Combining electoral dominance with the systematic weakening of institutional checks and balances, Orbán appeared to solve a central dilemma of modern authoritarianism: how to win repeatedly at the ballot box while hollowing out liberal democracy.

And because his model inspired admirers throughout the West (and beyond), helping to sustain a broader narrative of democratic decline, his humiliating election defeat carries implications far beyond Hungary.

The victory of Péter Magyar’s Tisza party, like the triumph of Poland’s Civic Coalition over the illiberal Law and Justice (PiS) party in 2023, represents not only a reversal of a seemingly consolidated system, but also signals that such regimes may be more fragile than they appear.

The lesson is not simply that illiberal regimes can lose.

It is that the very logic that sustains them can lead to their undoing.

Illiberal leaders have long justified their concentration of power by invoking the success of East Asia’s developmental states.

By weakening institutional constraints, they argued, governments could act decisively, coordinate investment, and deliver economic growth.

But this analogy was always misleading. The regimes of South Korea’s Park Chung-hee or Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew were effective not because they faced fewer constraints, but because they faced more pressure.

Geopolitical insecurity and the constant risk of domestic unrest forced them to deliver broad-based gains or risk collapse.

Reduced accountability did not produce complacency; it produced discipline.

More generally, effective state capacity depends on constraints that discipline those in power.

These can take different forms. In liberal democracies, constitutional checks and balances impose such discipline. In developmental autocracies, external and internal vulnerability provided it.

Contemporary illiberal regimes operate under very different conditions.

In the absence of pressures comparable to those faced by Park and Lee, the weakening of accountability does not generate developmental capacity. Instead, it creates opportunities for rent-seeking.

Power becomes a resource for maintaining political coalitions rather than for delivering public goods.

A supposed strategy for strengthening state capacity turns into a system of selective distribution.

Over time, this logic erodes the economic foundations of illiberal rule.

When political loyalty becomes the primary criterion for allocating resources, efficiency and innovation suffer. Public procurement rewards insiders, rather than the most productive firms.

Domestic entrepreneurs face corruption, uncertainty, and limited opportunities for expansion. At the same time, growth strategies based on foreign direct investment generate employment but often fail to produce upgrading or sustained productivity gains.

That is what happened to Hungary under Orbán. As economic performance weakened, so did the regime’s capacity to sustain its supporting coalition.

Slower growth narrowed the tax base and reduced the resources available for redistribution. Investment in education, health care, and social mobility stagnated. Hungarians increasingly experienced what had been presented as a system of stability as a system of closure.

Large segments of the workforce faced declining prospects, stagnating wages, and limited opportunities for advancement.

At the start of Orbán’s long reign, these internal dynamics were partly masked by financial transfers from the European Union.

But access to these resources became increasingly conditional on government transparency and judicial independence—precisely the forms of accountability Orbán resisted. The result was a self-imposed constraint:

by rejecting external oversight, the regime limited its own access to funding.

As such constraints tightened, it is no surprise that Orbán turned to even more illiberal partners, including Russia and China, trading regulatory autonomy for new forms of geopolitical dependence.

A project that began in the name of sovereignty risked ending in vulnerability.

More broadly, Orbán has shown that even highly captured systems can become politically exposed. The very mechanisms that sustained illiberal rule could, over time, turn into sources of fragility.

Hungary’s model relied on a tenuous coalition of multinational firms, politically connected domestic elites, and voters promised stability and economic improvement. But as growth slowed, tensions within this coalition intensified. Domestic businesses found fewer opportunities, while voters faced declining living standards and blocked futures.

Defeating Orbán became possible when discontent met organization — when a credible challenger united fragmented voters and turned frustration into participation.

Where traditional opposition forces were weak or discredited, this required leadership capable of transforming social grievances into a broad-based political movement that mobilized across class and institutional divides.

That is what Magyar and his Tisza party accomplished. For years, Hungary served as proof that democratic backsliding could be institutionalized and sustained within the framework of formal electoral competition.

Magyar’s decisive victory demonstrates something equally important: that such systems are not irreversible.

But Orbán’s defeat, like the defeat of Poland’s PiS three years ago, does not mark the end of illiberalism.

The structural conditions that fueled its rise — economic insecurity, social fragmentation, and political distrust — persist across many democracies. But Orbán’s fall does challenge the sense of inevitability that had surrounded the global drift away from liberal democracy.

Now, the more difficult task begins: dismantling entrenched patronage networks, restoring institutional autonomy, and rebuilding state capacity without reproducing the failures that enabled illiberalism in the first place.

Magyar will also need to redefine how national interests are pursued within the European Union — strengthening domestic constituencies while building transnational alliances capable of advancing deeper and more resilient forms of integration.

Defeating illiberalism at the ballot box was hard. Building a resilient form of liberal democracy in its aftermath — one capable of delivering both accountability and inclusion—might be even harder.

But one thing is certain: democracies, friends and foes alike, will be watching closely.

This article originally appeared on Project Syndicate and is republished with permission from the copyright holder.

The agreement was informally dubbed the "Kachka-Kos plan" after the officials who signed it – Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Taras Kachka and European Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos.

But for the EU, it is much more than a declaration by the Ukrainian deputy prime minister.

Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos explained the logic behind the plan in an interview with European Pravda. "One of the reasons why we adopted this 10-point plan is to rebuild trust with the member states because of what happened on 22 July [when Ukraine undermined its own anti-corruption reforms – EP]. The 10 points mostly have to do with fighting corruption. But these 10 points are what is really important. We expect that Ukraine will fulfil them [within a year]."

Since the plan was motivated by EU member states’ loss of trust after Ukraine’s move to strip its anti-corruption agencies of their independence, it is focused solely on anti-corruption reforms and issues relating to the rule of law. The government set itself a deadline of 12 months to implement all 10 points of the plan. 

Three of those months have passed, yet almost zero progress has been made.

It is hardly surprising, then, that European diplomats and officials are increasingly warning of a growing lack of confidence in Ukraine’s commitment to the reforms required for EU accession.

Parliament is not demonstrating a willingness to work. And even the government, which undertook the commitments needed to rebuild trust, is stalling on their implementation. Here we publish the first expert analysis of the fulfilment of the Kachka-Kos plan, which reveals the biggest issues and some progress, which could be developed further.

Kyiv needs to demonstrate results as soon as possible. Because what’s at stake is our European partners’ trust in the government’s future promises – and by extension in the very foundations of Ukraine’s path towards EU membership.

Who’s doing the counting, and how?

Both the government and the expert community are well aware that the implementation of the Kachka-Kos plan is a critical issue in EU-Ukraine relations, including in the context of accession.

To some extent it is paradoxical that formally the plan is not part of the accession process – it exists independently. But in reality, for many EU member states the plan’s implementation is an indicator of whether one can speak of real progress by Ukraine in carrying out accession reforms.

European Commissioner Marta Kos explained this during her visit to Kyiv a month ago. In her interview with European Pravda, she emphasised that this plan encapsulates the main areas for reform being monitored by EU member states. "These are the priorities where we'll be very strict that the reforms should be done," she said, stressing that Ukraine itself set the deadline of 2026.

In the same interview, Kos also said she was aware of the "civic monitoring" of the plan and is in contact with the organisations that will be conducting it. "I met some of them in Kyiv to get a better picture – to have a view through some other glasses, not just our own, those living in the Brussels bubble," she explained.

This article presents the initial results of that monitoring, which is known as Membership Check.

It’s true that these are nowhere near all the reforms that will be required for Ukraine to become a member of the EU.

But without these, there will be no real progress. That is why they deserve special attention.

The monitoring is being conducted by a coalition of eight expert organisations, led by the New Europe Center, focusing on European integration, anti-corruption issues and judicial reform. The other members of the group are European Pravda, the Mezha Anti-Corruption Center, ANTS (the National Interests Advocacy Network), the DEJURE (Democracy, Justice, Reforms) Foundation, the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform, the Anti-Corruption Action Center, and Transparency International Ukraine.

To start with, we should explain the methodology.

At present, the consortium is only measuring the extent to which the Kachka-Kos plan has been implemented by the Ukrainian state. Here we proceed in the same way as the EU: although formally the plan was approved by the government and signed by Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Taras Kachka, as far as the Europeans are concerned, it is a plan for the whole of Ukraine. What matters is the end result. And if that result isn’t there, Brussels and the other capitals won’t care who messed up or why a particular Ukrainian commitment has not been met.

This, incidentally, is also how the other accession reforms are assessed.

The end result is key. Merely setting up some "working groups" and "comprehensive dialogues", which all too often merely go through the motions, won’t cut it. No reform – no high score.

Of course, the political process matters too, so even statements by top government officials to the effect that Ukraine agrees to carry out a certain reform, or the development of a reform strategy, are worth a few initial points – but no more than 10% of the total score.

Drafting a piece of legislation and registering it in parliament can earn no more than 20% of the points (together with the 10% mentioned above).

After that, if a draft is genuinely good, the score can be raised to 50% by preparing it for adoption (passing a law at first reading, drafting amendments for the second reading, obtaining an expert assessment from the European Commission, etc.), because even a good law or secondary legislation only counts when it has been adopted. The coalition firmly believes that preparation should not be worth more than half of the points.

