicative.

"You can change the laws however many times you want, but you can’t bring trust back overnight.... This is what we agreed in the paper – within one year," European Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos explained, referring to the notorious events of July 2025, when Ukraine undermined its own anti-corruption reforms.

The plan may not have formal legal status, but politically, it’s hugely significant.

EU officials are now repeatedly emphasising that Ukraine itself set the implementation deadline at one year. Ukrainian officials, including Taras Kachka, are continuing to insist on this timeframe as well.

Yet six months have gone by, and progress on implementing the plan is well below expectations. Expert monitoring of Ukraine’s progress gives it a score of 15 out of 100 – and most of that reflects preparatory work rather than reforms that have actually started.

Unless the situation changes immediately, Ukraine will create serious obstacles on its own path towards EU membership. Failure to fulfil the commitments it has undertaken, especially those regarded as a "test of trust", also significantly increases the risk of the EU deciding to decouple Ukraine and Moldova’s accession ahead of schedule – something that officials in Brussels have hinted at.

If that happens, the government and parliament will have no one to blame but themselves.

What this report is about and what counts as success

Alignment with the EU legislation that Ukraine must adopt during the accession process is measured annually by the European Commission in the Enlargement Report. To assess progress in the "Fundamentals" Chapters 23 and 24, the EU uses a separate mechanism – the Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR).

Things are more complicated with the Kachka-Kos plan. It is not part of the formal accession process, so there are no public EU tools to evaluate progress. The European Commission prepares only internal documents, which it shares with member states but does not publish.

This raises the question: how can we determine whether Ukraine is actually succeeding in fulfilling these requirements, which are essential if it is to continue on its path towards EU membership?

To address this, Ukrainian think tanks formed a coalition known as Membership Check, led by the New Europe Center. It brings together eight expert organisations working on European integration, anti-corruption and judicial reform. The other members of the group are European Pravda, the Mezha Anti-Corruption Center, ANTS (the National Interests Advocacy Network), the DEJURE (Democracy, Justice, Reforms) Foundation, the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform, the Anti-Corruption Action Center, and Transparency International Ukraine.

In this article, the coalition presents its second report.

The first one, published in early April, revealed disappointing results. After three months of work, the authorities had achieved only 9% of the maximum score. At the time, the government said it expected to speed up later, as the first few months were mainly spent on preparatory work. This explanation made sense. But even less progress has been achieved in the second quarter.

The result as of the end of June, according to the methodology, is 15 out of 100 points – only 15% complete.

It’s important to emphasise that 100% completion is not an absolute requirement.

Of course that remains the desired outcome, but reality is always more complex.

Even when it comes to formal accession requirements, Brussels often accepts less-than-perfect results. For example, in the area of the rule of law, the EU does not require literal compliance with all its recommendations, but rather the creation of a system in which citizens and businesses can trust court decisions and believe that they are fair.

The same applies here: if Ukraine can show that it has made a genuine effort to implement all the points, but details of the final decisions differ from the EU’s vision (or that of the expert coalition), the plan could still be considered fulfilled even if the numerical score were, say, 80 points instead of 100.

The problem is, however, that right now, no meaningful progress is being made on any of the 10 points.

Ukraine has implemented only one minor element of one of the points. It has also completely failed to address the main elements related to judicial reform. Within the coalition there were even discussions about whether a negative score should be given, since this is essentially a rollback in one of the reform areas.

Yet the coalition’s sources in the government remain optimistic.

They say that work is ongoing, a number of draft laws are being coordinated with the European Commission, and that this is one of the main reasons for the delay (in other words, it’s the EU’s fault, not Ukraine’s).

It is true that Kyiv could still demonstrate rapid progress in implementing the plan in the remaining six months before the deadline Ukraine itself set. But that doesn’t explain how it will remedy the dismantling of the reform of judges’ declarations of integrity.

Another reason for cautious optimism is that a group of MPs, including the chair of the anti-corruption committee, Anastasiia Radina (from the Servant of the People faction), have started registering draft laws that aim to implement the plan’s points on their own, without waiting for the government.

But will there be enough votes in parliament to go against the government – even with the realisation that Ukraine’s path towards EU membership is at stake – especially given that the government has been showing that it disagrees with certain pro-European parliamentary initiatives?