Only the adoption of a law or implementation of a reform allows a score of up to 100%.

No rubber-stamping is possible. A decision must be high-quality and effective, so the coalition analyses the substance of proposed reforms.

Firstly, the proposed/adopted reform must align with the goals of the Kachka-Kos plan. Secondly, reforms are not being carried out "for Marta Kos", but to bring about practical change in Ukraine, so the chosen implementation option must produce institutional and practical results. Thirdly, this area of reform matters specifically in the context of Ukraine’s progress towards EU accession, so reforms are analysed for compliance with the Interim Benchmarks of the Fundamentals cluster (chapters 23-24 of the accession negotiations). And if these benchmarks provide further clarification of the substance of a reform, the authorities’ actions must take that into account.

Finally, we should emphasise that the consortium’s assessment may be different from Brussels’. The consortium (albeit with slightly different members) experienced this when we conducted a Candidate Check study on Ukraine’s fulfilment of the EU candidate requirements. Our goal is to show real progress made by Ukraine, push forward reforms that have stalled and highlight what has been achieved, while ensuring that the European assessment is also appropriate.

However, so far there has been little to highlight.

A quarter of the time gone and minimal progress

All the points of the Kachka-Kos plan are important, but they vary in complexity of implementation and practical effect. The biggest is point 1 (Adopt comprehensive amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and other legislation to ensure fast and high-quality justice). Even in the text of the plan it takes up the most space, consisting of five major elements, so the assessment of this point has the highest weighting – 20 points. We have also singled out two points – 6 and 9 – which do not require new reforms to be developed and adopted. These points received a weighting of 5 points each. The remaining seven elements of the plan received 10 points each, making the total maximum score 100 points.

The timeframe within which the entire plan must be implemented has also been defined. In the document signed by Taras Kachka and Marta Kos, Ukraine declared its intention to implement the measures set out in the plan within a year. And although this clause is formulated in a way that gives Kyiv the possibility to extend the timeframe, the European Commission expects Kyiv to complete everything during 2026.

The reality so far is very discouraging.

Three whole months of 2026 have passed – 25% of the time within which the EU expects the entire plan to be implemented. Yet the expert assessment currently gives Ukraine only 9 points out of 100 for its execution – not even 10%.

For some points, the score is zero or 0.5 (for example, when a point consists of two elements and progress has only been made on one of them. Even that is minimal).

All infographics by the Membership Check consortium

This result is a long way from acceptable. And if Ukraine continues to move at this pace, the complete failure of the plan is inevitable.

It is sad to write this, but that is the reality.

On only two of the ten points has Ukraine achieved even 20% implementation – at the level of "a draft law has been registered". These are points 6 (Appoint internationally vetted judges to the Constitutional Court and members of the High Council of Justice) and 8 (Adopt the draft law on declarations of integrity of judges; adopt legislation aimed at improving the enforcement of court decisions on monetary and non-monetary obligations and digitalisation). Moreover, with regard to the latter even this assessment is stretching it a bit, because the draft law on judges’ declarations of integrity fails to meet a direct requirement of the Kachka-Kos plan: it does not apply to Supreme Court judges.

Point 6 is simpler, because this is an element of the plan where no reforms need to be adopted. Ukraine simply has to carry out what it has already committed to.

Four points of the plan are clear stragglers.

Two of them demonstrate the failure of prosecutorial reform, which the European Commission and experts were pointing out as long ago as last year. Despite these warnings, Kyiv currently shows no signs of having listened to its European partners. According to the European approach, the prosecution service is part of the justice infrastructure, which is why "prosecutorial" requirements have been included in this plan.

Thus, on point 3 (Conduct a comprehensive review of the selection and dismissal procedure of the Prosecutor General), Ukraine has scored a dismal 0 points and a note says "No progress has been made".

On point 4 (Ensure a transparent and merit-based selection process, appointments and transfers for prosecutors to significant positions), formally at least some actions and discussions have taken place, so Ukraine scores 0.5 points out of 10. This reform has particular weight, as it is about reinstating anti-corruption reform after the events of 22 July 2025, when parliament voted for and the president immediately signed a law rolling back anti-corruption reforms and introducing authoritarian changes to the functioning of the prosecution service. And while the anti-corruption framework ultimately had to be reinstated, the authorities "forgot" about the prosecution service and still appear to have no intention of tackling the problem.

Two other points with extremely low scores of 5% each are point 2 (Ensure that NABU has effective access to impartial, timely and high-quality forensic examinations) and point 10 (Develop and strengthen internal control systems against high-level corruption). Needless to say, these elements are a litmus test for Ukraine’s partners – yet Kyiv has shown no visible progress in implementing them.

Three other elements could be called mid-level performers based on the results, since they currently have 10% of the points, which is slightly above the average score.

But can a sector be called mid-level if there are no tangible results?

After all, 10% corresponds to a level where there are only general ideas about how to implement a point, or statements by top officials, but no official draft decisions.

This is the case, for example, with point 1 on comprehensive amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure. There have been statements (by, for example, Deputy Prime Minister Kachka) about Kyiv’s intention to implement this point, and there appear to be some initial draft proposals, but nothing has even been submitted for a government vote.

This is also true of point 5 (Reform the State Bureau of Investigation). There have been statements about the need for reform, but no documents have been drafted.

It’s the same story with point 7 (Extend the involvement of international experts in the selection commission for the High Qualification Commission of Judges).

The situation is different regarding the approval of the Anti-Corruption Strategy and its implementation plan. This is not a reform as such, merely a strategic overview of the situation. Yet even these steps remain at an early stage.

What should be done about this?

Ultimately, the Kachka-Kos plan does not stand alone. It is a concentration of the EU’s priority requirements for Ukraine within the accession process. All its elements must be implemented, both to restore EU trust and to meet the accession benchmarks used to assess readiness for membership. This means that progress on them is also close to zero. The New Europe Center has also published detailed conclusions by the consortium on each point, describing the link between the plan and the benchmarks.

So the situation as it stands is extremely alarming. And the delays in implementing the plan are already affecting Ukraine’s relations with the EU.

It’s true that in Kyiv, they may point out that parliament is not terribly functional at the moment. But this explanation doesn’t wash.

First of all, as far as the EU is concerned, it is fundamentally irrelevant who is slowing down the implementation of changes. Either Ukraine fulfils its commitments or it does not. After all, it is not Ukraine's parliament, government, etc. that are joining the EU, but the state as a whole.

Secondly, it isn’t always parliament that’s holding things up. In many cases, laws have not even been drafted.

Thirdly, the narrative about a "non-functioning parliament" is a very dangerous one. If parliament can’t pass laws, then how can one speak about moving towards EU accession? Hundreds of laws must be passed on the road to EU membership. If Ukraine is not capable of doing that, how can EU accession be possible?

From the government to parliament and the president, Ukraine must do everything necessary to prove to the EU that it can carry out fundamental reforms and renew this work. Progress on the Kachka-Kos plan is the ideal instrument for this.

Sergiy Sydorenko

Editor, European Pravda

Study by the Membership Check coalition

Our discussion reaffirmed that Russia’s occupation of parts of Ukraine is not just about battlelines of geopolitics:  it is about people – the dismantling of freedoms and rights, and the erosion of identity and diversity of the Ukrainian society.

No place captures this human dimension of war more starkly than Crimea – occupied for more than a decade. Crimea is a home – to Ukrainians of many backgrounds, including the indigenous Crimean Tatar people.

And Crimea is a template of what Russian occupation brings -

there in 2014, and in other temporarily occupied territories today.

Crimea is a place of striking beauty, and a meeting point of cultures and histories.

Those of us lucky enough to have visited before Russia’s occupation remember that and feel the tragedy of knowing that a generation of Ukrainian children is now growing up under Russian occupation. 

As we heard, they are taught a single, manufactured, political story about who they are, what their country is, and what they should be willing to die for.

Russian occupation is a project of demographic manipulation. In Crimea, opposition has been driven underground or silenced. Our panelists spoke of enforced disappearances, intimidation and torture, of families who think twice before speaking on the phone.

The Crimean Tatars – indigenous to the peninsula – feel this repression especially sharply. Many have been persecuted, imprisoned, or forced to flee, echoing the trauma of the mass deportation of 1944.

Alongside political pressure comes discrimination against belief and culture: a narrowing of space for non-Russian identities, and the message that coexistence without assimilation is not permitted.

The situation of the Crimean Tatars, including the religious discrimination they face, should matter to anyone who values their cultural or religious identity. 

What happens to children under occupation should trouble all of us. Speakers in Geneva described propaganda that begins early, even in kindergartens – children receive persistent messages that it is a noble thing to give your life for the Russian state, that those who refuse war are cowards, and that there is only one acceptable identity and one acceptable version of history – Russian.

Crimea has been turned into something closer to a military base than a normal society.

Young people face pressure to conform, to enlist, to keep silent and to grow up with core goal of joining the Russian army.

One of our panelists, Oleh a young man forced to leave Crimea after receiving a conscription letter into the Russian army, spoke of an information vacuum – of how hard it is for those still on the peninsula to access independent news, to speak freely online, or to hear perspectives beyond state television.

* * * * *

The UK has not forgotten about Crimea – and we will not. We will continue to advocate for the human rights of all Ukrainians at the United Nations, and across the world.

Listening to Artem, and to Crimean Tatar voices who refuse to be erased, I was reminded that the struggle for Crimea is a struggle for the right to live freely as yourself: to speak your language, practice your faith, teach your children truth, and choose your future.

The UK will not forget Crimea.

But he never fully defeated them, and their reporting on the regime’s corruption and abuses of power has helped fuel the opposition’s rise ahead of April’s election.

There is now a distinct possibility that Hungary’s main opposition party, Tisza, will defeat Viktor Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party in the country’s parliamentary elections on April 12.

This has prompted Tisza’s leader, Péter Magyar, to promise that if his party wins, one of its first acts in government will be to suspend the license of the Media Services and Support Trust Fund (MTVA), the state body that finances and oversees public-media assets. Pulling the plug on the pro-Orbán MTVA is long overdue.

For more than 15 years, Orbán’s government has steadily erected barriers to objective reporting and tightened its grip on the media ecosystem. Through a combination of hostile takeovers, pressure campaigns, and interference with regulators like the National Media and Infocommunications Authority, it has fundamentally altered public discourse.

As a result, 80% of the country’s news outlets have become pro-government mouthpieces,

including formerly independent publications such as Origo and Index.

Media capture on this scale, extensively documented in a major new study, is unprecedented in the European Union and demonstrates how quickly pluralism can be destroyed through legal engineering.

My own experience underscores the calculated nature of Orbán’s efforts to control the media that Hungarians consume.

In 2016, I was the deputy editor-in-chief of Népszabadság, once the highest-circulation daily broadsheet in Hungary, when it was closed overnight. Within days, our website and massive digital archive spanning decades were inaccessible.

The takeover was orchestrated and executed by Mediaworks, a conglomerate owned by the oligarch Lőrinc Mészáros, Orbán’s childhood friend. Mészáros, whose fortune was built on state contracts, now effectively controls the entire print media landscape and numerous online platforms.

By now, it is clear that the MTVA’s official commitment to impartiality is a fiction.

The Budapest-based Republikon Institute recently monitored state media’s evening news broadcasts and found that Fidesz and its coalition partner received 15 hours of positive coverage per week.

By contrast, Tisza and Magyar were subjected to more than five hours of overtly critical or defamatory reporting.

With this propaganda machine at its disposal, Fidesz can steer the national conversation as it sees fit.

During this campaign, character assassination and geopolitical fearmongering have featured prominently. In a desperate bid to shore up support for Orbán, Hungarian public media are currently portraying him as the sole guarantor of peace in "times of war."

Another of the state’s main narratives is that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has supposedly hatched a "master plan" with the European Commission to "dethrone" Orbán and install Magyar as a puppet.

Moreover, domestic "scandals" are manufactured to support the regime’s central claim: that the opposition is out of touch with Hungarians and funded by foreign interests.

Last August, Index published a document that it claimed was a Tisza plan proposing a 33% tax rate.

Even though Tisza promptly denied the veracity of the report, the story dominated the political agenda for months. 

Index later published the party’s alleged proposals for a "dog and cat tax," leading the government to warn pensioners that Magyar would force them to euthanize their pets.

While the Metropolitan Court eventually ruled that Tisza had nothing to do with the text, the damage was done.

These domestic smears are intended to sow doubt among the electorate and are subsequently linked to broader geopolitical grievances. For example, the regime recently stopped two cash-in-transit vehicles during a routine transfer from Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank to the State Savings Bank of Ukraine.

Within minutes, pro-government outlets framed the incident as evidence of "dirty money" flowing through the country to support a foreign-controlled political opposition. By invoking national security in its partisan propaganda, the government reinforces the idea that dissent is synonymous with treason.

The Hungarian media’s financial foundation is also fundamentally lopsided. Since 2015, the government and state-owned companies have reportedly spent in excess of €1.1 billion ($1.3 billion) on advertising, funneling taxpayer money almost exclusively into Fidesz-aligned outlets.

There are, however, signs that the regime’s information monopoly is beginning to fracture. A small number of independent newsrooms have managed to pierce the government’s propaganda shield, despite being under constant political pressure and largely starved of advertising revenue.

Investigative outlets like Direkt36, Telex, and 444.hu, which have survived for years on the doggedness of their staff and the support of their readers, have chipped away at the wall of misinformation with their persistent reporting on corruption and the regime’s ties to the Kremlin.

This has provided the public with a shared set of facts that the state’s coordinated megaphone has failed to suppress, creating the conditions for Tisza to emerge as a viable challenger. After 16 years, reality is proving more resilient than manufactured narratives.

This spells trouble for Orbán in April’s elections.

Ultimately, the independent journalism that Orbán has sought to tame – but never fully muzzled – could be his government’s undoing.

This article originally appeared on Project Syndicate and is republished with permission from the copyright holder.

Next year, France is set to elect a new president, so the recent local vote was expected to provide a snapshot of a country soon to choose Emmanuel Macron’s successor.

Although the second round is still ahead and the names of future mayors in the largest cities, including the capital, are not yet determined, the first round was revealing in itself. Ultimately, only 1,526 communes, or 4.4% of the total, advance to the second round.

The local elections highlighted the rapid marginalisation of the presidential camp. Meanwhile, the far-right improved its results, though not as much as many had expected.

This is particularly important for Ukraine, because while key issues for it, such as sending weapons to Kyiv. The opinion data in the file points to a country that still supports a serious defence posture, but unevenly. In February, 58% of respondents backed a major increase in France’s defence budget. Support for supplying arms to Ukraine, however, stood at 47%, against 39% opposed, down from much higher levels in 2022. 

So what changes in electoral sentiment in France were revealed by the local elections? And what does this mean in the context of the upcoming presidential elections?

Elections with a record-low turnout

The first takeaway from the recent vote is voter fatigue.

Official participation reached just 57.1%, the second-lowest first-round municipal turnout of the Fifth Republic after the Covid-disrupted vote of 2020.

In 68% of communes, only one list was registered, which drained any sense of suspense.

In France’s 25,000 communes with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants, voters can no longer pick and choose names on the ballot. They must now vote for a complete list, which have weakened the feeling that a single vote could still shape the final result.

The age divide makes the warning sharper.

An Ifop survey conducted in early February, before the vote, estimated that only 39% of 18-24-year-olds and 46% of 25-34-year-olds were certain to vote, against 72% of voters aged 65 and over.

France’s presidential pre-campaign is beginning in a democracy where younger voters appear significantly less invested in local politics than their elders.

In addition, only 1,526 communes, or 4.4% of the national total, are heading for another vote. In those places, lists above 10% can stay in the race, while lists above 5% can merge with a qualified list. 

And what does the vote itself reveal? The results in Paris are particularly telling. Paris is not the whole country, but it it shows many of the same political tensions.

Socialist Emmanuel Grégoire came first with 37.98%, well ahead of Republican Rachida Dati on 25.46%. Behind them, two extremists and one centrist passed the 10% mark.

The result did not produce one clear winner. The left is in the strongest position, but it is still divided.

It offers a simple picture of French politics before 2027: a left that leads without being fully united, a right that remains competitive only through regrouping, and a centre that barely survives.

What did the far-right show?

The right is where 2027 is already being tested most clearly.

The central question is no longer whether the National Rally can score well. It can.

The real question is whether the French right can still exist outside its gravitational pull.

Nice is the clearest case. Eric Ciotti, running with Union of the Right for the Republic (UDR) and backed by the National Rally, finished far ahead of the outgoing mayor Christian Estrosi, 43.43% to 30.92%, with the left also qualified on 11.93%.

Ciotti’s strategie was to benefit from the National Rally backing without displaying it too ostentatiously. The result suggests that, at least in parts of the south, that formula is becoming electorally workable. 

Toulon offers the mirror image. There too, the National Rally finished strongly ahead, with Laure Lavalette on 42.05%, against 29.54% for the outgoing mayor Josée Massi and 15.71% for Republican senator Michel Bonnus.

But unlike in Nice, the post-first-round reflex was immediately anti-National Rally: Bonnus withdrew and reached out to Massi. That does not guarantee defeat for the RN. It does, however, show that making a stand against the far right still matters to many French voters and elected officials.

At the same time, the National Rally’s municipal picture remains uneven. In cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants, it reached 20 second rounds, which is better than in 2020 but still worse than in 2014. Outside the Mediterranean strongholds, the movement remained weak in many large metropolitan centres.

In Paris, Lyon, Toulouse, Nantes, Montpellier, Strasbourg and Bordeaux, National Rally candidates all stayed below 8%. One of the reasons identified in the reporting is territorial weakness itself. In those big cities, a third of RN lead candidates were parachuted in or worked elsewhere. 