Now for some more details on each of the 10 points.

Point 1: closing corruption loopholes in the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC)

This point of the Kachka-Kos plan reads: "Adopt comprehensive amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and other legislation to ensure fast and high-quality justice."

This is the most important point of the entire plan and the largest in scope. In its detailed explanation, five elements are listed that are meant to solve several long-standing and very important problems.

In particular, Ukraine has committed to closing loopholes that currently allow some top-level corruption offenders to avoid responsibility – for example, by dragging out investigations and then closing cases due to statutes of limitation (this is a long-standing problem that Ukraine created for itself during a previous convocation of parliament, when it adopted and the president signed the "Lozovyi amendments").

All attempts by parliament to fix these and similar provisions have failed, so the European Union has identified remedying these problems as one of the accession criteria.

In the coalition’s assessment, the first point carries the highest weight – 20 points. However, Ukraine’s current score is only 2.5 out of 20.

Ukraine is still only preparing to work on this reform.

The government promised long ago to submit a relevant draft law, and has actually drafted it, but issues arose during coordination. The draft has now been sent back for revision jointly with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP).

Recently – evidently not expecting rapid progress from the government – members of parliament registered two alternative draft laws: No. 15333 on improving the effectiveness of criminal proceedings after the expiration of pre-trial investigation deadlines and preventing procedural abuse, and No. 15334 on improving the rules for determining jurisdiction and ensuring international cooperation. So far there has been no movement on them in parliament.

Point 2: independent forensic examinations for NABU

Here, too, everything is still at a very early stage. Essentially, there have only been political statements expressing readiness to implement this point.

The Ministry of Justice has started to draft a bill, but NABU is unhappy with the proposals and critical of the government’s concept of how the institution responsible for conducting forensic examinations would operate. After discussions of the ideas promoted by the Ministry of Justice, anti-corruption activists doubt that the new body would truly be independent. There is currently no draft suitable for expert analysis.

Expert score: 2 out of 10 points.

Point 3: changing the rules for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General and selection of candidates for the position

This point of the plan deserves particular attention.

Normally the European Union is very cautious not to interfere with national traditions and procedures, especially in areas where there are no common EU rules. The rules for appointing a Prosecutor General differ across European states, and the position is often filled according to political quotas, but subject to strict professional criteria.

However, an exception has been made for Ukraine. A review of the procedure for selecting and dismissing the Prosecutor General has been included in the EU accession criteria, and in the Kachka-Kos plan as well.

The reason for this exceptional treatment is the role played by Ukraine’s Prosecutor General, Ruslan Kravchenko, in the attack on anti-corruption institutions in July last year. The EU is well aware that it was Kravchenko who drafted the controversial law that undermined the independence of NABU and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO).

However, the European Union cannot and will not demand his dismissal. The only requirement is that Ukraine introduce safeguards for the future, so that future Prosecutors General are selected based on professionalism rather than loyalty.

Even here, however, the government has done nothing so far. Moreover, there have not even been any political statements indicating an intention to carry out a meaningful reform.

The experts have awarded half a point only because of a parliamentary initiative: draft law No. 15343 on competitive selection for the position of Prosecutor General has been registered in the Verkhovna Rada.

Expert score: 0.5 out of 10.

Point 4: reinstating the competitive selection process for the appointment and transfer of prosecutors

This is another consequence of the notorious July 2025 law. As is well known, under pressure from the Ukrainian public and Western partners, the authorities rolled back restrictions on the independence of NABU and SAPO. However, the law also contained a provision concerning the prosecution service.

Parliament "forgot" to repeal it, and to this day Kyiv has ignored all reminders about this from the EU.

There have been political statements about the intention to implement this point, but no actual action.

The Office of the Prosecutor General has drafted a law (which the coalition has reviewed), but it does not reinstate competitive appointments of prosecutors to positions. The government says it intends to submit the draft law to the Venice Commission after further refinement, which could delay the process even more.

Expert score: 0.5 out of 10.

Point 5: reform of the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI)

Despite the fact that the Kachka-Kos plan is supposed to be implemented by the end of 2026, the government already appears to be planning to miss the deadline when it comes to the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). Current government statements suggest an intention to submit a draft law "by the end of the year", which is quite late for such a complex reform.