Stagnation of the center, success of the left

The second takeaway from the recent elections is that the political center no longer structures the political landscape.

Édouard Philippe, Former Prime Minister and the most likely presidential candidate from the presidential camp, may survive. Macronism, as a political organising centre, does not.

Philippe did what he needed to do in Le Havre, finishing first with 43.76% and preserving his national credibility after tying his local fate to his presidential ambitions.

But his case almost proves the opposite of what a healthy centrist bloc would look like.

The documents show that only figures with an existence before Macronism, such as Philippe and François Bayrou, still resist electorally. Elsewhere, the presidential camp is often absent, marginal or reduced to supporting local notables of another colour. 

The left is gaining more and more voters each elections.

Its problem is leadership. The Socialist Party remains strong in several major cities, including Paris, Rennes and Nantes, and in Strasbourg Catherine Trautmann, supported by the Socialist Party, finished ahead of both the right and the outgoing Ecologist mayor.

But La France Insoumise is also becoming harder to ignore at local level. In Roubaix, its candidate David Guiraud won 46.6% and came close to being elected in the first round, which points to real local support rather than a temporary protest vote.

The Ecologists, for their part, are no longer the rising force they looked like in 2020, but they still matter because they often help hold together a divided left.

These elections also remind us of an older rule of French local politics: roots matter. In municipal contests, party labels are only part of the story. Voters also look for familiarity, local knowledge and proof that a candidate genuinely belongs to the place they want to govern.

That helps explain why Édouard Philippe’s anchoring in Le Havre strengthens his results, why the National Rally remains weaker in cities where its candidates lack local standing, and why well-known names can still be rejected if they appear parachuted in.

Philippe Gustin, chief of staff to Sébastien Lecornu, was badly beaten in Fougerolles-Saint-Valbert after rivals attacked him as an outsider. Louis Sarkozy also suffered a heavy defeat in Menton after arriving only a few months before the vote. 

* * * * *

If there is a winner of the first round, it is not one single camp.

The left remains the best placed in many major cities, from Paris to Nantes and Strasbourg, even if it is still divided over who should lead it.

On the right, the National Rally has not swept the country, but it is continuing to pull the wider right into its orbit, most clearly in places like Nice.

The clearest loser is the centre: Édouard Philippe has preserved his own position in Le Havre, but Macronism no longer looks like the force organising French politics.

The second round will now show whether those trends can be turned into power. Can the left turn first place into discipline? Can the right unite without disappearing into the RN’s orbit? And can the centre still matter beyond a handful of local fiefdoms?

That is what this election is really beginning to answer.

Charlotte Guillou-Clerc

Journalist, France

Kyiv is launching a legal and political fight against Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s regime in several jurisdictions at once.

On 5 March, two Ukrainian vehicles belonging to the state-run Oschadbank were seized by a Hungarian special service as they were transporting gold and US$80 million in cash. The employees who were escorting the consignment were kept handcuffed for more than a day. They were denied access to either a lawyer or a consul, and eventually they were deported, after being robbed as well, since their phones and personal cash were never returned.

Moreover, the Hungarian authorities have no intention of returning the seized money and gold.

To create at least some legal basis for this, the Hungarian parliament has urgently passed an "individual" law prohibiting the return of the assets to Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the Hungarian government has issued a demand: the seized money will only be returned to Ukraine if Ukraine restores the transit of Russian oil to Hungary. Kyiv has described this as "banditry" and "state terrorism", but the Hungarian government is deaf to such accusations.

There are reasons behind these drastic measures by Orbán’s team.

First, there’s more than just oil at stake. Orbán is using the "Ukrainian gold" story in his political struggle against his electoral rival, Péter Magyar. He claims that the Hungarian opposition is being bankrolled by a "Ukrainian military mafia".

Second, there is information to suggest Kremlin involvement in Hungary’s actions.

Against this backdrop, Kyiv has been trying to obtain public support from Europe, but to no avail: the EU remains deliberately silent.

Torture, threats and other "minor violations"

The reality of what happened in Hungary on 5 March is hard to take in. Kyiv, too, initially remained silent when the news began to trickle in.

Oschadbank first realised something was wrong when its automatic geolocation system showed that two armoured cash-in-transit vehicles carrying cash to Ukraine via Hungary had suddenly changed their route, headed towards Budapest, and stopped on the territory of the country’s Counterterrorism Centre. Phone calls to the employees went unanswered.

At the same time, the Hungarian authorities were ignoring the urgent enquiries being made by Ukrainian diplomats. This left little doubt that it was a special operation. On the night of 5-6 March, Kyiv issued a statement on the seizure of the money and Ukrainian hostages by the Hungarian state.

The diplomatic pressure was kept up for a day. Then, without officially informing Ukraine, the Hungarians brought the detained Ukrainians as far as the border, informed them that they were banned from entering the EU for three years, and expelled them from the country.

Later, details of their detention became known that shocked Ukraine.

The two armoured vehicles, which had been regularly transporting cash to Ukraine in recent years under an official contract from Raiffeisen Bank International in Austria, had been travelling along their usual route, of which the Hungarian side had been informed.

During a scheduled stop at a petrol station on the Budapest ring road, the Ukrainians – who, in line with international rules, were unarmed – were attacked by armed representatives of a Hungarian special service. According to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, the special forces even had grenade launchers and machine guns.

Even more shocking were the details of the bank employees’ detention. They were kept in handcuffs for more than a day, and for much of that time they were blindfolded (according to some reports, ski masks were put on them back-to-front and pressed tightly down on their eyes). One of the detainees lost consciousness. Such detention conditions are considered equivalent to torture.

While breaking into the armoured vehicles, the Hungarian "counter-terrorist" officers also told at least two of the Ukrainians that they would never see Ukraine again and would remain in prison in Hungary.

Finally, the Ukrainians were also robbed. Their phones, money and other personal belongings were not returned to them when they were deported.

The Russian hallmark in Orbán’s special operation

However, no official charges were brought against the Ukrainians. They were interrogated as "witnesses" to an unclear crime. The questioning, contrary to the rules, was conducted not in Ukrainian but in Russian, and the Ukrainians were required to answer in Russian.

European Pravda sources say that one of the "Hungarians" who conducted the interrogation spoke Russian like a native speaker. This is not conclusive proof that he was Russian, but the possibility cannot be ruled out.

There are in fact several reasons to believe that Russians were involved in the special operation.

Orbán’s party election headquarters is known to be working with political strategists from Moscow, who arrived in Hungary under diplomatic cover. They are members of a Kremlin team that specialises in interfering in foreign elections, led by Sergey Kiriyenko, deputy head of Vladimir Putin’s presidential administration.

Until recently, this team had been working in Moldova, where, among other things, they built a network of bots to influence online discussions.

Tellingly, Hungarian-language posts promoting narratives favourable to Orbán about the seizure of the cash-in-transit vehicles suddenly received thousands of likes from users listing their place of residence as Moldova. The "bot farm" had simply been moved from Moldova to Hungary, saving the effort of creating new identities for the accounts. This anomaly was spotted by Hungarian fact-checkers, and the Russians will likely rectify this error.

But European Pravda sources believe Russia’s involvement is not limited to the internet.

It’s widely thought that it was the Russians who pointed the Hungarians to that particular convoy, which included Hennadii Kuznetsov, a former top official of the Security Service of Ukraine now working in Oschadbank’s security service. His name was reported in Russian sources while the detained Ukrainians were still behind bars and their names had not yet been made public.

Nevertheless, it is the Hungarian government that bears responsibility for this operation.

There is no doubt that it was personally approved by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Interestingly, only half a day before the attack on the Ukrainian convoy, Orbán personally visited the counterterrorism centre that would later seize the armoured vehicles.

This visit provided political approval to the officers, who understood that attacking armoured cash-in-transit vehicles with flashing lights and breaking into bank safes was clearly illegal.

Why did Orbán need to do this?

What is the objective of such a blatant and obvious violation of all the rules? What does Orbán stand to gain? Is all of this really just to blackmail Ukraine into reopening the oil pipeline?

The true purpose of the special operation is political. On 12 April, elections are set to be held that could result in a change of government in Hungary.

Media outlets loyal to the government have claimed that the seized money may have been intended to bankroll opposition leader Péter Magyar and his Tisza party.

There is no evidence to support these accusations, and there are documents that actually contradict them. Nevertheless, the Hungarian parliament urgently passed a law stipulating that the state has the right to confiscate the money and valuables from the two specific Ukrainian vehicles and must hold them for at least 60 days while checking whether the funds were intended to finance the Hungarian opposition.

This has to be the first time in history that a law was passed purely for two specific vehicles.

Why is this so important for Orbán? The explanation is simple: financing a political party from abroad is considered an extremely serious violation of electoral law – one that could even potentially lead to a party being removed from the election race.

Despite being unsubstantiated, this accusation quickly became a central element of Orbán’s propaganda campaign. Efforts to promote this narrative are reportedly being assisted by a Kremlin team, whose activities have been confirmed by the Financial Times.

It is unlikely that these accusations will ever reach a court. The chances of proving this claim are virtually zero, even within Hungary’s judicial system. But in information warfare, just making the accusation is often enough.

Europe’s silence and Ukraine’s response

When European Pravda asked Volodymyr Zelenskyy about his expectations of Ukraine’s Western partners in this situation, he responded: "I have spoken with many of them about this, and I will repeat publicly what I said to them: today Europe needs to do one thing – not remain silent."

Yet silent the EU has remained.

The European Commission and other EU bodies have no direct leverage over the intelligence services of member states. Under European law, this area falls under exclusive national competence.

However, in his attack on Ukraine, Orbán has gone so far that the EU now has grounds to intervene. Kyiv has even suggested how this could be done.

On Monday, Andrii Pyshnyy, head of the National Bank of Ukraine, sent official letters to several European leaders: his Austrian counterpart Martin Kocher; Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank; Kaja Kallas, the EU’s top diplomat; and John Berrigan, the European Commission’s Director‑General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union. European Pravda has seen copies of these documents.

In the letters, Pyshnyy warns the Europeans that their inaction and silence, in a situation where a member state is effectively supporting banditry by its own special services, could have dramatic consequences for the entire EU.

"We cannot allow EU space to be turned into a feudal medieval Europe," he writes.

In his letter to Lagarde, Pyshnyy also notes that such blatant violations create additional reputational risks for the development of the EU’s single market and may complicate plans to strengthen the euro.

Writing to the European Commission, he asks it to act as an independent third party to clarify all the circumstances of the incident objectively and impartially, and guarantees that Ukraine will provide all necessary information. He also stresses that "the institutional capacity and reputation of the entire EU" is at stake.

The letter also states:

"Such gross violations of established practices of international cooperation in the banking sector are essentially a politically motivated manipulation of EU anti-money-laundering rules. This directly creates additional reputational risks for the development of the EU’s single market and undermines trust in European compliance procedures."

Despite Kyiv’s arguments, Brussels has not found the courage to act.

The European Commission merely confirmed that it had received the letter from the head of the National Bank of Ukraine. When European Pravda contacted the press service of the European Central Bank, it took some time to consider its response, later replying briefly: "We have no comment to make on this for now, and we will get back to you when we have more updates on this matter."

This hesitation on the part of EU institutions may be connected to the fact that Brussels had previously decided to suspend all criticism of Orbán until the elections so as not to fuel the anti-European propaganda of Hungary’s ruling party.

But Hungary’s actions have now crossed a line. The EU should respond.

Regardless of what the EU does, Ukraine is preparing for a legal battle. Kyiv will challenge the clearly illegal actions of the Hungarian authorities regarding the detained Ukrainians. It is almost certain that we will see a lawsuit brought by the Ukrainian state or the state-owned Oschadbank in European courts.

It can also be said with certainty that Orbán won’t be returning the $80 million seized by the Hungarian authorities before election day, because doing so would mean admitting that Hungary’s actions were unfounded.

For now, the Hungarian regime, together with its Russian consultants, is going all in. By attacking armoured bank vehicles, Orbán has demonstrated that he is willing to cross unprecedented lines.

We may yet see new red lines crossed before the elections – lines that still seem untouchable today.

Sergiy Sydorenko

Editor, European Pravda

Tetiana Vysotska

European Pravda correspondent in Brussels

The new Dutch government may lack stability due to its insufficient votes within the coalition, but it certainly does not lack an understanding of Ukraine’s significance for the future of Europe. That is why the new prime minister chose to visit Ukraine on 8 March as his first trip outside the European Union and only his second foreign visit overall – the first was to the EU capital, Brussels.

Before leaving Kyiv, Prime Minister Jetten agreed to give an interview to European Pravda.

Mr Jetten, this is your second foreign visit as prime minister – the first one was to Brussels. Why did you choose Ukraine? And what can Ukraine expect with you as prime minister?

Well, first of all, I'm very happy to be here because Ukraine has suffered so much over the past few years, fighting for the freedom of all Ukrainian people, but also fighting for European values.

For me as the new prime minister, it's super important to underline to all Dutch voters that we will continue to support this country, that we stand ready to increase cooperation, both military and non-military, but also that the Netherlands can play a vital role in the justice that needs to take place as soon as this war is finished.

By talking not only to the president and the prime minister but also to many Ukrainians today, I can bring back the stories, the suffering, and the heroism of the Ukrainian people to hopefully also inspire people in my country and help them understand why we will continue to support you.

Prime Minister, since you referred to justice, let me focus on that. Let me be frank: the Netherlands is also perceived as a country that is slowing down the creation of the Special Tribunal [for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine]. We have heard statements that it might not be established until after 2028, which Ukraine considers unacceptable because it is too far off. Do you anticipate that this might happen under your leadership?

At the moment, I'm very glad that the advance party is on the way, diving into the details to establish the tribunal. It is of utmost importance that we speed up the process.

This is also what I discussed today with President Zelenskyy: what the Netherlands can do to make sure that we continue to progress on this very important topic. I just had a very long and intense conversation with former prisoners of war and abducted children who are luckily now back in Ukraine. It's their stories and their suffering that underline the importance of bringing to justice all those war criminals who were responsible for it.

Do you anticipate that the tribunal could start working this year, or maybe in 2027?

For this year, it's important that we fill in more details about how the tribunal could work, what could be a good location in the Netherlands, and also to make sure that other parties in the Council of Europe will be part of it so that we can start the work as soon as possible.

During the interview. Photo by the Embassy of the Netherlands in Ukraine

We've heard today that you want to see Ukraine in the EU. Do you think it is possible for that to happen while you are in office?

Well, I hope to be in office for four years, and maybe even more, but you never know in Dutch politics!

But I think what is important is that the future of Ukraine is in Europe.

The reforms that the Ukrainian government has implemented over the past few years were very important steps, but there is more work to be done.

If Ukraine continues on the path of reforms, then the European Union can also continue on a path toward Ukrainian membership of the EU.

What we stated in our coalition agreement is that this is also part of the new geopolitical world order. Europe needs to think about what the European family should look like.

From the perspective of my government, it's an EU with Ukraine, but it needs to go hand in hand with the necessary reforms to make sure that all European member states will be able to accept Ukrainian membership.

Do you think the current enlargement methodology needs to be changed significantly? For instance, would you support a model in which Ukraine becomes a political member first and gains full membership benefits later?

The Netherlands has for a long time been a very strong advocate for modernisation of almost everything within the EU – accession, but also the European budget, European agricultural policies, and many other topics.

On many topics, Europeans need to be less naive and understand that if we want a stronger continent that delivers more for our people, we have to do a better job in a modernised EU.

In terms of Ukrainian accession, I think we should also be careful. To prevent a lot of disappointments in the years to come, we shouldn't promise things that we are not able to deliver.

So I would see a step-by-step approach. If we increase support for Ukraine in terms of all the reforms that need to take place, I'm sure Ukraine can speed up its side of the process.

But do you understand that Russia will do everything possible to prevent Ukraine from joining the EU unless some political steps are done differently than they are now?

Yes, and that's why we've stated that we have to look at the European family also from a geopolitical point of view – not only regarding Ukraine, but also other countries that would love to be part of the European family.

If we do not increase our cooperation and if we don't provide a clear path to EU membership, it's not only Russia but also other countries that will try to influence the process and destabilise the European continent.

So that is something we need to keep in mind during all these negotiations.

As a Ukrainian who spent three years in the Netherlands as a refugee, I want to ask you: what is going to happen to Ukrainians after 2027? What will their status be, and what will happen to those who are living in temporary centres?

That's a very good question, and it's also one of the top priorities for our new minister for migration to have in-depth talks with European partners to clarify in time for Ukrainian refugees in Europe how we can provide them with the right shelter, education, work rights, and so on.

Hopefully during this year we can provide clearer answers on that as soon as we've progressed in the negotiation process.

How can Dutch businesses be sure that Ukraine is safe enough to invest? We don't know whether all territories will be de-occupied. Some might remain occupied, and the Russian threat will still remain. What reasons are there for Dutch businesses to invest in Ukraine?

I had a very interesting conversation on this topic with the prime minister today, and I'm convinced that we can create much more business-to-business cooperation between the Netherlands and Ukraine – not only in the defence industry, but also in the energy sector and many others.

I will ask the minister for foreign trade to come up with a clear plan to make sure that Dutch businesses are willing to do more here in Ukraine, also in the short term.

During the war?

Yes, both during and after.

Daria Meshcheriakova and Sergiy Sydorenko

European Pravda

Waiting for news from the war means living in a state of consistent hope and despair. Day after day. For months and even years.

Despite the scale of the problem, many women remain alone with their pain. Society expects them to be "resilient" rather than to speak about psychological exhaustion. Ambiguous loss is still not widely recognized as a complex trauma, neither in public discourse nor within support systems.

To shed light on the experience of women living with ambiguous loss, the Future for Ukraine charitable foundation, in collaboration with the Luminance Production, created a short social video titled "Ambiguous Loss Is Trauma". The film premiered on YouTube.

The video portrays women of different generations waiting for someone dear to them. A phone that doesn't ring. News with no given answers. Emotional rollercoaster – from faith to a total exhaustion.