The government says this is because the bill will only be drafted upon completion of an audit of the SBI.

However, the main problem is not missing the deadline, but the possible deliberate entrenchment of politically dependent leadership within the SBI.

The tenure of the current SBI director ends on 31 December 2026, and the competition commission to select his successor must be formed no later than 31 October 2026. Therefore there is a risk that the new director will be selected according to the existing procedure, the transparency and independence of which are questionable.

Expert score: 1 out of 10.

Point 6: appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court and members of the High Council of Justice

This point of the Kachka-Kos plan includes the requirement that only internationally vetted candidates should become judges of the Constitutional Court (CCU) and members of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) going forward.

Overall, there are no critical problems here, although the pace of implementation could be faster. A competitive selection process is underway for two vacant CCU judge positions under the parliamentary quota. Around late June/early July, the Advisory Group of Experts is expected to determine the candidates’ rankings and submit them to the parliamentary committee. The CCU judge positions that are under the quotas of the president and the congress of judges remain vacant.

As regards the High Council of Justice, the congress of judges has elected two members to the HCJ, but there are still vacancies under the quota of the congress of advocates (no competition has been announced since 2022, as the bar self-governance system, once controlled by Andrii Portnov, remains a systemic problem).

In August 2026, and again at the beginning of 2027, the terms of 13 more HCJ members will expire. Competitions to fill these vacancies have been announced.

Expert score: 1 out of 5, with hopes that the assessment may improve shortly.

Point 7: involving international experts in the selection commission of the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ)

Draft law No. 13382 has been registered in parliament, but its consideration has not progressed since June 2025.

The government claims it has prepared an alternative legislative initiative, which is currently at the stage of coordination with the European Commission.

Expert score: 1.5 out of 10.

Point 8: judges’ declarations of integrity and digitalisation of enforcement proceedings

This is a complex point consisting of three elements, so the experts agreed to roughly divide the maximum score (10 points) equally between them.

Let’s begin with the good news.

On 7 April, parliament adopted new legislation on the digitalisation of the enforcement of court decisions. The law received a positive assessment from the European Commission, and the experts also have no objections, so the coalition awarded the maximum score here – 3.5 points.

The other two elements concern the reform of judges’ declarations of integrity, which must include "improvement of the verification procedure", as well as the introduction of a separate mechanism for such declarations for Supreme Court judges, including "the temporary involvement of internationally nominated independent experts".

On both of these elements, there has been either zero progress or movement in the wrong direction.

It is important to explain that declarations of integrity are one of the few tools for cleaning out the judiciary. Or rather they were supposed to be – but the Ukrainian parliament has decided to protect dishonest judges. And this assessment is no exaggeration.

On 9 June 2026, parliament adopted draft law No. 13165-2 on judges’ declarations of integrity. Yet the law contradicts the plan’s requirements, does not improve the verification of existing declarations, and actually makes it easier for judges to exploit loopholes to avoid accountability. European Pravda has covered this in this article: A "European" reform in name only.

In addition, contrary to the plan’s requirements, the adopted bill does not provide for the temporary involvement of international experts in the verification of Supreme Court judges’ integrity declarations. Thus, parliament did not even attempt to simulate compliance with this element.

The controversial law is now awaiting the president’s signature.

Total expert score for the three elements of this point: 3.5 out of 10.

Point 9: the Anti-Corruption Strategy and Anti-Corruption Programme

Formally, this point has already been breached. It is the only one for which the Kachka-Kos plan has a separate deadline: both of these documents were supposed to have been adopted by the end of Q2 2026 – i.e. now.

Yet it was not until May, after a long delay by the government (which failed to approve the strategy developed by the NACP), that draft laws for the State Anti-Corruption Strategy (SAS) appeared in the Verkhovna Rada. The process was unlocked despite the Cabinet of Ministers’ position when MP Anastasiia Radina decided to submit the draft on behalf of the NACP herself.

Only then did the government submit its own draft law – but it removed several of Ukraine’s key commitments from the Strategy (as European Pravda has reported on in detail).

Later, a third, alternative parliamentary draft was also introduced. At present, all three remain stalled. It is unclear whether the government will agree to adopt a version that aligns with Ukraine’s obligations to the EU.