"Ambiguous loss is a silent, invisible trauma. It has no date and no ending. Yet it can be just as devastating as a confirmed bereavement. We speak it aloud because silence only deepens isolation for these women. We want the international community to understand that war does not unfold only on the front lines – it continues in homes, in daily waiting, and in the minds of those living between hope and fear," says Olena Nikolaienko, president of Future for Ukraine (USA) and Head of International Fundraising.

Knowledge about the trauma of ambiguous loss helps dismantle stigma and opens the path to professional support.

"There is a widespread belief that this kind of pain cannot be helped. Women often perceive their condition as simply ‘waiting,’ rather than as psychological trauma, but prolonged uncertainty exhausts both body and mind. We often observe somatic symptoms, chronic tension, and emotional burnout. In therapy, we first address these external manifestations and then help women rebuild their internal strength," explains Natalia Prysiazhniuk, psychotherapist of the GIDNA project that provides free psychological support to women suffering the war consequences. 

According to Anna Hrubaia, Head of the GIDNA project, nearly 70 women have already received qualified psychological assistance, specifically at ambiguous loss direction.

Women seeking free professional support can submit an application through the project’s website.

The material is produced by CF "Future for Ukraine" with the support of the Askold and Dir Fund as a part of the Strong Civil Society of Ukraine – a Driver towards Reforms and Democracy project, implemented by ISAR Ednannia, funded by Norway and Sweden. 

The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of CF "Future for Ukraine" and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Government of Norway, the Government of Sweden, and ISAR Ednannia.

Watch the video "Ambiguous Loss Is Trauma" on YouTube:

Although the enlargement portfolio (and Kos’s remit) covers ten countries, four of which are considered frontrunners, Ukraine carries particular weight. The commissioner does not deny this. In our interview, she referred to Ukraine several times as "my candidate country".

We met on 24 February, shortly before the end of her visit to Kyiv on the anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion against Ukraine.

The main topic of our conversation was obvious: the European Commission’s initiative on new rules for the accession of candidate states to the EU. The drafting is in its final stage, Kos said. We also discussed the accession negotiations that are already underway with Ukraine; the slowdown of reforms; the consequences of the events of July 2025; and whether joining the EU is possible with occupied territories and a war on.

"We live in times when there is no international order anymore"

Marta, I’m glad to see you again in Kyiv. How many times have you been to Ukraine now?

As a Commissioner, I am here for the fifth time, but I'd been to Ukraine before.

It is a special visit, I would say, because last year when I was here for the third anniversary, I thought that I would never come back for the anniversaries of the start of the war during wartime. But it’s happened again.

Today, when I was standing on the Maidan, I was very emotional, because I can explain many things rationally or also emotionally, but I can't explain how Russians can deliberately kill people of Ukraine because they wanted to go their own way.

And I asked myself: what did we do wrong in Europe in the past that war has come back?

What is your answer to that question?

My answer is that there is so much of the animal instinct in people around the world that it brings out the worst in them. This answer is emotional, not rational.

That's why I'm so happy to be your commissioner.

Because we are fighting Putin’s system. Putin wants to subordinate everybody around him, prevent everyone from being economically developed and having a democracy.

This means that Ukraine is on the right path. And what you are doing doesn't only have to do with Ukraine – it has to do with protecting values on a broader scale. European values! That's why I support Ukraine on its path to the EU.

Recently, in Munich, you said that the EU needs to reconsider its approach to admitting new members. That triggered a very broad reaction in Ukraine.

Thank you for bringing this information to your citizens.

Yes, indeed, the methodology we are using today is made for a world which doesn't exist anymore. It is made for a world where we have peace, when there is enough time for the reforms and alignment with the European legal order.

But today we live in times when there is no international order anymore.

We live in times where the big superpowers like the US, China and Russia are working based on spheres of influence. We are living in times where for the first time in the enlargement processes, we have adversaries from the outside who would like to see not just our candidates like Ukraine to fail, but also the EU.

That's why we are already working on different possibilities regarding how to align the methodology with the challenges we are confronted with today. When I say that we don't have time, it is not just that Ukraine doesn’t have 10 years to negotiate. It is also about us.

So our task now is first to present the options, possible scenarios, and then to discuss with the member states what we can do.

We have already heard many ideas from different European leaders on how we should do this, but the Commission is now preparing the draft. We are in the end phase of drafting possible scenarios, and then we will discuss them with the member states.

We are preparing for the discussion with the member states on the changes in enlargement, because the European Commission cannot do this by itself. We need EU-27 support.

"Change or die!"

Will this project be ready in a month or so, or in a few months?

Several months, of course. Yes, this is a debate. But this is about the future of Europe.

It is a clear task: we have to be good at presenting why we think that one scenario is better than the other.

Is there an understanding within the EU that embarking on a revision of the EU’s fundamental treaties is not an option, because that would make it impossible to move quickly?

We can do a lot without changing the treaty. I agree with you completely. It would be very difficult to change the treaty now. But we can do quite a lot without changing it.

There are some possibilities which we haven't used in the past but could use in the future.

It is also important to stress that Ukraine has not stopped the accession process. The technical process is going on. As one could read in your article, we have benchmarks, which are set by the member states…

Did you have a chance to read that article?

Of course I did! Of course.

And with that list it's clear what Ukraine has to do, especially on the field of rule of law and on the 10 points which I agreed with [Ukraine’s] Deputy Prime Minister [for European Integration] Taras Kaсhka in Lviv at the end of last year.

These are the priorities where we'll be very strict that the reforms should be done.

As I understand it, we are talking about fast-track accession to the EU. Will it be possible to set a date for Ukraine’s accession?

I don't know if it would be a fast-track accession. We have to agree with the member states on how we do this.

But what I know, and this will be really the position of the European Commission, is that full membership is possible only with the full-scale reforms that need to be done by Ukraine.

That's why I also cannot speak about the date. But of course, you know, personally I would say as soon as possible, when Ukraine fulfils the criteria.

Could there perhaps be another stage besides full membership?

We will see. We have to see how the discussion with the member states will go.

I'm pushing my team all the time. I believe we have to be innovative, that we have to think outside the box in times when there is no box.

And we cannot just stay the same.

"Change or die!"

That is what our president [Ursula von der Leyen] once said, in the sense that we also have to accommodate new challenges at a time when we as the European Union are attacked, not just from the East, but also from the West.

"We cannot do enlargement against the will of the citizens"

I want to return to the events of July last year, when there was a setback in reforms in Ukraine. At the time, many said that trust in Ukraine within the EU had been undermined. Can we say that this is in the past now?

No, not at all. This will stay forever.

Let me share my own experience. When I was told by members of my cabinet what had happened, at first I really couldn't believe it. And the first question was: why is Ukraine doing this? You know I thought: they really have to know that they will have to reverse everything, otherwise they will never be able to attain EU membership.

So yes, it was about trust. You are right.

You can change the laws however many times you want, but you can’t bring trust back overnight.

I got so many phone calls – from international financial institutions, representatives of the member states, from inside the European Commission where 1,000 people are working, not just from my service, for the Ukrainian integration process. And they all wanted to know why.

Once trust is not fully there anymore, then whatever your partner is doing, you put a little question mark: is this okay? Why are they doing this?

If you trust somebody, you can accept even a very difficult decision. But as soon as you don't trust 100%, you start questioning, even in areas where usually you would not pay special attention.

So do you still have questions?

Sometimes, yes.

But what gives me trust is your civil society.

When I saw that you, citizens of Ukraine, went out demonstrating against your government…

During martial law.

During martial law. And you know, I was waiting to get news of a Russian drone attack [on the protesters]. How much courage you have to do something like this! But I know that this was not the first time in Ukraine. It started in 2014 on the Maidan, when you demanded that your government, your politicians, do the right thing.

That's why I'm more relaxed, because I know that civil society is really playing an important role in Ukraine.

And, for instance, I know now there is a survey out that 72% of Ukrainians support EU membership, and when they were asked about the benefits, the answer about fighting corruption is very high, as well as the possibility of prosperity.

This is the society I want to see in every candidate country. You're ready to fight.

And 72% is not even that high – we have had higher figures. And the rest are not against EU membership: mostly, people simply do not believe that accession is possible.

You have made a very important point.

I would be surprised if it was 100%, like in the old communist times. You lived there – I lived there, too. But of course I was also asking myself – and thank you for this answer – what is the rest? What is the rest of the people, the other 28%?

You said some people perhaps don't believe in it. Probably there are some in Ukraine who would still love to go with Russia – I don’t know.

Even if it's very few, almost zero, this is a challenge for your politicians, but also for us. And I will explain to you why this is so important.

Whatever we do, we cannot do the enlargement process against the will of the citizens. And this is where I see another very important task. This is actually what my team and the whole European Commission are explaining to the member states, to our European citizens: why integrating Ukraine into the EU is so important.

"Elections must be free and fair because this is the basis of every democracy"

Ukraine is currently under martial law, which limits democracy. These restrictions are established by law, but they still don’t seem to be compatible with the EU.