Work on the State Anti-Corruption Programme, which is to be based on the Strategy, will only begin after the Strategy is adopted.

Expert score: 1.5 out of 10.

Point 10: internal control systems against corruption

Here, according to the experts, work is still at a very early stage, although a number of measures have been implemented. The State Audit Service of Ukraine has added questions about the state of internal control to the audits it conducts. A whistleblower reporting portal is functioning, but it needs further improvement.

In May, updated Internal Audit Standards came into force which revised the requirements for organising internal audits in the public sector and strengthened requirements for the organisational and functional independence of internal audit units.

Expert score: 1 out of 10.

The full monitoring report is available at the following link.

By Sergiy Sydorenko, European Pravda

Assessment by the Membership Check coalition

It’s the summit’s most candid description of its internal order.

France had spent months preparing the G7 around global economic imbalances, critical minerals, artificial intelligence and the gathering conflict around the Strait of Hormuz.

Ukraine was never certain to dominate an agenda crowded by Iran, China and a fraying global economy. Yet by the end of the summit, the seven leaders had adopted a dedicated declaration on Ukraine. It promised more air defence, more interceptors, long-range capabilities, support for Ukraine’s energy system and stronger sanctions on Russia’s oil and gas sectors.

The fact that the United States signed it was the point.

A year earlier, the G7 summit in Canada had ended without a common position on Ukraine after Trump left early. In Évian, he stayed until the end. He met Volodymyr Zelenskyy twice on the margins of the summit. Emmanuel Macron emerged declaring a "re-synchronisation" of the G7 on Ukraine and a "very deep change" in the American approach to the war.

The United States remains the country that can alter the military balance faster than any other partner, whether through its air-defence stockpiles, intelligence, industrial capacity or political influence over allies.

According to IMF-based figures assembled for the French presidency’s policy ecosystem, the group’s share of global GDP has fallen from roughly 60% in 1980 to about 45% in 2025. At the same time, power inside the G7 has become more lopsided.

The United States accounted for nearly 59% of the G7’s GDP in 2023, up from 46% in 2000. Europe may still speak in the plural; economically and militarily, America increasingly arrives as the heavyweight.  

A better summit than expected

The G7 declaration contains more than ceremonial language. It says the group will increase deliveries of air-defence capacities, additional systems and interceptors, as well as long-range capabilities. It says members are ready to consider granting licences that would allow Ukraine to expand its military production. It promises further support for Ukrainian energy resilience ahead of next winter and stronger pressure on the Russian war economy.

Those commitments gather several strands of the war into one political offer. Air defence protects cities and industry. Long-range capabilities shape Russia’s calculations behind the front line. Energy resilience keeps the country functioning through winter. Industrial licences could reduce Ukraine’s dependence on the increasingly depleted arsenals of its partners.

Macron’s argument was that the G7 had finally accepted a reality that Kyiv has been repeating for months: Russia is not negotiating seriously because it believes time still favours it.

Trump, according to the French president, now shares that judgement.

The change should not be exaggerated. Trump’s position has moved before. It can move again. His administration remains an unpredictable presence in the coalition supporting Ukraine, capable of announcing a new posture one week and undermining it the next.

But diplomacy often begins with narrower gains. France did not obtain an American conversion to European strategic thinking. It obtained something more immediate: a US signature under a text that treat Russia as the problem, Ukraine as a partner worth arming, and pressure on Moscow as unfinished business.

That is a considerable improvement on the atmosphere of the previous G7 summit.

It also reveals how low the bar has fallen. European leaders now count it as a strategic success when the American president stays in the room, endorses a collective line and does not leave them to explain the consequences alone.

A promise is not a shield

The G7 "agrees to increase" deliveries of air-defence capabilities and long-range systems. It is "ready to consider" licences for Ukrainian military production. It "agrees to provide further support" to get Ukraine through winter.

The declaration offers political direction, not operational detail. It gives no figures for additional systems or interceptors. It sets no timetable. It does not say which country will provide which capability, how licences would be structured, or what financing would make production viable in Ukraine.

For a country facing another season of Russian missile and drone attacks, that distinction is severe. An interceptor arrives in one of two forms: it is either in a warehouse, on a launcher or already flying towards its target. It cannot be substituted by a paragraph agreed beside Lake Geneva.

The same caution applies to military production. Friedrich Merz, the German chancellor, was right to say that Europe and the United States are producing too little, and that licences could help compensate for the shortfall. Ukraine has factories, engineers, experience and a brutal understanding of what works in modern warfare. Yet "ready to consider" is not the same as a signed industrial agreement. American firms have commercial interests, export controls and concerns about intellectual property. European governments have their own procurement rules and political constraints.

The United States and Europe have spent years sending weapons from existing stocks. That approach has limits. The next phase must involve production lines, shared designs, repair facilities and long-term orders. Ukraine should not remain a customer waiting for deliveries from abroad. It should become part of the industrial base producing the weapons Europe itself will need.

Évian acknowledged that possibility. It did not settle it.

The guarantee that remains missing

The summit did not establish a security-guarantee mechanism for Ukraine. The EU and its member states said they were prepared to contribute to "robust and credible security guarantees" for Ukraine through the Coalition of the Willing and "in cooperation with the United States".

Europe wants to prepare for a future in which it it carries more responsibility for its own security. Yet the guarantees it is beginning to sketch still depend on cooperation with the same country whose commitment has become hardest to predict.

There is no contradiction in wanting American involvement.

Europe cannot replace the United States overnight.

It still relies on American intelligence, surveillance, strategic lift, nuclear deterrence and several categories of advanced weapons. But dependence becomes dangerous when the partner at its centre changes policy according to personal instinct, domestic politics or the latest crisis.

Trump’s "I’m the boss" line was delivered as a joke. It nevertheless captured the bind facing European capitals. They dislike his methods, distrust his consistency and understand that he can use their dependence as leverage. They also know that the United States remains indispensable in the short term.

France’s policy in Évian was built around that uncomfortable reality.

Macron’s version of strategic autonomy is often described as an effort to free Europe from America. The summit showed a more practical version. France is not trying to push Washington out of European security. It is trying to keep Washington involved while Europe builds enough capacity to survive a future American retreat.

France buys time, Ukraine needs capability

The French achievement at Évian was therefore not autonomy. It was time.

Time for Europe to increase military production. Time to build a more credible air-defence architecture. Time to turn Ukrainian and European defence industries into partners rather than occasional contractors. Time to reduce the risk that a political mood swing in Washington leaves a hole in Ukraine’s defence.

The European Council has called for faster production and delivery of air-defence systems, ammunition, drones and missiles. It has also linked Ukraine’s security to the protection of energy infrastructure, the repair of the grid and the resilience of civilian life. On finance, the EU has far stronger instruments. Brussels expects the first disbursement from its €90bn loan for Ukraine in 2026 and 2027 before the end of June.

Europe can keep the Ukrainian state functioning. It can finance reconstruction, support reform and move accession negotiations forward. It has proved that repeatedly.

Its weaker point remains hard power. A Europe able to fund recovery but unable to secure Ukrainian skies without American help has not yet achieved strategic autonomy. It has achieved a partial form of it.

Ukraine, meanwhile, is not only the recipient of European security policy. It is becoming one of its architects. Ukrainian forces have adapted faster than most European militaries to drones, electronic warfare,, dispersed production, civilian resilience and the industrial demands of a high-intensity war. European armies are studying those lessons because they have little choice.

The war has already made Ukraine central to Europe’s future security order. The question is whether Europe will treat Ukraine as a temporary battlefield on its eastern edge or as a permanent military and industrial partner.

The licensing debate points towards the second option. So does the growing recognition that Ukrainian factories should not merely repair foreign systems but help produce the next generation of European capabilities.

What to watch after Évian

The first test is air defence. Ukraine needs additional systems and interceptors before Russia’s next major campaign against cities and energy infrastructure. Every delay will be measured in damaged substations, destroyed housing and civilians spending nights in shelters.

The second is industrial. Announcements about licences must lead to contracts, technology transfer and production. Otherwise, Europe will continue to describe Ukraine as a defence-industrial partner while leaving its factories dependent on decisions made elsewhere.

The third is sanctions. The G7 promised stronger pressure on Russian oil and gas.