I think everybody understands that there are some restrictions under martial law. But I always stress that these restrictions must be justified and proportional.

It should not mean that you cut off all human rights. Or that you cut all power balances, so that, for example, the parliament has no power anymore and the government does everything. This is what we really handle with care.

Every candidate country has to prepare a roadmap for the functioning of democratic institutions. It requires that you have a division of powers, that parliament is really working, that it works in a transparent way, that parliament – not the government – is the one that passes most of the laws, with transparency.

Do you expect elections in Ukraine in the near future?

Ukraine will decide this by itself.

What I expect is that those elections will be free and fair, because this is the basis of every democracy, meaning that people will be able to decide how they want to vote.

Under the new possible enlargement scheme, could Ukraine join the EU during an active war? Putin could keep the war going for years. Would that mean he effectively has a veto over Ukraine’s membership?

No, Putin will never have a veto on the future of Ukraine. He is making your life really hard. But there is one thing where Putin has zero to say, and that is your EU membership.

Yes, we could have more difficulties, because one part of your territory is occupied and it is unlawfully part of the constitutional order of Russia. But we have great capabilities inside the European Union to find a working solution, when it is necessary, to the most impossible challenges.

We have already granted Ukraine candidate status knowing what is happening with one part of the country – especially because we knew what is happening with part of the country.

We think that it is a necessity that you become a member of the European Union, because nobody can deprive you and your people the right to decide about their own future. Ukrainian citizens in the occupied territories didn't have this chance.

"These 10 points are what is really important"

It was announced in Lviv last December that Ukraine is beginning "frontloading" [a kind of hybrid accession negotiation process bypassing Orbán]. Has this process developed further? Some things are already known – the article you referred to mentions that the EU has provided us with accession criteria. Is there anything else?

I would never have thought about this wording – hybrid negotiation – but let me be clear. First, it is not a hybrid, it is real. And second, it is not actually negotiations, it's the adoption of EU law.

What we are doing now – frontloading – is because we don't need Orbán to tell you what you need to do to become a member. And you don't need Orbán to tell you what you will be doing.

This is a process between us. Based on what was decided in Lviv, we had explanatory meetings with your teams from Ukraine to go through all the benchmarks for the frontloaded clusters, to ensure that Ukraine understands what each and every benchmark means.

And now, the homework has to be done.

There will be an assessment by the EU.

Yes. And we are doing this in the enlargement report, where we go through all the clusters, we do the assessment of how far a country has come in the accession process. It will be published in November this year, and we started last week.

We know exactly for every step what our candidates are doing on the specific benchmarks, what needs to be done on the specific reforms or areas.

In Lviv, you also adopted a reform plan in the areas of anti-corruption and the rule of law, known as the "Kachka-Kos 10-point plan". What is the status of this document?

One of the reasons why we adopted this 10-point plan is to rebuild trust with the member states because of what happened on 22 July.

The 10 points mostly have to do with fighting corruption. This is for the orientation for your government, but also for us.

Sometimes the amount of what needs to be done is so huge that you don't see the big picture in the sense of what is now the most important. But these 10 points are what is really important. We expect that Ukraine will fulfil them.

Within this year?

This is what we agreed in the paper.

Have you heard that Ukrainian think tanks are now preparing to monitor the implementation of this plan?

Yes, of course. I met some of them in Kyiv to get a better picture – to have a view through some other glasses, not just our own, those living in the Brussels bubble.

"Up until now, you have been very quick. Now it has slowed down"

Will Ukraine and Moldova remain coupled on their path to the EU? There have been several attempts to separate us.

You started together. You were granted candidate status together. The so-called frontloading started together, and for the rest of the three clusters it will hopefully happen soon under the Cypriot presidency.

Yes, you are together.

But we will see what time will bring when you have to start delivering the reforms. As you know, EU accession is a merit-based process, and that means that if you deliver with the same speed as Moldova, you will stay together. If not, then your ways will separate.

Under the new enlargement methodology, are we also supposed to move forward together?

We will discuss this with the member states, but in my personal opinion we have, as I always say, four frontrunners, which are Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine and Moldova.

And they are supposed to remain together, as I understand it.

Montenegro and Albania are much further ahead in the accession process than Ukraine. You are a bit further back – but no worries, you can also run fast.

What are our current reform speeds? Some in Ukraine say we are moving quite fast. Others disagree. What is your view on this?

Until now, you have been very quick. We've had the fastest screening process, frontloading…

But I'm worried that because of the situation in the Rada [Ukrainian parliament], the processes could slow down. And this shouldn't happen. I have met the Speaker and a delegation of the Rada. I meet them all the time. And my message is very, very clear: the accession process or your future membership is not a project of the government. It is a project of the whole nation.

In the Rada we have the representatives of the whole nation. They have to do what the people want. But I would like to see unity in making the reforms or adopting the reforms also in the future. Up to now, you've been great.

It's not a tragedy if it's postponed for a few months, but if you have more and more delays, then we will have to react.

But it is possible to catch up?

Yes!

Once again, you have done a lot. If I compare what Ukraine is doing with the Western Balkan countries – I don’t want to do this, but just to give you hope that it is possible – you are doing so much better than they are in these reforms! And you are at war, your people are dying, families are without fathers and mothers and grandfathers and grandmothers, and with all of this, you deliver.

They are not at war. They've been at war, it's also not that easy.

But you are delivering. So there is hope.

And once again, I would like to stress that there is no accession process without hiccups. Sometimes it goes a bit faster, then it goes a bit slower. But it is also the responsibility of me and my team to help you, since you are a candidate. I have the huge responsibility – I’m getting emotional now – of taking care of you, taking care of my candidate country, Ukraine, to be ready to become a member of the EU.

So, yes, there are hiccups, but we are there with my whole team and the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen.

When my country [Slovenia] became a member of the EU, we saw the accession process mostly through economic glasses – how much money we would get, how much our GDP would increase and so on. But there are three or four main areas or answers as to why the European Union was established decades back.

It’s about peace, it’s about freedom, it’s about prosperity and security. But we only thought about prosperity!

Because of Ukrainians, now we know what it means not to live in peace. Because of you, we know again what it means not to live in freedom. Because of you, we know that we have to take more care of our own security – with your help.

Sergiy Sydorenko

Editor, European Pravda

This phrase has long become commonplace. In practice, however, many interpret it differently.

The official statements of the Ukrainian leadership on this matter have been quite consistent. The word "justice" means, in particular, that crimes – including the most serious ones – cannot remain unpunished, that there must be compensation for those affected, and those responsible must face verdicts for unlawful aggression – including the highest leadership of the Russian Federation.

However, several Western leaders and capitals are consciously stalling this process.

Yes, this is a serious accusation, but one that is supported by substantial evidence.

Moreover, among those acting disgracefully in this matter, are undisputed friends of Ukraine – those who are among the key providers of assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, whose support is one of the main factors keeping Ukraine economically afloat.

Some, such as the Netherlands, are openly delaying the establishment of the tribunal. The Hague has stated its intention to extend over several years processes that itself has previously completed much faster. It is doing this even publicly – for example, at this week’s Justice Conference forum in Kyiv. Privately, according to European Pravda’s sources, The Hague has been pushing for an unrealistically high budget for establishing the tribunal by including tasks whose necessity is doubtful.

Other leading countries are using the financial uncertainty as an excuse to leave everything in limbo. The Council of Europe – the very institution that took on the job of creating the tribunal – claims that "it has done all it could."

Ukraine, for its part, is insisting rather strongly that any compromise on accountability for the aggressor is unacceptable, and fortunately we are not alone in this position. In particular, the EU institutions are on Kyiv’s side.

The tribunal of broken promises

First, a very brief overview of the current stage of this story.

International lawyers began discussing the idea of creating a special tribunal for the crime of aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine as early as spring 2022.

From the very start of the full-scale war, the global community became convinced that Russia’s attack on Ukraine is a grave violation of international law deserving of punishment – but the existing international law contains no provisions or mechanisms for an investigation that would legally prove the guilt of Russian leaders and bring them to account.

As a result, the leadership of a state that is a permanent member of the UN Security Council could act with impunity and not everyone was comfortable with this precedent.

The discussions on creating the special tribunal were not simple, but in spring 2025 a compromise was finally reached.

On 9 May, at a ceremonial meeting in Lviv, representatives of a few dozen countries made a decision to create a "new Nuremberg Tribunal" (European Pravda reported on the details of this arrangement). At the end of June, President Zelenskyy in Strasbourg signed an agreement with the Council of Europe (CoE) on establishing a tribunal for the crime of aggression (we explained the legal implications of this agreement here).

At that time, it seemed that the grinding wheels of international law had started turning and would soon be ready to break Russian immunity. Very optimistic assessments were voiced then. Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset said in an interview with European Pravda that by the end of 2025 several more stages would be completed. He asserted that by then a multilateral agreement with all the other participating states in the tribunal would have to be signed, and even suggested the possibility that the tribunal itself could actually start investigating the actions of Russia’s leadership.

"Our ambition is to create the tribunal this year," said the Secretary General. However, 2025 is already long over.