The European Council went further, calling for reduced Russian energy revenues, tighter action against the shadow fleet, greater pressure on the banking system and more serious enforcement against sanctions evasion.

That is where the next phase of economic pressure lies. Russia has become skilled at keeping its war economy afloat through opaque shipping, intermediaries and third-country supply chains. Another package of restrictions will not be enough if enforcement remains optional.

Finally, there is Washington itself.

Trump’s change of tone in Évian is useful. It should be welcomed, not romanticised. A president who accepts that Russia is the offensive party and signs a declaration on strengthening Ukraine’s air defence is preferable to a president who leaves the summit early and tells Europe to manage alone.

France succeeded in keeping the United States tied to the coalition. The harder task is making Ukraine’s security less dependent on that tie.

Charlotte Guillou-Clerc,

Journalist (France) 

Polish President Karol Nawrocki’s decision to "punish" the president of Ukraine by stripping him of the Order of the White Eagle, and the subsequent mass renouncing of Polish state honours by Ukrainian politicians and diplomats, are not the cause of this crisis, merely one of its manifestations.

This is not about awards. We are truly heading towards the abyss.

Some in Warsaw are calling for military supplies to Ukraine to be halted. That is unlikely to happen (at least for now), but at a minimum, Ukraine's accession to the EU is on the line. Yet even that high stake does not mean Kyiv has unlimited room for concessions. There are red lines that the Ukrainian authorities will definitely not cross.

Under these circumstances, Ukraine’s friends in Poland are even more important than usual.

Poland’s political arena is filled with anti-Ukrainian narratives and xenophobia. A Polish minister who attempted to explain to other politicians why Ukraine named a military unit after the Heroes of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) has been harassed and attacked. That said, there are still healthy political forces in Poland. There are politicians who are trying to prevent relations with Ukraine from deteriorating further. Prime Minister Donald Tusk is one of them. So it is vitally important that Kyiv’s actions take account of the interests of those in Poland who continue to stand on the side of common sense.

For now, and precisely for these reasons, the official reaction from Kyiv to Nawrocki’s attack has been broadly correct. The order had to be returned to Warsaw.

But for the very same reasons, President Zelenskyy should travel to Poland this week.

The visit would help Ukraine’s friends – and refusing to go would help anti-Ukrainian politicians.

This article is an Editorial. That means it is published on behalf of the entire editorial team and reflects the collective position of all European Pravda journalists. We reserve this format for truly exceptional cases, particularly when Ukraine finds itself at an important crossroads. Given that the President’s Office is reportedly considering declining to attend the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) in Gdańsk, this is just such a situation.

We will also explain in this article why the European Pravda editorial board believes that the "order-fall" (the return of Polish state decorations by Ukrainian politicians and diplomats) was necessary. It’s particularly important to note that this unprecedented step, taken without any directives or coordination, was undertaken not only by representatives of the current government, but by its opponents as well.

This demonstrates the existence of the red lines mentioned above – red lines that are not obvious to Poland.

Ukraine as a political tool

First, let us address something that Kyiv is acutely aware of and that we at European Pravda have written about many times, but which is important for understanding the current situation.

The "Ukraine question" has long been used as a tool in domestic politics in Poland. The reason is simple: playing against Ukraine brings electoral dividends.

This tendency has evolved into a self-reinforcing spiral.

Opinion polls consistently show that negative attitudes towards Ukrainians predominate in Poland, especially among right-wing voters (who constitute the majority of the electorate), and that this is getting worse. As a result, criticising Ukraine/the UPA/Stepan Bandera has become an obligatory element of almost every right-wing politician’s campaign.

These politicians have no hesitation about playing the Ukraine card, often relying on myths, half-truths or outright lies.

Anti-Ukrainian statements by politicians then normalise this sort of rhetoric and further worsen public attitudes towards Ukrainians. The vicious circle is complete.

It isn’t just the far-right who play this game (you have only to recall the anti-Ukrainian remarks made by the liberal politician Rafał Trzaskowski during the 2025 election campaign).

But when it comes to the Nawrocki-Tusk rivalry, the division of roles is particularly clear.

For Nawrocki, attacks on Ukraine are a tool in his struggle against Donald Tusk.

For example, if Tusk is not sufficiently supportive of criticism of Ukraine by Nawrocki, he can be accused of being "pro-Ukrainian". In Poland today, this accusation is being increasingly used to stigmatise nationally prominent politicians.

The story surrounding the Order of the White Eagle is a perfect example of this dynamic, as European Pravda has previously explained in this article. When Karol Nawrocki signed the decree stripping Volodymyr Zelenskyy of the Order, it wasn’t just punishing his Ukrainian counterpart that was important to him. More significantly, he would need to send the decree to Tusk for countersignature, knowing that the prime minister is opposed to the Ukrainian president being "punished".

Every day that passed without Tusk’s signature gave Nawrocki an opportunity to attack him, accusing him of tolerating the crimes committed in Volhynia in 1943, and so on. This is precisely why Zelenskyy’s decision to return the order to Warsaw was the right one: it removed the political need for Tusk’s signature and minimised the political damage to him.

That said, the decoration did not necessarily have to be sent back via Nova Poshta courier; other channels were available. But politics is rarely devoid of an element of theatre.

Why going to Gdańsk is the necessary next step

However, Zelenskyy’s loss of the decoration is not the end of the story.

The crisis has not gone anywhere. It has only become more acute. And the President’s Office in Kyiv is fully aware of how deep it is. One sign of this is the fact that since early June, Zelenskyy has no longer been using Rzeszów Airport for his foreign trips. During a period of tension between the two countries, it would look odd to be relying on Polish transit and would further underscore Kyiv’s dependence on Poland.

Nevertheless, Zelenskyy had planned to make an exception for the trip to Gdańsk given the importance of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2026) – the annual international forum on Ukraine, which this year has been organised by Poland.

However, after the decoration was withdrawn, Kyiv started to think about cancelling even that exception.

Indeed, over the weekend, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha stated that Zelenskyy might decline to travel to Gdańsk.

In other words, Ukraine could choose to punish Poland in return.

Zelenskyy’s refusal to attend the conference would indeed constitute a form of punishment. It would be highly likely to lead to a lower level of participation by other countries. At present, participation is expected to be at leader level. According to early reports, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen are planning to attend.

Moreover, the worst-case scenario would be if all of Ukraine’s top government officials were to announce that they could not attend, effectively stripping the conference of its purpose.

Poland aspires to international leadership on Ukrainian issues and is frustrated by its inability to fully achieve that goal. Even the milder version of such a response would be a slap in the face of the Polish government from Kyiv.

And "government" is the operative word here.

The Gdańsk conference is a project of the Polish government and Donald Tusk personally. It was Tusk who arranged for top European leaders to attend.

So its disruption or failure would be a failure for Tusk. It would also provide another argument for anti-Ukrainian forces in Warsaw to complain about Kyiv’s "ingratitude", which they would claim is isolating Poland from European discussions on aid to Ukraine.

In addition, Zelenskyy’s refusal to travel to Gdańsk would be perceived in Poland as a sign of Kyiv’s weakness.

Thus, such a response from Kyiv would be the best possible gift for Nawrocki, and it is quite likely that this is exactly what he is hoping for. There is even a view, not without foundation, that derailing the URC may have been one of the motives behind Nawrocki’s decision to sign the White Eagle decree at this particular time.

So should Ukraine really give Nawrocki such a gift?

That is a rhetorical question.

But an important point must be added: decisions regarding Poland should be based on two factors.

The first is Ukraine’s interest: does a given action bring strategic benefit to Ukraine?

The second is the interest of those forces and politicians in Poland that are friendly to Ukraine. If Ukraine acts without considering their position, it will only strengthen anti-Ukrainian forces – and ultimately harm Ukraine itself.

Both of these considerations mean that Zelenskyy should go to Gdańsk and maintain the Polish government’s engagement in Ukrainian affairs. Politics is no place for emotional decisions.

But this also means that despite all of Nawrocki’s outrageous behaviour, Zelenskyy should also seek to meet with him.

Red lines for both sides

As we have mentioned, topics such as the UPA, Bandera and "Ukraine's ingratitude" have long been part of domestic politics in Poland, where Ukraine is treated as an object.

But that does not negate the fact that for Polish voters, the issue of the UPA is indeed highly sensitive.