Now the CoE Secretary General is trying not to recall his own promises and denies the responsibility of the organisation. "The Council of Europe has done its part; now it’s up to the politicians," he said during a recent visit to Kyiv. Berset gave a similar explanation this week in his online speech at the Justice Conference.

But his statements are not entirely sincere.

In reality, the next legal and political steps must be taken by a CoE body – the Committee of Ministers (CoM), which is currently avoiding decisions. The CoM was supposed to approve the draft multilateral agreement establishing the special tribunal. Then the Council of Europe was to convene a diplomatic conference for its signing by the states that support punishing the aggressor. All of this was supposed to happen in 2025, but to this day it is unknown when the Council of Europe will even take the first step.

Therefore, Alain Berset is now trying to publicly distance himself from this delay, saying that he supposedly does not influence the positions of the member states. Those states also insist that they are not against the tribunal and, supposedly, just need more time. And as many have noted, this excuse from the capitals sounds maximally insincere.

The price of Russian impunity

The Netherlands have a particularly important role in the creation of the future special tribunal.

Back in 2023, in the early stage of negotiations on the tribunal, participants in this process agreed that the new judicial body would operate in The Hague, as then reported by European Pravda.

There were many arguments in favour of creating a "Tribunal for Putin" specifically in The Hague. There is the symbolism (The Hague is effectively the capital of international justice), and practical considerations (for example, the ability to use the staff and facilities of other international courts). After all, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), where Slobodan Milošević and other war criminals of the Balkan wars were tried, has now ceased its operations, but its facilities remain.

According to European Pravda’s information, the Dutch government team was initially not thrilled at the prospect that their country would become the venue where Putin would likely be tried – but they did not oppose it, so everyone considered the matter settled. In fact, the idea of locating the as-yet unestablished court in The Hague began to be included in political statements and documents.

The Dutch also signalled that they took the idea seriously. The government created a position of "Special Envoy for the Special Tribunal," to which they appointed an experienced diplomat Arjen Uijterlinde.

This week he arrived in Kyiv.

There, the special envoy suddenly began hinting that the question of holding the tribunal in The Hague has not yet been decided.

According to him, The Hague is ready to host the tribunal only under certain conditions, primarily financial. And these conditions have not been met.

"We have been saying constantly since the negotiations that the Netherlands is ready to host the tribunal, but only if certain conditions are met," he declared in his address. Among these conditions, the diplomat listed "the presence of wide international political and financial support" and "sufficient financial coverage and backing from other states to ensure that the Netherlands can fulfil this task."

And the sums involved are truly hefty.

The Hague has presented partners with funding proposals that far exceeded expectations – both in total cost and in scope. For example, the government proposes that the partners finance the construction of a brand-new, ultra-secure detention facility for the detainees. Its cost, according to sources, has been estimated in the Netherlands at €70 million (!). And that is in addition to an annual budget estimated in the tens of millions of euros per year.

If you hadn’t heard these numbers – don’t be surprised. In The Hague and in Strasbourg they decided not to disclose them publicly. But it was enough to halt the process – because other countries said they were not willing to pay so much. Notably, the four largest contributors to the CoE budget – Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy – were not prepared to do so.

But instead of convincing the Dutch to lower their demands, the partners began dragging out the process. Allegedly, "without a budget we cannot ratify the documents." The dialogue continues, but very, very slowly – for example, Uijterlinde says that it will be only "in a few months" before he goes to Strasbourg to discuss this.

It is quite obvious, though, that the costs declared by The Hague are excessive.

"They say that for the possible detention of Russia’s leadership the facility must have extraordinary security. And this is supposed to delay the creation of the tribunal, seriously?! And this after we have already agreed that the key proceedings would be in absentia (i.e. with the accused not present)?" – such outbursts of indignation by one of European Pravda’s interlocutors involved in the tribunal’s creation have been heard repeatedly these days, including in the sidelines of the Justice Conference.

The consensus was the conviction that this was a deliberate, artificial stalling.

And while Ukrainians spoke about it only in informal conversations, Western politicians allowed themselves more openness on the matter.

"As we see, the Netherlands themselves do not really understand how much the tribunal will cost, and this has become a sort of pretext, an artificial explanation for European and other participants to say: ‘We cannot join because we cannot make financial commitments until we understand how much it costs,’" explained Estonian MP Eerik-Niiles Kross (the CoE Parliamentary Assembly’s rapporteur on the Special Tribunal) who spoke after Uijterlinde. However, the Dutch representative did little to hide that his government is in no hurry to launch a court for Russia’s leadership.

Not to refuse, but to stall

While disputes over funding (and whether the process is being stalled jointly by The Hague and key European capitals) had already been discussed privately, another statement by the Netherlands government’s special envoy appears to have introduced a new twist.

"We aim to see the formation of the skeleton of the tribunal in the Netherlands in the first half of 2028," Uijterlinde said. He did not make any further predictions, but if it takes until 2028 to form just the basic structure of the future court, then one can logically expect that full operation and formal charges will come even later.

Uijterlinde also assured that these timelines were based on the experience of other tribunals. But this is plainly untrue.

For example, the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia – often simply called "the Hague Tribunal" in Ukraine – was decided to be created in February 1993 by the international community, when the UN Security Council adopted a substantive resolution to that effect (an event analogous to the agreement that Ukraine and the CoE signed in June 2025). But within three months a substantive agreement was approved (a step that the Council of Europe now does not dare to take), by the end of 1993 the entire court structure had been built and its rules adopted, and in 1994 the tribunal delivered its first verdict.

Moreover, it is believed that organising the tribunal for Yugoslavia was particularly challenging, because it was the first international criminal special court since Nuremberg.

The special tribunal on Russian aggression does have precedent to draw on – but we are now being told that instead of the 10 months it took to fully launch the tribunal in 1993, now just assembling the basic team for the court will take three years (from June 2025 to 2028).

It is hard to see this as anything other than a deliberate stalling of the process.

And, it bears repeating, the question here is not only about the Netherlands.

The key members of the Council of Europe (from Germany to Italy and beyond) who tolerate and support the delay also share responsibility for the fact that the process of bringing Russia’s leaders to justice is being postponed.

Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset – who is trying to wash his hands of it and shift the responsibility onto vague "politicians" instead of pushing the process publicly at every opportunity – by doing this he only proves that this scenario is comfortable for him as well.

What is the real reason behind their joint actions aimed at delaying the process?

There is no proven answer, but in the sidelines of the Kyiv conference the most common idea heard was about the connection with the peace process. "We understand that this is what they are ready to sacrifice in negotiations with Putin first of all – so it’s better if the tribunal is not created," one of EP’s interlocutors explained as the possible logic.

"No dignified peace without justice"

The phrase highlighted in the subtitle is a quote from President Zelenskyy at a meeting with Secretary General Berset, which he recalled this week while speaking about his visit to Ukraine in early February. Despite the partners’ actions, Kyiv’s position remains unchanged.

At the forum in Kyiv, Ukrainian officials made every effort to convince the partners: no, Ukraine will not give ground on the tribunal issue. Moreover, it seems that sending this message was the main reason why this legal conference was convened in Kyiv on the anniversary of the full-scale invasion.

"Such wars either end with a just verdict, or the war inevitably returns again in an even larger and more dangerous form. Peace without accountability is a pause in hostilities, but certainly not a resolution of the problem. Peace without consequences for the aggressor is an invitation to repeat these actions in other parts of the world and a model for other authoritarian regimes," the new head of the President’s Office, Kyrylo Budanov, convinced the foreign participants.

"There will be no amnesty. International criminals have no right to amnesty," Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha echoed him.

Furthermore, first Sybiha, and then the [First] Deputy Head of the President’s Office, Serhii Kyslytsia, each in turn assured participants that Ukraine had already rejected such a scenario in trilateral negotiations with the Russians. "One of the reasons why the so-called 28-point peace plan was transformed into 20 points is that the Ukrainian side declared that we would not discuss such a possibility (regarding abandoning holding the Russian leadership to account)," Kyslytsia recounted.

Whether their persuasion was successful is unknown. But it is also worth noting that Ukraine has like-minded allies on this path. In particular, on 24 February the Nordic and Baltic countries issued a joint leaders’ statement with Ukraine saying that "the Special Tribunal for investigating the crime of aggression against Ukraine is a priority task." "For example, we in Estonia have decided that we will be involved in the process regardless of the price, no matter how much the special tribunal will cost," said Eerik-Niiles Kross.

The European Union as an institution is also on our side. To break the silent blockade in the Council of Europe, the EU has allocated initial funds (€10 million) for preparations to launch the tribunal. But without real political pressure on those countries that make the key decisions, the process will not move from this standstill.

At the moment, two things are of key importance. First – will the insincere and even disgraceful position of the official Hague change after the new Dutch government is appointed? And second – will the slogan that justice, even if with in-absentia verdicts, is an essential part of the post-war settlement be voiced both publicly and privately? So far Kyiv is voicing this, but we need the support of our partners, which is currently lacking.

Sergiy Sydorenko,

Editor, European Pravda