The reason is that Poland largely lives within a historical myth about the events of the first half of the last century. In the interpretation dear to Nawrocki, the entire right wing and Polish historiography in general, Poland was solely an innocent victim during the interwar period and World War II.

There was no Polish occupation of Ukraine. There were no ethnically motivated crimes by Poles against the Ukrainian population. There was no ethnic cleansing by the Home Army (Armia Krajowa). Instead, the Volhynia tragedy of 1943 is unequivocally identified in Polish historiography as "genocide".

Most Poles deny and do not wish to hear that for Ukrainians, the UPA is a symbol of Ukraine’s struggle for statehood and freedom. It is perceived exclusively through the lens of ethnic crimes.

So while for politicians history is often merely a tool to be used, their voters feel genuinely offended.

The social sensitivity of this issue in Poland has to be understood – and this is precisely what Ukrainian politicians often fail to do.

But at the same time, we must also work to ensure that the Polish public understands the principled nature of Ukraine’s position. In Poland there is a widespread belief that the issue is simply about politicians’ malicious intentions.

The conspiracy theory that Zelenskyy named a unit of the Special Operations Forces after the "Heroes of the UPA" specifically in order to insult Poland, and as part of a larger strategic manoeuvre, is very widespread. This is not a fringe belief. And it appears that Nawrocki did genuinely expect Zelenskyy to reverse that decision. Yet for Ukraine, that would have been an absolute red line and would have meant agreeing to Poland rewriting Ukrainian history.

That is why the mass renouncing of Polish state honours by Ukrainian politicians was not just a gesture: it also carried significant meaning.

This was not done by order of the President’s Office (as indicated by the lack of synchronisation: two days passed between the decision of Sybiha, who was the first, and former ambassador to Poland Vasyl Zvarych, who is currently the latest to return an award). It’s also important to note that all the recipients of the Order of the White Eagle have returned it, including Petro Poroshenko, a political opponent of the current president, and Leonid Kuchma, who is certainly not dependent on Zelenskyy.

There was probably no other way to send the message that Nawrocki’s decision crossed a red line for Ukraine.

That he had offended not Zelenskyy, but the Ukrainian people.

After all, the order awarded to Zelenskyy in 2023 was rightly perceived as an award to the brave Ukrainian people and to the Ukrainian soldiers who are defending Europe, including Poland, from the Russian invasion. So Nawrocki’s "punishment" was not directed at Zelenskyy alone, but at all Ukrainians.

And most importantly, pressure from the Polish president demanding that Ukraine abandon its interpretation of history is unlikely to succeed. Opposition to this approach is broad and includes representatives of all political camps.

However, while defining red lines is important, it is certainly not all that needs to be done. Ukraine’s leadership must also seek a way out of this deadlock.

And the worst possible option right now would be to burn bridges with Nawrocki.

The stakes are too high for Ukraine to leave grievances to heal on their own after this level of escalation.

Therefore, Zelenskyy should not only attend the URC in Gdańsk, but also seek opportunities to meet Nawrocki. For this reason, sending the order back via Nova Poshta rather than trying to deliver it personally may not have been the best idea – although the editorial board of European Pravda has differing views on this point as well.

Six months ago, in a similarly challenging context ahead of the Hungarian elections, Kyiv chose to burn its bridges with Viktor Orbán in anticipation that Péter Magyar would win. That bet paid off, and Ukraine now has a new partner in Hungary – not always an easy one, but one with whom agreements are possible.

But repeating that strategy with Poland is not possible right now.

Nawrocki’s current term has only just begun and is set to last until 2030. There is no certainty that the right wing will not regain both parliament and government in the 2027 elections. So there is no alternative to negotiating, while respecting the red lines of both sides. Zelenskyy must seek a path to such agreements even when no path is visible.

Options must be proposed that allow Nawrocki to claim an electoral victory and to sell the decision to right-wing voters.

And for that to happen, bridges with Poland, including with the Polish right wing, must not be burned. There are still many friends of Ukraine there, but in the current climate they are forced either to remain silent or to join the chorus of critics.

The trip to Gdańsk (and possibly also to Warsaw) should be the first step on this difficult path.

Editorial Board of European Pravda